

A HISTORY OF THE GOLD COAST AND ASHANTI

from the earliest times
to the commencement of the
twentieth century

W. WALTON CLARIDGE

with a new introduction by

W. E. F. WARD

VOLUME ONE



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DEDICATED TO
SIR HUGH CLIFFORD, K.C.M.G.
to whose interest and assistance the
publication of this book is mainly due.

INTRODUCTION TO FIRST EDITION

SINCE the manuscript of Dr. Claridge's monumental *History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti* first came into my hands in the summer of 1915, its publication in suitable form has been to me a matter of keen personal interest. It is not often that one of our Crown Colonies has the good fortune to number among the officials serving in it a man who possesses so many of the qualities that go to the making of a really good historian—diligence in research, meticulous accuracy, a capacity for marshalling facts, the nice sense of proportion which allots to each question or incident its full, but no more than its due place in the general picture, a strongly critical habit of mind, and a thorough command of appropriate language. The exercise of all these, together with years of patient but enthusiastic labour, have been devoted to the production of the present work, and Dr. Claridge has thereby rendered to the Colony, with which he has long been connected, a service of conspicuous value.

In the past, too, it has not infrequently happened that when labour of this description has been performed by a servant of Government during his not over-abundant leisure, the result of his toil has been suffered to reach the public either at his own expense, or under the auspices of some learned body, whose imprimatur is apt to have upon the general reader an effect comparable to that which scare-crows are piously supposed to exercise upon the fowls of the air. In the present instance, however, the Government of the Gold Coast has succeeded in saving the author and his work from such unmerited obscurity, though with its characteristic vacillating caution (of

which so many notable instances are to be found recorded in the pages of Dr. Claridge's book) it has been careful to dissociate itself from any implied endorsement of the opinions expressed in these volumes.

It is in every way right that this work—which is now presented to the public under the guarantee of the House of Murray—should be placed in a position to make its appeal to readers in every part of the Empire, for it deserves the attention of all who are interested in the history of the over-seas possessions of Great Britain, of which it forms an unusually striking and instructive chapter. It illustrates with peculiar force the curiously haphazard fashion in which many of our tropical colonies have come into being ; the manner in which so often the Flag has followed trade, rather than trade the Flag ; and the frequency with which extension of control and jurisdiction has been gradually and reluctantly accepted, not as the result of an insatiable appetite for power and dominion, but in the first instance, as the only practicable means whereby peaceful commerce could be assured, and later because a newly awakened sense of responsibility toward the native races forbade continued toleration of savage and barbarous practices. It reveals, among other things, the ugly fact that the path to the establishment of a durable peace in semi-civilised communities is almost invariably paved with the victims of a series of devastating little wars ; and it shows how immeasurably the difficulty of avoiding such happenings is increased by an imperfect understanding of the character, the polity, and the outlook upon life of the peoples with whom, in tropical lands, Great Britain has had to deal.

I have not included an absolutely unbiassed judgment among Dr. Claridge's qualities as an historian ; for, as is the case with most Englishmen who have come into close contact with the Ashantis, the admiration excited by the courage and the many manly and chivalrous characteristics of this warlike people has engendered in him so strong an affection for them that he cannot invariably view all the incidents in their history with complete and dispas-

sionate impartiality. But such bias as he from time to time shows, is a generous bias, and lends to this book, in my opinion, a very special value. It is well that our national actions should be examined as much as possible from the standpoint of those who were affected by them ; and no intelligent reader can rise from the perusal of these pages without being conscious that their author has conveyed to him a deeper and truer appreciation of the peoples of the Gold Coast and Ashanti than has, in the past, been any way common, or without feeling that his sympathy with them has thereby been notably enlarged and quickened.

The records of a Colony, the earliest beginnings of which had their inception in the dark days of the slave-trade, cannot but hold many things that modern Englishmen must recall with mingled shame and horror. The reader will find much to deplore in the public and private acts of many of the white men who, in their time, made history on the Coast ; and some deeds were done which must for ever remain among the most bitter and humiliating memories of every Britisher who loves his country and is jealous of its fair fame. For these Dr. Claridge has done well to offer neither palliation nor excuse. On the other hand, it is at least open to argument that he has occasionally been somewhat harsh in the verdicts which he passes upon the policy of the Government and upon the actions of its servants. The historian is necessarily in the position of one who is wise after the event, but the large bird's-eye view which he is enabled to take was not at the service of any save very exceptional men among those who were the contemporaries of the events which he records. This must be borne in mind, for exceptional men are rare at all times and in all places, and few indeed found their way to the West Coast of Africa. Due allowance, therefore, must be made for the imperfect appreciation, which many public servants showed, of the situations with which they were confronted, and for the bewildering ignorance of the people with whom they were dealing, by which they were so frequently hampered.

To-day most thinking men will readily subscribe to the opinion that the only justification for the presence of Great Britain in West Africa, and for the control which we exercise over its inhabitants, abides in our ability to govern the country in a manner more conducive to the common good and happiness, and with a higher regard to the rights and well-being of the weak and inarticulate masses, than would be possible to the natives themselves if left to their own devices. This theory, however, had not the remotest connection with the objects for the attainment of which the first European settlements were established on the Coast ; and though Englishmen began trading with the natives of the Gold Coast as long ago as 1553, the publication of Dr. Claridge's *History* celebrates the centenary of the earliest tentative attempts of a British Governor to improve the lot of the people, or to save the weak from the oppression of the strong.¹ For many decades after 1815, however, the maintenance of uninterrupted trade-routes to and from the interior represented the highest ambition of the British Government on the Coast, and it was in order to secure this object that little by little jurisdiction was extended and an increasingly active part was taken in inter-tribal politics. Even after the national conscience had been sufficiently awakened to bring about the abolition of the slave-trade, the commercial interests of the British traders continued to be the principal preoccupation of the authorities on the Coast, and the assumption of responsibility for the welfare of the natives, whose world our coming had turned topsy-turvy, was shirked and evaded as much as possible. There can be no reasonable doubt that, if the British had not interfered, the Ashantis would have extended their empire over all the nations of the Gold Coast ; but our disapproval of their invasions was due, in the beginning, not so much to any feeling of pity for their victims, as to resentment at the disturbance to trade which they occasioned. Thus the rôle of protector of the defenceless was more or less inexorably thrust upon us in the interests of our own commerce ;

¹ *Vide* Vol. I., p. 279.

but once accepted, it could never again be wholly discarded, and thereafter our main object was to keep tribal warfare within some sort of bounds, and to shore up, as best we could, the tottering prosperity of the countries which the aggressive energy of the Ashantis was perpetually assailing.

After the characteristic fashion of our nation, we tried to accomplish this with the expenditure of as few men and as little money as possible, and a policy of hopeless vacillation and inconsistency of course resulted. Such a policy, equally of course, was quite unintelligible to the natives with whom we were dealing ; and the Ashantis, at any rate, never knew what to expect of us—which was only natural, seeing that we were living, so to speak, from hand to mouth, and never knew from year to year what to expect of ourselves.

Looking backward from the standpoint we occupy to-day, it is clearly to be seen that anything resembling a permanent friendly alliance between a British Administration on the Coast and an independent Kingdom of Ashanti was unthinkable, having regard to the incompatible ideals and the wholly divergent views on a number of vital matters entertained by the two Governments. It may be that modern civilisation is the lion, and that barbarism is the lamb ; but the two cannot nowadays lie down side by side. No Colonial Administration of our time, for instance, could long have maintained an alliance with a Power which regarded human sacrifice as an essential religious rite ; and the records of West Africa show beyond dispute that the abolition of such practices can only gradually be effected even in localities where Great Britain exercises full executive authority. A Colonial Government, which in the beginning battened on the slave-trade, was itself, according to modern notions, in a condition of semi-barbarism, from which it had to emerge ere ever the assumption of responsibility for the regulation of the habits and customs of its native neighbours could be recognised by it in the light of an imperative duty. The white men of bygone generations, therefore,

whose aim was commercial expansion, not the moral improvement of the Africans, whose own standards of civilisation were still in some respects rudimentary, and who regarded a friendly Ashanti as the surest means of securing the ends they had in view, cannot fairly be blamed for having failed to foresee that their ideals would fall far short of the demands of those who would come after them. Thus the history of British relations with the peoples of the Gold Coast and Ashanti, rightly viewed, is the story of an attempt to secure our merchants' profits at the least possible cost to ourselves, and the gradual assumption of extended responsibilities undertaken in pursuance of that object. To a much later phase belongs the practical annexation of the whole country—a step which was forced upon us, not by any alteration in the habits and practices of its inhabitants, but by a change which, in the course of years, had been wrought in ourselves and in our conceptions of the moral obligations which our presence in their midst imposed upon us.

The passing away of an empire, which had risen to great power through the warlike genius of its rulers and people, cannot but occasion some sentimental regrets ; and the dissolution of the Kingdom of Ashanti, like the destruction of the great military organisation which Chaka created in Zululand, seems to curtail the already dwindling domain of modern romance. No one, however, can find serious reason for doubting that the people of Ashanti to-day, who devote their energies to the cultivation of their food-plots and cocoa-gardens, and to the improvement of their towns, are not only a more useful, but on the whole a happier set of people than were their blood-stained ancestors, who spent a goodly portion of their time in ravaging their neighbours' homesteads, taking other people's lives, and enslaving their women-kind and their children. The contrary point of view—which much more accurately represented the truth when it was written, nearly fifteen years ago, than it does now—is ably set forth in the quotation from a despatch by Sir Matthew Nathan, which will be found on page 440 of the second volume of this book.

The dragging across the face of any primitive country of Jagannâth-car in which is borne aloft the great idol we name *Pax Britannica*, entails the demolition of many romantic things. It necessitates the substitution of the commonplace for the exotic, the tameness and safety of ordered modern life for the excitement and the perils of primordial existence, and the drab of every-day wear for the highly coloured hues of barbaric display. Incidentally, however, it affords to the individual human being—the average man who, in the past, was at best a successful looter, and at the worst mere food for powder—an opportunity to live his own life in peace and quietude, and in a manner chosen by himself. It once fell to my lot to bear the tidings of an outbreak of war through the villages of a country whose people were famous for their bellicose and blood-thirsty reputation. The men wore grave faces as they looked to their weapons and patiently resigned themselves to the inevitable ; but the wailing of the women still sounds in my ears. Kings and chiefs, on the other hand, stood to lose much, and to gain little or nothing, by the establishment of a lasting peace and a well-regulated administration ; for it has usually been the peculiar privilege of the great ones of the earth to thrive at the expense of their subjects, and to combine the excitements of war with a comparative immunity from its dangers. It is not possible, however, to legislate for a minority ; but experience would seem to show that it is a mistake to suppose that the average man of any race, who has tasted war in real earnest, has thereafter an overpowering love of it.

It is to be regretted that Dr. Claridge has not seen his way to carry on his record of the history of the Gold Coast and Ashanti beyond the dawn of the present century, for whereas the story that he has to tell relates to the almost uninterrupted wars and disturbances which culminated in the final campaign of the British against Ashanti in 1900, it is during the past decade especially that the fruits of the peace, which was then established with so much difficulty, have been made manifest. Even now the potentialities of the Gold Coast and its Dependencies have

only begun to be fully appreciated, and the phenomenal prosperity of its people is the growth of the past few years. Never, until quite recently, have the natives of the Gold Coast and Ashanti been afforded an opportunity of developing their ancestral property in peace and security, free from the fear that the accumulation of wealth might excite the cupidity and invite the unwelcome attentions of some powerful neighbour. Little more than a dozen years have elapsed since this possibility dawned upon the bulk of the population ; yet to-day the Gold Coast and Ashanti alike are inhabited by a sturdy race of peasant proprietors who, among other things, produce annually more than a fifth of the total cocoa-crop of the world. British energy and a careful management of the financial resources of the country are beginning to overcome the appalling transport difficulties by which West Africa is still shackled ; the development of the gold-mining industry is due to British capital, enterprise, and science ; but the enormous agricultural expansion of the last ten years, which has revolutionised the conditions of life on the Gold Coast and in Ashanti, is the work of the natives themselves. It has, of course, been aided and stimulated by the Government, but no one can doubt that a people, who have so promptly and eagerly availed themselves of the chances placed within their reach, can look forward with confidence to a future marked by increasingly creditable achievements. And though, alas, the mistakes which the British have committed in the past in their dealings with the peoples of the Gold Coast and Ashanti have been both grave and numerous, and though the African's instinctive suspicion of the white man has all too frequently been justified, the essential soundness of the relations which in our time subsist between ourselves and the native population has recently emerged triumphant from a very searching test.

When the great war broke out in August, 1914, the military forces of the Gold Coast invaded Togoland, the adjoining German colony, in the interior of which had been erected a huge wireless installation of immense

strategic value. In less than four weeks the Germans had been compelled to surrender, and there can be little doubt that the knowledge that, whereas the natives of the Gold Coast were doing all in their power to aid us, the natives of Togoland had everywhere welcomed us as their deliverers, helped them to the conclusion that their position was desperate. A month later it was found possible to despatch to Duala, to aid in the campaign of the Allies in the German Kamaruns, nearly all the men of the Gold Coast Regiment of the West African Frontier Force who were not required for the occupation of the conquered territory. The denudation of the Colony and of Ashanti of practically all the troops which, in time of peace, are ordinarily maintained in them, was rendered possible by the enthusiastic loyalty to the British Throne and to the Government which was manifested from end to end of the country. As an additional proof of the sincerity of this feeling, subscriptions to the Patriotic Fund, initiated by natives and mainly received from native contributors, amounting to over £25,000, were rapidly collected and placed in my hands for transmission to the Secretary of State. It is pleasant to recall that, at this time of national crisis, the chiefs and people of Ashanti displayed as keen a desire to assist and support the Government as any that was shown by their neighbours on the Coast.

There is one subject upon which I feel constrained to break a lance with Dr. Claridge. His book will tend, I fear, to confirm the popular belief that the "climate" of the Gold Coast is one of the deadliest in the tropics. I regard this opinion as at once unsound and unscientific. Speaking as a man who has spent more than thirty years in tropical lands, east and west, I regard it as an axiomatic proposition that the climate in any part of the heat-belt is strongly inimical to the health of Europeans. It cannot be otherwise than enervating to be in a constant state of perspiration ; and those whose skins are not provided with wide-open pores really suffer more than do men who possess this healthy but inconvenient equipment. As tropical climates go, however, that of the Gold Coast is at

once less hot and less damp than those which are to be found in many other parts of the world. This is not a question of opinion, but of fact, proved beyond dispute by the readings of the thermometer and the rain-gauge ; and no one who has lived both in the Gold Coast and in, say, the low country of Ceylon, in the Malay Peninsula or Archipelago, in Cochinchina or in Kambodia, can entertain a doubt on the subject. Yet it is an incontrovertible truth that the ravages wrought in the health of Europeans, and especially in that of newly arrived Europeans, by a sojourn in the Gold Coast, have from time to time been greater than any which are recorded in the localities above enumerated. This is to be accounted for not by " the climate "—which, as I have said, is merciful, as tropical climates go—but by the virulence of the insect and water-borne microbes which have their home in West Africa.

It will perhaps be said that, if the result is in either case lethal, it does not greatly signify whether sickness or death is induced by the climate or by microbes ; but the fallacy of this will be recognised when it is remembered that, though mankind has not yet obtained a mastery over climatic conditions, a successful war against microbes is something well within our power. Were the " climate " of the Gold Coast the primary cause of disease, we should be unable to effect in it even a slight improvement ; but if, as has now been proved to be the case, infection is conveyed by the bites of certain insects or the drinking of impure water, it will at once be realised that preventive measures are more nearly within our reach. As it is, however, it is neither more nor less accurate or logical to blame " the climate " for cases of yellow fever, malaria or dysentery than it would be to hold the climatic conditions of India accountable for the injuries which a man had sustained in an encounter with a Bengal tiger. In each case the person affected has fallen a victim to the onslaughts of the local fauna, which chance to require a tropical climate for their comfort and well-being.

Accordingly, if in the light of the knowledge we to-day

possess concerning the causation of tropical diseases, we were to analyse the statistics quoted on page 165 of the second volume of Dr. Claridge's *History*—which show the casualties from sickness among the Europeans engaged in Lord Wolseley's march to Kumasi in 1874—we should have to admit that, on the face of them, they constitute no specially damaging case against "the climate" of the Gold Coast. We should ask, for instance, how many of those invalidated had dispensed with the use of a mosquito-net, and how many had drunk water which had not previously been boiled and filtered. In other words, we should eliminate all cases of avoidable tropical disease, such as yellow fever, malaria, and dysentery, and when this had been done it would be found that a surprisingly small residue remained to be laid at the door of "the climate."

For the invisible and aggressive organisms of the Gold Coast, to whose assaults the death and illness of Europeans in that country are almost entirely to be ascribed, I do not desire to be understood as holding any sort of brief. It is true that mosquitoes are here far less numerous and persecuting than they are in many other countries—the Malay Peninsula, for instance—but that renders them all the more dangerous. When these insects swarm in myriads,—as they did on the Perak River in Malaya or in Georgetown, British Guiana,—a comparatively small percentage of them are usually infected, and an elementary desire to avoid being eaten alive compels even the most careless of Europeans to protect himself from them. In the Gold Coast a man may easily be tempted to pass the night outside his net, for the sake of coolness, and the mosquitoes will not usually be sufficiently numerous to break his sleep; yet the bite of one of them may compass his undoing.

The attack is, therefore, more insidious in the Gold Coast than it is in other tropical countries, and it is also far more virulent. The malarial mosquito is here neither more nor less dangerous than his fellow in Malaya or Ceylon or elsewhere in the tropical zone—which means that he is a pretty deadly enemy to Europeans; but it is only of very recent years that it has been recognised and ad-

mitted that yellow fever, which is conveyed by the bite of the common house mosquito, is endemic in West Africa. Ere long it will probably be a generally accepted theory that the West Coast is the original habitat of the as yet unidentified organism which, passing from the mosquito into the blood of a human being, causes this disease ; and that it was from across the Atlantic that it was imported into the West Indies and South and Central America with the cargoes of slaves, some of whom carried the infection in their veins. The extraordinary virulence of yellow fever, when it first appeared in those countries, would seem to indicate that the germs were let loose among a population which had never acquired any measure of hereditary immunity from them, or which, in the case of the descendants of the African slaves, had lost that immunity. Similarly, it has now been ascertained that though the tse-tse fly, which is the bearer of the germ of sleeping-sickness, is found distributed throughout wide areas in tropical Africa, the disease in an endemic form has for centuries been familiarly known to the natives of Ashanti and many other parts of the West Coast, where it annually claims a few, but only a very few, victims. Of recent years, however, the opening up of trans-continental communication between the seaboards of the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, which has been effected by Europeans, has caused sleeping-sickness germs to be imported into localities where the tse-tse fly abounds, but has hitherto been innocuous. In these places the native populations had had no opportunity of acquiring an hereditary immunity, such as is enjoyed by the natives of, say, parts of Ashanti, and in consequence the people of Uganda, to cite a single instance, have died of the disease in very large numbers.

The position then is that West Africa, while enjoying what *for the tropics* is quite a good climate, has the misfortune to be the chosen home of a variety of dangerous living organisms, which are peculiarly deadly to Europeans, and are much less easy to cope with than man-eating tigers or other more demonstrative beasts of prey. The recognition of this fact was and is the first step toward

effecting an improvement. The destruction of the breeding-places of mosquitoes ; the segregation of Europeans at night, with the object of minimising the chance of attack upon them by *infected* mosquitoes ; the avoidance of exposure to mosquito-bites by the use of nets and other artificial contrivances ; the judicious use of quinine when such exposure is inevitable ; the provision, where possible, of pipe-borne water supplies, and the boiling and filtration of all drinking-water—these are to-day precautions which are regarded as a mere matter of common sense, which no one of any intelligence would willingly neglect while living in West Africa. Little more than a score of years has elapsed, however, since the necessity for many of these things first dawned upon Europeans in the tropics, but the result is already to be seen in the enormous improvement in the death and invaliding-rates. An immense deal, of course, still remains to be done ; for one cannot deal with a country of the size and population of the Gold Coast and its Dependencies as the Americans have dealt with the narrow strip of territory through which the Panama Canal has been delved. The complete extirpation of disease-carrying insects, which has there, to all intents and purposes, been effected, is something altogether removed from the regions of practical things where vast areas are in question ; but it is not a task beyond the ability of the sanitary expert notably to reduce the chances of infection, and to work a material improvement in the health-conditions of particular localities. Every year this is being progressively effected in the Gold Coast, and it is time, I suggest, that the old and crusted superstition anent "the climate" should be discarded once and for all. It is all very well to give a dog a bad name, and hang him ; but it is hardly fair to go on hanging him after it has been conclusively proved that it was the cat that robbed the larder.

For the rest, I have none but the warmest admiration to express for Dr. Claridge's handling of his subject, for the long and patient labour which he has devoted to it, and for the success which that labour has achieved. The

people of the Gold Coast and Ashanti have reason to be grateful to him, for he has recounted the history of their country and their forebears in a manner which should cause it to be widely read throughout the English-speaking world ; and if a knowledge and understanding of a country's past is, as I believe it to be, essential to those who serve it in the present, and have to some extent a hand in the moulding of its future, then the toil and study which have gone to the making of this book will bear fruit in West Africa, not only for men of the present generation, but for those of generations yet unborn.

HUGH CLIFFORD.

LLANDOGO, MONMOUTHSHIRE,
August 17th, 1915.

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NEW INTRODUCTION

by

W. E. F. WARD

A HISTORY OF THE GOLD COAST AND ASHANTI

CHAPTER I

THE ORIGIN OF THE GOLD COAST TRIBES

THE country now known as the Gold Coast includes, ^{CHAP. I} not only the Colony proper, but also Ashanti and a small portion of the Southern Soudan known as the Northern Territories. Its coast-line extends from Newtown on the west to Aflao on the east, and, in addition to the Gold Coast as geographically defined, includes a part of the Slave Coast to the east of the River Volta. It is only within comparatively recent times that the greater part of this area has been included within the sphere of influence or been visited and explored by Europeans, who, for many centuries, never penetrated more than a few miles into the interior.

The history of the country lying along the coast-line is fairly well known ; for one European nation or another has held trading settlements there for over five hundred years, and the works of several writers remain, giving a more or less complete account of different periods. Such discrepancies as occur between them are mainly attributable to international jealousies ; for they were written at a time when several nations were on the coast together, contending the one against the other for the trade and regarding each other as interlopers. In these circumstances, it is not altogether unnatural that each writer should incline towards that version of any particular occurrence which redounds most to the credit of his own race. Apart from

CHAP. I these works there are no written records. The local history, however, has always been handed down verbally from one generation to another through the Linguists, and such are their powers of memory that these accounts have been found remarkably accurate in those cases in which they could be checked by the written records. They are always entitled to consideration, and may usually be accepted as reliable so far as the incidence and sequence of events are concerned, and there is seldom any difficulty in fixing the approximate dates by other contemporary occurrences.

The records left by Europeans do not commence till the latter part of the fourteenth century, and none of them have left any account of any statements that may then have been made to them by the people as to their past history. Very little is known, therefore, about the origin of these tribes, and such accounts as have been handed down and are current among them at the present time are purely traditional. The Gold Coast African, however, seldom emigrates. He will make long journeys for purposes of trade and may stay away for years, but he always tends to return to his original home. The Linguists and better-class people, from whom these traditional accounts of past events are obtained, belong to families which have had their home in one and the same place from time immemorial. Among such a people, tradition has a far greater value than among less settled races, for places and natural objects connected with their past history are constantly before their eyes, and assist in preserving the story from generation to generation.

The general sum of these traditions is that the Fantis, Ashantis, Wassaws, and in fact all the Twi-speaking or Akan peoples, were originally one tribe. They were a pastoral race and inhabited the open country beyond the forest belt and farther north than Salaga. A northern and lighter-skinned people, which is commonly supposed to have been the Fulanis, commenced to encroach on their territory, and being stronger than they, seized their cattle and young women and made many of the others slaves.

After a time, the Akans began to migrate in small parties CHAP. I into the forest, where they built little villages and lived in hiding. As time went on, the number of these forest-dwelling fugitives increased, until, in the course of many years, their numbers became very considerable. Their oppressors then heard of them and made several attempts to conquer and enslave them, but were unable to fight in the dense forest, and, tiring of their want of success, eventually left them unmolested. Living in peace, the people continued to increase, and gradually extended farther south until they had populated the forest belt and eventually reached the coast.

The subdivision of the united Akan race into its main branches, the Fantis and Ashantis, is variously accounted for. The split, however, seems to have occurred long before the coast-line was reached and while the principal settlements were in the country north of the River Pra, the present Adansi, and around Tekiman. One story very plausibly explains that the constant raids of their northern enemy, who burned all the farms, reduced the Akans to great straits for food. Some of them subsisted on a wild plant named "fan," and others on a plant named "shan," and thus gained the names "Fan-dti" and "Shan-dti" (dti—to eat). The former subsequently migrated farther south, and the latter remained in the more northerly districts of the forest. But though this story accounts for the names Fanti and Ashanti—and it is worthy of note that the initial "A" of the latter is not pronounced by the people—it fails to explain why they separated. Another account says that a section of the people disliked the King and conspired to poison him. The names of the two tribes are derived from the names of the foods they offered to him. The Fantis are said to have gathered "fan" and the Ashantis a poisonous herb called "asun" or "asuan," which, with the verb "tsiw" (to gather), give the derivation of these names. The King, discovering what the Ashantis had done, naturally favoured the Fantis; but they were not strong enough to withstand the jealousy and oppression of the former, who ultimately drove them

CHAP. I from the country. Yet another version of this story says that a quarrel arose among the people, who divided into two factions, one of which migrated farther south. They became known as the "Fa-tsiw-fu," meaning a portion of the people who had cut themselves off from the main body, and the others were called "Asua-tsiw-fu," meaning the people who did not hearken, because they refused to listen to the advice of the King when he wanted to restore peace and prevent the Ashantis from driving the Fantis away.

The Fantis say that they found the forest uninhabited, and some of them settled there, founding the village of Kwaman ; but the majority pushed on till they reached the coast. They are said to have been led by three chiefs—Osun, Oburnuma Kuma and Odapagan. They found the sea-board inhabited by two tribes, the Asibus and Etsiis, who united to oppose the new-comers. Kormantin is said to have been the principal town of the Asibus, and their Chief, Amanfi, who is said to have been a giant, led them against the Fantis, defeated them and compelled them to pay him tribute. Later, however, they organized a rebellion and drove the Asibus into the bush, but Amanfi, who was suffering from guinea-worm in his legs and could not escape, was found in his house and put to death. The Elminas are said to have come to the coast at a later date, and to be an off-shoot of the Ashantis, which would account for the fact that while the latter have always been the foes of the Fantis, their relations with the Elminas have been uniformly friendly.

How much truth there may be in these accounts, it is impossible to say ; but vague and uncertain though they may be, they are, nevertheless, not unreasonable, and are probably very fairly correct. The Fulanis are known to have been migrating in a southerly direction for centuries, and the Arabs had, even prior to the eleventh century, founded states in the interior of Africa, one of the chief of which was Ghana, which is believed to have been near the present site of Sokoto. The country of Wangara belonged to this state, and, though this name is now confined to a country quite distinct from Ashanti, the Ma-

homedans in Kumasi in 1821 told Mr. Dupuis, the British Consul, that Ashanti was a part of Wangara. According to the Arab historians, the country to the south of Wangara was called Lam-lam, and was inhabited by a race of savages, whom the people living round the Niger used to hunt and sell into slavery. It is, moreover, well known that the Mahomedans have only been able to conquer in countries where they could use cavalry, which would have been quite impossible in the dense forest of Ashanti, and might easily account for their lack of success against the Akans who fled thither.

In Winneba and some other places on the coast, a language is still spoken which is quite distinct from Twi. This language is gradually dying out, but it may well owe its origin to that of the tribes who were living on the coastline at the time of the Fanti immigration. Assuming the traditional account of their conquest to be substantially correct, it by no means follows that they were exterminated. It is far more probable that they would have been required to pay tribute to the Fantis, and, if this was so, the natural conservatism of the African would be quite sufficient to account for their language and perhaps some of their customs having lingered in those parts of the coast where they settled. The different languages of the Accras and Apollonians, on the other hand, are to be accounted for by the fact that they are believed to be immigrants from the Slave and Ivory Coasts rather than true natives of the Gold Coast. The Accras at least have never succeeded in establishing themselves in the true forest districts ; and the fact that the country now occupied by the Fantis was at one time inhabited by a very primitive race is proved by the discovery of a number of stone weapons and implements.

The only argument that could be adduced to refute the general truth of these traditions is the fact that the Portuguese, when they first settled on the Gold Coast in 1482, found the people already grouped into separate petty kingdoms and tribes ; and the question has been raised whether four and a half centuries would afford suffi-

CHAP. I client time for the migration through the forest and the formation of these tribal distinctions. Each of these little states, however, most probably arose from the settlement of one of the more powerful families of the immigrants with their dependents ; for the family or patriarchal system is the fundamental principle of the Akan constitution.

Another point in favour of a belief in the common origin of the Fantis and Ashantis is the existence among them of a number of definite families. At the present time it is impossible to say what their original number may have been. It is certain, however, that some of them are of very much greater antiquity than others, which are believed to be off-shoots from the parent stock due to quarrels or some other cause. The principal families are the Twidan (Leopard), Nsonna (Bush-cat), Kwnonna (Buffalo), Intwa (Dog), Anonno (Parrot), Abradzi (Plantain), Abrutu (Corn-stalk), Appiadi (Servant) and Yoko (Red earth). There are several others, but these are generally acknowledged to be the oldest. The animals and other objects from which they derive their names are commonly held sacred by their members. The name was probably given as a descriptive title to the original head of the family—a common practice among most primitive peoples—but in course of time the fact that it was merely the name of an individual has been lost sight of, and later generations have come to regard these animals as their actual ancestors, or as the tutelary deities or the homes of the tutelary deities of their families.

Members of these families are found among Fantis and Ashantis alike, and it would be difficult to find any explanation of this fact unless it is admitted that these tribes were at one time living together as one united people. Many of these names, too, seem to belong to an older dialect, for they are not those in common use among the Fantis at the present day. Moreover, though the members of these clans are now so widely scattered, a certain brotherhood still exists among them, and the customary laws in use among all the Akan peoples, though varying slightly

in different districts just as the dialect they speak does, CHAP. I are, nevertheless, identical in principle and clearly point to a common origin. The same may be said of their religion, customs and municipal regulations.

Meredith, writing in 1811, while bearing out what has already been said about the origin of the Fantis, also records a tradition of their early government on the coast. He says :—“ The Fantis were originally an inland people, and governed by the kings of Ashantee : but when they formed a separate state, we have no satisfactory accounts to determine. They, however, rebelled against the Ashantee government, and fled towards the sea ; where, it appears, they remained unmolested until very lately. When they considered themselves out of the Ashantee dominions, and in tolerable security, they appointed a person to govern them : but as they dreaded the vengeance of their old masters, and were fearful that on the promise of favour or reward this person would betray them, they had recourse to a singular expedient to prove his fidelity. They told him, that he must consent to lose his left hand as the only token they considered sufficient to prove his attachment to them. The man hesitated at this extraordinary method of putting his fidelity to the test ; when a general murmur arose against him. Whereupon his cane-bearer stepped forward and exclaimed, that if his master were unwilling to lose a hand for the good of the people, he was not ; and laying his left arm upon the block, it was taken off. He was then constituted their Braffoe ; which term signifies captain, or leader ; and the person so appointed was endued with many privileges : his family were to be provided for, and considered as a kind of nobility ; and his power was almost absolute.”¹

According to Bosman, however, the power of the Brafo was at first controlled by a Council of Elders “ not unlike some European Parliament, acting perfectly according to their Inclinations, without consulting the Braffo,”² and it was not until later that the Brafos usurped greater powers,

¹ Meredith, p. 116.

² Bosman, p. 57.

CHAP. I and their rule became so tyrannical and obnoxious to the people that their authority was expressly limited.

In addition to the Akans, there are a number of other tribes, more especially in the Northern Territories, about whose origin little or nothing is known ; and there are also many colonies of Hausas and Fulanis scattered about the country ; but, though something more is known of their early history, they are only aliens in the land and cannot legitimately be included among the tribes of the Gold Coast.

CHAPTER II

THE GOLD COAST AND THE ANCIENTS

WHETHER the Gold Coast was known to the Ancients or CHAP. II

not, is a question to which it is impossible, at this day, to give a decided answer ; but there is a certain amount of evidence which tends to justify the belief that it was.

The greatest navigators of early times were the Phœnicians, but, as none of their writings have been preserved, the exact extent of their voyages and discoveries is doubtful, and there is very little mention of them in the writings of other nations. This fact is easily accounted for by the jealousy of the Phœnicians, who carefully guarded all information connected with their navigation and trade as State secrets. Consequently, when Tyre was conquered by Alexander and Carthage by Rome, these records were lost for ever. We know, however, that they made frequent voyages in the Mediterranean, which were often extended along the Atlantic coast of Africa or to the British Isles, and that they founded colonies on the African coast, beyond the Straits of Gibraltar, as early as 1,200 to 800 B.C. But it is quite certain that they would never have attempted such colonization of new countries until they had, by frequent voyages, become fairly well acquainted with their seas and coasts.

Knowing therefore that these ancient Phœnicians were in the habit of sailing down the western coast of Africa, the only question to be settled is how far these voyages extended. There are two passages in Herodotus which point to the possibility of their having reached the Gold Coast or its neighbourhood. He states that the Carthaginians say there is a region of Libya (Africa)

CHAP. II beyond the Pillars of Hercules (Jebu Zatout and Gibraltar) which is inhabited ; and that when they go there to trade, they land, and having deposited their goods on the beach, return on board their ships and make a great smoke in order to attract the attention of the natives. The latter then come down to the shore and place the gold they are willing to give in exchange opposite the heaps of merchandize and go away. The traders then land again ; and if they are satisfied with the amount offered, take the gold and leave the goods and then sail away ; but if they think the price too small, they go on board again and wait for it to be increased.

Now a similar method of trade is mentioned by two other writers. Aluise de Cada Mosto, a Venetian, was sailing from Venice to Flanders in 1455, when he heard of the great profits made by the Portuguese in the African trade under Prince Henry the Navigator. These were stated to be sometimes 700 or even as much as 1,000 per cent. He therefore determined to make a voyage down the west coast, and arranged to give the Prince a fourth of the profits on his return. Having arrived at a place somewhere in the neighbourhood of Cape Blanco, which he calls Hoden, he heard of a town or district named Tregazza (meaning a chest, bag or sack of gold) which lay some six days' journey by land from Hoden. From this Tregazza a salt trade was regularly carried on by means of caravans to Tombuto (Timbuktu) and thence to Melli. Whatever salt was not disposed of in Melli was taken by carriers through a country where there were no camels or other beasts of burden to a river (? the Niger¹). There, he says ;—" having reached the shore, or bank of The Water, the salt is placed in heaps, each merchant's property by itself. They who belong to it then retire to the distance of half a day's journey ; when other negroes, who avoid being spoken to, or seen, and who it is conjectured come in boats from some adjacent Islands, approach the heaps of salt ; and having examined its quality, place a certain portion of gold on each, and withdraw.

¹ Or possibly the Volta.

The original traders then return : if the Deposit satisfies CHAP. II their expectation, they take it, and leave the salt ; if not, they again retire, without removing the gold. The former Negroes upon this, either add more gold, or only take the salt on which their deposit was approved. This mode of trading is very ancient among them : the truth of it has been attested by many of the Arab and Azanagli merchants, and by other persons whose information deserves credit."¹

The next mention of this silent trade is made by Captain Richard Jobson, who, in 1620-21, made a voyage to the River Gambia for the express purpose of discovering the gold trade mentioned by Cada Mosto. He published an account of his voyage in 1623 ; but though he makes mention of this trade, he does not seem to have been writing from personal experience of it, but rather to have been repeating what he had read in "certain authors, but whose names he could not recollect."² Claude Jannequin, Sieur de Rochfort, who made a West African voyage in 1637, also mentions the existence of this silent trade in the neighbourhood of Cape Blanco. The account given by Herodotus of this trade as carried on by the Phoenicians is therefore confirmed ; and the fact that payment was habitually made in gold is additional proof of its truth. It does not follow, however, that they sailed as far as the Gold Coast, though it is a fact that a form of this silent trade is not uncommon both there and much farther down the coast, even to the present day.

The second passage from Herodotus is of much greater importance in this connection. About 600 B.C. Pharaoh Necho,³ then King of Egypt, attempted to cut a canal from the Nile to the Red Sea ; but such enormous numbers of his labourers died at this work that he was forced to abandon it and seek some other means of establishing communication between that sea and the Mediterranean. He therefore provided some Phoenicians with ships in the Red Sea and ordered them to enter the Mediterranean by the Straits of Gibraltar and so return to Egypt. They

¹ Clarke, p. 245.

² Astley, vol. ii, p. 182.

³ The same who slew the Jewish King Josiah.

CHAP. II accordingly sailed south, and, on the approach of autumn, landed and made a farm, where they sowed corn and waited to gather in the harvest. This, Herodotus explains, was the usual practice with sailors on an African voyage. "Having thus consumed two years, they in the third doubled the columns of Hercules, and returned to Egypt. Their relation may obtain attention from others, but to me it seems incredible, for they affirmed, that having sailed round Africa, they had the sun on their right hand."¹

It appears that though Herodotus believed that Africa was everywhere surrounded by the sea except at Suez, he thought this statement that the sailors had had the sun on their right, that is to the north, was a mere travellers' tale. As a conscientious historian, however, he inserted it for what it was worth, and it is very fortunate that he did so; for it undoubtedly affords the very strongest evidence that the circumnavigation of Africa was actually accomplished. Either this must have been done, or the whole story was a pure invention of the Phœnicians, who tried to cover their failure by describing something marvellous. But, as against this latter hypothesis, it must be remembered that such an idea was so entirely opposed to the knowledge of those days that, had they wished to invent anything, it is one of the very last things they would have been likely to think of; and, since the holders of such unorthodox views were more often than not punished by death, it is even less likely that they would have ventured to repeat it unless they had really seen what they described and were convinced of its truth. This statement alone, therefore, goes far to prove the truth of their story and to justify the belief that they really had rounded the Cape of Good Hope and were describing in perfect good faith a phenomenon which they had actually observed, but which they were unable to explain. Nor are any of the other details given inconsistent with this belief. The time the voyage is said to have occupied is not unreasonable, and the winds and currents are more favourable for the passage from east to

¹ *Melpomene*, 42; Clarke, p. lxxxvii.

west than in the opposite direction. The only real difficulty is the doubt whether the ships of those days could have successfully encountered the enormous seas which are so frequently met with off the Cape of Good Hope. It is usual to avoid these by standing out to the south, but this was a course which the Phœnicians, coasting along in strange seas, would not have been able to adopt. But though this objection exists, it is not sufficient to invalidate the story ; for, starting with a number of ships, it would be quite reasonable to expect a proportion of them to get through, and it is known that they constantly sailed to and maintained a regular trade with the British Islands, which involved the successful navigation of the Bay of Biscay.

Believing therefore that this voyage was indeed made 600 years B.C., it is quite possible that the Gold Coast may even then have been visited. The ships of those days were small and the seas unknown, and it is safe to assume that this voyage was a coasting one, and that the ships never lost sight of land for more than a few days at a time, and then only if blown out to sea by storms. The Phœnicians would, moreover, have been compelled to land and obtain fresh water and provisions at fairly frequent intervals, and it is quite possible that one or more calls may have been made on the Gold Coast for this purpose : for though it is true that the landing there is for the most part very dangerous, there are several places where it is nearly always easy and safe, and they would doubtless have been put on shore and taken off again by the natives, who would have come out to the ships in their canoes, and are well able to manage them in almost any surf. They might even have made their farm there, though this is very improbable owing to the amount of clearing that would have been necessary. If they did in fact visit the Gold Coast, it is possible that it was then that they discovered that gold was obtainable there, and founded that more or less regular trade which there is some reason to suppose at one time existed. For similar reasons we must admit the possibility, at any rate, that

CHAP. II the Gold Coast may have been visited by others of the Phoenician explorers who sailed along the West African coast, but of whose exploits no record has been preserved.

There seems to be no doubt that, at this time, the belief that Africa was a peninsula had gained general acceptance, and that the theory of Hipparchus, which confined each sea in its separate basin, was only formulated after all recollection of these earlier discoveries had died out. It was then that such fragmentary accounts of the Phœnician voyages as survived came to be discredited. In the reign of Xerxes, Sataspes, a Persian nobleman and a nephew of Darius, was condemned to death for some crime ; but his mother prevailed upon Xerxes to commute his sentence on condition that he should sail round Africa until he reached Arabia. Sataspes accordingly set out, and passing the Pillars of Hercules and Solois, turned towards the south. According to Herodotus,¹ after " continuing his Voyage for several months, in which he passed over an immense tract of sea, he saw no probable termination of his labours, and therefore sailed back to Egypt."² On his return to the Court of Xerxes with his task uncompleted, he gave as his reason for turning back that it was impossible to make the circuit of Africa, as his vessel was totally unable to proceed. Xerxes, however, was not the man to be put off with excuses of this kind, and the original sentence was at once carried out and the unfortunate Sataspes crucified. Antonio Galvano, writing in the sixteenth century, gives the date of this voyage as 485 B.C., and says that Sataspes reached the Cape of Good Hope, though it is not very clear on what grounds he bases this assertion. It is true, however, that "several months" might have enabled him to get there, and the mountainous seas and strong currents around the Cape might well account for his statement that his vessel was totally unable to proceed.

By far the most important of these ancient voyages of which we now have any record, however, is that of the Carthaginian Hanno. This was undertaken when Carthage

¹ *Melpomene*, 43.

² Clarke, p. cii.

was at the height of its prosperity—"Carthaginis potentia CHAP. II florente"—and consequently before the battle of Himera in 480 B.C. ; its exact date, however, is not known, and some place it as early as 1,000 B.C. or even earlier. The account we have of it certainly gives more details than those of the other ancient voyages, but leaves room for endless speculation as to its actual extent. The original account was, of course, written in Punic, and the one we now have is a translation of this made by a Greek at a much later date, and is apparently little more than an abstract, in which many important details of time and distance have been either omitted or distorted.

The dual object of this voyage was the foundation of colonies on the West African coast and the discovery of another route to India. Hanno's fleet consisted of sixty quinqueremes, large galleys with two masts and five banks of oars: one tier of these was amidships between the masts, two more, one above the other, before the fore-mast, and the other two were similarly arranged abaft the main-mast. The colonists, amongst whom were many women, numbered 30,000, and they also had on board large quantities of provisions and other stores.

The first colony was founded two days' sail beyond the Pillars of Hercules. This was named Thymaterium, and has been identified with Azamor on the banks of the River Marmora. Sailing on, Hanno next came to a promontory which he calls Soloeis. This is believed to be Cape Cantin. Here he built a temple to Neptune, and, sailing another one and a half days beyond the cape, founded five other cities along the coast, which he named Coriconticos, Gytte, Acra, Melitta and Arambys. He next came to a river which he calls the Lixus, where he describes the natives as a race of herdsmen, and says he remained there so long that they became quite friendly. The time taken in reaching this river is not given, but it is generally believed to have been either the Ouro or the St. Cyprian. When he left this river, Hanno took some of these friendly Lixitæ with him as interpreters, and then sailed two days south and one day east. He then dis-

CHAP. II covered an island in a deep bay, which he colonized and named Cerne. He adds that the distances from the Pillars of Hercules to Carthage and to this island seemed to him to be about equal. He seems, therefore, to have doubled Cape Blanco and to have reached the island now known as Arguin ; a surmise that is further borne out by the discovery in Arguin of the remains of the old tanks or cisterns constructed by these Phœnician colonists. Proceeding farther south, Hanno came to another river, the Chretes. This he entered, and found that it opened into a large lake containing several islands. One day's sail beyond the mouth of this river were some mountains, and still farther south another large river, in which were large numbers of crocodiles and hippopotami. This description can fairly be applied to the Rivers Senegal and Gambia, the first of which has a large lagoon, in which there are several islands, while the latter was noted for the number of crocodiles and hippopotami it contained within quite recent times. The mountains he mentions as being one day's sail beyond the Chretes would then be the hills around Cape Verde, which, though of no great height, are specially noticeable on a coast that is almost uniformly flat. Hanno, having apparently reached the mouth of the Gambia, then returned to Cerne for a time before again proceeding south, and it is during this second part of the voyage that the principal difficulties arise in identifying localities, and that there is most reason to suspect errors or omissions of time on the part of the Greek translator.

The Periplus gives the following account of this second portion of the voyage. "Sailing then twelve daies Southerly, not going farre from the Coast, which was peopled with Negroes, who upon sight of us fled away, and spake so, as the Lixitae that were with us understood them not ; the last day we arrived at a Mountaine full of great trees, the wood whereof was odoriferous, and of various colours. Having now coasted two daies by this mountaine, wee found a deepe and troublesome race of Sea ; on the side whereof towards the land was a plaine,

where by night we saw fires kindled on every side, distant CHAP. II one from the other some more some lesse. Having watered here, we sailed by the land five daies, so that we arrived in a great Bay, which our interpreters said was called Hesperus his horne (the western horn). In this there was a great Island, and in the Island a lake, which seemed a sea, and in this there was another Island ; where having landed, by day wee saw nothing but woods, but in the night many fires were kindled, and we heard Phifes and the noise and sound of cimbals and drummes, and besides infinite shouts ; so that wee were exceedingly afraid, and our diviners commanded us to abandon the island : then swiftly sailing from thence, we passed by a countrie smelling of spices ; from which some fierie rivers fall into the sea, and the land is so hot that men are not able to goe in it ; therefore being somewhat affrighted, we suddenly hoised out our sailes, and running along in the maine the space of four daies, we saw by night the countrie full of flames, and in the middest an exceeding high fire, greater than all the rest, which seemed to reach unto the Starres : but wee saw this after in the day time, which was a very loftie mountaine, called the Chariot of the Gods. But having sailed three daies by fierie rivers, we arrived in a gulfe called Notuceras, that is, the South Horne : in the inner part thereof there was a little island like unto the first, which had a lake in it, and in that there was another Island full of savage men, but the women were more ; they had their bodies all over hairie, and of our interpreters they were called Gorgones (Gorillæ) : we pursued the Men but could take none, for they fled into precipices and defended themselves with stones ; but we tooke three of the Women, which did nothing but bite and scratch those that led them, and would not follow them. Therefore they killed them and fled them, and brought their skins to Carthage : and because Victuals failed us we sailed no further.”¹

This portion of the voyage is less easy to limit than the earlier part, and various estimates of its extent and

¹ Clarke, p. clxx.

CHAP. II the positions of the Western and Southern Horns have been given by different commentators. D'Anville says the Western Horn is Cape Roxo and the Southern one Cape St. Anne or the point of Sherbro Sound. M. de Bougainville, on the other hand, fixes Cape Palmas as the Western and Cape Three Points as the Southern Horn, while Major Rennel thinks Sherbro Island was the island of the Gorillæ, and practically limits the extent of the voyage to Sierra Leone. But though there are mountains here, some indeed reaching a height of about 2,600 ft., they have been pronounced non-volcanic. Others again believe that Hanno reached the Gaboon and Congo ; while some geographers have argued that he never got beyond the Moroccan coast, and others even say he reached the Cape of Good Hope. Several of these writers had no personal acquaintance with the West African coast ; but those who know it best incline to the belief that Hanno reached the Cameroons, even if he got no farther.

Apart from the question of time, there are other difficulties ; the chief of which seems to be to decide what Hanno himself really means by the different things he says. In the first place, there is some doubt about the meaning implied by the term "horn." Much confusion seems to have arisen through some commentators having confined this term to promontories, whereas the word "keras" was usually applied by the Greeks to arms of the sea. A passage in Hampton's translation of Polybius shows the sense in which it was then used. In describing the current in the Bosphorus, he says :—" It is once more hurried back to Asia to the place called Bos ; and lastly falling back again from Bos it directs its course towards Byzantium, and there, breaking into eddies, a small part of it winds itself into a pool which is called the horn." The islands mentioned in the great bay at the Western Horn were probably low-lying alluvial tracts, whose conformation would, in the course of centuries, be liable to very great alterations. They might even become joined to the mainland and cease to exist. The island of the gorillæ, however, seems to have been of a much more permanent

character, for precipices are mentioned in it which certainly do not occur on the alluvial islands found in lagoons and river deltas. CHAP. II

Then there is the question whether the Gorgones mentioned in the Periplus were identical with the species now known as gorillæ, or were in reality baboons, chimpanzees or some other large species of ape. When the modern gorilla was discovered in 1846 it was so named because it was believed that it was the species that had been described by Hanno. The way in which the males are said to have fled up the mountains and thrown stones is very suggestive of baboons, the females of which would equally have fulfilled the conditions of biting and scratching their captors, and would, moreover, have been far more readily taken than genuine gorillæ. In fact the capture of three living and possibly full-grown specimens of the true gorilla would be an undertaking of considerable magnitude and danger even at the present day. Even assuming that these animals really were gorillæ, it is quite unnecessary to conclude that the species was then confined within the same geographical limits as now. We know that many African animals were common, even within the last few centuries, in places where they would certainly never be found at the present time. Bosman, writing about 1700, describes how the tracks of thousands of antelope, elephants and other animals were to be seen in the neighbourhood of Takoradi and Sekondi; while around Axim and the River Ankobra several elephants were killed daily. One indeed was killed close to the fort at Accra and at least three at Elmina, one of them in the town itself. Elephants could not now be found within many days' march of these places; and if this change has occurred within the comparatively short space of a couple of centuries, how much more may the distribution of the gorilla have been altered during a period of between two and three thousand years. The probability is, however, that these Gorgones were merely baboons or chimpanzees.

Then there is the distance travelled by the ships of those times in a day's sail to be considered. Rennel has

CHAP. II collected several examples in his *Geography* of Herodotus giving the rate of sailing of the best constructed ships of the Phœnicians, Greeks and Egyptians. He gives eight examples, and, taking the mean of these, a day's sail works out at thirty-seven miles. A great deal, however, must depend upon winds and currents, and Hanno would naturally have had to regulate the speed of his whole fleet by that of his slowest vessel, so that it is impossible to draw any accurate conclusions from times alone. Moreover, great uncertainty exists whether the times given in the *Periplus* are either complete or correct. Obviously, then, it would be very unwise to place too much reliance on them as a means of fixing localities, though, when times are given, they cannot of course be entirely disregarded.

Consequently, with so extensive a field for conjecture opened up by this question of time, the possible uncertainty about the exact meaning of the term "horn" and the doubtful identification of the Gorgones, we are compelled to rely rather on the more definite physical features mentioned, and notably on the mountain of fire, the island with precipitous hills which was inhabited by some species of ape, and either promontories or gulfs, but preferably the latter, that will answer the descriptions given of the Western and Southern Horns.

Now to consider the second portion of the voyage in greater detail. Taking Cerne as having been satisfactorily identified with Arguin, about which there can be little room for doubt, and the Carthaginians having already explored the coast as far as the Gambia, we find they set out again from Cerne and sail south past a country inhabited by Negroes whose language the interpreters taken from the Lixitæ were unable to understand. This again clearly shows that they had already passed south of the River Senegal, which forms the northern limit of distribution of the true Negroes, whose language would of course be strange to the Lixitæ. Next they reach some mountains covered with trees. This is probably another reference to Cape Verde, for there are no other mountains except Dubrika until Sierra Leone is reached, and this cape is so

conspicuous a point and landmark on a West African voyage that it would not be unnatural to mention it again. The tree-covered hills of this cape, from which it derives its name, are cited as a landmark by all the early voyagers. Villault, in 1666, says "Cape Verde is one of the most agreeable places in the world for its verdure, the north part is mountainous and always covered with green trees."¹ Golberry, who wrote an account of his travels in West Africa during 1785-87, says of this spot "the baobabs, which are the most monstrous of all vegetables, grow here in great abundance. I counted near sixty of them towards the point of Cape Verd, among which there were many of a prodigious size ; their branches laden with foliage, give the Cape a very verdant aspect, and it is from these trees alone that it derives its name."² It is also given as a landmark in the *Merchants' and Mariners' African Guide* (1819), which says of the hills at Cape Verde that "the easternmost is thickly studded with trees."³ Having already mentioned the River Gambia, Hanno probably would not refer to it again, and the "troublesome race of the sea" may be the mouth of the Rio Grande, which he could hardly fail to notice.

After this they come to the great bay called the Western Horn, where they land on an island, but are alarmed at night by the sounds of drumming and shouting and by fires. This Horn at any rate is distinctly stated to have been a bay, and can hardly have been anything but the harbour of Sierra Leone, which is the finest on the whole coast. It also contains several low-lying alluvial islands beyond Tagreen Point. The fires and sounds which so alarmed the Carthaginians are capable of a very simple explanation. It has been the custom of the natives along the whole of this coast, from time immemorial, to clear land for their farms by setting fire to the low bush and grass at the end of the dry season, and it was probably these fires that Hanno saw "distant one from the other some more some less," or they may have been fires lit by the people to illuminate

¹ Astley, vol. ii, p. 376.

² Golberry, vol. ii, p. 37.

³ *Merchants' and Mariners' African Guide*, p. 14.

CHAP. II their dances in the evening. The drumming and shouting may be heard in any African village on a moonlight night.

After this they passed by the land "from which some fierie rivers fall into the sea, and the land is so hot that men are not able to goe in it." This so alarmed them that they went on for four days until they sighted the mountain of fire. These fiery rivers admit of two explanations. It was commonly believed by the earliest voyagers that the heat in the tropics was so great that no man could live there, and that the heavy surf they saw was due to actual boiling of the waves on coming in contact with the heated sands. For many years this surf was always referred to as "burnings," and Bosman, in his description of the mouth of the River Volta, mentions the "very high Burning of extraordinary violence, as well as lofty Agitations of the Waves,"¹ and the same author, when writing of the bad surf on the Slave Coast, says: "This Port (Fida) is so incomodious and dangerous; by reason of the horrible Burnings in the Sea, that we cannot land here without running a great Risque; but in April, May, June and July the Sea burns so violently, that according to the Proverb, he ought to have two lives who ventures . . . for the Sea-Burning is so violent and rolls so that a Canoa full of People is over-turned and the Canoa shattered into Splinters in a minute."² These statements about fiery rivers, therefore, may merely mean that the rivers they passed had bad bars, and have been inserted to explain why it was that they did not enter and explore them. It may be, however, that the passage was intended to be taken literally; for when the grass is fired at the end of the dry season the vegetation along the banks of the rivers and streams is usually too damp to burn and remains until later, when, if the stream has dried up and the grass is again fired, the rest of the land being already clear, the appearance of a veritable river of fire is produced. The four days mentioned probably refers to the time taken after leaving this land and not to that occupied in passing it also, which has been omitted; and if this is so, they might

¹ Bosman, p. 328.

² *Ibid.*, p. 337.

well have reached the neighbourhood of Benin. If this is CHAP. II really what they did, they would have had many opportunities of seeing fiery rivers of either kind, until they arrived off the dense mangrove swamps of the Bight of Biafra.

The Carthaginians now came to the great fire reaching to the stars, which they discovered in the morning was a "very loftie mountaine called the Chariot of the Gods." There is no mountain along the whole West African coast to which this description so aptly applies as to the Cameroons Peak, a volcano which is not even yet extinct ; and if Hanno really sighted it during an eruption by night he may well have felt alarmed. If the name "Chariot of the Gods" was not given to this mountain by the Carthaginians themselves, they must have obtained it from their interpreters. But the interpreters themselves would not have been able to understand the language of the natives, and would have been forced to carry on any conversation they held with them chiefly by means of signs. Hanno, too, must, as a rule, have communicated with his interpreters in the same way, for any knowledge of their language that he had acquired must have been very limited. In this way errors may very easily arise, and the one thing that is quite certain is that no West African used the word "chariot," for they have no knowledge of such things, and even to this day do not know what wheels are except in the coast towns or artillery stations. Even there, a Kru-boy or other African will almost invariably call a wheel the "cart's foot." Now the name borne by the Cameroons Peak at the present day is Mungo ma Lobeh, which can be interpreted as the Place or Throne of Thunder or the Place or Throne of the Gods.¹ This mountain, therefore, coincides both in description and in name with that which Hanno passed before reaching the Southern Horn.

The Southern Horn is plainly described as a gulf containing the island of the Gorgones. This island was evidently no mere sandbank such as might disappear in the

¹ Kingsley, *West African Studies*, p. 236 (1st edition).

CHAP. II course of a few centuries. Now the number of really permanent islands in this part of the world is very limited, and the choice on this particular part of the coast is reduced to two, Fernando Po and Corisco. The former lies too far out to sea to have been described by Hanno as being in a gulf, but Corisco, standing in the entrance to Corisco Bay, is a rocky, wooded island with some small precipitous cliffs along its shore and with mountains, lakes and miniature rivers inland. In fact it answers the description admirably.

Now there is nothing in all this voyage to show that Hanno ever landed on the Gold Coast ; in fact, if its extent has been correctly estimated, he seems to have been too alarmed by the surf or bush fires that he saw even to have touched there to water his ships. The account, however, is of very great importance, because it is the only one that has been handed down to us, and because, whatever its actual extent, it shows the enterprising character of the Phœnicians, and proves that they had seriously turned their attention to West Africa. Their explorations were made primarily for the purpose of extending their trade, and it is quite certain that, after achieving so much as, at the very lowest estimate, was done by Hanno, they would have followed up this first success by further voyages, and have endeavoured to open up communication and trade with the natives. They would then have received gold and ivory in exchange for their merchandize, and, once they learned that these were obtainable on the coast and in very considerable quantities, nothing would have been left undone to foster and extend so profitable a trade. A very few voyages would have sufficed to show them that gold was most abundant on the Gold Coast, and the bulk of their trade would then have gone there. Therefore, though no accounts of any further voyages are now extant, it is not at all unreasonable to believe that they were made.

There is, however, other evidence on the Gold Coast itself which supports this belief in an ancient trade with a maritime people. There are on the Gold Coast certain peculiar beads, locally called Aggri beads, though the

natives can give no meaning to the word. These beads are highly prized and commonly valued at their weight in gold. The natives assert that they find them in the ground, and it is noteworthy that they have only been found in the western part of the Colony, where the best-known gold-producing districts have always been ; nor have they been found at any great distance inland. Their manufacture is a lost art. Many attempts have been made to counterfeit them on account of the high value set upon them by the natives, but easily detected imitations have been the only result. They are of different colours, either plain or variegated, and some have small flowers or other patterns worked on them or an appearance of mosaic. Similar beads have been discovered in some parts of North Africa, in tombs in Thebes, and in places in India to which the Phœnicians are known to have traded. It is also known that the Phœnician city Sidon was celebrated for manufactures of this kind. They cannot have been introduced by caravans across the Sahara, or specimens would surely have been discovered farther inland, and they must therefore have been brought by maritime traders, and none more likely than the Phœnicians, who made them. The remains of bronze lamps of antique design and arranged to burn a wick floating in oil have also been found in some old disused gold workings.

About the year 117 B.C. a Greek named Eudoxus, a native of Cyzicus, sailed from Egypt to India ; and on his return voyage, meeting with bad weather, was blown out of his course and driven on to the East African coast. Here, among other things, he found the wreckage of a ship with the figure of a horse carved upon the prow. Regarding this as something of a curiosity, he carried it away with him, and subsequently exhibited it in the market-place at Alexandria. Some pilots who saw it there identified it as the prow of one of the ships of the fishing fleet of Cadiz, which were all marked in this way and used to fish along the West African coast as far as the River Lixius.

Having found the wreckage of a ship peculiar to western

CHAP. II waters on the east coast of Africa, Eudoxus concluded that it must be possible to sail round that continent, and determined to make the attempt. Accordingly he went to Cadiz and fitted out one large and two small ships, in which he sailed down the west coast for some distance, but was then compelled to beach his vessels, because the crews, when they found themselves entering unknown seas, refused to go any farther. He persuaded them, however, to make another start, but then found he could not refloat his largest ship. At length he contrived to build another small one of her materials and saved all her cargo. Continuing the voyage, he reached a country inhabited by Negroes, which was probably Senegambia, and then a fresh mutiny broke out and he was forced to return. This failure, however, was not sufficient to extinguish his ambition. Fitting out two more small vessels, he again sailed south, but unfortunately never returned.

The wreck Eudoxus found on the east coast can hardly have been carried there by wind and tide after having been lost on its usual fishing grounds, though the possibility of this must be admitted. Nor is it known exactly how far Eudoxus went on his first voyage : some indeed believe that he sailed much farther than Senegambia, for he reported on his return that the natives spoke the same language as those on the east coast, and that before he turned back he was unable to obtain provisions. The language common to the east and west coasts at the present day is Bantu, which would not now be met with north of the Cameroons, nor is there any reason to suppose that it ever extended any higher. It is quite possible, however, that in those days, before the Arab invasion of North Africa, the Berber language may have extended right across this part of the continent. The accounts of the old Arab historians show that the Moroccan coasts were much more fertile in those days than now, and a determined man like Eudoxus should have had no difficulty in obtaining provisions until he got down among the mangrove swamps of the Niger Delta, or, if he really went

south of the Cameroons, until he had passed the Congo CHAP. II and reached the Kalahari Desert.

Though, therefore, there is no definite proof of trade or communication with the Gold Coast by the Phœnicians or any other ancient race ; there are, nevertheless, a number of facts which together furnish a considerable amount of evidence in favour of such a belief.

PART II

*THE PERIOD OF EUROPEAN DISCOVERY AND
SETTLEMENT*

1364 TO 1699

CHAPTER III

THE DISCOVERY OF THE GOLD COAST BY EUROPEANS

1364 TO 1482

THE earliest European discoveries on the Gold Coast 1364-1482 of which there are now any complete records are those CHAP. III made by the Portuguese. They first reached this coast in 1471, and in 1482 began to form Settlements, in which they remained for a period of one hundred and sixty years. It is by no means certain, however, that they were actually the first European nation on the scene. The French claim to have discovered the Gold Coast in 1346, over a century before the arrival of the Portuguese, and to have established and maintained a regular trade for many years. This claim of the French is most indignantly denied by the Portuguese and as stoutly supported by themselves. It is true that there is a certain amount of evidence in their favour, but it is of rather doubtful value. Consequently, the truth of this French claim has not been generally admitted. The Portuguese discoveries, on the other hand, are thoroughly substantiated, and there is no doubt that, whether preceded by the French or not, they were made independently. It is to them, therefore, that the credit of having been the European pioneers of the Gold Coast is usually given, and their discoveries will be dealt with first and the claims of the French considered later.

The progress of Portuguese discovery along the western coast of Africa was gradual and stimulated from time to time by various successes. Many years elapsed before the Gold Coast itself was reached, and its discovery was, in reality, only an incident in a long sequence of events.

1864-1482 These will, therefore, be outlined in order to show what
CHAP. III were the objects for which these explorations were undertaken, and how it was that the Portuguese were encouraged to persevere for so long.

The discoveries of the Portuguese were primarily due to the enterprise and ambition of Prince Henry the Navigator. He was the fifth child and fourth son of John I of Portugal and Philippa daughter of John of Gaunt. On his mother's side, therefore, he was English and a nephew of Henry IV and great-grandson of Edward III. Until the year 1412 the Portuguese had never passed beyond Cape Non ; but in this year Prince Henry sent a small ship to explore the coast, and another was despatched a little later. Cape Non was then passed and the coast explored as far as Cape Bojador ; but when they reached this point, the Portuguese were so alarmed by the strong currents and tremendous surf they found there, that they were afraid to venture beyond it, and maintained that they had now reached the limit of practicable navigation.

In 1415 Prince Henry accompanied his father to Ceuta, in the conquest of which he greatly distinguished himself, and was created Duke of Viseo. Remaining some time in Africa, he collected all the information he could from the Moors, and it was then that he learned for the first time of the existence beyond the Sahara Desert of a rich and fertile inhabited land where both gold and ivory were obtainable. This he was told could be approached either by land or by sea. The Mahomedans at this time had several States on the Niger, and were well acquainted with the Jallof country and Timbuktu. It was the account of their trade with these regions, the very existence of which had hitherto been unsuspected, that fired the Prince with the strongest desire to reach them. But this was not the only object of the explorations to which he devoted the remainder of his life. He was anxious to discover, if possible, a southern route to India in order to obtain for Portugal a portion of the valuable trade carried on by the Arabs and their Venetian agents, which had first been

founded by Alexander and Nearchus. Prince Henry was, 1864-1481 moreover, a very pious man and Grand Master of the CHAP. III Order of Christ. He believed in the now abandoned dogma that no heathen could be saved, and the propagation of the Christian Faith and the discovery of the kingdom of Prester John also formed part of his schemes. This rather mysterious person was said to rule over a Christian people. He had been sought in vain in Asia, and it was now believed that his kingdom must be somewhere in Africa. At the present time this kingdom of Prester John is identified with Abyssinia, whose Kings trace their descent from the son of the Queen of Sheba by Solomon.

Prince Henry, though only twenty-one, now retired from the Court and went to live on Cape St. Vincent, where the town of Sagres was built. It was a bleak and desolate spot, where a few junipers were the only plants that could survive the continual drenchings of spray from the waves that dashed against the foot of the cliff. The view of the wide expanse of ocean constantly inspired his thoughts and encouraged him to persevere. Here he established his dockyards and collected the most skilful navigators, the best shipwrights, and the most learned scientific men of his day ; and from here he watched his vessels sail from the neighbouring port of Lagos with the cross of his Order painted on their sails, and patiently waited to catch the first glimpse of them as they returned from the unknown seas they had been sent to explore.

In 1418 Prince Henry sent two naval officers of his household, Joao Gonsalvez Zarco and Tristam vaz Teixeyra, in a small ship to try to pass Cape Bojador. Before they reached the cape a heavy gale sprang up and blew their ship out to sea. In this helpless condition, having lost sight of their familiar landmarks, they had given themselves up for lost when they suddenly saw an island ahead, under the lee of which they cast anchor. This was one of the Madeira group, which they named Porto Santo. Hitherto the Portuguese had never done more than coast along within sight of land ; but this accident had demonstrated the possibility of navigating the open sea, and when they

1864-1482 returned and reported their discovery they were sent back CHAP. III in the same year with one Bartholomew Perestrello to colonize the island.

Prince Henry now met with great opposition from many sections of his own countrymen, who, for reasons of their own, were averse to the further extension of these discoveries. The nobility were afraid the wealth obtained by others from these new lands might weaken their own power and dignity, and the learned men dreaded having their long-cherished theories upset by newly discovered facts. The clergy seem to have thought the expenditure of a part of the funds of the Order of Christ on the problematical conversion of heathens who had yet to be discovered was hardly justifiable, and the jealousy of the military was aroused by the sight of honours being won by a profession they had always been accustomed to look down upon. There were many ignorant and superstitious persons, too, who loudly proclaimed that it was vain presumption to attempt to discover a passage round the southern extremity of Africa, which the best and wisest of the older geographers had always taught was impossible. They declared that any Portuguese who were rash enough to pass Cape Bojador would be turned into Blacks and bear this lasting brand of their folly. These absurd predictions had such an effect on public opinion that Prince Henry found it impossible to obtain crews to man his ships; but he was not a man to be easily turned from his purpose, and the success he had already achieved in the discovery of Porto Santo made him determined to persevere. About 1430, therefore, he sent Ferdinand Lopez d'Azevedo to Pope Martin V to point out the advantages that might accrue to the Church if his discoveries were extended. He succeeded so well in this mission that the Pope granted a Bull confirming the Portuguese in the possession, not only of the islands that they had already discovered, but of any lands that might be acquired by future expeditions also. He then silenced the objectors by blessing the naval profession and granting plenary indulgence to all those who might lose their lives in these attempts. These concessions

were subsequently confirmed and extended by Popes 1864-141
Eugene IV, Nicholas V, and Sextus IV.

CHAP. III

In 1433 Gilianez succeeded in doubling Cape Bojador and then returned and reported that, contrary to the general opinion, there was nothing to prevent the seas beyond that point being navigated. Accordingly, in the following year, he was sent out to continue his discoveries ; and with him, in a larger ship, went Alphonso Gonzales Baldaya, the Prince's cup-bearer. They reached a point ninety miles beyond Cape Bojador, where, on landing, they found the trail of a caravan and then returned. They gave the name Angra dos Ruyvos or Bay of Gurnets to the bay in which they had anchored, on account of the number of those fish that the seamen had caught. The next year, 1435, these same two men were sent out again and ordered to prolong their voyage until they met with some of the inhabitants of these new countries. They sailed another forty miles beyond the Angra dos Ruyvos, but saw no signs of any people. They therefore landed two of their number, Hector Homen and Diego Lopez d'Almaida, with horses. Neither of these youths was yet sixteen, but they rode boldly inland to explore : each was provided with a spear and sword, but they were not allowed armour lest they should be tempted to engage the natives if they met any. It was not until late in the day, after they had ridden many miles, that they espied nineteen natives all armed with spears, who, on their approach, fled and hid themselves in a cave, from which they found it impossible to dislodge them. The two adventurers, therefore, returned to their ship for assistance, and a party was quickly organized, which set out for the cave ; but when they reached it they found that the people had already fled. In commemoration of this excursion the bay in which they had landed was named Angra dos Cavallos or the Bay of Horses. Later, they reached Punto da Gale, where they found a fishing-net, but could see no other sign of any inhabitants, and then returned to Portugal.

During this voyage Gilianez had obtained some seal

1464-1482 skins, and in 1441 Antonio Gonzales was sent out to continue the exploration of the coast and get a further supply of these skins. Having shipped his cargo, this enterprising man took nine of his crew and marched inland by night. After they had gone about ten miles, they saw a man armed with two spears following a camel and easily secured him, for he was too astonished by this sudden apparition of white men to attempt to escape. On their way back to the ship with their captive, they fell in with a party of forty men and a woman, and, having separated the latter from her companions, secured her also. The next day, while they were getting ready to leave, Nuno Tristan arrived in another ship, and a second excursion was at once planned for the following night. They had not gone far when they again fell in with the natives, and after a struggle in the darkness, in which three of the Africans were killed, succeeded in taking ten more prisoners. They were taken on board, where it was found that an Arab who formed one of the crew was able to understand their language. He was accordingly put on shore with the woman to arrange for the redemption of the others. The Africans were naturally enraged by these captures and the loss of the men who had been killed in the affray over-night ; and though they came down to the beach in great numbers and beckoned to the Portuguese to come on shore and treat with them, the Arab called out, warning them that if they landed they would certainly be attacked. They therefore lay off in their boats, and the people, after throwing volleys of stones at them, went away. Gonzales then returned to Portugal with his prisoners, and Nuno Tristan, having first careened his ship, continued his voyage down the coast and succeeded in reaching Cape Blanco about three hundred and sixty miles beyond Cape Bojador. But though he again found fishing-nets on the beach, he could see nothing of any inhabitants.

The prisoners taken on this expedition were well treated ; and when it was found that three of them were men of some importance in their own country and willing to pay liberally for their release, it was decided to send them

back ; for the Prince believed that the accounts they 1464-1462 would give of the good treatment they had received at CHAP. III the hands of the Portuguese would do much to remove the ill-feeling of the people towards his sailors and materially simplify their future labours. In 1442, therefore, Gonzales returned with the three principal Moors, and, on reaching the coast, landed the chief one. He, however, no sooner found himself free again than he forgot all his promises and disappeared as quickly as he could without paying theransom, for which he certainly cannot be blamed. But he seems to have reported the arrival of the others ; for nine days later about a hundred of their people came to redeem them. They were given up in exchange for ten Negroes¹ from different countries, some gold dust, a few ostrich eggs and a buckskin shield. This gold dust was the first that had been seen, and the estuary in which it was obtained was named the Rio del Oro or River of Gold. It is difficult to over-estimate the effect it had in inflaming the zeal of the Portuguese for further discoveries and silencing their detractors ; for the sight of it opened up such vast possibilities of an extensive and highly profitable trade that there was no longer any fear that these explorations would be abandoned. Had Prince Henry died before this gold was obtained to prove the truth of his theories, it is doubtful if any further voyages would have been made ; for he was still generally regarded as a visionary, and it was due to his personal influence and determination alone that they had not been given up long before. In 1443 Nuno Tristan doubled Cape Blanco and reached the Island of Arguin, where he captured fourteen more natives.

These seizures of natives by Gonzales and Nuno Tristan constituted the foundation of the African Slave Trade ; for from that time forward it became customary for the captain of every vessel that passed down the West Coast to carry off a few of the people in this way.² Though it was not until the commencement of the sixteenth century

¹ They were presented by Prince Henry to Pope Martin V.

² In 1444 200 slaves were brought to Portugal, and the annual average importation soon rose to 700 or 800.

1864-1482 that this trade began to take definite shape, it was then
CHAP. III very quickly established, and eventually assumed such proportions that it over-shadowed everything else, and for many years afterwards maintained its position as one of the greatest curses ever introduced into Africa. It was a custom, however, which was not peculiar to the Portuguese ; nor did they originate it. Slavery, in one form or another, had existed from the remotest times, not only in Africa, but also among the Jews, Greeks, Phoenicians, and in fact every ancient race. During the Roman occupation of Britain, great numbers of the people were carried away into slavery to add lustre to the triumphal processions of their generals or to be done to death at their festival games.

About this time some merchants of Lagos, now fully alive to the importance of the Prince's schemes and the value of the trade that might be expected to result from his discoveries, projected a Chartered Company. The Prince granted their request, and the first East India Company was formed by Lançarot, Juan Diaz Gilianez, Estevan Alphonso and Rodriga Alvarez. In 1444 this Company, with the sanction of the Prince, sent out a fleet of six caravels under Lançarot, who reached the Island of Nar near Arguin. There he assaulted a village and captured not fewer than one hundred and fifty-five natives, afterwards taking forty more from some other islands near by. It is said that the object of the Portuguese in taking these prisoners was to obtain reliable information about their countries, but that the Prince had ordered all his captains to treat the people at all times with kindness and humanity and not to take more men than were necessary for this purpose. It is evident, however, that these moderate instructions were grossly exceeded by his officers, who had only themselves to thank for the unfortunate events that occurred a little later.

It is but natural that such high-handed proceedings should have been resented by the natives and have incensed them against the Portuguese, and, in the following year, Gonzales da Cintra was betrayed by an Arab interpreter at Arguin, and he and seven of his men murdered, while five

others only saved their lives by swimming off to the ship. 1444-1482 Prince Henry, therefore, sent three ships in 1446 under CHAP. III Antonio Gonzales, Diego Alphonso and Gomez Perez with strict orders to use every possible means to cultivate the friendship of the people and remove their suspicions and ill-will. In this they met with little or no success ; but on their return Juan Fernandez was left behind at his own request. By living among the people for a time he hoped to gain much information about the country and to win their confidence. This intrepid man, after suffering the severest hardships and living with the people as a slave, at length gained the friendship of an aged Moor, named " Huade Meimon," who treated him with some consideration. He was rescued about eight months later by Antonio Gonzales, and several of the prisoners previously taken by the Portuguese were ransomed at the same time. This voyage was very successful, and Gonzales returned with a considerable quantity of gold dust, besides ninety Negroes obtained from various places.

In 1446 Denis Fernandez sailed past the mouth of the Senegal River, near which he captured four natives in a canoe, and reached and named Cape Verde before turning back. Many minor voyages were made during this period, and in 1447 Nuno Tristan, sailing past Cape Verde, reached the Rio Grande, which he entered and began to explore in one of his ship's boats. He took twenty-two of his crew with him ; but after they had gone some distance up the river, they were suddenly attacked by eighty natives in canoes. They had doubtless heard of the kidnapping propensities of the white men, and at once poured in a flight of poisoned arrows, killing or wounding every man. Tristan himself and two or three others were the only occupants of the boat who were still alive when she drifted down to the ship, and they too died soon after being taken on board. Only four men out of the whole ship's crew were now left to sail her home, but after experiencing the greatest difficulties they eventually succeeded in reaching Portugal.

In this same year, 1446, Alvaro Fernandez sailed forty

1864-1482 leagues beyond the Rio Grande, when he too was wounded
CHAP. III by the poisoned arrows of the natives, but, " being possessed of an antidote," recovered and returned in safety to Portugal, where he received one hundred gold ducats each from the Regent Dom Pedro and Prince Henry as a special mark of their gratitude. After many other voyages of no special importance, and the first two voyages of the celebrated Genoese Aloisio da Cada Mosto in 1455 and 1456, Pedro da Cintra sailed with two armed ships in 1462 and discovered and named Sierra Leone, after which he sailed on and explored the coast as far as Cape Mensurado.

Before Da Cintra's return, Prince Henry had died in 1463 in his sixty-seventh year. The death of this illustrious Prince, the founder and moving spirit of European discovery in West Africa, put a stop for a time to further explorations of an organized character. His had been undertaken as a national work, but the only voyages that were made during the next few years were those of private traders and adventurers.

Though the records of his discoveries only extend them to the neighbourhood of Sierra Leone, there is some reason to believe that some of the expeditions he sent out went much farther and even penetrated south of the Line ; but whether the absence of records is due to loss or to the fact that the explorers were wrecked and could not return to report the extent of their travels, is doubtful. The latter, however, seems to be the most probable explanation. In 1525 Garcia de Loaysa, Knight of Malta, visited the Island of San Thomé with a Spanish fleet. He found it uninhabited, but saw distinct traces of its former occupation by the Portuguese. Besides many fruits and tame cattle, he discovered an inscription carved on a tree, as was the Portuguese custom, setting forth that they had been there eighty-seven years earlier—that is, in the year 1438, twenty-five years before the death of Prince Henry, whose motto " Talent de Bien Faire " was also carved upon the tree.

In 1469 King Alphonso V farmed out the Guinea Trade to Fernando Gomez for an annual rent of five hundred

ducats (equivalent to about £138) and an undertaking that 1464-1482 he would extend the discovery of the coast five hundred leagues farther south. Few details remain of the voyages made during this period ; but in 1471 Juan de Santerem and Pedro d'Escobar discovered the trade of Oro de la Mina, or the Gold of the Mine, somewhere in the neighbourhood of Elmina or Shama.¹ This is the first authentic record of Portuguese discovery on the Gold Coast. Fernando Gomez also opened a gold mine at Abrobi, near Komenda.² There was now a regularly established gold trade, and large quantities were imported annually from Elmina and Shama, a treaty of commerce having been concluded with the Chief of the former place. When his contract expired in 1474, Fernando Gomez was given the surname Mina by the King and granted a coat of arms argent, three Negroes' heads collared or and with rings in their noses and ears, in recognition of his discoveries.

CHAP. III

In 1481 John II ascended the throne of Portugal, and being thoroughly conversant with the Guinea Trade and appreciating to the full the great importance of the work done and progress made by Fernando Gomez, decided not to rely on the Papal Bull alone, but to build a fort on the Gold Coast to protect the trade from the avarice of other nations and safeguard the interests of Portugal. Accordingly, a fleet of ten caravels and two transports was made ready and loaded with all the materials necessary for the erection of a fortress and church, which were to be built at the place found most convenient for protecting the gold trade. The equipment was remarkably complete. Everything was provided from the ready-dressed stones for the foundation to the tiles for the roof and provisions for six hundred men. The command of this fleet was given to Don Diego d'Azambuja, under whom were the following officers commanding caravels : Gonzales da Fonseca, Ruy d'Oliveira, Juan Rodrigues Gante, Juan Alphonso, Diego Rodrigues Inglez, Bartholomew Diaz, Pedro d'Evora and Gomez Aires. Of these, the last was an attendant on Pedro King of Arragon, but all the others were officers

¹ Marmol.

² Ellis.

1864-1482 of the King's household. The two transports were com-
CHAP. III manded by Pedro da Cintra and Fernan d'Alphonso, and a smaller vessel went with them as despatch-boat to the squadron. They had 500 officers and soldiers and a 100 masons and other workmen on board.

This fleet sailed on the 11th of December 1481, and anchored off Elmina on the 19th of January 1482. There they found a Portuguese trader named Juan Bernardo, who had come to the coast for gold and had some knowledge of the people and their language. He was therefore taken as interpreter and sent to notify the Chief of the arrival of the expedition. He was told to arrange a meeting as early as possible, and particularly to impress upon the Chief the high rank and importance of his visitors.

Early the next morning, January 20, the party landed, carrying their arms concealed under their coats, and walked towards the spot they had chosen as most suitable for the erection of the fortress. There they hoisted the Royal Standard of Portugal on a high tree, beneath which they built an altar. Mass was then said and prayers were offered for the success of their plans, the conversion of the Africans, and the endurance of the church they were about to found. Everyone was splendidly dressed in order to make the greatest possible impression ; d'Azambuja wore a gold brocaded waistcoat and a richly ornamented gold collar set with jewels, and all his companions were clothed in silks.

The Chief was now expected, so d'Azambuja seated himself on a raised chair and disposed his followers in two lines before him so that they formed an avenue up which the Elminas would have to pass. The Chief, whose name is given as Caramanca—probably a corruption of Kwamin Ansa—now approached with his retinue. They wore monkey-skins or palm leaves hanging from the waist, but were otherwise naked. Their arms consisted of spears, shields, and bows and arrows, and on their heads were helmets made of skins and thickly studded with sharks' teeth. The Chief, who was preceded by his horn-blowers and drummers, wore plates and other ornaments of gold on

his arms and legs and a heavy gold chain around his neck, 1864-1482 while his hair and beard, as well as those of his subordinate Chiefs, were ornamented with small golden bells and other trinkets. The lesser Chiefs also wore gold chains about their necks, and each one was accompanied by two attendants, one of whom carried his stool and the other his shield. CHAP. III

After an interchange of salutations and compliments, d'Azambuja, through his interpreter, explained the object of his visit. He used every specious argument he could think of to convince the Chief of the advantages he and his people would derive from the friendship and local protection of so powerful a monarch as the King of Portugal ; and, while carefully concealing all anxiety and covetousness on his own side, laid special stress on the fact that the King's chief wish was to instruct the people in the Christian religion. Finally he asked Ansa's permission to establish themselves in his town and build a house, saying that though Baya the Chief of Shama and several others would think it an honour to have such a house built on their lands, yet the King had selected Elmina because he had been moved by Ansa's previous kindnesses to his people and wished to honour him alone.

This speech was listened to with great attention by the Elminas, and, when it was finished, Ansa sat silent for some minutes considering the whole subject and weighing the arguments that had been advanced by d'Azambuja in support of his request. He raised no objection to anything but the suggested formation of a Settlement, a project which he evidently viewed with suspicion and distrust. His guarded reply plainly shows that even in those early days the African Chief was as skilled a diplomatist as those of more recent times have so often proved themselves.

"I am not insensible," said he, "to the high honour which your great master the Chief of Portugal has this day conferred upon me. His friendship I have always endeavoured to merit by the strictness of my dealing with the Portuguese, and by my constant exertions to procure an immediate lading for their Vessels. But never until this

1864-1482 day did I observe such a difference in the appearance of
CHAP. III his subjects : they have hitherto been only meanly attired, were easily contented with the commodities they received ; and so far from wishing to continue in this Country, were never happy until they could complete their lading, and return. Now I remark a strange difference. A great number richly dressed are anxious to be allowed to build houses, and to continue among us. Men of such eminence, conducted by a commander who from his own account seems to have descended from the God who made day, and night, can never bring themselves to endure the hardships of this climate ; nor would they here be able to procure any of the luxuries that abound in their own country. The passions that are common to us all will therefore inevitably bring on disputes ; and it is far preferable that both our nations should continue on the same footing they have hitherto done, allowing your ships to come and go as usual ; the desire of seeing each other occasionally will preserve peace between us. The Sea and Land being always neighbours are continually at variance, and contending who shall give way ; the Sea with great violence attempting to subdue the Land, and the Land with equal obstinacy resolving to oppose the Sea."¹

This skilful evasion of the principal, if not the sole object of their mission, considerably disconcerted the Portuguese, and it required all the address of d'Azambuja, backed by presents and promises and veiled threats that if permission were withheld it might possibly be dispensed with, to induce the Chief to give a reluctant consent. His unwillingness was probably due in part to previous misunderstandings and quarrels with some of the Portuguese sailors, and to a belief commonly held by the Africans that Europeans were a people who had no land of their own, but were compelled to wander about the seas in ships until some fortunate chance enabled them to settle themselves in the country of some other people. Whatever his real reasons may have been, there can be no doubt that Ansa looked forward to the continual presence of the

¹ De Barros and Faria. *Vide* Clarke, p. 324.

Portuguese with anything but enthusiasm, and had a 1864-1482 pretty clear perception of his own interests. However, CHAP. III his consent once given, d'Azambuja lost no time in commencing operations, and Ansa as soon saw his misgivings justified.

The very next morning (January 21) the workmen were landed and preparations at once made for laying the foundations of the fortress. Seeing a large rock close at hand and convenient for their purpose, the Portuguese were beginning to quarry it, when they were suddenly attacked by the Elminas, who believed it to be the residence of the god of the River Benya. D'Azambuja ran towards them and managed to pacify them with presents and apologies, but not before many of his men had been wounded. This misfortune, however, was not allowed to delay the building of the fort, and the work was pushed on to such good purpose that in twenty days' time the tower had been raised to the first storey and the whole building was already sufficiently advanced to be capable of easy defence. This rapid progress had been made possible by the prepared materials that had been brought out for the tower, which only required fitting together. This is the tower which stands just beyond the draw-bridge at the main entrance to the Castle at the present time.

As soon as the building was finished, d'Azambuja sent back the fleet with a large quantity of gold, while he himself remained at Elmina with a garrison of sixty men as its first Governor, a position which he filled with credit for two years and seven months. The fort was named the Castle of San Jorge,¹ and in 1486 King John conferred upon it all the rights and privileges of a city, and an annual solemn mass was ordered to be said in its church for the repose of the soul of Prince Henry, to whose efforts the Portuguese owed their Possessions in West Africa. At the same time, the King added to his other titles that of "Lord of Guinea."

The site of the Castle was well chosen. It stands upon a rock forming the point of a peninsula, and is surrounded

¹ Saint George.

1864-1482 on two sides by the sea and on the third by a lagoon known
CHAP. III as the River Benya, which runs inland for some distance
almost parallel to the sea. The Castle, therefore, can only
be approached by land on its western side.

Such is the account given by the Portuguese historians
of the formation of the first settlement at Elmina ; but
although this is the one that is most generally accepted,
it is not, as has been mentioned already, the only one, and
the claim to priority of discovery which has been advanced
by the French must now be considered. That the French
traded to the Gold Coast shortly after the Portuguese
settled at Elmina there is abundant evidence to prove, and
the Portuguese themselves admit it ; but the question
now at issue is whether or not they were there in the four-
teenth century, long before the date of the Portuguese
discoveries and even before the time of Prince Henry
himself.

This claim has been advanced by Villault, Sieur de
Bellefond, who made a voyage to the Gold Coast in 1666
and 1667, and by the geographer Robbe, whom Ogilby
and others have copied. Their several accounts are in
general agreement. Villault says that in the year 1346
certain adventurers of Dieppe, who were accustomed
to make long voyages—a circumstance which he attributes
to their Norman descent—sailed down the West Coast of
Africa and established Settlements at various places,
especially in the neighbourhood of Cape Verde, where they
named a bay the Bay of France, giving the names Petit
Dieppe and Cestro Paris to Rio Corso and Grand Cess
respectively. He says they brought large quantities of
ivory back with them, and that it was at this time that the
ivory-turning and comb-making industry for which Dieppe
afterwards became famous was first established. He
goes on to say that the Castle of Mina (Elmina) was founded
by the French in 1383 and that they held it until 1484 ;
but that during the time of the Civil Wars in France,
from 1380 to 1461, this trade became so disorganized that
the Settlements were first neglected and ultimately
abandoned.

Robbe's account is that in 1364 the merchants of Dieppe 1864-1481 made several voyages to Cape Verde and Cestro Paris, CHAP. III and in 1382 combined with the merchants of Rouen to send three ships on a voyage of discovery beyond these places. One of these, *La Vierge*, arrived at Komenda on the Gold Coast, and afterwards sailed on to Elmina. He agrees with Villault that it was in the following year, 1383, that a fort or factory was built at this place and garrisoned by ten or twelve men. The trade prospered, and in 1387 a chapel was also built. This trade was carried on until 1413, when it was finally abandoned owing to the Civil Wars in France.

Such are the statements of these two authors, who unfortunately give very little information as to the grounds upon which they base their assertions. They say, however, that there still existed in Elmina Castle a battery—the principal battery towards the sea—known as the Bastion de France, and that a stone in it bore an inscription, of which all that was legible was "Anno 13—."¹ This they allege referred to the date 1383 when the place was built by the French. As further evidence in support of their claim, they mention the existence of places with French names and some knowledge of the language by the natives, who they say used a few words derived from it. The French are further said to have had Settlements at Axim, Cape Coast, Kormantin, Komenda, Accra and Takoradi.

Barbot, who was Agent-General of the French African Company in 1682, in discussing this question, decides against the French claim on the following grounds. "If this account be true, it is strange that no mention is made of it by other French historians, several of whom I have examin'd, and particularly de Serres and Mezeray. Such considerable undertakings, and so rich a trade, seemed to deserve a place in history. . . . The silence of the French historians in [sic] this point, gives us just cause to suspect the validity of this author's assertions; nor do I find in the history of Portugal, which is so full of the Portuguese

¹ Or MCCC- -.

1864-1482 discoveries of Nigritia and Guinea, the least mention of
CHAP. III their having heard of any Frenchmen that had founded
 the Castle of Mina, in 1383 ; or that Azembuja when he
 came to Mina in 1484 [sic], and begun there his first en-
 trenchment, ever saw or heard of any such castle built by
 the French an hundred years before." ¹

These reasons seem singularly insufficient for thus summarily dismissing all claims of the French ; for according to the accounts of Villault and Robbe, those voyages and settlements were made by private merchants, and not, as in the case of the Portuguese, as a national work. It seems most unreasonable to suppose that these independent traders, having at great trouble and danger to themselves discovered and founded a rich and profitable trade in a hitherto unknown country, would have been anxious, or even likely, to have advertised many particulars ; but far more probable that they would have been content with congratulating themselves on their good fortune and have endeavoured by every means in their power to keep it to themselves. A manufacturer at the present day who discovers a new and lucrative process does not immediately make a present of it to all his rivals but, on the contrary, takes every precaution to keep it secret. There are comparatively simple means of effecting this now, but in former times silence was the only safeguard, even as it is still the best. The absence of any mention of this trade by the French historians is not, therefore, very remarkable.

The fact that no French fort is mentioned by any Portuguese historian is equally inconclusive. These writers were dependent for their information on those who went to the Coast with Diego d'Azambuja's expedition ; and if they, going out to found a Settlement, suddenly discovered the existence of a fort built by another European nation long before the date of those discoveries of their own race in which they took such pride, it would be only in accordance with human nature, perhaps, if they decided to say nothing about it, but to keep all the credit

¹ Barbot, p. 10.

for themselves, rather than nullify the glory of all those 1864-1481 expeditions that had cost them so much.

CHAP. III

As against this possibility, it may be argued that the Portuguese would never have permitted a name or inscription pointing to such a previous occupation to have remained in existence during all the time they were in undisputed possession. But though this seems to be a sound argument, it is nevertheless a well-known fact that such careless mistakes are very frequently made, and the name Bastion de France might have been perpetuated by the Elminas themselves and not by the Portuguese at all. The inscription also amounted to so little, that it might easily have been overlooked or its defacement deferred until in the end it was forgotten ; or, again, it may actually have been defaced but the work badly done.

The existence on the coast of places bearing French names at the time of Villault's voyage is, however, of very little importance. Such names were probably given by the Rouen Company, which had Settlements on the Grain Coast in 1616, only fifty years before he wrote, but were afterwards abandoned. On the other hand, in favour of this claim, Villault distinctly states that he himself saw the ruins of the French fort at Takoradi,¹ upon which the Swedes had subsequently erected a fort which, in turn, was then in ruins ; and saw at Elmina "a fair Church still in Being, adorned with the Monuments and Arms" ² of France. He was also shown at Komenda the remains of the old French factory at the northern end of the town, and received a message from the Chief informing him that he had refused a flag that had been sent him by the Dutch General Willemburg at Elmina, on the ground that his country had always belonged to the French and that no other nation would be welcomed in it. The Portuguese and Dutch writers also complain of the damage done by

¹ These may, of course, have been the ruins of Fort Witsen, which was blown up by De Ruyter in 1665, but it is none the less a fact that the Chief and people of Takoradi still point to a hill at some distance from that on which are the remains of Fort Witsen as the site of a French fort that stood there many years ago.

² Astley, vol. ii, p. 375.

1864-1482 the French to their trade, and the preference the people
CHAP. III showed for them.

The chief interest in this dispute, however, centres around the inscription in the Bastion de France. As has already been remarked, and as might reasonably be expected, the French make mention of these things, while the Portuguese, on the other hand, are silent on the subject. They were both interested parties ; and Villault, as has been stated, did not write until 1666 and does not quote any authorities for his assertions. It is interesting, therefore, to note what a third party, writing at a not much later date, has to say on the subject. Dapper, a Dutchman, published a description of this Coast in 1686, less than fifty years after the expulsion of the Portuguese from Elmina, of which he gives one of the best accounts. He says : " Some years ago the Dutch restored a battery which is called the French Battery, because, according to the general opinion of the natives of the place, the French were masters of it before the Portuguese. There is engraved on a stone the first two figures of the number 1300, but it is impossible to decipher the two others. It had another inscription also carved on a stone between two pillars in a small room inside the fort, but it was all obliterated."¹ He goes on to say that there was yet another inscription over the door of the warehouse in the Castle, setting forth that it was built in 1484 under John II of Portugal, and that the figures of this date were so little worn that " they might only have been carved nine or ten years," and consequently the others must be assumed to be of great age. Farther on he describes how, after the expulsion of the Portuguese, the Dutch restored " the ruined battery which held the outworks of the Castle, and is said to defend the shore battery and river,"² and that as the soldiers in this battery could not pass into the Castle, except by " two flights of close on forty steps, the soldiers' lodgings were lowered by about 5 ft. and a long gallery constructed all round from the sea to the new bastion."³

¹ Dapper, p. 280.

² *Ibid.*, p. 281.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

Now if the figures in an inscription over the door of a 1864-1482 warehouse, where they would be exposed to the inclemency CHAP. III of the weather, only appeared to be about ten years old after the lapse of a couple of centuries, it is absolutely inconceivable, even after allowing for possible differences in the quality of the stone, that another inscription in a sheltered position in a room inside the fort should have been so defaced by time alone as to have become quite illegible after a period of only one hundred years longer. Consequently, great support is lent by this statement to the theory that there really was a French fort in existence at Elmina when the Portuguese arrived there under d'Azambuja, and that, in order to conceal this evidence of priority, they defaced the inscriptions, but did not perform this act of vandalism and deceit sufficiently thoroughly to prevent a part of the date of one of them being still decipherable ; and further, that the ruins of this old building were subsequently restored and incorporated with the Castle by the Dutch.

Labat, writing in 1728, alleges that there existed among the archives of Dieppe, a Deed of Association between the merchants of Dieppe and those of Rouen to carry on the trade to West Africa. This deed was dated 1365, but was destroyed in the fire which consumed the Town Hall in 1694, and consequently could not be produced in evidence.

Such is the evidence now available on this disputed point, which it must be admitted is somewhat inconclusive and meagre. But though it may be impossible at this date to decide with certainty whether the French had established themselves in Elmina before the arrival of the Portuguese or not, it is equally out of the question altogether to ignore the claims of the former nation. The account of the formation of the Portuguese Settlement has therefore been given first, merely because there is no doubt that it occurred and because it is the one of which we now possess the fullest particulars, and not because the French account is considered apocryphal or in any way deserving of ready dismissal.

CHAPTER IV

EARLY ENGLISH VOYAGES TO THE GOLD COAST

1482 TO 1592

1482-1592 Soon after the ~~Portuguese~~ had formed their Settlement
CHAP. IV at Elmina, the King sent to Pope Sextus IV and obtained a confirmation of the Bulls that had been granted to Prince Henry. This Pope added an injunction strictly forbidding any Christian nation to disturb the Portuguese in the possession of the territory that he had bestowed upon them, and even decreed that if they should discover any fresh countries within the limits he had assigned to the Portuguese, these too should belong to them. At this time the Pope's right to dispose of kingdoms was universally acknowledged, and his mandates were considered binding upon all European nations ; nevertheless, it appears that their violation was, on at least one occasion, seriously contemplated. In 1481 John II sent Ruy de Sousa as his ambassador to the English Court. He was accompanied by his surgeon and secretary, Joan d'Eluas and Fernam de Pina, and had orders to "confirm the ancient leagues with England" and to inform Edward IV of the King of Portugal's title to Guinea. He was to ask him to cause this to be published throughout his kingdom, so that none of his subjects might go there, and more particularly to request him to prohibit the sailing of two Englishmen named John Tintam and William Fabian, who were even then fitting out a fleet under the instructions of the Spanish Duke of Medina Sidonia. With all these requests Edward complied.

John, however, was not entirely satisfied with these

safeguards, and feared that if the great riches of the country became known, the greed of gain might be more than sufficient to counteract fear of the Pope's commands. He therefore spared no pains to keep the full extent of the Portuguese discoveries secret. He spread reports of the great difficulties to be encountered in making a voyage to Guinea, and alleged that each quarter of the moon produced a terrible storm, that the people were cannibals, that the shores were hedged around with dangerous rocks, and that such a voyage was, in fact, only possible at all in a ship of special construction which had been invented by the Portuguese.

Hence it is that very little is known of the history of the Gold Coast during the earlier years of the Portuguese occupation, and such knowledge as we have of the latter part of this period is mainly derived from the accounts of different voyagers who sailed there after the Pope's Bull had come to be disregarded. It is known, however, that about the year 1500 John II formed a Guinea Company, granting it a monopoly of the trade to the Coast for an annual payment of a "hundred pieces of gold," and making it a capital offence for any of his subjects to trade there without its licence. This Company for a time made very great profits and set up new stations at Axim, Accra and Shama, and a little later at Christiansborg and probably at Cape Coast also. According to all accounts, the Portuguese treated the people very badly, though it would be unjust to place implicit trust in everything that is said of them by other nations, who were doing their utmost to deprive them of their trade and oust them from their Possessions. It is certain, however, that they had frequent trouble with the people of different places, and had very little power outside the range of the guns of their forts, and that they often treated not only the natives, but also any Europeans who fell into their hands, with the utmost barbarity.

The Gold Coast at this time was held to extend from the Rio de Sweiro da Costa (River Tano) on the west, to Ningo on the east. It was split up into a number of


1482-1592 petty kingdoms and commonwealths lying along the sea-board, none of which extended any great distance inland.

CHAP. IV Commencing on the west, the country between the Rivers Tano and Manco was known as Adour and the kingdom of Ankober lay between this and the Rio Cobre (River Ankobra). Next came Atsyn (or Axim), which was bounded on the east at Akoda (Akwida) by the western frontier of Ante.¹ Ante extended from this point to about a mile and a half east of Zakonde (Sekondi). Between this place and the Rio San Juan (River Pra) were two more kingdoms, Adom or Little Inkassan and Jabi ; but on crossing the river the kingdom of Commani, Commendo or Guaffo was entered. This stretched as far as the River Benya or Salt River at Elmina. The present coast town Komenda was called Little Commany or "Ekki-Tokki," and it and the headland near it were known to the Portuguese as Aldea de Terres. It is still called Ekiteki by the natives. The capital Eguafu, which was then a large town said to have contained about four hundred houses, was distinguished as Commany Grande or Great Commendo. Fetu lay between the Benya and Queen Anne's Point, and Saboe between there and the Iron Hills. These last three seem to have been subdivisions of an earlier larger state ; for Barbot says the kingdoms of Commendo, Fetu and Saboe formerly constituted one kingdom called "Adossenys."² It is possible that the split may have occurred during the early years of the Portuguese occupation. Fantyn (Fanti) lay between the Iron Hills and somewhere near where Saltpond now stands. From here to the Monte de Diable (Devil's Mount at Winneba³) was Akron and from there to Beraku, Aguna. The country lying between this and Ningo constituted the kingdom of Accra. In the majority of these little States the towns on the sea-board were mere villages, the inhabitants of which were employed in fishing and making salt to supply the larger inland towns. The capitals of their Kings lay at some distance from the coast.

¹ Ahanta.

² Barbot, p. 154.

³ So called because it was believed to be the residence of the god Bobowisi.



EARLY NATIVE STATES SHOWING THE

after

D'Anville 1729

When the Portuguese first settled in Elmina, the town 1482-159¹ was divided into two parts under separate kingdoms, one CHAP. IV owing allegiance to the King of Eguafu and the other to that of Fetu.¹ The Portuguese, however, encouraged them to assert their independence, and, now that they had the Castle to protect them, they established themselves as a separate republic. There were three Town Companies in Elmina at this time, and their Chiefs ruled the town under the direction of the Portuguese Governor. They had to submit their decisions and resolutions for his sanction, and his right to approve or reject them was jealously guarded and went far to maintain the local authority of the Portuguese. The people were also assisted when necessary to avenge any wrongs inflicted on them by the neighbouring tribes, and were thus kept trained to war and made formidable to their enemies. But though the Portuguese found it to their advantage to encourage and humour the Elminas, they treated the people elsewhere with very scant consideration.

When the Guinea Company was first formed, the King caused the Castle to be further fortified and well provisioned, and reserved to himself the right of appointing the Governor and other principal officers. These appointments were made every three years, and were usually given to officers who had lost a limb or in some other way become unfitted for further active service while fighting in the King's wars against the Moors of Fez. The chief officials besides the Governor, were the Padre or Chaplain, the Viedor or Chief Factor, the King's Procurador or Judge and the Officer Commanding the Garrison. These and the Company's chief clerk had quarters in the Castle, but the soldiers, barber-surgeon and others lived in the town beneath its walls and only went there each day to do their work. The garrison was composed of criminals who had been banished there for life, and with such a rabble it is not surprising that discipline is said to have been very poorly maintained. Only the most negligent guard was kept, except when there were ships in the roads, when the

¹ Efutu.

1482-1592 sentries in helm and breastplace and armed with heavy
CHAP. IV halberds might have been seen pacing up and down the
ramparts. Two fleets of four or five ships each used to
arrive at Elmina in April and September every year,
bringing merchandize and supplies for the garrison from
Portugal. Elmina Castle, on account both of its position
and design, was a fortress of no mean importance. The
Portuguese had built two batteries on the side towards the
sea and mounted them with six guns each. On the land
side there was another six-gun battery, but towards the
north-east, facing the River Benya and a hill beyond it,
it was only defended by two small pieces of ordnance.
Towards the sea it was strengthened by the lower bastion
known as the Bastion de France, so the walls on this side
were of no great height ; but those to landward were very
lofty. The Castle was surrounded by a deep ditch ; but it
was only on the side towards the sea that it contained any
water. Here, however, it was deep enough to admit small
boats. There were two gates, one on the east and the
other on the west. The latter, which was the main
entrance, was furnished with a draw-bridge, and over it,
in d'Azambuja's original stone tower, were the Governor's
quarters. The other and lesser gate was next the Custom
House, and was only used for passing goods in and out
of the Castle. Some time before 1555 the Portuguese
built a little chapel on the hill over-looking the Castle from
the other side of the River Benya and dedicated it to St.
Jago. The hill itself still bears the name. A little later,
between 1555 and 1588, a small watch-tower was also
erected there, and a stone wall with a gate in it and de-
fended by a deep ditch and several guns was built across
the neck of the peninsula on which the Castle stands,
extending from the sea to the River Benya.

The first fort erected by the Portuguese at Axim¹
was built on a little point on the shore, but they were so
continually harassed by the natives that they were com-
pelled to abandon it. In 1515, however, they built a
second but far stronger fort on a small but high rock in

¹ Called "Achombene" in some of the older books.

the sea, which formed the rounded head of a peninsula 1482-1592 and was only open to attack on the land side, where it CHAP. IV could easily be defended. This side was strengthened with breastworks, a ditch 8 ft. deep and a draw-bridge, the approach to which was covered by several guns. There was also a spur capable of containing twenty men, with steps cut in the rock to connect it with the main building. This fort was named San Antonio. Though small and triangular in shape on account of the limited space afforded by the rock upon which it was built, it was, nevertheless, very strong, and had two good batteries towards the sea in addition to the land defences already described. It mounted several large guns besides smaller pieces.

The post at Shama was only built to supply the Castle at Elmina with provisions and firewood. Little if any trade was carried on there, and the place was afterwards neglected and fell into decay. In 1554 the Portuguese had a dispute with the Shamas over a man they had stolen, and drove them out of the town, fully half of which they demolished with their guns.

The fort at Accra was built much against the wish of the people, who dreaded the tyranny of the Portuguese and were anxious to keep them out of their country. They therefore took steps to remove them at the first opportunity. In 1578, some traders having arrived from the interior, a number of the Accras went to the fort, and having gained admission under a pretence of coming to trade, fell upon and murdered the garrison and razed the building to the ground. They subsequently invited the French to settle there, which they did, but were soon afterwards forced to abandon the place owing to the persistent hostility of the Portuguese.

Until the time of the Reformation, the Papal Bull had insured a monopoly of the Guinea Trade to the Portuguese ; but the change in religion had no sooner invalidated the Pope's authority in the eyes of other nations, than they began to compete with them. According to the accounts that are still in existence, the English were the first to undertake trading voyages to Guinea ; they were quickly

1482-1592 followed by the French however, and very soon afterwards **CHAP. IV** by the Dutch also. These intrusions naturally aroused the bitterest enmity of the Portuguese, who left no stone unturned to drive the new-comers off the Coast. It is from the accounts left of these early voyages, and principally from those of Towrson, that most of our knowledge of what happened on the Gold Coast at this period is derived. They were semi-piratical adventures in which ships were sent out by small syndicates of merchants ; and the captains divided their time between a legitimate barter of goods for gold and ivory or slaves and attacks upon one another.

The first of these English voyages was made by Captain Thomas Windham and Antonio Anes Pinteado, who sailed in two ships, the *Primrose* and *Lyon*, and a pinnace, the *Moon*, with total crews of 140 men. This Pinteado was a Portuguese, a native of the Port of Portugal (Oporto), who, on account of his skill in navigation, had formerly been a gentleman in the King's household and very popular, but afterwards fell out of favour and came to England, resolved to bring the English on the scene to avenge his wrongs. He is described as having been a very able and prudent navigator and an expert pilot, and it is on record that he had previously been entrusted by the King of Portugal with the "care of the Coasts of Brazil and Guinea against the insults of the French." From this it appears that, though there are no accounts of such voyages now extant, the French had made attempts to trade on the Coast prior to this voyage ; and if it is true that they had a prior claim to it, it may very well be that they did make efforts to re-establish themselves there after the Civil Wars, to which their former retirement is attributed. Windham, on the other hand, seems to have been a very ill-natured, quarrelsome and obstinate man, and to have taken great offence at the appointment of this Portuguese captain as his colleague.

They sailed from Portsmouth on the 12th of August 1553, Windham having first given a sample of his disposition by turning a relative of one of the principal merchants

out of his ship. On reaching the Gold Coast they carefully 1482-150: avoided Elmina, but traded along the shore both to east CHAP. IV and west of it and succeeded in obtaining 150 pounds weight of gold. There was no lack of gold here, and they might easily have bartered the whole of their cargo for it, a course which Pinteado advised. Windham, however, who had commenced to quarrel openly with Pinteado soon after leaving Madeira, insisted upon going on to Benin for Guinea-pepper,¹ and, when his fellow captain ventured to doubt the wisdom of this course owing to the lateness of the season, openly reviled and cursed him before the crew, saying, " This whore son Jew hath promised to bring us to such Places as are not to be found, or he cannot bring us to ; But if he do not, I will cut off his Ears and nail them to the Mast."² They sailed on, therefore, to the Benin River. Pinteado and some of the crew then ascended it for some distance in the pinnace and saw the King, who treated them very well and sent out ordering his people to bring in large quantities of pepper. Windham, in the meantime, was becoming alarmed at the high rate of mortality among his crews and sent for them to return, to which they replied that they now had large quantities of pepper and daily expected more. They therefore begged him to wait a little longer. This so enraged Windham that he seems to have lost all control over himself. He broke up Pinteado's cabin, destroying his chests, instruments and other possessions, and then sent him word that if he and his party failed to come back at once he would sail without them. Pinteado then hurried down and tried to make him listen to reason ; but Windham himself now died, and several of the officers and crew after cursing Pinteado for having brought them to so deadly a place and even threatening his life, insisted on leaving the Coast at once. It was in vain that Pinteado begged them to wait for those who were still up the river or to leave him one of the ships' boats and a sail to bring them home : nothing would content them but that they must start at once and he with them. He therefore wrote

¹ *Aframomum* ; much valued as a spice at this time.

² *Astley*, vol. i, p. 142.

1482-1592 to the men he had left, promising to come back later and **CHAP. IV** fetch them, and was then forced on board and grossly ill-treated, being put with the cabin-boys and half starved. He died broken-hearted a few days later. The crews were now so reduced that they had to sink one of their ships for want of hands to sail her, and on their arrival in England there were only forty men left alive of the 140 who had set out. Nevertheless, the great quantity of gold they had got in exchange for only a part of their cargo soon encouraged others to try their fortunes on a Guinea voyage.

One of the first of these was Captain John Lok, who sailed from the Thames on the 11th of October 1554 with three ships, the *John Evangelist* and *Trinity* of 140 tons each and the *Bartholomew* of 90 tons. He also took two pinnaces, but lost one of them in a gale before he had cleared the Channel. Passing Fort St. Anthony at Axim (which Lok calls Arra Castle), he reached Shama on the 12th of January 1555. Here he says the natives fired on them with their ordnance, "whereof they have only two or three pieces." This was a year after the Portuguese had had their dispute with the Shamas and destroyed most of the town, so that they may have already abandoned their lodge, as these smaller fortified houses at out-stations were called. In this case the Shamas may have been making use of the guns they had left there, but it is far more likely that it was the Portuguese themselves who were firing. Sailing on, they reached Cape Korea (called Cabo Corso by the Portuguese and now anglicized to Cape Coast). The Chief of this place was called Don John by the Portuguese ; hence these early writers often refer to it as Don John's Town. The people here were very friendly, and the English found a ready market for nearly all their cloth. In the meantime, the *Trinity* had been trading along the coast farther east, but the other ships now joined her and they then traded in company as far as Beraku. While the *Trinity* was at Kormantin, the Chief had come on board and invited the English to build a fort there, promising to give them land if they would do so. On the

13th of February they turned homewards, and two or three 1482-1592 days before reaching Cabo de Tres Puntas (Cape Three CHAP. IV Points) sent the pinnace to trade along the shore. This time they seem to have obtained a quantity of gold at Shama, where they had been fired on on the outward voyage, so that if the Portuguese were there then they must have left it now. Possibly, as no trade was done there, no permanent garrison was maintained, but the place was only visited from time to time. The return voyage to England occupied not less than twenty weeks. They lost twenty-four men in all, most of whom died after they reached the colder latitudes and especially after passing the Azores ; but they brought back over 400 pounds weight of gold, 36 butts of Guinea-grains and about 250 elephants' tusks, some of which measured as much as nine spans along the curve, were as thick as a man's thigh and weighed 90 pounds apiece. The elephant seems to have caused them the greatest astonishment, and they brought back a skull as a curiosity.

The natives of the Gold Coast at this time are described by Lok as follows : " Their Princes and Noblemen pounce and raise their Skins indivers Figures, likeflowered Damask. And although they go in a Manner all naked, yet many of them, especially their Women, are, as it were, laden with Collars, Bracelets, Hoops and Chains, either of Gold, Copper or Ivory. . . . Some wear one on each Arm and Leg, wherewith they are often so gauled, as to become in a Manner lame ; yet they will by no Means leave them off. Some wear also on their Legs, great Shackles of bright Copper ; which they think to be no less comely. They likewise make use of Collars, Bracelets, Garlands and Girdles of certain blue Stones like Beads.¹ Some of their Women wear on their bare Arms, certain Fore-sleeves, made of Plates of beaten Gold ; and on their Fingers, Rings of Gold Wire, with a Knot or Wreath, like that which Children make in Rush Rings. Among other Things of Gold, which the English had in Exchange, were certain Chains and Collars and Chains for Dogs. They

¹ Evidently " aggri " beads.

1482-1592 are very wary in bargaining, and will not lose the least
CHAP. IV Spark of Gold. They have Weights and Measures, and
are very circumspect in them. Whoever would deal with
them must behave civilly, for they will not traffick if they
be ill used."¹

In 1555 Captain William Towrson made the first of his three vogages to the Gold Coast. This, as in the case of the preceding ones, was a trading venture ; and two vessels, the *Hart*, John Ralph master, and the *Hind*, William Carter master, were engaged in it. Their cargo consisted principally of linen cloth and small basins. They left Newport in the Isle of Wight on the 30th of September 1555, and after trading for pepper and ivory higher up the Coast, eventually reached Cape Three Points on the 3rd of January 1556, having passed Fort St. Anthony during the night. They found some difficulty at first in getting the people to trade with them, for they were all afraid of being punished by the Portuguese, who, now that they found their trade declining, dealt severely with all those whom they caught buying from other nations, confiscating the goods and fining or enslaving the purchasers. At length, however, they anchored off a town which Towrson calls St. John's Town. This, from the description he gives of it, must have been Shama, the name being given it because it stood at the mouth of the Rio San Juan, as the Portuguese called the Pra. Here they traded very profitably. The people gave the Portuguese a bad name. They said they used to catch the natives whenever they could and keep them in irons as slaves in the Castle at Elmina, and would certainly hang any English or French whom they caught trading on the Coast. Towrson was also told that, instead of the four or five ships every six months that formerly brought supplies to Elmina, only one ship and a small caravel now came once a year. This in itself is sufficient evidence of the disastrous effect that competition and the counter-attraction of their newly acquired commerce with the East Indies had had on the Portuguese trade.

¹ Astley, vol. i, p. 148.

These people wore cloth manufactured from the bark 1482-1591 of trees, probably palms, and used cords and fishing-lines CHAP. IV of the same material. Some wore caps of this cloth, and others helmets made of skins, either basket-shaped or like a wide purse. They understood the working of iron, and made spears, fish-hooks, two-edged daggers and other articles of it. Some of these latter weapons were very sharp and curved like a scimitar. Their other arms consisted of spears and bows and arrows, and they carried shields made of bark.

Having been told at Shama that Don John the Chief of Cape Coast was then at war with the Portuguese, they sailed down and anchored off his town. Cape Coast at this time consisted of only some twenty houses, which were enclosed by a rush fence about 5 ft. high. The Fantis call this place Gwa or Ogwa, and a local tradition says that it was founded by an Efutu hunter of that name, who came down to the coast and first saw the sea from the hill on which the Wesleyan Chapel now stands. No boats coming off to them, they landed and were told that Don John had gone to the bush, but was expected back that night. Landing again the next day, they found he had not yet returned, but was expected hourly. Some men, however, had arrived in the meantime from Deviso, the town on Akwon Point, so called from its Chief having been named John de Viso by the Portuguese. They had brought some gold to show Towrson, and asked him to come down there and trade. He therefore went down in the *Hind*, and spent the next two days trading with them. This trade was carried on from the ship's boats, which lay off the shore, the people coming out through the surf in their canoes ; but, finding the natives kept pressing them to land, they suspected treachery and went back to the ship, whence they discovered thirty men on the hill with a flag, whom they took to be Portuguese. Towrson, therefore, went down in his boat to join the *Hart* off Cape Coast ; but before he could reach her she was seen to fire two guns and her boats came hurrying off from the shore. Hastening on board, he learned that some of his

1482-1592 men had been on shore negotiating with Don John and his
CHAP. IV sons to open trade, when a party of Portuguese suddenly
came down from the hill and fired on them as they were
making off in their boats. The people had tried to warn
them of their danger, but they had not understood what
they said and were taken completely by surprise.

Guns were at once put into the boats, which were
well manned and pulled towards the shore. The surf
was too bad for them to land ; so they lay off the beach
and opened fire on the Portuguese, who had now taken up
a position on the rocks. The fire was returned, but no
one seems to have been hurt ; and, as the Portuguese were
seen to be still in the town next morning, they went down
to rejoin the *Hind* off Deviso. Here they found the
Portuguese had punished the people for trading with them
by burning their town, and only six houses were left stand-
ing. They therefore went farther along the coast until
they came to a place which, from the description given of
it, must have been Kormantin.

The people here seemed afraid to trade ; but in the
evening the Chief came down to the beach and Towrson
sent him a present. Early the next morning they landed
and rigged up a tent with their oars and sail while waiting
for the people to come down. After a time the Chief
arrived ; but though he appeared friendly enough, he was
in reality betraying them into the hands of the Portuguese
and trying to distract their attention from a crowd of his
people who were standing in the opening of a narrow path
and acting as a screen for the enemy while they got their
gun into position. With this they suddenly opened fire ;
and before Towrson and his men could get the oars and
sail into their boat and launch her, they had reloaded and
fired a second shot. Fortunately, however, neither of
them did any harm, and having now got their boat into
the water, the English sprang into her and pulled off to
their ship as fast as they could, while the Portuguese fired
two more shots at them and the Kormantins also ran out
along the rocks and poured in a volley or two.

The cause of this treacherous attack by the Korman-

tins was that the year before, when Lok was on the Coast, 1482-159: Robert Gainsh, the master of the *John Evangelist*, had CHAP. IV basely seized the Chief's son and three other men who had come on board his ship to trade, stealing the gold they had brought with them and carrying them off to England. This disgraceful act had had the natural effect of turning the Kormantins against the English and making them friendly with the Portuguese, whom they had formerly hated. It was probably the cause of the unwillingness to trade that was shown by the people of more than one place during this voyage; for the fact that these men had been kidnapped seems to have been well-known all along the Coast, and a man had asked Towrson, when he was at Shama, what had become of them, and had been told that they were safe and well in England and would return as soon as they had learned enough of the language to be of use to the English in their trade. Had Gainsh himself suffered for his treachery, he would have had only himself to thank for it; but, as it was, the vengeance of the people fell on Towrson, who seems to have been a most honourable man in his dealings with the natives, who afterwards became very fond of him, so that his bad fortune was quite unmerited. Nor were these his only troubles; for a Portuguese brigantine followed him wherever he went to warn the people against trading with him, but was herself too weak to risk an attack on his ships. In spite of all these difficulties, however, he managed to get a great quantity of gold before returning to England.

A year later, in 1556, Towrson set out on his second voyage with three ships—the *Tyger* of 120 tons, the *Hart* of 60 and a 16-ton pinnace, commanded by himself, John Skire and John Davis. His experiences during his last voyage, however, had convinced him that he would have very little need to fear the Portuguese if he could but secure the good-will of the natives. Before leaving Plymouth, therefore, he arranged to take back the men whom Gainsh had kidnapped in 1554. They sailed on the 15th of November and had got as far as the Cess River

1482-1592 when they sighted three other ships. Thinking they **CHAP. IV** might be Portuguese, they at once cleared for action ; but on coming up with them, they found that the strangers were Frenchmen. On learning each other's nationality, the Frenchmen enquired what Portuguese the English had seen and were told none but fishermen : the French, however, reported that several Portuguese ships had recently been sent out to Elmina to protect the trade and that they themselves had taken and burned another of 200 tons only a short time ago, saving only her captain, one or two Negroes and a few of the crew ; but they had all been so severely burned that they had put them ashore at the Cess River.

The French officers came on board Towrson's ship and proposed that the two fleets should continue their voyage in company. Towrson and his officers carefully weighed the advantages and disadvantages of this arrangement, and, next day, dined on board the French flag-ship and agreed that " to whatever Place they came, they should be of one Mind, and not hurt each other's Market. To which End some of their Boats should settle the Price for all, and then one Boat make Sale for each Ship."¹

Having doubled Cape Three Points, they arrived on the 15th of January 1557 at a town standing on the shore of a bay. This, which they call Bulle, was probably Butri or perhaps Dixcove. The inhabitants were very pleased to see the Kormantins they had now brought back with them, and told them that there had been more than one fight recently between the Portuguese guard-ships and some other French vessels that were down the coast. From here they went to Hanta, which, from the sailing distances given, may have been Sekondi or Takoradi, where they heard that there were five ships and a pinnace then at Elmina. The Kormantins they had brought back with them were well known here, and they were consequently very well received. On the 17th they anchored off Shama, and, putting guns in their boats, landed with drums beating and trumpets sounding, fully

¹ Astley, vol. i, p. 163.

expecting to encounter some of the Portuguese. In this, 1482-1592 however, they were agreeably disappointed and were able CHAP. IV to do a good trade in peace. They promised the Chief protection from the Portuguese, and fired their guns and shot with their long-bows in order to give him some idea of their power, which greatly astonished and impressed him. All this time they had been keeping a sharp look out for the Portuguese and always went ashore prepared for battle and expecting to be attacked ; but though they heard some shots in the forest near by, which must have been fired by the Portuguese to frighten the Shamas and deter them from trading, they were evidently not strong enough to risk an engagement, and never showed themselves. Towrson, therefore, lay at anchor here for some time, sending his boats every day to trade at the different villages along the beach.

About a week had been spent in this way when, on the 23rd, the Shamas warned them that the Portuguese ships had left Elmina and were coming down to attack them. The English and French thereupon fired their guns and sounded their trumpets, while the Shamas implored them to show the Portuguese no mercy. Two days later, five Portuguese ships were sighted coming towards them, and the boats were at once recalled, but when night closed in the enemy were still a long way off, and in the morning they were seen at anchor. White scarves were then served out to all the English crews so that the French might distinguish them in case of boarding, and that night they anchored just out of range of the enemy. Next morning both fleets weighed anchor at about seven o'clock and the fight commenced. The Portuguese seem to have out-maneuvred the ships of the Anglo-French fleet, besides having the faster vessels and the better ordnance. They sailed past in succession and riddled the French flag-ship with their broadsides and carried away her main-mast, "neither was the *Tyger*" able to make a good shot at any of them, because "she was so weak in the Side that she lay all her Guns under Water."¹ The *Tyger* and the

¹ Astley, vol. i, p. 165.

1482-1592 Frenchman tried to run alongside and board some of the
CHAP. IV enemy's ships, but they were too fast for them and sailed
too close to the wind, so that they fell away to leeward and
were left behind. The other French ships would not close,
and the *Hart* lay far astern. The *Tyger*, therefore, seeing
the French flag-ship was disabled, crowded on all her
canvas and gave chase. Having followed the enemy out
to sea for two hours, they suddenly put about and fired
on her as they passed. All the other French and English
ships had now sailed away to sea, but Towrson still held
bravely on in pursuit of the Portuguese, in order to prevent
them from boarding and capturing the disabled French-
man. As they passed the latter, they each poured in a
broadside, but, the *Tyger* being still close astern, they
dared not stop to board her and seemed afraid to separate.
After they had passed the Frenchman, she too lay as close
as she could to the wind and followed the rest of the allied
fleet out to sea. The *Tyger* was thus left in the lurch,
but Towrson handled her so well that though the Portu-
guese tacked over and over again, he always contrived
to keep to weather of them, so that it was useless for them
to fire on her. These tactics were maintained until it was
so dark that in the end she lost them.

Next day Towrson came up with the other English and
French ships, except the French vice-admiral's ship
Leuriere, which had fled clear away, and upbraided them
with having deserted him. Most of them, however, were
in a sorry plight, having lost many of their men and sus-
tained other serious damage. The pinnace indeed had
been so badly knocked about that they had to take off
her crew and set her on fire. Ten days later, when they
had resumed their trade, one of the Kormantins whom
they had brought out with them came in a canoe, having
followed them for thirty leagues, and told them that after
the battle, which he had watched from the shore, the
Portuguese had put into the Pra, but the Chief of Shama
had refused to allow them to harbour there. Two men
had been killed on one of their ships by a shot from one of
the *Tyger's* guns.

They now seem to have returned to the Ivory Coast, 1482-1591 where they found trade very bad for a time, the people at CHAP. IV some places wanting too much for their gold, while at others difficulties arose out of their preference for the French cloth, which was a little wider and of slightly better quality than that which Towrson had brought out with him. The French and English ships, therefore, separated ; the French remaining where they then were and the English going farther east to the Gold Coast again. But a few days later one of the French ships rejoined them and complained that they could do no good where they had been left, but Towrson fired on her and drove her off. He now obtained plenty of gold for a time, and, among other places, seems to have put in at Komenda and sent some of his men to visit the King at Eguafu. Later, they arrived at Mowre (Mori), but found the place deserted, and heard soon afterwards that the people had removed to Lagoua (Lagu), probably to be farther from the Portuguese. On their way back to Shama they saw the five Portuguese ships with which they had fought lying at anchor off Elmina, and before returning to England were chased by another Portuguese fleet of two ships of 200 and 500 tons and a pinnace which had just arrived on the Coast. Five days after passing Cape Verde on the homeward voyage they were again attacked by a French ship, but gave her such a warm reception that she soon drew off, badly damaged and having lost a number of her men. A French trumpeter on board the *Tyger*, though lying ill in bed, " yet on this Occasion took his Trumpet, and sounded until he could sound no more, and so died."¹

The men who went to Eguafu, or whatever place this inland town was, brought back a wonderful tale of what they had seen, part of which at any rate was an obvious invention or exaggeration ; for they said it appeared to them to be as large as London, which, though a comparatively small place in 1556, certainly contained more than four hundred houses, which was all there were in Eguafu. They said they saw about a thousand ricks of corn and

¹ Astley, vol. i, p. 168.

1482-1592 millet, and that the people " keep strict Watch there every
 CHAP. IV Night, and have Cords, with Bells at them, stretched
 a-cross the Ways which lead into Town ; so that if any one
 touch the Cords, the Bells ring, and then the Watchmen
 run to see who they are : If they be Enemies, and pass the
 Cords, they take them by letting fall Nets, hung for that
 Purpose, over the Roads, which they are obliged to pass ;
 for there is no getting otherwise to the Town, by reason of
 the Thickets and Bushes which are about it. It is also
 walled round with long Cords, bound together with Sedge
 and Bark of Trees."¹

Towrson's third and last voyage was made in 1558² in the *Minion*, *Christopher* and *Tyger* and a pinnace named the *Unicorn*. They had no sooner arrived on the Coast and begun to trade at Hanta, than they were attacked the very next day by five Portuguese ships. A running fight ensued, but no great damage was done on either side. At Lagu they heard that there were four French ships farther down the coast, one at Perrinen (?), another at Weamba (Winneba), a third at Perikow (Beraku) and the fourth at Egrand (Accra) ; and, England being then at war with France, they decided to go down and attack them. They soon sighted one of the Frenchmen coming out of Winneba and gave chase, and the next day found three of the enemy together at anchor, one of which, the *Mulet*, they boarded and took. She had fifty pounds five ounces of gold on board, and when they had removed this and all her cargo they tried to sell her back to the French ; but they would not pay anything for her, because she was leaky, so they sunk her off Accra. The ships now cruised singly along the coast, but met with very small success, and at Mori and Cape Coast the people refused to trade with them at all. At Cape Coast the inhabitants fled into the bush and the English took several of their goats and fowls ; but when they landed at Mori they were stoned, and on returning the next day to get ballast,

¹ Astley, vol. i, p. 167.

² The date is given in *Astley's Voyages* as 1557, but this is an obvious error.

numbers of people attacked them and tried to drive them 1482-1592 on board again. Several of the natives were killed in CHAP. IV this affray, and their town was then burned. The ships were now running short of provisions, so they returned to Shama and Hanta ; but the Chief of Shama had now come to terms with the Portuguese, and refused to supply them with anything, and they in revenge burnt his town also. They did very little better at Hanta, for the people here would not trade with them either ; so they concluded they were not likely to gain anything by remaining any longer on the Coast and returned to England.

When Towrson was at Komenda, the King of Eguafu had asked him to send men and materials to build a fort in his country, and in 1561 a syndicate calling themselves the Company of Merchant Adventurers for Guinea, and consisting of Sir William Gerard, William Winter, Benjamin Gonson, Antony Hickman and Edward Castelin, decided to send John Lok out in the *Minion* to choose a site near the sea and report on the possibility of accepting this invitation. The *Minion*, however, was an old ship, and had been badly strained in a gale on her last voyage home, and Lok told the Company that even though she had been repaired, he did not consider her sea-worthy, nor did he believe that any amount of patching would ever make her so. He therefore refused to sail in her, and the project fell through.

A year later, however, in 1562, the *Minion* and *Prim-rose* were sent out by this syndicate, but their misfortunes fully justified the predictions of Lok. They were unable to trade anywhere on the Gold Coast, for the Portuguese ships followed them to Cape Coast, Mori, Kormantin and wherever else they went, and continually harassed them.

The favourite method of attack with the Portuguese was in galleys, in which they could creep up under a ship's stern as she lay becalmed and helpless and take her at a disadvantage. These galleys carried a gun in the bow and had eighteen oars on either side, to each of which three slaves were chained. Many of these wretched galley slaves were English or Frenchmen who had had the mis-

1482-1592 fortune to fall into the hands of the Portuguese, and now **CHAP. IV** had to spend the remainder of their short lives sitting in the broiling sun and tugging at the oars, with nothing to keep up their strength but a minimum quantity of the coarsest food and little or no hope of rescue or escape. Two men used to run up and down between the rows of slaves carrying whips, with which to lash them to greater exertions, and in the stern were a number of harquebusiers and crossbow men.

During the action off Kormantin, the *Minion* was attacked by two such galleys, which crept up under her stern, where they were safe from her guns while every shot from their own bow gun told. At last, by dint of great exertions, the *Minion*'s crew managed to get a demi-culverin into position on the stern, and during the next hour did great damage to the Portuguese. Many of them and the slaves were either killed or wounded and a cross-bar shot broke nearly every oar on one side of one of the galleys, so that though the *Minion* had lost several men, she was fully holding her own, when a barrel of powder suddenly exploded in the steward's room, injuring not only him but the chief gunner and nearly all his men as well. On this the Portuguese raised a shout of triumph, for the English were now dependent on their small-arms only, not having enough gunners left to work the gun. Soon after this, a lucky shot from one of the galleys carried away the foremast, and the Portuguese gave another great shout, thinking that now they must surely take the ship. Indeed the crew of the *Minion* had almost given themselves up for lost, when one of the white galley-slaves called out to them in English "not to give up, as it was better to die like men than lead a dog's life as a slave." Thereupon one of the Portuguese ran up to him and lashed him with his whip until the blood streamed down his shoulders and back, which so enraged the English that they swore they would never surrender, and poured in a close shower of arrows which killed both the wretched slave and his brutal assailant. Determined though they were however, they could not have held out much longer, for the

ship's stern was riddled with shot and fully half her crew 1482-1592
were either killed or disabled ; but one of the Portuguese CHAP. IV
ships, for some unknown reason, now sent a boat to recall
the galleys, and they, with half their oars broken and the
thwarts encumbered with dead and dying slaves, pulled
slowly away. With the help of the *Primrose*'s crew, a
jury-mast was rigged, and the ships, finding it impossible
to trade on the Gold Coast, sailed away. The *Primrose*
soon afterwards lost five men through the capsizing of
her pinnace, and by the time they reached England they
had lost twenty-one men dead and so many others had
been disabled that there were only twenty left to work
the ships, while even they were so ill and weak that they
could scarcely drag themselves about.

In the November of the following year, 1563, several
merchants fitted out two ships, the *John Baptist*, Laurence
Rondel master, and the *Merlin*, Robert Revel master, and
sent them down the West Coast to trade. They had not
gone far when they fell in with two French ships, one of
which they boarded and captured, selling her cargo at
Groine in Spain. Having arrived on the Coast, Robert
Baker, the factor of the *John Baptist*, and eight men went
to trade along the shore in their boat, intending to return
before night ; but a tornado unexpectedly coming up, the
ships dragged their anchors and were blown out to sea
and the boat's crew were forced to seek safety along the
shore. The next day the ships returned to pick up their
boat ; but, partly on account of the haze and partly
because they had mistaken each other's direction, they
missed her altogether, and after cruising up and down for
three days, concluded that she must have been swamped
and returned to England.

Thus stranded, Baker and his companions, having been
without food for three days, landed and bought some
yams and other provisions with some of their goods, and
then continued their search for the ships. In this way
they spent twelve days, living on yams, coco-nuts, palm
wine, fish, and honeycomb, which they occasionally got
from canoes that came off to them ; but, failing to see any

1482-1592 sign of their ships, they concluded that it would be useless
CHAP. IV to spend any more time in looking for them, and began to consider what they had best do.

They saw at once that it would be hopeless to attempt to sail their boat home to England without provisions, and realized that it would be equally out of the question for them to remain in her much longer. Exposed as they were to all weathers by day and by night, they could not last long ; indeed, they were already so cramped that they could scarcely stand and were beginning to be afraid that they would lose the use of their limbs. Scurvy had also broken out amongst them. Baker, who had been factor of the *Minion* when she was attacked off Kormantin, and consequently knew what to expect, now suggested three possible courses. First, they might go to Elmina and surrender to the Portuguese, when the worst that could happen to them would be to be hanged and so have an end put to their misery, or, if they were made galley-slaves for life, which was the most they could hope for, they would at any rate be supplied with food and drink. Another possible course was to throw themselves on the mercy of the natives ; but they knew very little about them and were afraid they might be cannibals who would kill and eat them forthwith, while, even if they escaped this fate, they thought it very doubtful if they would be able to exist on their diet and endure the hardships they must suffer from want of clothing and other inconveniences to which they had never been accustomed. Their only other course would be to stay in the boat, which they had already decided was impossible. Baker, therefore, recommended that they should go to the Portuguese, from whom, as white men and fellow Christians, they might reasonably hope for better treatment than they could expect from the pagan Africans.

Everyone having agreed to this proposal, they started to row to Elmina ; but, seeing a light ashore during the night and thinking there must be a trading town there, they anchored until daybreak and then pulled in towards the beach. There they saw a watch-house, with a large black

wooden cross in front of it standing on a rock, and beyond 1482-1591 this a castle. This proved to be the Portuguese Fort San CHAP. IV Antonio at Axim, of the existence of which they seem to have been ignorant. Some Portuguese now came out of the fort, and one of them, carrying a white flag, beckoned to them to come on shore. But though they had been bold enough at a distance, the sight of the Portuguese, now that they had reached them, caused the boat's crew to regret their decision to surrender, and they tried to make off. The Portuguese however, seeing their intention, fired one of their guns, the shot from which fell within a yard of the boat, and they, having no means of resistance, then pulled towards the beach as fast as they could. The nearer they drew to the shore however, the more furiously did the Portuguese fire on them, until they got under the castle wall, where they were out of reach of the guns. They were about to land, when they were greeted with a shower of stones from the walls of the fort and saw the natives coming down with their bows and arrows. Several of them had been wounded by the stones hurled down at them by the Portuguese, so they turned round again in sheer desperation and once more tried to escape out to sea. Four men rowed, while the others snatched up their bows and fire-arms and turned them against the enemy. Having dropped several of the Axims, they next began to shoot at the Portuguese whom they saw standing on the walls of the fort "in long white Shirts (or Gowns), many of which were soon dyed red by means of the English Arrows."¹ They were still near enough to the fort to be safe from its guns, and had already discovered that there were no galleys in the place that might be sent out to take them; they could therefore afford to laugh at the threats of the Portuguese and held their ground until they thought they had sufficiently punished them for their want of hospitality. They then rowed off, and, although they were greeted with another storm of shot as soon as they entered the fire zone of the fort, got clear out to sea without receiving any damage.

1482-1592 CHAP. IV They had now had more than enough of Portuguese charity, and decided to sample that of the natives. Having sailed about thirty leagues from Axim, they anchored off a town somewhere in the neighbourhood of Grand Bassam, where some of the people came off to them in canoes. Baker gave them each a present, and the Chief's son then came out to them, to whom they explained by signs that they had lost their ship and were starving. They were then invited to land, but in doing so their boat capsized in the surf ; the people, however, swam out and not only rescued them, but brought the boat and oars and all their goods safely to shore also. They were then kindly received and food was brought to them. For a time they were liberally supplied with everything, and Baker seems to have expected the people to feed and wait upon them for an indefinite period and complains because they did not do so. An European built boat, with her sail and oars and the goods that had been in her, must have represented an almost fabulous sum to these people and should have amply repaid them for anything they did ; but when they found the time slipping by and no ships came, as they had expected, they gradually reduced the supplies and forced the castaways to shift for themselves. The latter then suffered great hardships, but do not seem to have been very resourceful, for they made no attempt to build themselves a hut or make a farm, but slept around a fire on the bare ground and subsisted on any roots or berries that they could find growing wild. This kind of life soon told on them, and six of the nine died one after the other ; but Baker, George Gage, and one other survivor were ultimately rescued by a French ship, and, as England and France were still at war, were carried back to France and imprisoned.

The Portuguese were now thoroughly exasperated by the damage that was done to their trade by the continual presence of English and French ships on the Coast and took the severest measures to discourage them. In 1564, when the *Minion* was sent out again, they took her commander Captain Carlet, and a merchant and twelve seamen prisoners, and drove the ship off the Coast ; and in 1582

their guard-ships sunk a Dieppe ship, *La Esperance*, 1482-1592 killing most of her crew and making the rest prisoners. CHAP. IV They also offered a reward of one hundred crowns for every English or Frenchman's head that was brought to Elmina, which led the natives to kill a great many, whose heads were then stuck on spikes on the Castle walls. All prisoners taken were either hanged or kept in chains to work as galley-slaves for life ; but this last was their usual fate, for the Portuguese had no authority to execute without a special warrant from the King of Portugal, though it is probable that they did not hesitate to exceed their powers when it suited them to do so. The only exception to this rule was in the case of slaves who were caught attempting to escape, and a Frenchman who was thus taken was blown from one of the guns.

The Portuguese on the Gold Coast itself were still far too weak to be able to effect much unaided, but they now had an extensive trade with the East Indies and the passing fleets used to help the local Authorities. In 1588 too, Queen Elizabeth granted a Charter to the merchants of Exeter to trade in Senegal and Gambia, and in 1592 another concession was given for the trade between Cape Nunez and Sierra Leone. These Charters, by providing fresh and less dangerous fields for their enterprise, combined with the barbarous treatment meted out to them by the Portuguese, quickly reduced the number of Englishmen who would venture to the Gold Coast, until in the end these voyages ceased altogether.

The Portuguese would never open their warehouses until forty or fifty marks of gold had been brought, and if any of it was found to be mixed with base metal, the offender was immediately put to death or enslaved. Besides punishing any of the people whom they caught trading with the English or French, they often seized quite innocent persons, and either compelled them to work for them or sold them as slaves. The Slave Trade, in fact, made the early history of the Gold Coast ; and though the English were at one time as actively engaged in this traffic as any other nation, they were the last to embark in it,

1482-1592 and, in the end, not only abandoned it themselves, but CHAP. IV made great efforts to abolish it altogether. Slaves had been taken from West Africa to Portugal as early as 1434 ; but it was not until the Spaniards in 1470 began to import slaves into Spain, the Canary Islands, and later into the West Indies also, that this trade began to assume large proportions.¹ There was some opposition in 1503 to the importation of slaves into the West Indies on account of the great number of them who escaped into the woods and formed themselves into dangerous predatory bands ; but the rapid decrease in the number of Indians, who died in enormous numbers under the cruel treatment of the Spaniards, and indeed seemed likely to become extinct, rendered the importation of Africans to replace them absolutely necessary. In 1517 this traffic in human beings received the formal sanction of the Pope, which at once established it on a firm basis, so that by 1539 the annual sales had risen to over 10,000.

The Papal Bull, by which the Spaniards were excluded from Africa, did much to bring other nations into the Slave Trade ; for as the demand increased and the profits became proportionately greater, so the international competition for the Spanish contract became more and more keen. The slaves were employed in the mines and on the sugar plantations and also as divers in the pearl fisheries. These unfortunate people, as well as the Indians themselves, were often treated with the utmost cruelty ; and Las Casas, the Bishop of Chiapa, who was styled the Protector of the Indians and had himself advocated the establishment of a regular system of importing slaves in order to save the remaining Indians,² mentions an instance of the inhuman treatment meted out to them. He says : " I

¹ The Portuguese commenced this " carrying trade " to supply other nations in 1497.

² Permission was refused by Cardinal Ximenes (Regent during the minority of Charles V), but, after his death, Charles granted it, and by 1539 from 10,000 to 12,000 slaves were being sold annually in the Slave Market established in Lisbon under Papal sanction. Charles afterwards regretted what he had done and forbade the traffic ; but, on his retirement to a monastery, it was revived.

once beheld four or five principal Indians roasted at a **1482-1592** slow fire ; and as the victims poured forth screams which **CHAP. IV** disturbed the commanding officer in his slumbers, he sent word they should be strangled. But the officer on guard (I know his name, and I know his relations in Seville) would not suffer it ; but, causing their mouths to be gagged, that their cries might not be heard, he stirred up the fire with his own hand, and roasted them till they all expired ; I saw it myself."

The English took no part in this trade until 1562, when Captain (afterwards Sir John) Hawkins engaged in it on his own account, fitting out three ships and obtaining three hundred slaves in Guinea which he sold in the West Indies ; and although Queen Elizabeth expressed her disapproval on his return, saying " If any Africans should be carried away without their free consent, it would be detestable, and call down the vengeance of Heaven on the undertaking,"¹ the prohibition, whether sincere or not at the time, was soon afterwards withdrawn, for the Queen lent Hawkins one of her own ships, the *Jesus*, for a slaving voyage in 1564, and granted him a coat of arms in which a Negro loaded with chains appeared.² In 1562 or 1563 an Act was passed legalizing the purchase of Africans, though few Englishmen, if any, seem to have availed themselves of the permission. Their efforts to establish Colonies in North America had not yet met with sufficient success to create a demand for slaves, and it was not until some years later, after 1660, that the English Slave Trade seriously began.

In 1580 Portugal had become a province of Spain under Philip II, and these African Possessions were much neglected for those in America. This still further damaged the Gold Coast trade, and, as the profits decreased, the King reduced the supplies sent to Elmina, so that in the course of a few years the garrison became very much weakened and poorly provisioned, thus paving the way for its fall soon afterwards.

¹ *Hill's Naval History.*

² Hawkins perished miserably, as his Sovereign had predicted, during a slaving voyage in 1588.

CHAPTER V

THE ARRIVAL OF THE DUTCH AND EXPULSION OF THE PORTUGUESE

1592 TO 1642

1592-1642 THE Portuguese had no sooner got rid of the English
CHAP. V and French than yet a third rival appeared on the Gold Coast. In 1595 Bernard Ericks of Medenblick made the first Dutch voyage and succeeded in establishing very friendly relations with the people, who found his goods were both better and cheaper than those with which the Portuguese were in the habit of supplying them. This Ericks had once been taken prisoner by the Portuguese and carried to the Island of St. Thomas, where he learned for the first time of the rich trade they had on the Gold Coast. Some time afterwards he was set at liberty and returned to Holland, where he laid his information before some Dutch merchants, who accepted the offer of his services and fitted him out with a ship and cargo to make a voyage to the Coast. This first venture, having proved so successful, was quickly followed by others, until in the course of a few years the Dutch had established a regular trade with the Gold Coast.

This fresh competition immensely disgusted the Portuguese who, since they had had the Coast to themselves again, had not improved their manner of treating the people and were as much disliked by them as ever. In 1596 Elmina Castle itself was threatened by one Charles Hutsor, and they were compelled to demolish their original Chapel, which stood outside the walls, and build another inside the fortress. They did all they could, however, to

counteract the evil effect of the presence of the Dutch on the Coast, spreading reports among the people that they were mere slave raiders, setting a price upon their heads, and offering a reward for every one of their ships that should be betrayed into their hands.

1592-1642
CHAP. V

In consequence of these offers, many Dutchmen were murdered from time to time, though it is not likely that the people paid much attention to the character given them as slave raiders, for they knew by experience that no one was more adept at this than the Portuguese themselves. Amongst others, several Dutchmen were treacherously killed at Cape Coast, where the natives persuaded Captain Simon de Taye to send some of his men ashore with a boat under pretence that their Chief wished to come on board his ship to trade. They had no sooner reached the shore, however, than they were furiously attacked and all murdered, with the exception of two or three who succeeded in swimming off to the ship. In 1596 again, the Portuguese seized a Dutch ship off Cape Coast, killing most of her crew and sending the others as galley-slaves to Elmina, where they soon succumbed to the harsh treatment they received. In 1598 they engaged a negro trader named Voetian to betray a Dutch barque into their hands. Some of his people went on board in an apparently friendly manner, and by tales of the abundance of game to be had on shore, succeeded in inducing three of the Dutchmen to land and join them in a hunting party. So soon as they set foot on shore, however, they were seized and taken to the Governor at Elmina as slaves. Meanwhile, others of Voetian's men had remained on board and became so friendly with the Dutch sailors that they, suspecting no treachery, put their gun-matches out. The people then fell on them, killing and wounding many and throwing others overboard ; indeed, they would soon have made an end of them all, had not the ship's carpenter, who had been cutting wood ashore, returned on board and attacked them so fiercely with his axe that they were glad to save themselves by jumping into the water and swimming back to the beach. In 1599 again, five Dutchmen were be-

1592-1642 calmed near Elmina as they were passing to Mori by CHAP. V canoe. They were seen by the Portuguese Governor, who sent some Elminas out to take them. Having wounded all the Dutchmen and brought them ashore, the Elminas then cut off their heads and presented them to the Governor. These and their broken limbs were set up on the Castle walls as a warning to their countrymen, and their skulls were afterwards made into drinking-cups by the natives. In 1600 again, the Portuguese, aided by the Elminas, surprised another Dutch barque, but met with such determined resistance that they were compelled to beat a retreat. In the same year, too, the crew of a barque from Oporto, which had been taken by pirates, put in at Elmina for fresh water and provisions ; but though they were Spaniards, the Governor refused to supply them and threatened them with slavery if they did not immediately leave the Coast.

In spite, however, of the continued hostility of the Portuguese, the Dutch succeeded in doing what neither the English nor French had ever attempted and founded Settlements of their own on the Gold Coast. In 1598 they formed an alliance with the King of Saboe and established a lodge at Mori.¹ The Portuguese in revenge came by night and burnt all the fishing canoes ; but the Dutch, having thus gained a definite footing in the country, rapidly extended their influence and built two more lodges, one at Kormantin and the other at Butri. The lodge at Kormantin, however, was abandoned very soon afterwards because of the quantity of base metal that was mixed with the gold brought by the people, who then had to come over to Mori when they wanted to trade. The Dutch also supplied the Komendas with arms and ammunition and incited them to attack the Portuguese to avenge the attack they had made on the canoe at Elmina. The Komendas were joined by the people of Fetu, and the war that ensued lasted several months and cost the Portuguese about three hundred men, who were presumably

¹ Afterwards called the Cemetery of the Dutch on account of the great number of that nation that died there.

nearly all Africans ; but though they eventually managed 1592-1641 to come to terms with the Fetuses, the Komendas refused to CHAP. V owe any further allegiance to them, and the Dutch then built another lodge in their town. These early Settlements of the Dutch were mere fortified houses, and even at their headquarters at Mori the defences consisted only of earthworks which were continually being damaged by the rains and needed constant repair.

An incident which occurred at Mori just before the Dutch settled there shows the favourable disposition of the people towards them. In April 1598 some Dutch sailors landed there for wood and began cutting down some fetish trees, paying no heed to the warnings and remonstrances of the people, which in all probability they did not understand. The Moris, therefore, attacked them, killing one of their number and cutting off his head. The next day they brought the murderer on board and asked the Dutch to put him to death in the same manner ; but they refused. They therefore took him ashore themselves and beheaded and quartered him, and when the Dutch landed again soon afterwards, they found that their countryman had been decently buried and the murderer's head set up on a spear over his grave.

The Dutch did all they could to cultivate the friendship of the people, forming alliances with the different Chiefs, encouraging them to defy the Portuguese, and assisting them in their wars. When the Moris were threatened by the Chief of Atti with a much stronger force, the Dutch lent them two cannon and sixty or seventy muskets, which materially contributed towards the complete victory that they gained soon afterwards. It is true that this policy of inciting the people to resist the Portuguese had been tried by the English and French and failed ; but the greater success of the Dutch was probably due to the fact that they had formed definite Settlements in the country, which gave the people some guarantee that they would not sail away and leave them to bear the brunt of Portuguese vengeance as their predecessors had done. During the next few years the consistent pursuit of this policy and their

1592-1642 fair and just dealings with the people steadily increased
CHAP. V the influence of the Dutch, and that of the Portuguese was proportionately diminished.

There are two Castles on the Gold Coast—Christiansborg and Cape Coast—whose early history is shrouded in mystery. They will be considered in greater detail a little later, but may be mentioned here because they are both said to have been founded originally by the Portuguese. The different accounts, however, vary so much that nothing definite can be said to be known about the earliest history of either.

In 1621 Philip IV came to the Spanish throne. The Portuguese trade on the Gold Coast, however, had by this time been utterly ruined by the Dutch, who were able to sell their goods more cheaply on the Coast than the Portuguese could buy them in Lisbon. The new King, moreover, was far more interested in the growing trade with the East Indies than in the trifling profits that could now be expected from his Possessions in West Africa. Their wealth had paled before the newly discovered riches of the East, and he therefore neglected them even more than his predecessors had done. The Portuguese thus became so weak that they could seldom or never attempt to do anything outside the walls of their forts, though at one time, while they were still strong enough, they had not only claimed, but actually exercised sovereign rights over a great part of the Coast.

One of their last sources of gain was lost to them at about this time. This was the gold mine at Abrobi which had been opened by Fernando Gomez before the Castle was built and had been worked with few intermissions ever since. But by 1622¹ the hill had been riddled in every direction with badly shored up tunnels, and suddenly fell in, burying a number of the workmen beneath it. Djesi, the Chief of Komenda, consulted the Fetish Priests, who

¹ This is the date given by Ellis, but, since the Dutch are said to have had a lodge at Komenda at this time, it is possible that this disaster may have happened a little earlier. Ellis, however, is so uniformly careful, that it is very unlikely that he would have given a date at all unless he had some good authority for it.

declared that the catastrophe was due to the action of a **1592-164**
sasabonsum¹ who lived in the hill and resented being dis- CHAP. V
turbed. After this announcement no African could have
been induced to reopen or enter the mine, and it had
to be abandoned.

Ever since they first came to the Coast, the Portuguese
had been accustomed to obtain large quantities of gold
from the Ankobra district, and their fort at Axim had, in
fact, been built for this reason. Fear of the Awoins, who
were the only tribe on the Coast who used poisoned arrows
and who were opposed to any advance of the Portuguese
into the interior, had hitherto prevented them from
following up this river ; but now that their trade had been
ruined by the competition of the English and Dutch and
the Abrobi mine had had to be closed, they were forced to
make an effort to open up some fresh gold-bearing district.
To protect their prospectors from the attacks of the
Awoins, an expedition was sent up the Ankobra in boats
in 1623, and a small square fort, designed to hold a garrison
of about twenty men, was built on the left bank of the
river about fifteen miles from its mouth. It was called
Fort Duma, after a stream of that name which joined the
river there from the east. This was not accomplished
without opposition from the Awoins ; but they were
taken by surprise, and the Portuguese had laid their plans
carefully and took with them in the boats a number of
mantelets made of stout planks and about seven feet high.
These were set up around the site chosen for the fort and
effectively screened the workmen from the showers of
arrows that were sent against them when the Awoins at
last arrived on the scene. A desperate attempt was made
to carry the position by storm, and was only repulsed by the
fire of a gun mounted in the bow of one of the boats, which
created such havoc in the densely crowded ranks of the
enemy that they were compelled to fall back, leaving nearly

¹ Sasabonsum are a class of malignant and implacable gods, who inhabit silk-cotton trees or live underground where the earth is red. They are the gods who produce earthquakes or kill people with falling trees.

1592-1642 two hundred of their dead before the fort. Even the
CHAP. V Portuguese, protected though they had been behind their
screen of mantelets, did not escape unscathed. About
half a dozen men were wounded by spears in the final rush,
and two or three Ahanta labourers and a Portuguese
received arrow wounds. The latter all ended fatally
within a few days with symptoms of tetanus. After this
peace was arranged. The Awoins recognized the right of
the Portuguese to open mines in the neighbourhood of
their fort, and the latter undertook not to interfere with
any workings that were already in the possession of the
people. A rich vein of gold-bearing quartz was soon
afterwards discovered in a hill at Aboasi,¹ about five miles
from Fort Duma. This hill, however, was believed to be
the residence of a sasabonsum, and for some time no labour
could be obtained; but in 1630 slaves were brought up
from Elmina, and the Chiefs having been won over by
presents and promises, work was commenced. During the
next six years it is said that some 2,000 pounds weight of
gold was sent to Lisbon from this mine; but this is prob-
ably a gross exaggeration.

The weakness of the Portuguese gave the Dutch more
leisure to improve their own position on the Coast. Their
first act was to enlarge and improve their post at Mori,
converting what had been a mere trading station and
redoubt into a substantial stone fort, which, on its com-
pletion in 1624, was named Fort Nassau in honour of the
House of Orange. It was garrisoned by a strong force of
Europeans and native levies and the command given to
Adrian Jacobs. They also built a stone house or lodge on
the hill at Queen Anne's Point; but no trade was done
there, the flag only being displayed to prevent others
from settling there and damaging the trade at Mori.

The great ambition of the Dutch, however, was to
capture Elmina, and in December 1625 they made their
first attempt on it. The Dutch force consisted of 1,200 of
their own men, most of whom had been sent out for the
purpose, and 150 Saboes. It was commanded by Rear-

¹ Meaning "Under the rock."

Admiral Jan Dirks Lamb. A landing was effected shortly **1592-164** before sunset at Terra Pequena (Ampeni), a village about **CHAP. V** six or eight miles to the west of Elmina ; but before the Dutch had time to form up they were furiously attacked by a large force of Elminas, who inflicted a crushing defeat, the battle being over before night. In this action the Dutch lost nearly all their officers, 373 soldiers, and 60 seamen, besides their native allies, who were slaughtered to a man. Admiral Lamb himself was among the wounded, and was only saved by the Komendas, who opportunely arrived on the scene. This decisive victory must always stand to the credit of the Elminas, who that evening gave such convincing proof of their courage and loyalty.

In March 1629 the Dutch States-General established a West India Company and handed over to it all their Settlements on the Gold Coast, together with any other lands that it might acquire in Africa between the Tropic of Cancer and the Cape of Good Hope. The English, too, encouraged by the great success of the Dutch, had begun to renew an intermittent trade. In 1618 James I had granted a Charter to Sir Robert Rich ¹ and some merchants of the City of London for the formation of a Company to trade to Guinea. This Company was called the Company of Adventurers of London trading into Africa, and several voyages were made ; but the results not coming up to their expectations, the promoters withdrew from it and the Charter was allowed to expire. The next Company was formed in 1631 under a Charter granted by Charles I to Sir Richard Young, Sir Kenelm Digby, Nicholas Crisp, Humphrey Slaney and some others. This Charter gave the Company an exclusive right to the Coast trade from Cape Blanco to the Cape of Good Hope for a period of thirty-one years. The principal trade at this time was for slaves, the demand for which had been greatly increased by the colonization of the West Indies by the English and the introduction of slave labour into Manhattan by the Dutch. The English had hitherto been content to cruise along the Coast and get a cargo of slaves

¹ Afterwards Earl of Warwick.

1592-1642 wherever they could ; but the growing importance of the
CHAP. V trade now led this Company to establish posts on shore the
better to supervise it. They selected Kormantin as their
headquarters, and built a large stone fort with four bastions
there, and afterwards erected lodges at several other places
along the Coast. Nominally this Company held the sole
English rights to trade on the Coast, but in reality the
trade remained open and anyone who cared to do so went
there. The Company tried to stop these private ventures
whenever it came to their knowledge that such a voyage
was being planned, and in 1637 the *Talbot* was so stopped ;
but as a rule their efforts were of little avail, for the pro-
moters of such undertakings nearly always kept their
destination secret until they were clear of the last English
port.

On the 18th of December 1636 the western districts of
the Gold Coast were visited by an earthquake, which
caused the tunnel and galleries of the Portuguese gold
mine at Aboasi to fall in and bury all those who were
working in it, with the exception of a single soldier, who was
on guard near the southern entrance to prevent the escape
of any of the slaves and ran out just in time. The sole
survivors of the disaster were this man, Juan Rodrigues,
Fernan Diaz, and Pedro Gomez the engineers, and three
other soldiers. They had all been above ground when the
accident happened. That night they camped around the
ruins intending to leave at daybreak and report. The
Awoin villages, however, had shared in the catastrophe,
and the Fetish Priests of course attributed it to the ven-
geance of the sasabonsum of the hill and demanded
sacrifices to appease his wrath. During the night, there-
fore, they led the villagers against the little camp and
surprised it. Five of the Portuguese were at once secured,
and one of the others was shot down as he tried to make
off ; but the seventh, though wounded in the thigh by an
arrow, managed to escape. The prisoners were taken into
the still open southern end of the tunnel, and there bound
hand and foot and left as a propitiatory offering to the
outraged god, while the Awoins tore down the supports of

the tottering roof and rolled great boulders of rock over 1592-164 the entrance until it was completely closed up and un- CHAP. V recognizable. The wounded soldier who had escaped saw all this as he lay trembling in his hiding-place on the hill-side above, and next morning dragged himself painfully over the five miles to Fort Duma, where he died of tetanus from his wound. Here too everything was in ruins. The guard-room roof had fallen in, crushing three of the soldiers, and all that now remained of Fort Duma was a heap of crumbled masonry, in the midst of which stood a few pieces of rent and tottering wall. The surviving members of the garrison had been awaiting the return of the party from the mine, but when they heard the news of their fate they lost no more time in abandoning the place, and retired to Axim, where they found that Fort San Antonio itself had been much shaken and damaged and had its walls fissured in several places.

Their disastrous defeat at Ampeni had not made the Dutch any the less anxious to gain possession of Elmina ; if anything, the added desire to wipe out the disgrace of that first defeat had made them more determined than ever. Nicholas Van Ypren was now Governor of Mori, and had followed the policy of gradually weaning the people from their allegiance to the Portuguese to such good purpose that, with the aid of large presents and still larger promises, he had now succeeded in obtaining from nearly every Chief on the Coast a guarantee that he would join in another attack on Elmina so soon as a favourable opportunity should arise. It is said that he had even contrived to bring about a division among the garrison of the Castle.

Having thus paved the way for another attempt on the fortress, Van Ypren wrote to the Directors of the Dutch West India Company telling them what he had done and assuring them that, if they could now supply him with a sufficient force, he had every reason to hope that he would be able to capture the Castle. The chief reason for their anxiety to secure this place was that they already had Possessions in Brazil, and hoped that if they could establish themselves on both sides of the Atlantic, they would be

1592-1642 able to control the trade to the East Indies to the exclusion
CHAP. V of all other nations. Moreover, Holland was then at war
with Spain, of which Portugal had been a province since
1580, and the Dutch being unable to effect very much
against the Spanish troops on land, had to rely on harassing
the enemy at sea, where they were uniformly successful.

When Van Ypren's letter was received, Count Maurice of Nassau, a near relative of the Prince of Orange and Governor of the West India Company's Possessions in South America, was in Brazil with a fleet of thirty-two ships, including twelve men-of-war, on board which he had 2,700 picked troops. The news from the Gold Coast was, therefore, forwarded to him, with a request that he would detach as many men and ships as he could spare from his squadron and send them to Van Ypren's assistance. Count Maurice was so impressed with the importance of this scheme, that he decided to go to the Gold Coast himself. He took nine men-of-war, well manned and provided with large reserves of ammunition, and gave the command of the troops to Colonel Hans Coine.

This fleet arrived off Cape Lahou on the Ivory Coast on the 25th of June 1637, and, as soon as the ships had dropped anchor, a letter was sent to Van Ypren at Mori, informing him of the arrival of the troops and asking him to choose a suitable spot for their disembarkation. He was warned to keep their arrival secret, especially from the English, lest they should suspect their object and do something to thwart them. The fleet then sailed down to Assini, where Count Maurice had arranged to await the Governor's reply. Here an unforeseen difficulty arose, for the people naturally concluded the ships had come to trade, and came off in eighteen canoes to barter their ivory. But the Dutch had no trade goods with them, and had to put them off from day to day, while they sent another urgent message to Van Ypren begging him to complete his preparations with the least possible delay; for they now lived in continual dread that the people would suspect and reveal their object and possibly ruin the expedition by giving the Portuguese time to prepare for their defence or

raising the opposition of the English. These fears, however, were groundless : the people believed they were putting them off in order to obtain better prices, and a few days later came out and said that their Fetish had revealed to them that there were seven other ships on their way to the Coast, which would soon arrive and ruin the trade of the Dutch.

Van Ypren's reply now arrived instructing Count Maurice to bring his fleet to Komenda, where he promised to join him. In the meantime, Van Ypren had secured the alliance of the Komendas by promising them large rewards if the Castle should be taken, and by the time the fleet arrived there they were ready to join it in 200 canoes. The combined fleets left Komenda on the 24th of August, and sailed down towards Cape Coast, where the troops were disembarked early on the morning of the 26th in a little creek about half a mile to westward of the Cape. This must have been the opening of the lagoon or salt pond at Free Town, which, though usually quite shut off from the sea, has been opened from time to time, and must have been permanently connected with the sea until the sand silted up and closed its mouth.

The Dutch force consisted of 800 soldiers and 500 seamen, besides the Komendas, who probably mustered between 1,000 and 1,400 men. Each man carried rations for three days. They advanced towards Elmina in three divisions : William Latan led the advance guard and John Godlaat the main body, while Colonel Coine himself commanded the rear guard. About mid-day they reached the Rio Dolce (Sweet River), where a halt was called to rest the men and give them an opportunity to have something to eat while the scouts were sent forward to find out the strength and disposition of the enemy.

It was absolutely essential for the Dutch to gain possession of the hill on which the Chapel of San Jago stood ; for this overlooked the Castle on its weakest side, and was the only position from which it could be attacked with any reasonable hope of success. But when the scouts returned, they reported that the hill was being defended by a force

1592-1642 of about a thousand Elminas which had been posted at its
CHAP. V foot. Four companies of fusiliers were, therefore, sent to drive them back ; but they advanced too far, and were so vigorously attacked by the Elminas that they were repulsed with heavy loss. The Elminas then seem to have imagined that they had already won the day, and, cutting off the heads of the fallen Dutchmen, carried them in triumph through the town. So many went to celebrate their victory in this way, that very few men were left to hold the position, and Major Bongarzon, coming up with a reserve detachment, quickly put this small party to flight with a loss of only four of his own men and ten of the native allies. The Elminas then realized too late that the battle had only just begun, and, hurrying back from the town, twice attempted to retake the position ; but though they fought well and inflicted some further losses on the Dutch, including William Latan and several more men killed, they were eventually driven back into the valley between San Jago and the hills behind it. The few Portuguese who had been with them at once sought refuge in the Chapel of San Jago and their redoubt, where they were soon afterwards attacked and forced to surrender.

Meanwhile, Colonel Coine had been having two paths cut through the bush, one leading to the summit of the hill and the other to the Sweet River, so that he could obtain fresh water and ascend the hill without using the path made by the Portuguese to their redoubt ; for this led up immediately in front of the Castle and was covered by its guns. Two pieces of cannon and a mortar were then brought up and mounted on the hill, whence fire was opened on the Castle and ten or twelve grenades thrown against it ; but they did little or no damage, as the range was too great. The Dutch, however, were perfectly safe where they were, for the Castle's only means of defence on this side were two small cannon mounted over an old walled-up gate, which were quite useless against an enemy on the hill. In the meantime, while the attention of the Portuguese had been engaged by the bombardment of the

Castle, the Komendas had been sent across the River **1592-1642** Benya to attack the town, which lay on the opposite bank CHAP. V under its walls, and, having advanced under cover of the banks of the river, now succeeded in driving off all the cattle and sheep.

Coine, who was anxious to avoid risking his men unnecessarily, could not however afford to delay, owing to the limited supplies that his men had with them. At day-break the next morning, therefore, he sent a trumpeter to summon the Castle to surrender, threatening to put all the garrison to the sword if they did not yield quickly. The Portuguese Governor replied that the decision did not rest with him alone, but that he must first consult his officers and people ; he therefore asked for a three days' armistice before giving his answer. Coine of course could not agree to this or his men would have been starving, and sent word that he would only give him one day. Next morning the trumpeter was again sent to the Castle to demand the Governor's answer, but the drawbridge was kept raised and the gates closed. Coine therefore brought up his whole force and, moving the guns nearer to the fortress, renewed the bombardment ; whereupon the Portuguese sent out two heralds with full powers to arrange the terms of capitulation.

These, which were shameful enough to the Portuguese, were agreed upon as follows :

1. The Governor, officers, garrison, mulattos, etc., to march out with their wives and children, but without colours or arms, and taking nothing with them beyond one suit of clothes each.

2. The Dutch to have all the gold, merchandize, slaves and other property then in the Castle, with the exception of twelve slaves, which were to be allowed to the Portuguese as servants.

3. The Portuguese to be allowed to carry away all those ornaments of their church that were not made of gold or silver.

4. The Portuguese to be put on board the Dutch warships and provided with the necessaries of life until

1592-1642 they could be landed on the Island of San Thomé
CHAP. V (St. Thomas).¹

Thus the celebrated Castle of San Jorge del Mina fell into the hands of the Dutch on Saturday the 29th of August 1637. A Dutch inscription over the main gate still exists recording the event, and a white stone let into the pathway leading from the bridge over the River Benya to the Castle marks the spot where the Portuguese Governor handed over the keys of the fortress to Colonel Coine. The garrison had been so reduced by death and neglect that only about thirty men were left to march out of the Castle, and even they were nearly all sick. The Dutch found very little gold or merchandize in the place ; but they took 30 good brass cannon, 9,000 pounds of powder, 800 cannon-balls and 10 casks of musket-balls, 300 packages of flints and 36 Spanish swords, besides a great number of axes, pikes and other weapons, most of which, however, had been much neglected and were very rusty. It was not want of ammunition, therefore, that had been the cause of the feeble defence made by the Portuguese.

Colonel Coine now left Captain Walraeven Van Malburg and 140 men to garrison the Castle while he went down to Mori to make arrangements for moving the Dutch headquarters to Elmina. At the same time, he sent a letter by canoe summoning the Portuguese Commandant at Axim to surrender. He hoped that the consternation following the fall of their principal stronghold would prove sufficient to ensure the submission of any other Portuguese on the Coast at his mere word ; but he soon found that this man was not such a poltroon as the Governor of Elmina, and the only answer he got was a defiant message challenging him to do his worst, the Commandant declaring that, as for himself, he would hold the fort for the King his master until his last breath. With this the Dutch had to be content for a time ; but in 1640 Portugal, taking advantage of the distracted condition of Spain, achieved her independence under the House of Braganza, and war

¹ There was also a provision that the life of a Dutch deserter named Herman should be spared.

immediately broke out between her and Holland on the 1592-1642 question of the possession of Brazil. It was during these CHAP. V hostilities that the Dutch attacked and captured Fort San Antonio on the 9th of January 1642, and by the treaty of peace concluded soon afterwards the Portuguese formally ceded all their Possessions on the Gold Coast to the Dutch West India Company in return for Holland's renunciation of her claims to sovereignty in Brazil.

The Portuguese version of the fall of Elmina is entirely different to that of Barbot and Dapper which has been given above ; but there is no difficulty in deciding which is correct. They say that a Dutch ship anchored in Elmina roads, either to obtain provisions or out of curiosity to see the place, and that her Captain became very friendly with the Portuguese Governor. They exchanged presents and entertained each other, and the Governor also purchased a considerable quantity of the Dutchman's trade goods on his own account, paying for them in gold. Before the ship sailed, the Governor invited the Captain to return as soon as he could with a large cargo, guaranteeing him a successful voyage and promising to have plenty of gold and ivory ready for him on his arrival.

The Dutchman now schemed to take possession of the place, and on his return to Holland laid his plans before the States-General. Their approval having been obtained, special short light cannon were cast and packed in boxes to represent cases of merchandize, and quantities of small arms and ammunition were made up into bales to appear like ordinary trade goods. These were put on board a ship with a small supply of the usual articles for the Coast trade and presents for the Portuguese Governor ; but instead of the thirty or forty men which was the usual complement of a merchantman of forty guns, 300 picked men sailed in her. Six months later she anchored off Elmina. Presents were sent to the Governor, and her Captain reported that, owing to want of fresh provisions and other privations, sickness had broken out among his men, who were nearly all seriously ill. He therefore begged the Governor's permission to land them and treat them in a hospital camp on shore.

1592-1642 Leave was granted and a site for the camp chosen on CHAP. V San Jago's Hill, where the sick men might reap the full benefit of the sea breeze. Tents were pitched, and the supposed invalids, and incidentally the cases containing the cannon, were carried up in hammocks. Engineer officers posing as surgeons accompanied them, and bales of arms and ammunition were landed as medical stores and other necessities. As it was found that the "sick men" complained of the intense heat and want of proper ventilation in the tents, it was next decided to erect barracks, a work in which some of the Portuguese soldiers themselves were paid to assist. These were so arranged by the "surgeons" that they could easily be converted into batteries. The Governor and Portuguese officers suspected nothing, being too afraid of possible infection to approach the working parties. They were, moreover, well entertained by the Dutch Captain and his officers, who did all they could to distract their attention from the suspicious number of loads that was being taken up to the camp. In two days' time all the arms and ammunition had been disembarked, and the Dutch then began to raise earthworks under cover of the temporary walls of the huts.

Their preparations were soon completed and the Dutch then invited some of the Portuguese to join them in a shooting party, and even borrowed guns from them, pretending that their own were still on board the ship. In the evening they entertained their guests to supper on the hill, and plied them so well with wine that they were unable to return to the Castle. During the night the temporary walls were taken down, thus uncovering the now finished batteries, and when the Portuguese awoke they were astonished to find themselves prisoners in a respectably fortified camp, with the "surgeons" commanding the plague-stricken crew, who now appeared as soldiers under arms and in the best of health. The Dutch Captain at once sent to summon the few Portuguese who remained in the Castle to surrender, threatening to butcher every one of them if they did not comply immediately. The ship at the same time stood in towards the shore and

prepared to bombard the fortress from that side, and the **1592-1642** Governor, deprived of most of his officers as he was, had **CHAP. V** no alternative but to surrender.

This ridiculous tale, invented by the Portuguese to cover the disgrace of their defeat, teems with so many palpable absurdities that it is utterly incredible. Their disposition towards all strangers who came to trade on the Coast, and the treatment they consistently meted out to them, are too well known to admit for one moment of the belief that they would ever have permitted any foreign ship to resort to Elmina and enjoy the privileges here described : and even assuming that the Governor himself had been bribed, it would still have been absolutely impossible for any of these preparations to have been carried out under the suspicious eyes of the other Portuguese officers. But in the case of the Dutch, the absurdity of the whole story is accentuated by the facts that they had a Settlement of their own at Mori, a few miles only from Elmina, to which they could have gone, and that they had already given unmistakable proof of their intentions by their attempt on Elmina only twelve years before this alleged deception. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the version previously given is the correct one. The only possible point that could be mentioned in support of the Portuguese story is the extraordinary similarity between the methods here attributed to the Dutch and those actually practised by some others of their nation in another part of Africa within recent times.

Though it is now over two and a half centuries since the Portuguese were finally driven from the Gold Coast, many traces of their 160 years' occupation are still to be found in words in common use and in geographical names. The Dutch and English, however, have left few such marks. This may be due to the fact that the Portuguese mixed more with the people than these other nations have ever done, but is more probably attributable to the perpetuation of the names originated by the Portuguese in a translated or slightly corrupted form. Examples of such words of Portuguese derivation are : *palaver*

1592-1642 (palabra), panyar (apanhar), fetish (feitiço), piccaninny (picania), caboceer (cabeceiro), and dash me¹ (das me).

Many of the old Portuguese geographical names, too, still persist, as : Gold Coast (Costa del Oro), Cape Three Points (Cabo de Tres Puntas), Cape Coast (Cabo Corso),² Elmina (San Jorge del Mina), River Volta (Rio Volta), River Ankobra (Rio Cobre), and many others. Many of the names used by them, on the other hand, have quite disappeared ; Ampeni is no longer known as Terra Pequena nor the River Pra as the Rio San Juan. It was the Portuguese, too, who first introduced cattle into the country and the prickly pear with which to fence their enclosures. They are also said to have brought Indian corn and the sugar-cane from the Island of San Thomé and the banana and pineapple from the Congo. It is also asserted that some parts of the funeral customs and other ceremonies of the people, especially in the neighbourhood of Elmina, show some traces of the influence of Roman Catholic ritual ; and this may very possibly be the correct explanation of their origin, for the Portuguese, so long as they were on the Coast, adhered to this object of Prince Henry, and maintained missionary priests to instruct the people in their religion. Nor were these the only missionaries on the Coast, for Barbot records the fact that some French Capuchine priests were sent out to Assini in 1635 " and at first made some progress among the people ; who treated them very courteously, and seemed to have some relish of Christianity ; but soon after, they scoffed at them, and their doctrine." Three of these men died at Assini, and the other two then " withdrew to the Portuguese near Axim, being no longer able to bear with the insulting behaviour of the Blacks, and their deriding the Christian religion."³

¹ Sarbah (Fanti National Constitution) thinks the derivation of "dash" is the Fanti " dasi " (thank you).

² A ridiculous corruption. The original name, meaning "cruising cape," was doubtless given to it from its use as a landmark by the Portuguese sailors.

³ Barbot, p. 305.

CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST ANGLO-DUTCH WAR

1642 TO 1672

THE Dutch greatly improved Elmina Castle. They re- 1642-1672
stored the Bastion de France, connecting it with the main CHAP. VI
building by a long gallery, and generally extended and improved the fortifications, until, in the course of a few years, the whole building had been very considerably enlarged. Having proved its weakness on the north-east, where it faced St. Jago's Hill, they set about remedying this serious defect as soon as possible. To this end they built a strong fort on the summit of the hill in 1638, which was planned with four batteries and a tower, whence watch could be kept over a wide expanse of country and ships sighted thirty miles out at sea. It was named Fort Conraadsburg¹ and garrisoned by an ensign's guard of twenty-five men, who were relieved every twenty-four hours. The greatest care was always taken to prevent the defences of this fort being inspected, and no strangers were ever admitted to it under any pretence, for the Dutch rightly regarded it as the key to the Castle. They also built a stone bridge, with a wooden drawbridge in its centre, across the River Benya, and cut a wide road from it to the new fort. Another battery was then constructed on this side of the Castle and mounted with six guns, which covered the road to the fort and were capable of being turned on the latter in case of need, and a second smaller battery was raised on another hill² as an additional protection to it.

¹ Now generally known as Fort St. Jago, after the hill on which it stands.

² Either Java Hill or St. Joseph's Hill.

1642-1672 Besides these material improvements in the defences, CHAP. VI a great deal of other work was carried out from time to time in after years. Stone walls were built along the banks of the River Benya converting it into a harbour into which small vessels could enter and, after passing through the drawbridge, refit under the guns of the Castle. Many fine stone houses were also built and some good roads made in the town rather later. Nor were these improvements confined to Elmina ; at Mori a half-moon was cut off Fort Nassau and the buildings further improved and strengthened, and in about 1640 or 1642 the old Portuguese lodge at Shama and their own at Butri were converted into small forts with four batteries each. The former had been called San Sebastian by the Portuguese, and this name was now retained by the Dutch, while the fort at Butri, which was built by one Carolus, was named Fort Batenstein. Other lodges were built at Anamabo, Kormantin, Accra and Corso (Cape Coast).

Very little is definitely known of the history of the Gold Coast during the first few years after the expulsion of the Portuguese, and a great deal has to be inferred from subsequent records in which mention is made of forts and Settlements then in existence at various places along the Coast and possessed by different European nations. At this time the enormous profits that were to be derived from the Slave Trade attracted others to the Coast, and the Danes and Swedes soon began to compete with the English and Dutch, so that in all probability many interesting but unfortunately unrecorded disputes and transactions took place. After the final conquest of the Portuguese by the Dutch, all their Settlements of course came into the possession of the latter nation ; but though we find some of these places occupied by others very soon afterwards, it is impossible to decide whether these changes were brought about by the reoccupation of posts that had been abandoned by the Dutch or by their forcible ejection from them. Thus important forts or castles are suddenly mentioned as being in existence at Christiansborg and Cape Coast, but of their origin next to nothing is

known, and there were doubtless many other lodges built 1642-167 at this time.

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Christiansborg is said to have been occupied first by the Portuguese, from whom the Swedes took it in 1645. At this time it seems to have been a fortified house rather than a fortress, and was known as Ursu Lodge. If it is true that the Portuguese were the first settlers there, this lodge was probably built after the demolition of their fort at Accra in 1578, and it is quite possible that they may have been here as late as 1645, for, though they had then lost both Elmina and Axim, the Dutch do not appear to have frequented the eastern districts of the Gold Coast until several years later.

Cape Coast Castle, obscure though its early history is, seems to have witnessed many changes. Reindorf, whose writings deal principally with the traditions of the Accra district, says : "Cape Coast Castle (the Castle at Cabo Corso) was built in the year 1652 by the Swedes. The foundation was laid by its commandant, Isaac Miville, a Swiss from Basel. The first name of the Castle was 'Carolus-burg' (Charles' fort). In 1658 it was taken by the enterprising Heinrich Karloff, a native of Sweden, then in the service of the Danish Company, and thus it fell into the hands of the Danes. . . . But unfortunately Immanuel Schmid, the successor of Karloff, surrendered the Castle . . . to the Dutch in 1659. After this the natives of Fetu (Efutu) besieged Cape Coast Castle and took it in 1660 ; but the Swedes retook it from their hands and kept it from that year to 1663, when the Fetus retook it from the Swedes by surprise and treachery. Now the English, Danes, and Dutch respectively endeavoured to get possession of it by negotiation, but all failed. On the second of May 1663, however, the Fetus voluntarily surrendered it to the Dutch. It had not been one year in their possession, when it was attacked by Admiral Sir Robert Holmes by land and by sea and captured on the third of May 1664."¹ Some of the latter part of this account is certainly incorrect, but this does not neces-

¹ Reindorf, p. 14.

1642-1672 rarely prove that there is no groundwork of truth in the
CHAP. VI remainder.

Ellis sums up what is known of the early history of this building as follows : " The question as to when Cape Coast Castle was built is involved in great obscurity. Smith, Surveyor of the Royal African Company, who visited the Gold Coast in 1727, says the Portuguese founded it in 1610 ; while Barbot (1687) says it was built by the Dutch shortly after the capture of Elmina. Neither of these gives any authority for his statement, and Barbot contradicts himself in two other places, saying in one that the Dutch ' had a pretty good fort at Cape Coast, which they bought of the factor of one Caroloff, who had built it for the Danish Company,' and in the other that ' Cape Coast is famous for the castle the English built there.' In any case Smith is in error, for there is abundant evidence to show that the Portuguese had no fort at Cape Coast, and Barbot's statement that it was built by the Dutch is directly traversed by the complaint made by the African Company in November 1662, in which it is said the Dutch had no factory at Cape Coast. There seems, therefore, but little doubt that Cape Coast Castle was built by the English, but at what date is uncertain. The probability is that it was built shortly before the formation of the Company of 1662, perhaps in 1662, for there is no mention made of it before January 1663."¹

The Portuguese author Vasconcellos, however, in his *Life of King John*, writing of the time when the Portuguese were still in possession of Elmina, and therefore prior to 1637, says of the Dutch that " they held without any other right but force, the fort at Boutroe four leagues from that at Axim, also the settlements of Kora, Kormantin and Aldea del Tuerto at Komendo." This Kora can have been no other place than Cape Korea, as Cape Coast was often called.

Meredith says the Danish force under Sir Henry Carlof (1657) " conquered the Swedish forts Carolusborg (now Cape Coast), Taccarary, Annamaboe, and Ursu Lodge

¹ Ellis, *History of the Gold Coast*, p. 53.

(now Christiansborg)."¹ In another place the same **1642-1671** author says the Castle was originally built by the Portuguese and ceded to the Dutch with their other Possessions in 1642. Barbot again, when writing of a Danish fort near the Castle, which will be referred to later, says "the Danes being formerly expell'd from Corso by the Dutch, made choice of that mount, as a proper place to build a fort."²

The name Carolusborg suggests the possibility that this place may have been built or enlarged by the same Carolus who built Fort Batenstein for the Dutch in 1640; and though Ellis says there is abundant evidence to prove that the Portuguese had no fort at Cape Coast, yet he gives none, and the statement of Vasconcellos quoted above certainly seems to show that they had, and that the Dutch had ousted them from it. When Towrson was trading on the Coast between 1555 and 1558, he was attacked by the Portuguese at Cape Coast, and in 1663 the Dutch Governor of Elmina, Jean Valkenburg, complained that "in 1647, the English had encouraged the Dutch vassals at Cabo Corso to rebel."

But although these statements are so conflicting, there are several points on which they show a general agreement, and they are not really so irreconcilable as they appear to be. After the date of the voyages of Towrson, it is known that the Portuguese made very determined efforts to drive all strangers from the Coast, and, having already found the English trading at Cape Coast within eight miles of their headquarters, there is nothing more likely than that they would have established a small fortified post or lodge there to protect their interests. This may very possibly have been built in about 1610; but when a little later their trade declined and their garrisons were weakened, this would have been one of the first places that they would have abandoned. This would be quite sufficient to account for the absence of all opposition to the landing of the Dutch in 1637, which is presumably the evidence upon which Ellis was relying. The deserted lodge would then have come into the possession of the

¹ Meredith, p. 197.

² Barbot, p. 172.

1642-1672 Dutch, who apparently did not think it worth garrisoning, CHAP. VI so that when in after years the Swedes resorted to the Coast, they were able to settle at this place without opposition. Their occupation of Cape Coast is said to date from 1652, and there is a general agreement that in 1657 or 1658 Karloff, or Carlof, dispossessed them and took the place for the Danish Company. What happened after this is very doubtful, and the place may have changed hands more than once, and even have been taken by the Fetus and passed from them back again to the Dutch, as is alleged, before it came into the possession of the English, as it undoubtedly had done by 1662 or 1663. Until then the fort was probably no more than a lodge, and it was at this time that the Castle itself seems to have been built, either as an addition to and improvement on the original lodge, or near it. It is most likely, however, that the latter course was adopted, and that the fortified house close to the Castle, and occupied by a native trading agent or middle-man, which will be referred to later, was the old lodge which had been left untouched and handed over to him.

The Accras were at first as strongly opposed to the erection of European forts in their country as they had been in the time of the Portuguese, and it was not until about 1642 that the Danes and Dutch, after giving considerable presents to the King, succeeded in obtaining his permission to build store houses, undertaking to pay seven marks of gold (£224) annually for the concession. Having once secured a footing in the place in this manner, they continually insinuated the necessity of converting these houses into proper forts in order to protect the Accras in time of need from the attacks of their inveterate foes the Akwamus. This was at last agreed to, and the Dutch then built a stone fort with a tiled roof, which they named Crève Cœur. It was completed in about the year 1650, but it was not until some years later, 1673 in fact, that the English were given a similar privilege. At this time the Swedes held Ursu Lodge, but in 1657 Frederick III of Denmark sent an expedition to the Gold Coast under Sir

Henry Carlof—the same who has already been mentioned 1642-1672 as probably having taken Cape Coast Castle from the CHAP. VI Swedes—who drove them out of the place and garrisoned it for the Danes. It was afterwards much enlarged and strengthened and renamed Christiansborg. A year later, in 1658, the Danes built a fort on a hill at Amanfu, about three-quarters of a mile to the east of Cape Coast, which they named Fredericksborg. The hill itself was known as Deenstein or the Danish Mount, and it was the Governor of this place who enlarged and renamed Ursu Lodge.

In 1651 the Charter granted twenty years earlier by Charles I was renewed and confirmed to Rowland Wilson and some other merchants by the English Commonwealth. The confusion of these times, however, had a most disastrous effect on the affairs of the Company, which had hitherto made large profits, with the result that the Dutch, Danes and Swedes increased their influence and trade on the Gold Coast at the expense of the English. So great were the losses of the English during the next few years owing to this competition of other nations, that, although a frigate was sent out in 1652 to protect the trade from the interference of the Dutch, and Lord Ambassador Whitelock was despatched to the Swedish Court in 1653 to remonstrate against the encroachments of that nation, yet the losses of the private traders alone, apart from those of the Company, in ships and goods taken, are said to have amounted to considerably over a quarter of a million sterling. From 1660 onwards there were continual bickerings between the English and Dutch, which finally resulted in actual war. In that year a formal protest was lodged by the English Ambassador at the Hague, but so far from any benefit arising from it, the Dutch aggressions against the English Company seem to have steadily increased during the ensuing years. In August 1661 the Dutch captured an English ship, the *Merchant's Delight*, and took her to Elmina, where her crew were imprisoned in the Castle by Governor Jasper van Houssen ; while in the November of the following year further complaints were made against the Dutch on account of aggressions at

1642-1672 Komenda and Cape Coast, at neither of which, according
CHAP. VI to the English statements, had they any factory at that time. The Dutch were doubtless much annoyed to find that after they had achieved their ambition and driven out the Portuguese, they had even more competition to contend with than before. They were therefore doing their best to put a stop to this also, so that they might realize their dream of being supreme on the Gold Coast. In 1662 one of their men-of-war, the *Golden Lyon*, fired on the boats of an English ship as they were going ashore at Cape Coast, but, try as they would, they could not succeed in driving their rivals from the Coast.

In 1662 a new Company was formed under a Charter granted by Charles II and dated the 10th of January. This Company was called the Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading to Africa, and their Charter gave them the sole trading rights from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Cape of Good Hope. It included many influential persons, amongst whom was the King's brother James Duke of York,¹ undertook to supply 3,000 slaves yearly to the West Indies, and was to maintain posts at Cape Coast, Anashan, Komenda, Egya and Accra, besides a factory at Winneba and their fort at Kormantin. The headquarters, too, were to be removed from Kormantin to Cape Coast, where the Chief Agent was to be assisted by two other merchants, a warehouse-keeper, a gold-taker, two accountants and three assistant factors. The Castle was to be garrisoned by fifty English soldiers and thirty slaves under the command of a captain and four sergeants. The garrison at Anashan was to consist of ten English soldiers and eight slaves, while two of each were allotted to each of the other lodges. The Slave Trade thus received the formal sanction of the Government and the direct patronage of the Royal Family.

The formation of this Company was strongly resented by the Dutch. On the 28th of May 1663 the King² of Aguna, at their instigation, plundered the factory at Winneba; and less than a week later, on the 1st of June, Governor Jean

¹ Afterwards King James II.

² ? Queen.

Valkenburg lodged a formal protest against the action of 1642-1671 the Company's agents in setting up factories in places CHAP. VI which he asserted belonged to the Dutch West India Company by right of conquest of the Portuguese. A few days later the Dutch showed their animosity towards the Company by more active measures. They surprised the garrison of Cape Coast Castle, seized the fortress, and by means of bribes and promises induced the King of Fantin to attack the English fort at Kormantin, after first arranging with the King of Aguna to secure the person of John Cabes, the local Chief, who was a staunch supporter of the English. The capture of Kormantin was prevented by the opportune arrival of Captain Stokes with reinforcements, but the Dutch took the factory at Egya.

As a result of these continual quarrels, the Company was quite unable to make any progress, and in 1664 representations were made in Parliament on the subject of the insolence and aggression of the Dutch, and Sir George Downing was instructed to demand full reparation from the States-General. The Dutch Chief Factor¹ at Fort Nassau at the same time handed a written protest to Captain Stokes on board the *Marmaduke* complaining of the erection of the factory at Anashan by the English and setting forth that the Dutch had not only won the Coast from the Portuguese at great expense and at the cost of many lives, but that the monopoly of the whole trade had been formally granted to their West India Company. There was certainly a great deal of truth in these contentions of the Dutch ; but they had been so busy improving Elmina and their other stations after the expulsion of the Portuguese, that they had not troubled to interfere very much with the English while they were still weak ; and now that their position on the Coast was stronger and their trade had developed sufficiently to arouse the jealousy of the Dutch it was too late for the latter to protest.

The Dutch had now committed a distinct act of war by seizing Cape Coast Castle, and Sir George Downing having failed to obtain any redress from the Government at the

1642-1672 Hague, Charles II at once despatched Captains Robert ^{CHAP. VI} Holmes¹ and Joseph Cubitts in the *Jersey* and another man-of-war, together with six frigates and the same number of smaller vessels, with secret orders to proceed to the West Coast of Africa and capture the Dutch fort at Goree ; thus commencing the Dutch wars. Having taken Goree in accordance with these instructions, Holmes sailed down the Coast and, reaching Takoradi on the 9th of April, took Fort Witsen and left an English garrison in it. Fort St. Sebastian was the next to fall, and this was practically levelled with the ground and abandoned, so that the Dutch were able to reoccupy it almost at once. They built a palisade fence around it as a temporary protection and, though they were again attacked by the English and the people of Jabi, succeeded in driving them off and eventually rebuilt the place. Cape Coast Castle was next recaptured on the 7th of May. It had been defended by less than twenty Dutchmen, but Holmes now left a garrison of fifty men to hold it and supplied them with provisions for six months and materials and labourers for the repair of its defences. According to Barbot, who less than twenty years after these events was on very friendly terms with the Danes and used to visit them at Fort Fredericksborg, they assisted the English on this occasion and were allowed to retain their position in return for these services. Fort Nassau at Mori and the lodges at Anamabo and Egya were all taken in turn, and according to Dapper the greatest barbarity was shown to the Dutch garrison of the latter place. He alleges that though the English had given quarter, they cut off the ears and noses of all their prisoners and afterwards cut the throats of some, butchering them like so many pigs. Others were flayed alive, and even the dead were disinterred in order that their heads might be cut off and carried in triumph on the ends of the English pikes. In the plate of Fort St. Anthony at Axim in Barbot's work, the small island in front of the fort is marked as the " large rock on which Admiral Ruyter raised a battery of twelve guns with which he forced the

¹ Afterwards Admiral Sir Robert Holmes.

fort to surrender,"¹ from which it appears that Holmes 1642-1672 must have taken this place also. The Dutch had thus CHAP. VI been taken completely by surprise, and Holmes, having fully avenged the seizure of Cape Coast Castle by the capture of nearly all their forts, now returned to England. He left the English in a far stronger position than they had ever before occupied, but unfortunately they were not supplied with enough men to enable them to maintain it when the Dutch began to retaliate.

The news of these depredations of Holmes had no sooner reached Holland than Admiral de Ruyter was ordered to sail from Gibraltar, where he then lay with a fleet of thirteen ships, to make good the losses of the Dutch Company. He began by recapturing Goree on the 11th of October 1664, and then sailed on to the Coast to retake Cape Coast Castle, which was the principal object of his expedition. Having destroyed a few English factories between Sierra Leone and the Kru Coast, he made an unsuccessful attack on Fort Witsen on Christmas Day. Only a part of his force had been engaged ; but he was then reinforced by 900 Elminas who had been sent down by Governor Valkenburg, and the fort was taken on the 15th of January 1665. The village was burned and its whole population put to the sword, while the English garrison, which consisted of only some eight or ten men, half of whom were sick, were stripped naked and otherwise grossly ill-treated. The guns were taken off to the ship, but the fort itself was blown up with 1,200 pounds of powder, as it was thought that the cost of its maintenance would outweigh any profits that could be derived from its trade. This fort is said to have been at one time and another in the possession of the English, Dutch, Danes, Swedes, Brandenburgers and French ; but though it doubtless witnessed some unrecorded changes, it can never have been held by the Brandenburgers, for they did not appear on the Coast until some years after it had been destroyed. It is quite possible, however, that all these

¹ He may have been misled by seeing the ruins of the watch-house described by Baker.

1642-1672 different nations may have occupied the place, though not
CHAP. VI this identical fort.¹

The Elmina auxiliaries are described as wearing helmets furnished with plumes of feathers and ornamented with one or two pairs of horns fixed to their front. They carried swords, the wooden hilts of which were carved in the shape of a leopard's jaw-bone,² and many of them had painted their bodies red or yellow.

De Ruyter next went down to Cape Coast Castle, which had now been repaired and further fortified by the English. Governor Valkenburg attached the very greatest importance to the recapture of this place ; for it was believed that if the English could only be deprived of the Castle, which was their chief stronghold on the Coast, they would give up all hope of re-establishing themselves and retire from the Gold Coast altogether, leaving the Dutch in undisputed possession. On reconnoitring the place, however, De Ruyter discovered that it was only possible to land in safety on one narrow strip of sand on the eastern side of the Castle, which, besides being swept by the guns, could easily have been held by a hundred resolute men against a thousand. The people, moreover, refused to assist the Dutch and threatened to side with the English if necessary, so that, as it was clear that they could have stopped the paths and cut off all access to the fresh water and other supplies, and that any force he might succeed in landing would be starving within two or three days if the Castle held out, De Ruyter contented himself with expressing his astonishment that the Dutch should ever have permitted the English to retake the place when once they had gained it, and declined to risk an attempt that seemed bound to end in disaster. Leaving Cape Coast, therefore, he went to Mori, where, with the assistance of his Elmina allies, he recaptured Fort Nassau, repaired its fortifications, and left a garrison of Europeans with fifty natives to hold it while he himself returned to Elmina.

General Valkenburg had been deeply chagrined by the

¹ *Vide* note p. 64.

² More probably a human jaw-bone, a customary trophy.

Admiral's refusal to attack Cape Coast Castle, and now 1642-1672 represented to him the great damage that was done to the CHAP. VI Dutch trade by the English forts at Anamabo and Kormantin, urging him at least to attempt the capture of these places. He undertook to prove that the presence of the English at Kormantin did more damage to the Dutch trade than Holmes had done during his whole expedition. The Admiral was at first rather reluctant to attack Kormantin, but having been assured of the friendship and assistance of the Anamabos and Egyas, he agreed to make the attempt. Leaving Elmina, he touched at Mori and embarked the Dutch garrison of Fort Nassau, and then sailed on to Kormantin, anchoring off it on the 6th of February 1665 in company with a fleet of four or five hundred canoes manned by the Elminas. On the 7th, 900 men were detached and sent with the Elminas in the ships' boats to effect a landing at Anamabo, where, though there was a small lodge in the possession of the English, the landing was much safer than at Kormantin and De Ruyter expected to be joined by his other allies. On nearing the landing-place after a hard pull against wind and tide, the boats were fired upon by the Kormantins, who, led by their Chief John Cabes, had marched over and were lying concealed behind the rocks and bushes. So heavy was their fire and that of the English lodge that the Dutch, believing that the King of Anamabo must have played them false, turned round and rowed back to their ships. But though the English had thus succeeded in beating off the enemy, it was more than they had expected. So confident indeed had they felt that the Dutch would land and attack their fort at Egya on their way to Kormantin, that the garrison had mined it and lighted a long fuse calculated to blow the place up when the enemy reached and entered it. They had then abandoned it and retired to Kormantin. The explosion followed in due course and wrecked the fort, but the unexpected retreat of the Dutch foiled the second part of their scheme.

In spite of this reverse, De Ruyter did not despair of taking Kormantin. He had now been joined by Valken-

1642-1672 burg, and that evening messengers arrived from the King **CHAP. VI** of Anamabo bringing hostages and assuring the Dutch of his fidelity. The Anamabos explained that the failure in the morning was not due to any fault of theirs, but to the fact that the Dutch had made the attempt too soon and before they had had time to win over the Kormantins. That same night a second messenger, named Antonio, came from the King bringing word that he hoped to complete his arrangements by the next morning, and that as soon as he had done so he would hoist the Dutch flag on the ruins of Egya Fort as a signal to them to land. On the morning of the 8th this signal was seen, and, as there was very little surf, the Dutch force landed in good order near Egya. Here they were joined by their allies, and by midday the whole force, consisting of between 1,000 and 1,100 Europeans and 3,000 natives, was concentrated at Anamabo. The allies were then provided with white scarves to distinguish them from those of the English.

General Valkenburg now sent a letter to the English Commandant of Kormantin summoning him to surrender, and moved his whole force on to a hill a little to the west of the fort and about a musket shot from it. Here they met with a far more determined resistance than had been anticipated. Not only was a terrific fire maintained from the fort, but a force of about three hundred Kormantins was also opposed to them. These men, led by John Cabes, inflicted such heavy losses on the Dutch allies that the paths soon became blocked with the bodies of their slain. Brave however as the Kormantins were, it was impossible that they could hold out for long against the immensely superior numbers of the Dutch force, and, though they stubbornly disputed every yard of ground, they were slowly driven back on to the fort. The Dutch now set fire to the village, and under cover of the smoke, which was blown directly on to the fort, brought up grenades and mortars and prepared to make the final assault. But the English garrison, realizing that their position was now hopeless, and finding such numbers of the enemy close under their very walls, removed the red

cross from their flag,¹ thus converting it into a flag of truce, 1642-1671 and opened the gate.

CHAP. VI

The Dutch took 150 pounds weight of gold in this fort and gave quarter to the garrison, leaving eighty of their own soldiers from Elmina and Mori in their place. The gallant Chief of Kormantin, John Cabes, who had been so ardent a supporter of the English, committed suicide rather than fall into the enemy's hands. The Dutch offered a large reward for his head, but he was buried by his people at Old Kormantin, and the only satisfaction his enemies obtained was the little they could derive from blowing up his house. On the fall of Kormantin, the few men in the lodge at Anamabo at once capitulated. The Dutch had paid a heavy price for their victory however; they lost forty-nine Europeans alone and their levies had fared even worse. These levies were paid sixty-two marks (£1,984) for their services, and the Fantis expressed great satisfaction at seeing the Dutch reinstated at Kormantin, complaining bitterly of the inconveniences they had suffered during the English occupation. They took this opportunity to gain an important concession from the Dutch, who agreed to pay them 300 guilders (£26 5s.) for every one of the Company's vessels, other than slave ships, that traded there. This cost the Dutch a great deal in the end; for the people soon demanded and obtained payment for every ship alike. The Dutch named this fort Fort Amsterdam, and a few years later, in 1681 and 1682, considerably enlarged it and improved its defences.

By the time De Ruyter left the Coast the only post left to the English was Cape Coast Castle, and the Company of Royal Adventurers petitioned the King on the subject of their losses. They tried to represent themselves as the innocent sufferers for the misdeeds of Holmes, and declared that they had neither sanctioned nor profited by those actions of his which had now brought upon them the reprisals of De Ruyter. They entirely ignored the fact that their factors and troops had occupied all the Dutch

¹ The Union Jack was flown only by the Governor at Cape Coast Castle: all other posts displayed the St. George's Cross.

1642-1672 forts that Holmes had taken, and that had matters turned **CHAP. VI** out differently they would have been the very first to have hailed him as a hero and benefactor instead of lodging complaints against him. They further alleged that they had, since the formation of the Company, established and maintained forts and trading posts at Cape Coast, Tantum-kweri, Kormantin, Anashan, Ahanta (probably Butri), Winneba and Accra, besides other places beyond the confines of the Gold Coast, and had, since their incorporation, sent out goods to the total value of £158,000 and brought away gold to the annual value of £200,000 and slaves worth another £100,000. The whole of this lucrative trade had now been ruined by De Ruyter, and they prayed that the Dutch prizes that had been taken during the war might be handed over to them as some compensation for the losses they had sustained. This appeal was doubtless supported by the Duke of York and others who were financially interested in the well being of the Company, and was, to some extent at any rate, granted, for in April 1666 the Dutch man-of-war *Golden Lyon* was handed over to the Company.

In 1666 Villault made his voyage to the Gold Coast, and from the account he wrote of it the condition of affairs at that time appears to have been as follows. The Dutch were in possession of Elmina, Kormantin, Axim, Mori and Butri, and had lodges at Anamabo and Fantin (? Egya). Cape Coast Castle belonged to the English, who had also re-established themselves at Anashan, and the Danes held Fredericksborg and Christiansborg. While he was lying near Sekondi, Villault received a letter from Harry Dalbreckhe of Hamburg, who was then Governor of Fredericksborg, offering him the use of his harbour in consideration of the alliance between their respective countries and asking him to reserve him some of his goods. Villault therefore anchored off the fort, and the Governor's secretary came off to fetch the goods that had been ordered, but was prevented from returning on shore that night by a tornado that suddenly sprang up. The next morning, as he was being rowed back from the ship, the English at Cape

Coast Castle fired on his boat, the ball falling within a **1648-167** few feet of it. Fort Fredericksborg immediately replied **CHAP. vi** with a shot at the Castle which "fell at the foot of the second battery," whereupon the English, seeing that they were under the Danish Governor's protection, fired a round of blank. He says that although war had been declared between the English and Danes on account of the Dutch, yet the Governors of Cape Coast Castle and Fredericksborg had a mutual understanding by which they remained neutral and on good terms with each other, the two garrisons meeting and drinking together daily. The Danish Governor informed Villault that the natives had been continuously at war with one another for the past four years, and that, as a result, the country around Accra had been so devastated that the garrison at Christiansborg were unable to obtain supplies locally and provisions had to be sent them regularly from Fredericksborg. Villault further learned that the Axims had recently murdered the Dutch Commandant of Fort St. Anthony and declared for the English ; but if this be true, nothing seems to have come of it. He was also told that the English had been intriguing with the King of Fantin to help them to regain possession of their fort at Kormantin, and had taken his son as a hostage ; but finding him unable or unwilling to fulfil his part of the contract, they now refused to give up the son. The King had, therefore, tried to lay hands on some of the Dutch in the hope of effecting an exchange, and had recently seized the Commandant of Kormantin and four others while they were on a visit to Anamabo, killing two of their escort in the scuffle. The Fantis also made a night attack on the Saboës while Villault was at Anashan, killing four men and taking others prisoners, and thus started a war between the two tribes.

Peace was restored between England and Holland by the conclusion of the Treaty of Breda in 1667. By the third article it was stipulated that each side should be restored to the places it had held before the war. The Dutch retained Kormantin and the English Cape Coast ;

1642-1672 but though this Treaty ended the war, it did not entirely CHAP. VI put a stop to the quarrels between the English and Dutch on the Gold Coast. The English soon re-established themselves at Egya, and of this the Dutch complained in 1668, affirming that, as the post was under the guns of Kormantin, it must necessarily have been ceded to them with it. In July of the same year the Komendas rose against the Dutch, plundered their factory there and murdered the garrison ; to avenge which the Dutch declared a blockade of the Coast, which was to include not only Komenda but the whole of Fetu and Cape Coast, the people of which were suspected of having connived with the Komendas in making this attack. The English, however, on being called upon to assist in enforcing this measure, very naturally declined to do so on the ground that their principal fort lay within the proscribed area. It could not, therefore, be carried out. In the following year, 1669, another war broke out between the Akwamus and Accras, which lasted for many years and laid waste a vast extent of country.

The Company of Royal Adventurers had had a most unfortunate career. Floated as it was at a most inopportune moment, great difficulty had been found in persuading people to risk their money in what at that time was generally regarded as a very speculative concern. The result was that the Company had been compelled to start business with insufficient stock, and the outbreak of hostilities with the Dutch so soon afterwards led to expenses and losses which they were quite unable to bear, and left them in debt for very large amounts. They had now not only lost a great deal of what they had originally had, but were by no means certain of being able to retain what still remained to them, and certainly had no prospects of being able to extend their Possessions. Had they started with a larger capital in the first instance, they might have been able to weather the storm, and, in time, make good their losses ; but as matters stood they were compelled to surrender their Charter to the Crown and, for a fixed sum, transferred all their Possessions and interests to another Company which was about to be formed.

CHAPTER VII

TRIBAL WARS AND ATTACKS ON THE FORTS

1672 TO 1694

THE Company of Royal Adventurers having been hope- **1672-1694**
lessly ruined by the Dutch wars and having surrendered its **CHAP. VII**
Charter to the Crown, a new Company, called the Royal
African Company, was established by Letters Patent under
the Great Seal on the 27th of September 1672. This
Company, which was under the patronage of the King,
the Duke of York and many other members of the nobility,
was granted an exclusive right to the countries and trade
between Port Sallee in Southern Barbary and the Cape of
Good Hope for a term of a thousand years, and all His
Majesty's subjects were prohibited from frequenting these
coasts without its license. Books were promptly opened
for the receipt of subscriptions ; but so great was the
distrust with which most people regarded the African
trade while the misfortunes of the late Company were
still fresh in their memory, that though the books re-
mained open for twelve months, the total of the subscrip-
tions only amounted to £11,100. This sum was far too
small, but the Company had perforce to commence business
and do the best it could with it.

Cape Coast Castle was the only station on the Gold
Coast that still remained in the possession of the outgoing
Company, and this was first purchased, together with their
fort on Bunce Island at Sierra Leone and James Fort in
the River Gambia, for £34,000. In order to better their
position as much as possible, the Company greatly im-
proved Cape Coast Castle, strengthening its fortifications

1672-1694 and enlarging it. They also built a fort, which they named CHAP. VII James Fort in honour of the Duke of York, at Accra in 1673 and other forts at Komenda and Anamabo. By these active measures they succeeded in securing to themselves a fair amount of the Gold Coast trade, and in 1673 fifty thousand guineas¹ were coined in England, being so called because the gold from which they were struck had been brought from Guinea by the Royal African Company. These first guineas bore the Company's stamp, an elephant, a privilege that had been specially granted by King Charles II in order to encourage the importation of gold for coining. Five-pound pieces were also struck, which were similar to the guineas in design, but had the inscription round the rim like the crown piece.

In 1679 the Winnebas attacked the English factory there and completely ransacked it. The Factor was severely wounded, and he and his garrison only saved their lives by escaping in a canoe by night to Cape Coast, where Barbot saw them land the next morning, and says the Factor was "much wounded and all embrued in his own blood."²

In the same year the Portuguese made an attempt to re-establish themselves on the Gold Coast. The Governor of the Danish fort at Christiansborg at this time was John Olricks of Gluckstad. One of his officers, a Greek named Peter Bolt, conspired with the natives, who treacherously murdered Olricks and installed Bolt in his place. He soon afterwards sold the place to Julian de Campo Baretto, an ex-Governor of the Portuguese Island of San Thome, for the paltry sum of £224, and the Portuguese Government then supplied a small garrison. The Portuguese made some improvements and extensions in the building, and named it the Castle of St. Francis Xavier. They raised the curtains and batteries another 3 ft., and built a small chapel inside the Castle, where Mass was said by a black

¹ These guineas were nominally worth twenty shillings, but, being actually worth eightpence more, gradually came to be accepted as twenty-one shillings.

² Barbot, p. 180.

priest who had been ordained by the Bishop of San Thomé. 1672-16 They maintained a garrison of forty-five white men, but CHAP. VII employed no natives, as they were so well hated all along the Coast that they could get none to serve under them. They also constructed a small turf redoubt at Anashan, where ten or twelve men were stationed under Lorenzo Perez Branco and carried on a small trade in tobacco, rum, soap and other American goods. They were still there three years later, but how much longer they remained or what afterwards became of them is unknown.

The war that had broken out in 1669 between the Accras and Akwamus lasted until 1680. During this time a vast extent of country had been laid waste, many towns had been burned and all the plantations destroyed. The Accras were completely crushed, and their country was reduced to the position of a tributary province of Akwamu. Those who had escaped the victorious arms of the enemy either found refuge in the European forts or fled to Popo, and their King, Furi, sought protection under Penin Ashrive the King of Fetu, to whom he was related. Little Accra, the town under the Dutch fort, was burned to the ground and some of its inhabitants removed to Soko under the walls of James Fort. Such was the devastation caused by this prolonged struggle that not only during the war, but for several years after the cessation of actual hostilities, the forts at Accra and Christiansborg had to be supplied with provisions from the windward Settlements. The Accras who had fled to Popo were at constant war with the Awunas. These quarrels are said to have been fomented by the King of Akwamu in order to distract their attention from his own country and give them no time to attempt to gain possession of some rich gold mines that he had there. He was careful, however, to keep the balance of power fairly even, assisting either side from time to time as might be necessary, so that neither was ever allowed to gain any signal advantage ; and though the Accras in 1700 succeeded in driving the Awunas from their country, they were very soon afterwards reinstated.

1672-1694 The Dutch at this time had a fort at Sekondi called **CHAP. VII** Fort Orange, but it is not known exactly when it was built : probably in about 1670-75. Captain Henry Nurse, Agent for the English Company, also built a fort there a few years later. Both these buildings were of about the same size and only a gun-shot apart, that of the English standing on rather lower ground than Fort Orange.

It was now some years since the Dutch had been on really good terms with the Elminas, and in 1680 or 1681 matters were brought to a head and the people broke out into open rebellion. The actual cause of this was an attempt by the Dutch to destroy the independence that the Elminas had gained under the Portuguese. The Elminas were joined by the Komendas and laid siege to the Castle, and for not less than ten months kept its garrison and that of Fort Conraadsburg closely confined and made two separate attempts to take the Castle by assault. Neither of these was successful however, for the Castle is indeed impregnable so far as African warfare is concerned and could only be reduced by bombardment. The Dutch lost only four men, but the Elminas had about eighty killed and several others were taken prisoners and kept stark naked, chained and exposed to all weathers, on the land batteries for over nine months. When they at last realized that the capture of the Castle was impossible, many of the Elminas burned their houses and emigrated to other towns and the siege was then raised.

In 1681, too, a great riot occurred at Cape Coast. This originated in the flight of eighteen slaves who escaped from the Castle and found refuge in the town. Neither threats nor persuasion would induce the people to give these men up, and when the guns were trained on the town to compel them to obey, at least 700 men turned out and boldly attacked the Castle. In the fighting that ensued the garrison had several men killed and fifty or sixty of the people also fell. The King, so soon as he heard of this outbreak, hurried in from Efutu with only twelve attendants to assure the English Agent of his own loyalty. He remained for eight days beneath a fetish tree which

then stood near the Castle, and it was principally due to **1672-1694** his mediation and persistent reasoning with the people CHAP. VII that the dispute was finally settled and the alliance between them and the English renewed.

Yet another European nation, the Brandenburgers (Prussians), tempted by the enormous profits that were being derived by others from the Slave Trade, now appeared on the Gold Coast. The Elector of Brandenburg despatched two frigates, one of thirty-two guns manned by sixty men and the other of eighteen guns and fifty men, under Captains Mathieu de Vos and Philip Pieter Bloncq, who had orders to form a Settlement. They arrived off Cape Three Points in May 1682 and, landing their men at "Poquefoe" (Princes), set up the Brandenburg flag. Bloncq had already made several voyages to the Coast and was well known to the people here. He therefore found little difficulty in persuading the Chief to grant them permission to build a fort on Manfro (or Montfort) Hill where they could trade. Some cannon were brought ashore and carried up the hill, where they were mounted and surrounded by earthworks and a palisade fence, within which houses were at once built for the storage of ammunition, merchandize and provisions and the accommodation of the garrison. Having thus formed a temporary Settlement, Bloncq took some of the Chiefs back with him to Hamburg and thence to Berlin, where they were well entertained and shown all the pomp and glory of the Elector's Court and army. A year later he returned, bringing the Chiefs back, and built a proper fort, which he named Groot Fredericksburg in honour of his sovereign. The Brandenburgers soon afterwards built a small fort at Akoda (Akwida) and named it Fort Dorothea. This, which was little more than a lodge when it was first built, was captured by the Dutch in 1690 and much improved by them; but in 1698 the Dutch West India Company ordered them to restore it to the Prussians. They also built a small fort at Takrama in 1694 to guard the adjacent watering-place, where they levied a toll of £10 from every foreign ship that put in for wood and water.

1672-1694 In 1682 Baretto, the Portuguese Governor of Christiansborg Castle, was made a prisoner by his own garrison, who rose against him and kept him closely confined in the tower of the fortress. Barbot, who had known him in Prince's Island three years before, went to visit him, but was only allowed to "salute him at the window . . . from a considerable distance."¹ The Portuguese Factor, who had refused him admission, told Barbot that he was prepared to justify what he had done, but that if the prisoner wished to return with him (Barbot) to Europe he might do so. Baretto however sent out a message that he would on no account leave his post except by order of the King of Portugal, but he sent a letter by Barbot to the Court at Lisbon. The garrison was in a miserable condition, and had no provisions, not even bread, and less than sixty pounds' worth of goods in their warehouse. The Danes at Fort Fredericksborg had offered to buy them out for any reasonable sum, but in vain. Eventually, however, the garrison became so reduced by deaths and was in such a wretched condition from shortage of provisions and lack of discipline, that the King of Portugal was glad to accept the offer of the Danes, and they were accordingly allowed to redeem the place.

The African Company had for a long time been anxious to gain possession of the Danish Fort Fredericksborg at Amanfu, which, being situated on a hill within gun-shot of their Castle at Cape Coast, constituted a serious menace to its safety. Conscious of their insecurity, the English had hitherto been compelled to humour the Danes and live as amicably with them as possible ; for it would have been an easy matter to have levelled Cape Coast Castle with the ground with a few good guns on the Danish Mount. Barbot, who knew it well and was on very friendly terms with its Commandant, says that he had often seen the garrison walking about in Cape Coast Castle from this fort ; but it was a poor enough place, which its owners never seem to have tried to improve, for he describes it as "only a pretty large, almost triangular enclosure,

¹ Barbot, p. 183.

or indifferent thick wall of stone and clay mix'd together, 1672-1694 always falling to decay, with a round flanker towards the CHAP. VII sea-side, and two other sorry small bastions to the land, of the same materials as the wall and curtains, one of them pointing east and the other west, towards Cape Corso ; on all which there are fifteen or sixteen old iron guns, in no good order. Within the enclosure, or walls, is a disorderly heap of old clay buildings, thatch'd, like those of the Blacks, and all out of repair."¹ In 1685 arrangements were completed for the purchase of this place by the English, and it was formally handed over by its Commandant, Hans Luck, to Captain Henry Nurse, the Company's Agent at Cape Coast, by whom it was renamed Fort Royal. But the English, once they had acquired it, do not seem to have troubled any more about it, and though they had the precedent of Elmina Castle and St. Jago's Hill to warn them of the possible results of such carelessness, it was allowed to fall into decay even greater than that which had existed while the Danes held it. The walls were merely patched with clay and the houses thatched with reeds, so that it can have been little if any better than a native hut, and certainly did not deserve to be called a fort. Nevertheless, it was allowed to remain in this state for many years.

When Barbot was on the Coast in 1682, he was much impressed by the friendship shown by the Komendas for the French. The King of Eguafu, too, sent his second son to him as a hostage and invited him to come and see him and discuss the formation of a French Settlement. On his return to Europe, therefore, Barbot laid this proposal before the French Ministry and advised them to accept the offer and choose Ampeni as the most suitable place for their purpose. In 1688 M. du Casse was sent out with four French men-of-war from Rochfort and established a factory at Komenda, and then sailed down to the Slave Coast to make further Settlements. The Dutch, however, contrived to pick a quarrel with the Eguafos a few months later, and in the war that ensued the King was killed

¹ Barbot, p. 172.

1672-1694 and the French factory pillaged. Its garrison fled to the
 CHAP. VII English at Cape Coast for protection.

The Dutch now decided to build a fort at Komenda to compete with the English, who had been established there for some time ; but they met with a great deal of opposition from the people, who were probably stirred up by the English Commandant to resist the new-comers. Eventually, however, Governor Sweerts collected troops from all their other forts and defeated the Komendas, who lost their Chief and several of their principal Captains, and a fort was then built about a quarter of a mile to eastward of the English post and named Fort Vredenburg.

In 1690 a most disastrous war broke out between the Adoms, who were soon joined by the people of Jabi, and the Ahantas. This war lasted three or four years, and ended in the total defeat of the Ahantas, whose losses were so terrible that, by the time peace was restored, Sekondi, which had previously been a rich and prosperous town, had been burned to the ground and many other places which, prior to the war, had been large and populous, contained not more than ten families. The majority of the survivors settled under the Dutch fort at Butri, whence, in spite of the severe punishment that they had already received, they still continued to bid their enemies defiance.

The Adoms were led by a Chief named Ankwa ; but it was to their own valour rather than to his that they owed their success. He was a blood-thirsty bully and an arrant coward, who, though for ever stirring up strife, usually took to his heels on the day of battle. Bosman says of him : " This Barbarous Monster having in an Ingagement taken five of his principal Antese Enemies, Anno 1691, he wounded them all over ; after which, with a more than Brutal Fury, he Satiated, tho' not Tired himself, by sucking their Blood at their gaping Wounds ; but bearing a more than ordinary Grudge against one of them, and not contented with the mentioned Savage Cruelty, he caused him to be laid bound at his Feet, and his Body to be pierc'd with hot Irons, gathering the Blood that issued from him in a Vessel, one half of which he Drank, and

Offer'd up the rest unto his God. In this Manner doth **1672-1694** this Merciless Bloody Wretch treat his Conquer'd Enemies ; CHAP. VII and no Wonder, for if Opportunity be wanting to exercise his Cruelty on them, his own Subjects always supply their Place ; for his insatiable thirst after Blood must one way or other be Satisfied. In the year 1692, When he took the Field the second time against the Antese, I went to give him a Visit in his Camp, near Chama ; he receiv'd me very Civilly, and Treated me very well, according to the Custom of the Country : But whilst he and I were diverting our selves together, a fresh Opportunity offer'd it self for the Exercise of his Brutish Cruelty : which was only a Negroe observing that one of his Wives had a new Fashion'd Coral on, and taking a part of it in his Hand to look on, without taking it off her Neck ; which she not thinking any hurt, freely permitted him to do. I should here inform you by the way, that these Negroes allow their Wives all honest liberty of Conversation, even with their Slaves. But Ankwa so resented this innocent Freedom, that as soon as I was out of the Camp, he caus'd both Wife and Slave to be put to Death, drinking their Blood, as he useth to do those of his Enemies. For such another trivial Crime, a little before, he had caused the Hands of one of his Wives to be cut off ; after which, in Derision, he used to command her to look his Head for Vermin, which being impossible with her Stumps, afforded him no small Diversion."¹

Dixcove Fort was commenced by the English in 1691 after a long dispute with the Brandenburgers, who had set up their flag there. The latter, however, found that the trade was very insignificant and waived all further claims to the place. The building was proceeded with in a very dilatory fashion, and it was not until six years later that the fort was finished and named Metal Cross Fort.

In 1693 Christiansborg Castle once more changed hands, passing this time into the possession of the natives. The garrison had been much reduced by deaths and only

¹ Bosman, p. 23.

1672-1894 numbered about twenty-five men ; and the Akwamus, CHAP. VII observing this, determined to avail themselves of so favourable an opportunity to seize the place. They were prompted to this partly by the hope of plunder and partly by a wish to avenge some real or fancied insults that had been offered to them by the Danes, with whom they had been on bad terms for some time. The affair was planned and managed by a man named Assameni, who had formerly been a cook at one of the English factories but had now set up in business as a kind of commission agent and used to bring traders from the interior to the fort. The Danish Governor reposed great confidence in him. This man came up to the Castle one day and told the Governor that he would soon be bringing a number of traders who had come down to the coast to buy firearms and advised him to raise the price. A few days later, he presented himself at the gate with about eighty Akwamus carrying ivory and gold, who he said were the traders he had spoken about.

The Danes, not suspecting any treachery, admitted the men, and the Factor began to sell them guns and powder. It was a common practice with the traders to allow the people who bought guns to test them with a blank charge before completing the purchase, and this the Akwamus now prepared to do. But they had secretly brought in some slugs, which they now slipped into their guns, thus fully loading them. Then, after stabbing the Factor who was serving them, they suddenly turned on the garrison and made them all prisoners. The Governor, who was upstairs, heard the noise and ran out of his room, sword in hand, but was at once attacked by two of the men. He held his ground for some time, calling for assistance ; but finding that none came, and seeing more of the Akwamus pressing forward to the attack, he turned back, and, jumping through a window, made his escape to the Dutch Fort Crève Cœur. He had been wounded in several places and his left arm was disabled. After remaining with the Dutch for a time, he went to Cape Coast Castle in the hope of finding a Danish ship that would take him

back and help him to recover the Castle. Assameni took 1672-1694 gold and goods in the Castle to the value of about seven thousand pounds, and then occupied it with a garrison of his Akwamus. He flew a white flag emblazoned with a device of a Negro brandishing a sword, dressed himself in the Danish Governor's uniform and caused himself to be treated in every way as Governor. He also required every ship that passed the fort to salute his flag and himself saluted all those that came there to trade. He was in fact lavish with his powder, often indulging himself with a salute, and the guns would thunder forth in his honour at all hours of the day or night whenever the fancy seized him.

While Assameni was thus installed at Christiansborg, Captain Thomas Phillips made a voyage to the Coast, and on reaching Accra purchased a canoe from him. Phillips, with Nicholas Buckeridge and John Bloom, the English Commandants of Winneba and James Fort, were then invited to dine at the Castle. The black Governor sent hammocks for his guests, but on their arrival at the gate the guard demanded their swords. Bloom and Buckeridge gave theirs up, but Phillips flatly refused to follow their example. Assameni was therefore informed and came down to the gate and explained that it was the usual custom ; to which Phillips replied that " that might be so, but it was never the custom of English commanders to deliver their swords upon any account whatever." This seemed to satisfy Assameni, who then led the way to the dining-room, which was entered by mounting a ladder and passing through a hole in the floor. Here he drank to his visitors while a salute was fired from the Castle guns, and Phillips greatly pleased him by taking off his sword of his own accord and passing it to his boy to hold. Assameni's previous experiences as cook enabled him to give his guests a very good dinner, at which he presided with a boy armed with a pistol standing on either side of his chair as guard. He repeatedly drank the healths of the King of England, the Royal African Company and each of his guests, with volleys of cannon to accompany each toast, about two hundred rounds being fired in all.

1672-1694 came into fairly frequent conflict with them. According to Barbot, the King of Eguao sent one of the Chiefs of Ampeni, named Coucoumy (Kukumi), as his ambassador to the King of France when he asked that a French fort might be built in his country, and this man complained that the people were tired of the overbearing treatment they had been receiving at the hands of the Dutch, who had frequently burned their coast villages. The Dutch also imposed tolls on the fisheries at Axim, Shama, Elmina and Mori, exacting a fifth of the fish caught at each of these places. Besides this, they began to take cognizance of the civil and criminal proceedings of the native Courts, a thing that the Portuguese had never attempted to do, and even assumed the power of life and death. Barbot, writing of this, says : " The Dutch Opper-Koopman, or chief factor, has an absolute authority over the whole country of Axim ; the natives being so entirely reduc'd under subjection by those people, that they dare not refuse him anything, but are obliged to serve him to the utmost ; nor will they presume to decide any controversy of moment without his knowledge and approbation ; he being as a chief judge or justice, to punish even the greatest of the Blacks. All fines imposed are paid into the said factor's hands, who distributes them to the injur'd persons, first deducting his own fees, which are very large. For example, if a Black be fined a hundred crowns for any crime, the factor's fees amount to two-thirds, and the assembly of Caboceiros has the other third ; but in cases of murder, or robbery, or compelling them to pay their debts, three-fourths of the whole are the plaintif's, and the other fourth is for the factor and the Caboceiros ; the former taking two-thirds thereof, and the latter one. So great is the authority of this factor at Axim, and throughout the country of Ankober, that the Blacks dare not shelter a criminal, but must deliver him up to be punish'd by him, according to his offence."¹ The Dutch, too, followed the example of the Portuguese in inflicting the severest penalties on those whom they found trading with

¹ Barbot, p. 150.

other nations, and in refusing to open their warehouses ~~1672-1682~~ until sufficient gold had been brought into the Castle to CHAP. VII guarantee that the trade would compensate them for the trouble of getting out their goods. They are said to have required at least six marks (£192) for this purpose.

It was this arrogation of judicial powers and the imposition of tolls and heavy fines that brought about the estrangement between the Dutch and the people that had culminated in the attack on the Castle and the subsequent evacuation of the greater part of the town in 1682.

The principal officers of the Dutch Establishment and their annual salaries were as follows :

Office.	Salary.
Director-General or Governor, whose full title was Admiral and General of North and South Guinea and Angola (3,600 guilders)	£ s. d.
Chief Factor of Elmina	315 0 0
Chief Factors of Mori and Kormantin	105 0 0
Seven or eight Factors of out-stations	84 0 0
Nine or ten Sub-Factors	37 16 0
Eighteen or twenty Assistants or Clerks	25 4 0
Chief Fiscal	16 16 0
Accountant or Book-Keeper-General	52 10 0
Under Book-Keeper	73 10 0
Book-Keeper of the Garrison	30 10 0
Secretary (sometimes)	25 4 0
Under Fiscal or "Informer"	52 10 0
Chaplain	21 0 0
Clerk of the Church	105 0 0
	21 0 0

Besides these there were a warehouse-keeper under the Chief Factor at Elmina, the officers and men of the garrisons, and a large number of workmen and labourers. Several of these officers drew allowances in addition to their salaries. The Chief Factor at Elmina, the Chief

1672-1694 **CHAP. VII** Fiscal and the Chaplain lived with the Governor ; but the other Factors were given from £21 to £26 table allowance, and all the principal officers had an allowance for servants. The Governor was given a commission on the trade along the whole Coast, and, after three years' service, received an annual increment of £105. The Factors were all allowed a commission on the trade transacted in their own stations, and were given an advance to cover the cost of the customary presents to native merchants and agents, which was sufficiently liberal to enable them to make a profit on it.¹ The Chief Fiscal was entitled to a third of all the gold and goods that were forfeited by illicit traders, as well as a third of all the fines inflicted on the staff, and another tenth of all forfeitures was given to the Under Fiscal.

The Sub-Factors received the gold that was brought in by traders and had to account for it to the Factor or Chief Factor, who, in turn, was responsible to the Company. Bosman says that the Factors had to watch these assistants very narrowly, for they sometimes contracted extravagant habits which resulted in a shortage of gold or goods that the Factor had to make good ; and though he might have the offender punished, there was seldom any chance of recovering the money. He mentions one case in which a Factor was called upon to make good a loss of between £700 and £800. Promotions usually went by seniority in the service, and were made by the Council on the Coast as vacancies occurred ; but the appointment of any officer to the post of Chief Factor at any of the three principal stations was only provisional until confirmed by the Directors of the Company. The Chief Factor of Elmina ranked next to the Governor, and, after having held his appointment for three years, was eligible for promotion to the Governorship when a vacancy arose. At this time, the Chief Factors of Kormantin and Mori used to make more by their commission on the Slave Trade than from any other source ; but in 1699 the management of this trade was handed over to the Captains of the ships engaged

¹ Barbot.

in it. The accounts of the whole Coast were kept at **1672-169** Elmina, where the Book-Keeper-General and Under ^{CHAP. VII} Book-Keeper had several assistants. The effects of any person dying on the Coast were sold by auction by the Book-Keeper of the Garrison, who was entitled to a commission of five per cent on the sum realized. The office of the Under Fiscal, who was usually spoken of as the Informer, was held in the greatest contempt. His duties consisted mainly in spying on the Factors and other officers and trying to detect them in trading on their own account. "In discharging this Trust," says Phillips, "he uses as much Subtilty and Rigour as the severest old Searcher in the Port of London ; and in case of a Discovery, not only takes all the contraband Goods away, but possibly seizing upon all the Gold the Factor has for the Company's Use, carries his Person to the Mina, where he is imprisoned ; and the gentlest Usage he meets with is to be well fined, and forced to carry a Musket in the Castle as a common Centinel, another being put into his Government."¹ All the officers were obliged to attend the garrison church daily on penalty of a fine, which was doubled on Sundays and Thursdays.

The Council consisted of the Governor, Chief Fiscal, Chief Factors and the Officer Commanding the Garrison. Sometimes the Book-Keeper-General was also added, and, on special occasions, the Factors of out-stations. The Government was nominally administered by this Council, but, as Bosman is careful to explain, virtually by the Governor alone ; for the members, being all under his authority, would seldom venture to oppose him, but, once they found out which way his opinion inclined, took care to agree with it themselves, understanding very well the meaning of the proverb, "Near is my shirt, but nearer is my skin." The Council, therefore, was a pure formality. The Governor only summoned it—"First, that the Directors of the Company may be informed that he did so ; not knowing the use he made of that Assembly. Secondly, when Offenders are to be punished with Capital

¹ Astley, vol. ii, p. 397.

1672-1694 or Corporal Punishments ; that not being otherwise to
CHAP. VII be done than in form of Law : and, thirdly, for the Govern-
 ment of the Coast, which is resolved and settled in the
 Council, and least when anything happens wrong, the
 Governour should want an excuse, he now being able
 confidently to alledge that he acted by the Advice of the
 whole Council by whom it was also so resolved, tho' their
 real Opinions were at the same time as distant from their
 Suffrages as East and West. In short, the Council is of
 no other real use, than to participate of the Governour's
 Faults, and to shelter him from being answerable for them.
 Thus it clearly appears that it is impossible for the Com-
 panies Affairs to succeed under an ill Governour."¹

The headquarters of the English Royal African Company were at Cape Coast Castle, and its officials were much better paid than those of the Dutch. The Governor, who bore the title of Captain-General of the English Settlements on the Gold Coast of Guinea,² drew a salary of £2,000 a year. There were two Factors with him at Cape Coast with salaries of £300 a year each and a Secretary drawing £200. These officers composed the Council. With the exception of the more liberal salaries paid to its officials, the English Company seems to have conducted its affairs on very similar lines to the Dutch. Its officers were forbidden to trade on their own account. No Informer was employed to spy on them however ; but they were required to take an oath to this effect, which Barbot³ says they did not scruple to break, and this illicit trade, together with the competition of the interlopers,⁴ deprived the Company of the best part of the trade. As in the case of the Dutch, the Council nominally administered the Govern-
 ment, but in practice had very little voice in any matter, the Governor's wishes invariably being unopposed and the members all voting with him as a matter of course. Besides these officers, there were the Factors of out-

¹ Bosman, p. 102.

² Barbot (p. 170) gives his title as " General of Guinea from Sierra Leona to Angola."

³ Barbot, p. 170.

⁴ Private traders not licensed by the Company.

stations, the Officer Commanding the Garrison and a Chaplain and Surgeon. As with the Dutch, the English Factors were given a percentage on the trade done in their stations.

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The death-rate was appalling ; nor, considering the conditions under which these men lived, is this surprising. Their food consisted almost entirely of what they could obtain in the local markets ; their knowledge of medicine and their supply of drugs were most deficient ; they were unsuitably dressed in a scarlet uniform and had to wear wigs, and all the contemporary writers are agreed that they drank to excess and more so than any other nation on the Coast "especially brandy, rum and punch," and constantly slept "in the open air . . . when heated with debauchery . . . having nothing on but a shirt."¹

The English, even at this early date, seem to have taken some part in the judicial proceedings of the people ; for Barbot, in his account of the Cape Coast district, says : "Besides the daily market I have mention'd to be kept at the town of Corso, there is a very considerable one at the town of Abramboe,² a large town, about twenty-seven miles northward from cape Corso ; where by appointment of the King of Fetu, at a certain time of the year, is a rendevouz from all parts of his country, for public dancing, and it is call'd the dancing season, and lasts eight days. An incredible number of people repair to it from all parts, and spend all the day, and most of the night, in that toilsome diversion. At the same time, are also decided all suits and controversies, which could not be determin'd by the inferior justices, in their several districts. This supreme court is composed of the king of Fetu, his Dey, or prime minister, the Geroffo, and the Braffo, with two English factors of cape Corso castle. It is the agent's prerogative to send those agents to that court, and each of them is to have as many suits of clothes, as he stays there days, to appear every day in a different suit, which puts the company to three hundred pounds charges yearly."³

¹ Barbot, p. 171.

² This Abramboe cannot have been Anamabo, for it is expressly stated that it lay at some distance inland : possibly it was Abakrampa.

³ Barbot, p. 172.

1672-1694 The Brandenburg Governor lived at Groot Fredericksburg and bore the high-sounding title of Director-General under his Electoral Highness of Brandenburg and his African Company. These Governors were usually of Dutch extraction. The Prussian Possessions were small, and though nothing is known of their staff it was probably very similar to those of the Dutch and English, but on a proportionately smaller scale. The Brandenburg Governor also claimed some jurisdiction over the people and seems to have sat with the Chiefs as a kind of judicial assessor. Barbot says : " The Governor . . . jointly with the Caboceiros of Poquefœ, and other neighbouring towns, determines all cases and differences arising between the inhabitants, summoning them together on such occasions . . . into the fort . . . whither immediately those Caboceiros repair ; and there decide all causes, civil or criminal, and their sentences are executed accordingly, with all submission from the natives."¹

Bosman thus describes the Brandenburg Governors who were in office while he was on the Coast at the close of the seventeenth century. " The first, John Nyman, an Embdener, a Man of sound Judgment, good Sence and great Experience, who discharged his Office with the greatest Fidelity and good Conduct, by which means he quitted this Country with a great deal of Honour and left a very good Name behind him : He was Succeeded by John and Jacob Ten-Hoost, the Father and Son, who both acquired a large share of Reputation, and kept their Subordinates in due Decorum ; especially the Son, who by good Nature and a civil Address gain'd the Affection of the Blacks, and had every body at his devotion ; By which means he Established the Brandenburghian Affairs in a much better Condition than any before him ; and as they never had a better Governor, so 'tis very much to be doubted, they'll repent the time when they removed him, and appointed Gysbrecht van Hoogveldt in his Place ; who before had been Factor in our Service at Axim, where he treated those under him so ill, that General Joel Smits

¹ Barbot, p. 431.

and the Council were obliged to discharge and send him **1672-1694** from the Coast, as incapable of their Service. However, CHAP. VII being now Commander in Chief, to Reconcile himself to the offended Negroes his old Enemies, he granted them several Franchises and Priviledges, which served not only to lessen the Power of the Brandenburghers, and lay the first Foundation of their Ruin, but after a short Government the Europeans and Blacks joynly rose against him ; and after Trying him, Discharged him once more the Government and Coast ; Choosing in his Place one John van Laar an Anabaptist, who was found to have a much better Talent at drinking of Brandy than at Business ; and took so little Care of the Publick, that all went to Ruin ; and he himself was timely Removed by Death, to make way for John Visser his Successor, a Person, who wanting even Common Sense, was therefore incapable of that Trust. Shortly after his Elevation his Factor at Akoda was killed by the Negroes, which he having neither sufficient Conduct nor Power to Revenge, they continued their unbridled Outrages, at the Expense of the Lives of several of his Europeans ; and lastly, seizing his Person they carry'd him into the Inland Country, and after miserably breaking almost all his Limbs, and fastening abundance of stones about his Body, drowned him in the Sea. This Barbarous Murther was variously talked of here : but all agree that the Europeans under his Command consented to, and abetted it ; and some assert it was done by their Order ; and Adrian Grobbe (Chosen by the Negroes) his Successor, is generally Charged with the greatest share in this Crime ; if he is Innocent I hope he will clear himself, but if guilty, may Heaven Avenge it on him and his Accomplices : for it has very perniciously weakened the Power of all the Europeans on this Coast, and filled them with apprehensions not altogether groundless, that if this Bloody Fact escapes unpunished, no Body is here secure of Life."¹ With their affairs in such an appalling condition and going steadily from bad to worse, it is small wonder that the Brandenburgers were unable to

¹ Bosman, p. 8.

1672-1694 retain their Settlements on the Gold Coast for much
CHAP. VII longer.

The affairs of the Danes, as has been seen, were at this time in a very unsettled condition, and their Establishment was a small one. Barbot describes their Government as being very precarious and uncertain. He says, " scarce any one, who is sent over from Denmark, as a person of known integrity to the Company, as chief or general, lives long on the Coast, but is either snatched away by a natural death, or by the contrivance of his inferiors, assisted by the Blacks, the better to compass their own designs. Thus it sometimes comes to pass, that a gunner of the fort, or other such mean person, succeeds to that post, and so manages affairs according to his small capacity, or rather to his wicked inclination to enrich himself in as short a time as may be ; knowing he must shortly be removed, or discharged by the Company, his command being only pro interim. . . . Of the two Danish Generals I knew there during my voyages, the first had been the gunner of the fort, the latter, a lieutenant, as he said himself ; but others told me he had been the other General's servant, a brisk, bold, daring, well-set man, and very young ; both which advanced themselves by the aforesaid means. The first was murdered in his turn ; but what became of the other I know not."¹ Of this latter man he relates a story that, finding the book-keeper would not keep his books in the way that he wished (probably falsely), he procured some natives to bring false accusations against him, and having tried him before a mixed Court of Europeans and Africans, all of whom were corrupted, sentenced him to death, and immediately set him to make his own coffin and then shot him.

Whether any of the other settlers ever brought European women to the Coast at this time is unknown, but the Danes certainly had done so. Barbot says that it had been observed that the Danish women could not live there long, and his brother James, who sailed along the Coast in 1699, says that Mr. Trawne, the Governor of Christiansborg, " had his lady with him."

¹ Barbot, p. 173.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DUTCH-KOMENDA WAR

1694 TO 1699

ON the 5th of September 1693, Captain Thomas Phillips 1694-1699 sailed for the Gold Coast in the *Hannibal* of 450 tons and CHAP. VIII 36 guns, with Captain Thomas Shirley in the *East India Merchant* of 30 guns. They were engaged in a slaving voyage, and one of the partners in the venture was Samuel Stanyer the Sub-Governor of the Royal African Company. They also had some soldiers on board for the Company's garrisons, so that if they were not actually sailing under its flag, they doubtless held its licence to trade. They arrived on the Coast in 1694, and the account of this voyage that has been left by Captain Phillips gives an excellent idea of the state of affairs and mode of life there at this time.

In spite of the fact that the Dutch West India Company and the English Royal African Company had both been granted the monopoly of the Gold Coast trade and were vested by their respective Governments with the power to deal severely with those who infringed their rights, there were more than a dozen Dutch interlopers on the Coast when Phillips arrived there. This interloping trade was a profitable one. The ships, the majority of which were Zealanders or French, used to trade quite openly ; and as they were always chosen for their speed and were well-manned and armed, fighting desperately rather than be captured, it was but seldom that any of them were taken. These illicit traders moreover, having no Settlements to maintain, were able to sell their goods from twenty-five

1694-1699 **CHAP. VIII** to thirty per cent cheaper than the Companies could, and thus did enormous damage to their trade. They could also afford to give better prices for slaves or other cargo when the supply was limited, and thereby shortened their stay on the Coast and had a quicker turn-over. Nevertheless, the occupation was not without its risks ; for the Dutch had power to put criminals of their nation to death after trial by Court Martial, and, whenever they succeeded in capturing one of these poaching ships, used to execute the officers and confine the crews in the dungeons of Elmina, unless, as not infrequently happened, it was made worth their while to adopt more lenient measures. The English, however, had less power, and could only send the offenders in irons to take their trial in England.

While he was lying off Axim, Phillips was visited by Rawlinson the Dutch Factor at Fort St. Anthony, who accepted his invitation to stay and " proved a boon Companion, taking his Glass off very smartly, and singing and dancing several Jiggs by himself."¹ Presently, however, he saw a large twelve-hand canoe with a flag in it coming up from the eastward and showed so much alarm that Phillips offered to fire on her ; but Rawlinson, hastily begging him not to do so, sprang into his canoe and, lying flat on his belly in the bottom of the boat, was paddled as fast as possible to westward, and, following a circular course, eventually landed about a quarter of a mile from his fort. A little later, he sent a canoe out to scout, and then returned on board " resolved to have the other Jug with them."² He explained that his sudden departure had been due to fear lest the canoe contained the Fiscal from Elmina on one of his periodical tours of inspection. It was, however, only one of the stewards—" Frank the Butler"—from Cape Coast Castle, who had been sent by the Company's Agent with letters and instructions for Phillips and had picked up Buckeridge the Factor at Dixcove on his way. The fort at Dixcove, though begun three years earlier, was as yet but half finished, and a few small guns planted in the open on the rocks were its sole means of defence.

¹ Astley, vol. ii, p. 397.

² *Ibid.*, p. 398.

At Sekondi they found the English Factor Johnson in 1694-1695 bed raving mad, and his assistant, a mere lad who had CHAP. VIII but recently left the Bluecoat Hospital, in charge of the fort. Johnson's madness was attributed to resentment against Van Hukeline, the Dutch Factor at Elmina. "One Taguba, a noted Negro Wench in Cape Coast Town being gotten with Child by some of the Soldiers of the Castle, was brought to-bed of a Mulatto Girl ; who growing about eleven Years old, this Johnson, then a Factor at Cape Coast, had a great Fancy for her, and purposed to take her for his Wife (as they take Wives in Guinea), and being about that Time removed to be chief Factor at Sukkandi, in order to make sure of the Girl, he took her there to live with him, till she was of Age fit for conjugal Embraces ; using her with much Tenderness, and taking great Satisfaction in her Company for two or three Years : But when she was grown up, being a pretty Girl, Vanhukeline, by Bribes and Presents, corrupted her Mother Taguba, and prevailed with her to go to Sukkandi, and under Pretence of making a Visit to her Daughter, to bring her off in a swift Canoa, which he had ordered to lie under the Dutch Fort there for the Purpose. The Mother accordingly went, and having been kindly treated by Johnson, who suspected nothing, went with her Daughter to take a Walk. Being come near the Place appointed, the Watermen took her by Force into the Canoa, her Mother following, and carried them both away to Vanhukeline ; who soon cracked the Nut Johnson had been so long cooking to his own Tooth. When Phillips dined with the Dutch General at the Mina he saw her there, being brought-in to dance before them, very fine, bearing the Title of Madam Vanhukeline. This, and some other old Differences between him and the Dutchman, had quite turned his Brain."¹

At Shama they had a good trade for gold ; but both there and at Komenda the people stood in great awe of the Dutch, who they were afraid might seize their goods to punish them for having traded with the English. This they often did ; and it was quite immaterial whether the

¹ Astley, vol. ii, p. 399.

1694-1699 purchases had been made from a ship or at one of the
CHAP. VIII African Company's forts.

As they passed down to Cape Coast, they saluted Elmina Castle with seven guns and then anchored off Cape Coast Castle, where they lay for some time as they had a great deal of cargo to land for the Company. While they were there, Clayton, the Commandant of Fort Royal, died and was buried in a spot known as Black Jack's Garden, between the Castle and Fort Royal, which was the usual burial-ground for Europeans. At Cape Coast they landed thirty soldiers for the Castle garrison, "in as good Health as they left England; but in two Months Time near half of them died."¹ On another occasion Captains Phillips and Shirley gave a dinner to the Agent and the rest of the Company's officers in a square summer-house which stood in the Castle garden. Each Captain took six of his quarter-deck guns on shore, with which eleven rounds were fired as a salute at every toast. These volleys accompanying toasts was a regular custom at this time.

Some time before this, the Dutch had instigated the King of Fetu to refuse the Assins permission to pass through his territory. These people used to bring a great deal of gold to Cape Coast Castle, and the Dutch hoped in this way to divert the trade to their own Settlements. The King having complied and plundered some of the traders on their way down, the Assins declared war against him and were assisted by the English with arms and ammunition. The King of Saboe was also paid to help them, and the allied army inflicted a crushing defeat on the Fetus, whose King was forced to fly to Elmina for protection. The victorious army, consisting of about 20,000 men under the King of Saboe and Nimfa the Tufuhin² of Assin, returned to Cape Coast while Phillips was there and was followed soon afterwards by the brother of the fugitive King of Fetu, who had been enstooled in his stead and had now come down to swear allegiance to the English.

From Cape Coast Phillips and Shirley sailed to Anamabo,

¹ Astley, vol. ii, p. 400.

² The principal war Chief or Commander-in-Chief.

where they entertained Searle the Factor, and Cooper 1694-1695 and Fasleman the Factors of Egya and the Dutch Fort CHAP. VIII Vredenburg. They then went to Winneba, where Nicholas Buckeridge was now in charge. The factory here was only a little thatched house with no defence beyond that afforded by its mud walls, so that it is not surprising that it should already have been twice plundered by the people and that the Factor lived in continual dread of another attack. A proper fort was built, however, in this year.

The Agunas were ruled by a Queen, which had been their custom from time immemorial. She was not allowed to marry, but bought male slaves whenever she pleased as paramours. Her eldest daughter, who succeeded to the stool, was granted a similar privilege so soon as she attained a marriageable age. These slaves were sold again whenever their mistresses grew tired of them, but if caught intriguing with other women they lost their heads. All the female children were kept, but any males that were born to the Queen or the Heiress-Apparent were sold into slavery. This custom, so different to that of the neighbouring Akan tribes, together with the fact that the people have a language of their own which is entirely distinct from the Twi, strongly supports the belief that they are descended from some of the survivors of the original inhabitants of the coast-line prior to the date of the great Fanti invasion.

From Winneba the ships went to Accra, where Captain Shirley died and was buried with naval honours in James Fort. While the corpse was being towed ashore, his own ship fired minute guns, and after the ceremony was over she fired a salute of thirty guns, the *Hannibal* fired twenty-six, Fort James twenty, and Fort Creve Cœur and Christiansborg Castle (then in the hands of Assameni and his Akwamus) sixteen each. The pall-bearers were Captain Phillips, John Bloom the Factor of James Fort, Nicholas Buckeridge Factor at Winneba, and the Dutch Factor from Fort Creve Cœur.

In September 1694 the Dutch Fort Orange at Sekondi was surprised and plundered by the Ahantas, who at the same time massacred the crew of a Dutch vessel that

1694-1699 chanced to be at anchor in the road. The fort, however, **CHAP. VIII** was not destroyed, and the Dutch soon afterwards re-occupied it.

The year 1694 saw the commencement of a war between the Dutch and the Komendas which was destined to last for some years, during which it did an immense amount of damage to the Dutch trade, besides costing them very large sums of money. When Mr. Sweerts, in 1688, had overcome the opposition of the Komendas and built Fort Vredenburg, he had only accomplished his object by force of arms, and the Komendas, who had never willingly submitted to the presence of the Dutch, had been nursing their resentment ever since and only required an excuse to break out into open rebellion. Such a pretext was given to them now by an attempt by the Dutch to reopen the old gold mine which the Portuguese were known to have worked at Abrobi. A party of miners was sent out from Holland and set to work to locate the mine. They commenced operations in a hill just above Komenda, which they thought must contain the object of their search ; but this hill was believed by the Komendas to be the residence of the chief local god, and a few days later the miners were suddenly attacked and robbed of all they possessed, several of them being captured and kept prisoners for some time. The Dutch complained to the Chief of Komenda, but he declined to accept any responsibility and said that the real author of this outrage was a native trader named John Kabes, who lived near Fort Vredenburg and had considerable dealings with the Dutch.

This Kabes had formerly been concerned in the murder of some Dutchmen and had fled to Cape Coast, where he lived for some years as a servant or agent under the English. Later, however, he got into their debt and went over to the Dutch Governor, Joel Smits, whom he bribed to let him off the punishment with which he had been threatened, and was given permission to settle in the village under Fort Vredenburg. In Bosman's opinion he was so arrant a coward that he would never have dared to commit such an outrage as this except by the express

orders of the Chief ; and this allegation against him was, **1694-169** therefore, merely an excuse made by the latter, who, **CHAP. VIII** though secretly determined to sever all connection with the Dutch, did not wish to declare his intentions too soon.

Mr. Smits, however, was a hasty-tempered man, and would neither listen to advice nor wait to inquire further into the facts of the case, but collected a force of Elminas and went direct to John Kabes' village. Kabes came out to meet him, leading a sheep as a present, preparatory to clearing himself of the charge that had been preferred against him. The Governor, however, was in no mood to listen to any arguments or excuses, and his men at once began to plunder Kabes' goods and loot the whole village ; but even John, coward though he might be, was not prepared to submit quietly to treatment like this, and when he and his people tried to defend their property a skirmish ensued, in which several men were wounded on either side.

By this hasty proceeding the Dutch had only aggravated the difficulty of their position ; for they had aroused the ill-will of John Kabes, who was now openly hostile, besides being still exposed to the secret enmity of the Komenda Chief. Kabes promptly invited the English to come to Komenda, and made his peace with them by giving them a temporary settlement in one of his salt villages and promising that so soon as he was able he would help them to re-establish themselves in their old fort, which had now been abandoned for some years. This they did very soon afterwards to the great embarrassment of the Dutch ; for the English fort was not only fully as large and strong as Fort Vredenburg, but had better ordnance and a tower which overlooked it and was capable of being mounted with guns.

War was now inevitable, and Mr. Smits engaged a force of Elmina and Cape Coast natives for about £5,000, and with this army might very well have succeeded in conquering the Komendas, whom they far outnumbered. But his rash disposition again asserted itself and led him to threaten the Fantis and Saboes that so soon as he had

1694-1699 defeated the Komendas he would march his army against CHAP. VIII them also. The natural result of these premature boasts was the immediate alliance of the threatened tribes with the Komendas. The allied army opposed to the Dutch was thus made much stronger than their own, and in the first general engagement the Dutch mercenaries suffered terrible losses, and, as those who were neither killed nor taken prisoners only saved themselves by flight, the Dutch found themselves not only without an army and £5,000 out of pocket, but with the most powerful of the Coast tribes at open war with them also. Fortunately for them, however, a division occurred among the enemy which gave them an opportunity of extricating themselves from their difficulties, of which they were only too glad to avail themselves.

A dispute arose between Abe Teki the Chief of Komenda, and his brother Teki Ankan, as a result of which the latter came over to the Dutch, bringing the Adoms and some other allies with him. With the new army thus provided, a second attempt was made to subdue the Komendas, and in the battle which followed both sides fought with such valour and determination that for some time the issue was in doubt. But at length the Dutch auxiliaries, thinking they had gained the advantage, fell to plundering, and while they were thus engaged Abe Teki brought up reinforcements, who, advancing with their arms reversed, succeeded in deceiving the Dutch, who mistook them for a party of their friends. No sooner, however, had they got near enough than they opened so rapid and accurate a fire that the Dutch force was soon routed and fled in disorder to Fort Vredenburg, thus giving a second complete victory to the Komendas.

No further action was taken until, on the death of Mr. Smits early in 1695, his successor, J. Staphorst, seeing the great losses that the Company had already incurred by this war, opened negotiations for peace and succeeded so well that the Komendas even undertook to make good the losses that the Dutch had sustained. Such a satisfactory termination of the trouble, however, by no means suited

the English, whose aim it was to profit by the expulsion ~~1694-1695~~ of the Dutch and thus get the whole of the Komenda trade CHAP. VIII into their own hands. They therefore pointed out to the Chief that after his two signal victories it was not for him to give satisfaction, but rather to dictate his own terms, and further supported their argument by showing that the Dutch were not in a position to refuse him but would have to purchase peace at whatever price he chose to demand. They also undertook to help him with arms and ammunition if he followed their advice.

By these means the Komendas were prevailed upon to assume the offensive once more, and in 1695 they attacked Fort Vredenburg. William Bosman was the Commandant and had less than twenty men, half of whom were sick, to serve the twenty guns. Finding that the Komendas were resolved to attack him, he sent to Elmina reporting his weak condition and asking for reinforcements and ammunition. Two ships were sent and anchored off the fort, and Peter Hinken, the Captain of one of them, sent a boat full of men to join the garrison. They had no sooner set foot on the beach however, than they were furiously attacked by the Komendas under the very guns of the fort and lost several killed. Bosman could do nothing to help them, for on going to the guns to fire on the enemy he found that, through the treachery of the gunner, every one of them had been spiked. The gunner was therefore arrested and sent in irons to Elmina, but Bosman complains that though the Governor swore that he would make a terrible example of him, he never did anything of the kind, but released him almost at once and promoted him to an even better position elsewhere very soon afterwards. Fortunately for the garrison, the Komendas did not avail themselves of this opportunity to storm the fort, but went away to eat and thus gave the garrison time to put the guns in order again.

In the evening, however, they returned and attacked the fort. The Dutch were at a great disadvantage, for many of the embrasures had no doors to them, and Bosman says "the Negroes pour'd Small-shot on us as thick as

1694-1699 Hail ; insomuch that those few Doors which were left
CHAP. VIII to some Gun-holes were become like a Target that had
been shot at for a Mark, and the very Staff which our
Flag was fasten'd on, tho' it took up so little room, did
not escape shot-free."¹ On one occasion one of the
enemy actually began to hack at the door with an axe,
but he was killed and no further attempt was made to
gain admission in that way. One of the soldiers, who
had had the crown of his hat shot away, came to Bosman
for some grenades, two of which he threw down to the
enemy, telling them that they were something to eat.
They at once crowded round and stood for a time watching
them burn, " and were at first very agreeably diverted ;
but when they burst they so gall'd them, that they had no
great Stomach to such another Meal."² The fight lasted
five hours, but the Dutch had only two men killed, and the
Komendas, finding they could not take the fort, then
drew off.

The Dutch now realized that if they were to maintain
their position and credit in the country, they must raise
another army as quickly as possible. They therefore
approached the Fantis, whose former enmity had by this
time died out, and bargained with them to take the field
and fight the Komendas until they had utterly exterminated
them on payment of a sum of £900. But no sooner had
this arrangement been made than the English paid the
Fantis an additional £900 to remain neutral. Their Chief,
who seems to have had some sense of honour, demurred
at this, but was promptly deposed and his stool given to
a less fastidious person ; so that, as the Fantis infinitely
preferred to do nothing for £1,800 rather than fight for
only half that sum, the only result the Dutch attained by
these negotiations was the loss of their money. The
Adoms next agreed to ally themselves with the Dutch for
something under £500, and a similiar arrangement was
made with the Assins and the people of Cape Coast. They
disagreed among themselves, however, over the division
of the money, and in the end all that could be got from

¹ Bosman, p. 27.

² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

them was a promise that they would remain neutral. As 1694-1699 a last resource the services of the Denkeras were engaged CHAP. VIII for £800, but before they could do anything a war broke out with their neighbours and they were compelled to stay and defend their own country instead of coming down to help the Dutch. Both they and the Adoms, however, had the honesty to return the money ; but not a penny could ever be recovered from the Fantis.

This, then, was the desperate condition of the Dutch when it occurred to them to employ their old ally Teki Ankan to sound his brother and report whether he was more in favour of peace or war. They found that he was as tired of the latter as they themselves were, and peace was then concluded on very satisfactory terms.

In 1697 the Dutch began to build a small fort at Apam, but met with great opposition from the people, who besieged them almost continuously until 1702, so that it was not completed for several years. The Dutch then commemorated the perseverance they had shown by naming the fort Fort Leydsamheid.¹

Dixcove Fort had only recently been finished, and in this year the people laid siege to it and very nearly succeeded in taking it. As it was, they compelled the Factor to submit to their terms, by which he acknowledged that he had no power or authority over them and agreed to join them in cheating all ships that called there by passing imitation gold on them. This compact was so well kept that the place soon became known as the " false mint of Guinea," and in 1701 two small ships, the cargo on one of which alone was valued at £1,700, sold their whole stock there and received nothing but this false gold in exchange. The manufacture of this imitation gold was a regular industry at Dixcove, and it was sold by the makers at the rate of a crown in good gold for false gold of the apparent value of twelve pounds.

On the 1st of June 1698 the English fort at Sekondi was attacked. The Commandant, Johnson, and several of the garrison were killed, and the fort itself was plundered

¹ Patience.

1694-1699 and burned. Nothing remained but the blackened outer
CHAP. VIII walls ; and though in about 1700 several attempts were
made to rebuild it, the people proved so hostile that nothing
could be done and such trade as the place afforded re-
mained entirely in the hands of the Dutch. A new fort
had, however, been built before 1726 when Smith, the
African Company's Surveyor, visited the Gold Coast ; for
he gives a drawing of both forts and a ground plan of the
English one. The Dutch had had several ships at Sekondi
at this time and were strongly suspected of having in-
stigated the attack ; but when a protest was forwarded
to Director-General John Van Sevenhuysen, he denied any
complicity and explained the presence of the Dutch ships
by saying that they had come in search of interlopers
But from some contemporary correspondence it seems quite
clear that this charge against the Dutch was well founded.
In a letter from the three English Agents to the Directors
of the Royal African Company reporting this occurrence,
and dated at Cape Coast the 26th of June 1698, it is stated
that the people who took the fort had been sent from
Elmina, some in canoes and others by land, and that the
English, warned of their hostile intentions, sent to the
Dutch Governor to protest. He admitted having sent
them, but said that they had only come to collect a debt
and refused to recall them. Moreover, from a letter from
the English to the Dutch Governor, it appears that an
English sloop was in Sekondi road at the time, having put
in on account of bad weather. She had lost both her
anchors, and her Captain, therefore, sent to borrow one
from one of the Dutch ships ; but the mate of the latter
replied, " 'Tis true we have enough, but do you think we
will spare any to you ? Do you not see we are sent to
take your fort, and can you expect our help ? " The
English answered, " We must then perish," to which the
Dutchman replied, " Why, then, perish, and the Lord have
mercy upon your souls." From a second letter, dated the
2nd of June 1698, it further appears that the Dutch Factor
allowed the goods that were taken from the English fort
to be carried openly into Fort Orange, and that he turned

the garrison away almost naked and only ridiculed their misfortunes. In the face of this evidence, it is hardly possible to acquit the Dutch of complicity in the attack.

1694-1695
CHAP. VIII

The fortunate termination of the Dutch troubles with the Komendas so exasperated the English that in November 1698 they treacherously murdered Abe Teki while he was visiting them at Cape Coast. The Komendas were determined to avenge the death of their Chief, and Teki Ankan, who was also concerned in this dastardly act, fled to Cape Coast and sought the protection of the English, whom he joined against his own people. The English then raised a large force of Saboes and Cape Coast men, and placing Teki Ankan in command sent him against the Komendas ; but the Dutch, though invited to join, refused to mix themselves up in this new quarrel. The Komendas, who were outnumbered by four to one, were led by their Tufuhin, Amu Teki, and completely routed the force under Teki Ankan. Amu Teki then sent some of the enemy's skulls¹ to the Dutch Governor at Elmina in token of his victory and as a sign of friendship. The messengers were well received, and sent back with presents for the Tufuhin and the Governor's thanks. The Dutch were now on such friendly terms with the Komendas that they had the best possible opportunity to damage the English ; but they seem to have been prevented from doing so principally by the intrigues of a native named Akim, who was much trusted by the Governor, who constantly allowed himself to be guided by this man's advice. Akim used every means to irritate the Governor against the Komendas. Some Elmina women were murdered at this time, and Akim pretended that this outrage had been perpetrated by the Fetus, though there is good reason to believe that it was really committed by Agents of Akim and Teki Ankan in order that they might lay the blame at the door of the Fetus, who were allies of the Komendas. Be this as it may, Akim persuaded the Governor to have a number of Fetus attacked when they came to the Castle to trade, several of whom were killed and eighty more taken

¹ Probably the jaw-bones only.

1694-1699 prisoners. This treacherous act was committed without
CHAP. VIII the sanction or even the knowledge of the Council.

The English now attacked the Komendas again, and this time met with better success ; for Amu Teki, being wounded and dropping out of the fighting-line, the Komendas, missing their general, lost confidence, and Teki Ankan secured an easy victory, killing or taking prisoners many of the principal men. Teki Ankan thus became Chief of Komenda, and the continual state of warfare in which the country had been kept for the past four or five years at last came to an end.

The affairs of the Royal African Company and the subject of the trade to Africa generally had now been considered by Parliament, and an Act¹ was passed laying open the trade to all His Majesty's subjects for a period of thirteen years from the 24th of June 1698. A duty of ten per cent *ad valorem* was to be collected on all goods and merchandize exported to Africa, and the amount thus raised was to be paid over to the Royal African Company to assist them in maintaining the castles and forts on which the safety of the trade so largely depended.

In 1699 the Company sent out special orders to the Agent at Cape Coast to lose no time in putting Fort Royal in a thorough state of repair. This important position had been neglected far too long ; nothing had been done to improve it since it was purchased from the Danes, and it was now little better than a heap of ruins. A model was now prepared however, which, if it had been followed, would have made this fort the strongest on the whole Coast ; but though it was rebuilt, the original plan was only partly carried out.

¹ This was an outcome of the Declaration of Rights.

CHAPTER IX

THE GOLD COAST AT THE CLOSE OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

1700

A **VERY** fair idea of the condition of the Gold Coast at 1700 the close of the seventeenth century can be gleaned from CHAP. IX the writings of Dapper,¹ Barbot,² Bosman,³ Smith⁴ and others who were in the country at or about that time. The seaboard was still divided into practically the same kingdoms as those that existed when the Portuguese settled on the Coast ; but two centuries of trade with Europeans had increased the importance of the coast towns and raised them from the position of tiny fishing villages to that of populous trading centres, which either became the capitals of their respective kingdoms or rivalled the capitals in importance. Accra, however, was no longer independent, but a tributary of Akwamu, and the balance of power among some of the other tribes was also changed. Fetu, which had been divided against itself during the Komenda wars and had thus sustained a double loss, had now become so weak that it was practically under the protection of Komenda. Elmina and Cape Coast, too, had suffered greatly in these wars, and the former had, moreover, been decimated by an epidemic of small-pox in 1686. Akron was divided into Great and Little Akron ; the former lay inland and was a Commonwealth, while the latter was a petty kingdom on the seaboard. These two were independent of each other, but lived on friendly terms

¹ 1686.

² Published in 1732, but apparently written soon after 1682.

³ 1705.

⁴ 1727.

1700 and were both under the protection of Fanti.¹ The Adoms, **CHAP. IX** Jabis and Akwamus were now the most powerful and warlike of the coast tribes ; but the latter were continually at variance with the Akims, who claimed a feudal right over them and tried to exact an annual tribute. Akim would have been a much more powerful State than it was if its Chiefs had only been able to agree amongst themselves instead of being for ever engaged in petty quarrels and disputes so that their enemies had little cause to fear them. Some of the inland States now began to be heard of for the first time. Of these Denkera was the richest and most powerful, and had recently conquered Awoin after a prolonged struggle, in which their ultimate success was largely due to the want of combination shown by the enemy. The Anamabos were especially truculent, and would sometimes keep the garrison shut up in the fort for days or weeks together, or, if they took a dislike to the Factor, thought nothing of sending him away in a canoe to Cape Coast.

Most of the garrisons of the forts were very weak, especially those of the English. Atkins² describes them as " a Company of white Negroes," and says that they were entirely in the power of the Governor, who punished them for any fault " with Mulcts, Confinement, the Dungeon, Drubbing, or the wooden Horse ; and for enduring this, they have each of them a Salary sufficient to buy Kanky, Palm-Oil, and a little fish, to keep them from starving : for though the Salaries sound tolerably in Leaden-hall-street (as from fifty Pounds to ninety Pounds per annum a Factor ; fifty Pounds for an Artificer), yet in Guinea, the General, for the Company's Good, pays them in Krakra, a false Money, current only upon the Spot, which disables them from taking any Advantage of buying Necessaries from Ships coasting down." In order to keep up the price of the stock, they were forbidden to buy anything except from the Company and were encouraged to run into debt, and then became practically exiled for life, for no one was ever allowed to leave the Coast until

¹ Barbot, p. 179.

² Astley, vol. ii, p. 451.

his account had been settled. If a man was too sober to **1700** run into debt, Atkins alleges that there were other means **CHAP. IX** of attaining the same end by "arts of mismanagement or loss of goods under his care." Similar methods were practised with the townspeople, many of whom thus became pawns to the Company and liable to be sold by the Governor at any time. "Most of the Factors . . . had dwindled from the genteel Air they brought ; wear no Cane nor Snuff-box, idle in men of business, have lank Bodies, a pale Visage, their Pockets sewn up, or of no Use, and their Tongues tied."¹

The unhealthiness of the climate and the insanitary habits of the people were as noticeable features of life on the Gold Coast in those days as they are at present. Bosman says : "The Stench of this unwholesome Mist is very much augmented by the Negroes' pernicious Custom of laying their Fish for five or six Days to putrify before they eat it, and their easing their Bodies round their Houses, and all over their Towns ; and if this odious Mixture of noysome Stenches very much affects the State of Health here, it is not to be wondered, since 'tis next to impossibility, not only for new Comers, but those who have long continued here, to preserve themselves intirely from its Malign Effects. The great Difference betwixt the European Air and this, is so observable, that few come hither who are not at first seized by a Sickness which carries off a great many, and that chiefly because we are so wretchedly unprovided with what should comfort and nourish these poor Men ; for we have no help to have recourse to but corrupted Med'cines, and unskilful Physicians, they being only ignorant Barbers, who bring several into the utmost danger of their Lives : Whereas Nature is strong enough, by the Assistance of good Nourishing Diet and Restoratives, it might probably recover the Patient. But, alas ! how should he be able to get them ? For our Medicines, as I have before told you, are most of them spoiled ; and for Food, what is here to be gotten for the common People besides Fish and a dry lean Hen ?

¹ Astley, vol. ii. p. 451.

1700 And, indeed, were he able to pay for better, here is nothing proper for a weak Stomach ; for all the Oxen or Cows, Sheep and Hens, are dry, lean and tough : So that a sound Man, not to mention an infirm one, hath enough to do to eat them."¹ The habits of many of the people have not noticeably improved during the two centuries that have elapsed since Bosman wrote, nor has the quality of the fowls changed for the better ; but the progress of civilization, has, nevertheless, had some effect, and neither the want of provisions nor the dearth of medical comforts are now such marked characteristics of the Gold Coast as they once were.

But though the lapse of time has failed entirely to abolish the defects complained of by Bosman, it has produced very great changes in the distribution of the wild animals of the country. In his day antelope, leopards, lions, elephants and other animals that are now rare or extinct along the coast-line were extremely common. He describes the slaughter of an elephant in Elmina itself as late as December 1700, and says that three had been killed there on different occasions, while several were killed daily in the districts around Axim.

The elephant at Elmina came into the town about six o'clock in the morning, walking along the foot of St. Jago's Hill, and numbers of the people, though unarmed, at once turned out and began to follow it. One of the Dutch officers came down from Fort Conraadsburg and shot at it, wounding it just above the eye ; but in spite of this and a number of other shots that were fired by the Elminas, it continued to walk quietly on until it reached the Government Garden, which it entered and began to pull down a clump of coco-nut palms. The Dutch Governor, with Bosman and several other officers, now came down, and while the elephant stood in the garden more than a hundred shots were fired into it at close range ; but as only leaden balls were used, they did not penetrate very far and many of them even failed to pierce the thick skin, so that a fatal wound was not to be expected and all this firing

¹ Bosman, p. 105.

had no effect beyond making the animal “ bleed to that 1700 degree as if an Ox had been killed.”¹ One of the Elminas then “ fancying himself able to deal with him, went softly behind him, catched his Tail in his Hand, designing to cut a piece of it off ; but the Elephant being used to wear a Tail, would not permit it to be shortened in his Lifetime : Wherefore after giving the Negroe a stroke with his Snout, he drew him to him, and trod upon him two or three times ; and, as if that was not sufficient, he bored in his Body two holes with his Teeth, large enough for a Man’s double Fist to enter. Then he let him lye without making any farther attempt on him ; and stood still also whilst two Negroes fetched away the dead Body, not offering to meddle with them in the least.”² The elephant then moved off in the direction of the River Benya, while the people scattered in all directions, most of them seeking safety up the slopes of St. Jago’s Hill. Having reached the river, he began washing his wounds, and then broke up some water-barrels and a canoe that were lying there. Here the shooting was renewed, and the beast at length fell down exhausted from loss of blood “ after which they immediately cut off his Snout, which was so hard and tough that it cost the Negroes thirty Stroaks ere they could separate it, which must be very painful to the Elephant, since it made him roar ; which was the only Noise I heard him make.”³ The animal then died after more than three hundred shots had been fired into it.

The arms of the people had now been augmented by the introduction of fire-arms, which were imported and sold to them in enormous quantities. Nor were they altogether satisfied with muskets alone ; for some of the Chiefs had a few small cannon also. The King of Akwamu had a great many, and the King of Saboe had two ; but they had very little idea of their use. The immense danger of this traffic was already foreseen ; but the profits were so great that in the absence of any agreement between the different Europeans on the Coast it was quite impossible to put a stop to it. Bosman points out that they were

¹ Bosman, p. 319.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 321.

1700 only obliging the people "with a Knife to cut our own
 CHAP. IX Throats," and Barbot prophesied that if the sale of cannon
 went on, it would only require some renegade white man
 to teach the people how to use them and then they might
 bid farewell to all the forts and castles and the Coast trade
 for ever.

Spears, both for throwing and stabbing, shields and bows and arrows were still in use, and helmets of crocodile's or some other skin adorned with a red shell on each side and a bunch of horse-hair behind and secured on the head with a heavy iron chain. The arrows were feathered, thus differing from those still in use among the tribes of the Northern Territories, and, except among the Awoins, were never poisoned. The use of arrows, however, was already dying out, and they were in general use only in Akwamu. Bosman says the people were "so nicely dextrous in shooting, that in Hare-hunting they will lodge their small fine Arrows in what part of the Hare's Body is desired."¹ The chief weapon, after their fire-arms, however, was the sword. These swords were very strong and heavy, but so blunt that several strokes were required to cut off a man's head. They were shaped exactly like the state swords that are still to be seen amongst the regalia of any Chief, which is the only form in which these ancient weapons have survived.

Several of the forts were struck by lightning from time to time, and considering the quantity of powder that was stored in them it is marvellous that none of them were blown up. Bosman found it recorded in some old papers written by Governor Valkenburg that in 1651 Elmina Castle was struck. All the gold and silver was melted in the bags, which were themselves untouched, and swords were broken in their scabbards without any damage to the latter. Fort Batenstein was struck in 1691 and the flag-staff shattered, and in about 1693 Fort St. Anthony and Fort Nassau were both struck. At Axim Bosman says "the Thunder broke all the Drinking-Glasses of the Factor's Chamber, and raised up his Child with the Bed

¹ Bosman, p. 186.

under it ; both which it threw some feet distant, without 1700 the least hurt done."¹ Fort James at Accra was also CHAP. IX struck, and its walls were so shattered that there were holes reaching through to the powder-room and some pewter porringers were melted into a lump.

In spite of the fact that no attempt had yet been made to improve upon the crude methods employed by the people to obtain gold, a very large quantity of this metal was annually exported from the Coast, though only a small proportion of it passed through the hands of the legitimate Companies. According to Bosman's estimate, the total amount was about 7,000 marks annually (equivalent to about £220,000² sterling). Of this he says the Dutch West India Company obtained about 1,500 marks, the Royal African Company about 1,200, the Dutch interlopers another 1,500 and the English interlopers 1,000, while the Brandenburgers and Danes between them accounted for another 1,000, and the Portuguese and French together had about 800 more. According to his reckoning, therefore, the largest share fell to the Dutch.

The gold was obtained by barter, and each nation took out chiefly those goods that were cheapest in his own country, though there were many articles with which they all had to be supplied. The Factors, too, had to be very careful in examining the gold, which was often mixed with base metal, more so at some places than at others. The principal trade goods were cloth of different kinds, linen, chintz, calico and other materials ; spirits ; muskets ; firelocks ; cutlasses and knives ; pewter dishes, basins and porringers ; powder and flints ; lead in sheets, pipes and balls or shot ; copper basins and pots ; brass kettles, locks, bells, rings, trumpets, pins and cups ; hair trunks ; iron bars and hammers ; glass bugles and beads of all kinds ; fish-hooks, and a variety of other articles. The French carried more brandy, wine, iron, paper and firelocks than the English and Dutch, who supplied most of the linen and cloth, wrought copper and pewter and beads, and nearly all the gunpowder. The Danes, Brandenburgers

¹ Bosman, p. 113.

² Barbot's estimate was £240,000.

1700 and Portuguese bought most of their goods through Jews
CHAP. IX in Holland, but the Portuguese often added rum and tobacco from Brazil.

Interlopers still frequented the Coast during the summer months, and then had nearly all the trade in their hands, as they could sell their goods more cheaply than the Companies, who relied mainly on the winter trade. James Barbot, in 1699, saw three Zealand ships in Elmina road which had just been captured by two Dutch frigates. One of them was a ship of thirty-six guns, and her commander, who had made a desperate resistance, was to be tried for his life.

The following is a description of the Forts and Settlements as they existed at or about this time. Commencing from the west, the ruins of a French fort are described by the Chevalier de Marchais as being still in existence on a hill to the east of the River Manco. He says it had been a double square redoubt, but his statements are not always to be relied upon and it is possible that what he saw were the ruins of Fort Elise Carthago, which had been abandoned by the Dutch. At Axim, Fort St. Anthony was in the possession of the Dutch, but the defences of this place have already been fully described. The Chief Factor's house was a high triangular building of brick with a small plot of ground planted with a few orange trees on its west front, and the Dutch had a kiln in the village where they burnt lime from oyster shells for the repair of their different forts.

Farther east was Groot Fredericksburg, the headquarters of the Brandenburgers, which mounted forty-six guns on four large batteries ; the guns, however, were of no great size. A handsome outwork on the east side of the fort rather weakened its defences ; and the breastworks, being no higher than a man's knee, afforded but little protection to the garrison and constituted another serious defect. The quarters and store-houses, however, were exceptionally fine and well built, and the gateway was the most beautiful on the whole Coast ; so large was it that the saying used to the burghers of Minde used to be quoted to

the garrison : " Mind to keep your gate close shut, lest the 1700 fort should run away."¹ The Brandenburg fort guarding the watering-place at Takrama was quite a small place, mounting six guns ; and Fort Dorothea at Akwida consisted of a flat-roofed house and two small batteries mounting twenty guns in all. The buildings, however, were none too strong and were crowded together in too small a space.

The English fort at Dixcove lay on the shore of a little bay where the landing was very safe. It was built of stone and lime with two round flankers and four batteries mounting twenty guns ; there was also a spur on the western side and a moderately high square tower. The garrison usually consisted of sixteen or more Europeans and about the same number of Africans. Some very good gardens were laid out in front of the fort.

Butri was considered one of the healthiest stations on the whole Gold Coast. The Dutch Fort Batenstein was a very insignificant irregularly oblong building, and mounted eight guns on two small batteries. In 1708 the Dutch laid out some ground here, and sent down to Wida for 200 slaves, intending to establish some sugar and rum works, for which materials had been ordered from Holland and plantations were being laid out. The English Governor, Sir Dalby Thomas, wrote that he feared the cheaper production might ruin the West Indian Colonies, but the scheme does not seem to have proved successful.

At Takoradi the ruins of Fort Witsen could still be seen on a hill near the village. The Brandenburgers seem to have occupied the place for a time, and the English regularly sent there to collect oyster shells from which to make lime for their buildings ; but in 1707 the Dutch built a second small fort here, for no other reason than to inconvenience the English. It mounted only seven or eight guns.

Sekondi, which had once been a prosperous and comparatively wealthy town, had been burned by the Ahantas during the war in 1690, and now consisted of a few houses only. The Dutch Fort Orange was a very small place,

¹ Bosman.

1700 being merely a square white house in a yard, mounting
 CHAP. IX eight or ten guns on a terrace on the roof. The first English fort had been a very similar building, but had been so grossly neglected that the guns were literally honey-combed with rust and the carriages rotten and useless. It is small wonder, therefore, that it fell such an easy prey to the Elminas. The second English fort was built on much the same plan as Fort Metal Cross at Dixcove and mounted the same number¹ of guns, but was made rather larger and stronger.

Shama at this time consisted of three small villages built close together and totalling about two hundred houses. The Dutch Fort St. Sebastian stood on a little hill and was of about the same size as Fort Batenstein, with eight small guns on its four batteries.

Komenda also consisted of a group of three villages, which at ordinary times contained about one hundred and fifty houses ; but in 1675 nearly the whole town had been accidentally destroyed by fire, and many of the people had temporarily removed to Ampeni. The lagoon at this time opened into the sea, and was used as a harbour for fishing canoes. The English fort was a large quadrangular building with four bastions and a high tower. It mounted twenty-one guns, and was garrisoned by about sixty men, half of whom were Europeans. The Dutch Fort Vredenburg lay a little farther east, and was a square stone building with a stunted tower and four batteries mounting twenty guns. The close proximity of these forts, which were within gunshot distance of each other, often led to disputes. In about 1725 the Dutch Commandant suddenly attacked the English Factor under a tree midway between the two forts, but was himself killed in the encounter. There was yet another small fort at Komenda, which belonged to the notorious John Kabes who had been attacked by the Dutch in 1694. At that time he had gone over to the English, but he seems to have quarrelled with them some years later and to have set up a separate trade with the interlopers, and, buying

¹ Twenty.

eighteen guns from one of them named Gladman, mounted 1700 them on a small fort that he had built near the English fort at Komenda in 1702. A little later he increased his armament by six more guns that were supplied him by Captain Ingle of the *Shrewsbury*. In April 1707 the English Factor reported to the Governor, Sir Dalby Thomas, that the Dutch were collecting a mixed force of Shamas, Jabis and Elminas to attack John in his fort, and asked him to send him some corn and a better gunner in case they should be blockaded or attacked. A long-boat and a five-hand canoe were accordingly sent down well armed, for fear of the Dutch at Elmina who had recently attacked several canoes passing between Cape Coast and Sekondi. These precautions were fully justified, for the Castle fired four shots at them and some canoes were sent out to take them, but finding them well armed and resolute soon drew off. From this it is evident that relations between the English and the Dutch were still very strained, but it is not so clear whether John Kabes had again made his peace with the former or not.

The defences of Elmina have already been partly described. The town¹ was, as a rule, very populous and capable of putting about 6,000 fighting men in the field : men, too, who had on more than one occasion given convincing proof of their valour ; but at this time it was in a very weak condition, having been almost depopulated by its losses in the recent wars and by repeated epidemics of small-pox. It contained about 1,200 stone houses and was built across the neck of the peninsula on the point of which the Castle stands—that is, on the present parade ground. The Castle of St. George mounted thirty-eight good brass cannon, besides several smaller pieces and some iron guns on the lower battery which were chiefly used for firing salutes. The old Portuguese moat on the western side had now been subdivided into two, and was used as a reservoir for fresh water, in which fish and turtles were often kept. The entrance to the Castle was well guarded by a drawbridge, covered by a small redoubt

¹ Odina.

1700 mounting eight iron guns, and an iron portcullis which
 CHAP. IX was further defended by four small pieces of brass ordnance
 within the gates. The only other door was high up in the
 wall facing the river, and was used for passing goods in and
 out of the Castle by means of a crane. Besides the water
 in the moat, there were three large tanks or cisterns con-
 structed within the Castle in which rain-water was stored,
 so that with an adequate supply of provisions for its gar-
 rison, which numbered about 200 men exclusive of officers,
 half of whom were Europeans, the place was well able to
 withstand a siege by natives for an almost unlimited time.
 "The Inside is a large Quadrangle, surrounded with
 handsome Storehouses of white Stone and Bricks, which
 makes a good Place of Arms. The General's Lodgings
 are above in the Castle, the Ascent to which is by a large
 Staircase of black and white Stone, defended at Top by
 two small Brass Guns, and four Padereros¹ of the same
 Metal, commanding the Place of Arms, and a Corps-de-
 Guard pretty large. Next to this is a great Hall full of
 Arms, like an Arsenal, through which, and by a by-Passage,
 you enter a fine, long, covered Gallery, all wainscotted,
 at each End of which are large Glass Windows. Through
 this you pass into the General's Apartment, consisting
 of several handsome Rooms and Offices along the Ram-
 parts. The Chapel on the other Side of these Rooms is
 very neat, and, besides Sundays, there are public Prayers
 in it every Day.... The Infirmary, or Hospital, lies along
 the Ramparts to the River-Side, and can contain an
 hundred sick Men. By it is a large Tower, which over-
 looks the Redoubt, but has no Guns."² Fort Conraads-
 burg has already been described ; it mounted twelve guns.
 Under the northern slopes of St. Jago's Hill was the
 Government Garden, in which was a peculiar round summer-
 house reached by a few steps, open at the sides and sur-
 mounted by a cupola roof.

Cape Coast contained about five hundred houses with
 a market-square in the centre, but the population was less

¹ Patereros were small swivel guns.

² Astley, vol. ii, p. 591.

than usual, owing to the recent wars. The space occupied 1700 by the town was roughly triangular in outline, the two CHAP. IX angles at its base coming down on to the northern and western faces of the Castle, while the apex reached north-west to the wall of the Government Garden, which was very extensive and well planted, but enclosed only on the side facing the town. The Castle, which mounted in all about forty guns, had a square tower, and had been much improved by the Royal African Company. Its walls were high, and for beauty and strength it was surpassed only by Elmina. The square was open to the sea on the east, where there was a platform mounting thirteen guns, while on the three other sides it was enclosed by buildings containing quarters for the officers and garrison and warehouses for goods. On the south side was a "large well-built Chapel, the back part of which joins to the Castle wall, having the great body of the rock Tabora¹ on the outside of it."² The Castle has "four flankers. . . . On the battlements are ten guns and twenty-five on the flankers, from minions to nine-pounders; and on a rock called Tabora, twenty paces from the Castle, are four, or six twelve-pounders, in a round tower,³ garrisoned by about as many men, which serves to keep the Blacks in the town the better in awe."⁴ There was also a dungeon near the main gate, in which criminals were confined before being sent to England to take their trial. The square, which was large enough to parade 400 or 500 men in, was raised about twenty feet above the rock on which the Castle stood, and beneath it, besides a large tank for the storage of fresh water, was a spacious arched vault, subdivided into several rooms and entered through an iron gate, in which the slaves were kept while awaiting the arrival of a ship. It could hold about a thousand. The garrison, who all wore red coats, consisted of some

¹ The rock upon which the Castle stands is the reputed residence of the marine god Tabi, whose wife, Tabi Yir (Tabora), is said to inhabit a group of rocks a little farther westward.

² Smith.

³ The base of the present Dalzel Tower.

⁴ Barbot, p. 169.

1700 two hundred men, half of whom were Africans,¹ under the
 CHAP. IX command of a Captain. Bosman, however, says that the
 garrison was very weak in his time and much addicted
 to drinking, and that " the Soldiers are such miserable
 Wretches that they raise your Pity rather than Fear." He
 was however, evidently annoyed by the refusal of the
 English Governor to give up some Dutch deserters who
 had fled to Cape Coast. The Castle gate was shut at eight
 o'clock every night, a strong guard mounted, and the
 officer provided with a pass-word by the Chief Agent
 (Governor). All ships, whether English or foreign, that
 anchored off the Castle or passed within gun-shot of it
 were required to salute it by lowering their top-sails, and
 if they omitted to do so they were at once fired on. Bar-
 bot² relates that when he put in to Cape Coast in the
 French warship *Le Jolly* they saluted the Castle with
 seven guns and were answered with five ; but when they
 were coming to an anchor, to their great surprise three
 guns were fired at them with ball which fell just ahead of
 the ship. They therefore went on to the Danish Settle-
 ment at Fort Fredericksborg, thinking war might have
 broken out between France and England since they sailed.
 Next morning he sent ashore to ask if this was the case.
 The Governor invited him to land, promising to explain
 the reason for the shots, and gave him a splendid re-
 ception. He then told him of this rule, and explained that
 his orders to see that it was observed were very strict.
 The Company's ships were usually supplied with fresh
 water from the Castle tanks, but if this was low, from a
 pond known as Domine's Hole. This appears to have
 been a name given to the lagoon to the west of Cape Coast,
 which was by this time cut off from the sea and contained,
 as now, brackish water ; for Barbot says that the Com-
 pany's ships were sometimes supplied from a large pond

¹ The African members of the garrisons are usually referred to as " Gromettoes," a corruption of the Portuguese " grumete," meaning a ship's boy. The majority, if not all, of them were the domestic slaves of the Company, and were possibly Kru-boys.

² Page 171.

" lying at some distance towards the sea, between cape Corso and Mina . . . at a place called Domine." ¹ 1700

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Close under the Castle was a small fortified house mounting a few guns, which belonged to a mulatto named Edward Barter, who flew the English flag and was regularly consulted by the Company's officers in all their dealings with the people. This man had very great influence, and practically all the trade passed through his hands as middleman. He seems to have corresponded at Cape Coast to the notorious John Kabes at Komenda. But according to some letters quoted by Barbot ² he overstepped the mark and fell into disgrace in Sir Dalby Thomas' time, and then intrigued with the Dutch to damage the English trade.

Fort Royal on the Danish Mount at Amanfu lay a little to the east of the Castle, and was entirely rebuilt at about this time. The old fort had been triangular, with a round flanker facing the sea and two batteries towards Cape Coast and Mori mounting sixteen guns. The new fort built by the English was square and could be reached only by a narrow winding path up the hill, which might have been defended by a single gun. It mounted eighteen or twenty guns, eleven of which were on the platform, and was garrisoned by six whites and twelve blacks. On its completion, all salutes from ships in Cape Coast road were acknowledged from this fort instead of from the Castle, in order to avoid disturbing any sick men in the latter by unnecessary noise. The English also had another small fort near Cape Coast. This was on Queen Anne's Point, mounted five guns, and had a garrison of five whites and six blacks. Near it the ruins of the old Dutch lodge could still be seen.

Mori contained over two hundred houses and was very densely populated. The Dutch Fort Nassau had been much enlarged, and was now a very fine building. It was nearly square, with very high walls and a handsome square tower at each corner. It mounted eighteen guns on four batteries and the gate was furnished with a drawbridge

¹ Barbot, p. 171.

² *Ibid.*, p. 445.

1700 and defended by a loop-holed gallery. So long as this
CHAP. IX was the Dutch headquarters a very large garrison had been maintained, but on their removal to Elmina it was considerably reduced. As was the case at all the other posts, Mori had very fine gardens attached to the fort : these indeed were generally acknowledged to be the best on the whole Coast.

The English factory at Anashan was a very insignificant place, mounting only two guns, and was never occupied by more than two or three men. Branco, the Portuguese, had his turf redoubt and factory here as late as 1683, but how much longer he retained his position is unknown.

Anamabo was large and populous, but the people bore a very bad character and were particularly turbulent. "The English Factors dare not in the least contradict them ; but are rather obliged to bear with them. . . . The great wealth of the Fantineans makes them so proud and haughty, that an European trading there must stand bare to them."¹ They often extorted money from the Factor by shutting the garrison up in the fort, closing all the paths so that no traders could come down, and compelling him in a very short time to purchase peace and a renewal of trade at their own price. The town was divided into two parts, one of which was inhabited by Elmina and the other by Fanti fishermen, who paid tribute to the King. The English fort had not long been built, and the remains of the mud walls of the old lodge could still be seen in front of it. It stood on a rock close to the sea and, though not very large, was strongly constructed of a mixture of stone and brick. It was defended by two turrets on one side and two flankers on the other next the sea, and mounted twelve good guns and two smaller pieces.² This was one of the posts that was held by a Chief Factor, who had twelve other Europeans and eighteen gromettos with him.

The English Factory at Egya was a mere thatched house with a large yard and a duck pond. Its sole means of defence were the muskets of the two or three men who formed its garrison. The town was divided into two

¹ Barbot, p. 177.

² Patereros.

separate parts, each of which contained about twenty-five 1700 houses.

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Fort Amsterdam at Kormantin belonged to the Dutch, and was a square stone building having one large and three smaller batteries mounting twenty guns and a square tower in the centre surmounted by a cupola roof. It was garrisoned by twenty-five Europeans and a number of Africans.

The English had another fort near here at Tantumkweri. It was built some time prior to 1726, but in which year is uncertain. It stood close to the sea, and was a regular fort, with four flankers and mounted twelve guns. At Apam was the Dutch Fort Leydsamheid, which was a very small building and had only two batteries with eight guns, but there was a fine turret in front of it.

The new English fort at Winneba¹ was a square building with four flankers very similar to that at Tantumkweri, but with the addition of a large spur. It mounted eighteen small guns, and was usually garrisoned by twelve whites and eighteen blacks. Its slave-room could hold one hundred. At Beraku there was a small triangular fort belonging to the Dutch and mounting twelve guns, and a deserted English factory at Shido, of which nothing more is known.

Accra was divided into three separate villages. Soko, of about a hundred houses, lay under James Fort; Little Accra, which before the war with Akwamu had been large and important and had had a big market, but had been burnt and now contained only sixty houses, lay under the Dutch Fort Crève Cœur, and Orsoko,² which had also been burnt during the war, under the Danish Christiansborg Castle. James Fort was a square building with four bastions and high thick stone walls, and was furnished with a good tower and a spur; it mounted twenty-five rather small guns and was garrisoned by a dozen white men and a few natives. Fort Creve Cœur was another square stone building with four batteries mounting fourteen guns and a few smaller pieces; its walls, however, were neither

¹ Simpa.

² Or Orsaki, or Osu.

1700 so high nor so thick as those of the English fort, but its
 CHAP. IX garrison was rather stronger, consisting of fifteen whites
 and twenty-five blacks. Christiansborg Castle was far
 larger and stronger than either of the other forts, and had
 four batteries ; but its flat roof made the whole fort prac-
 tically one continuous battery, and enabled its twenty
 guns to be moved to any part of it.

The Slave Trade was now at its height and quite over-
 shadowed that for gold. This detestable traffic was
 carried on along the whole West African coast, and enor-
 mous numbers of people were annually exported and sold
 in the West Indies and other parts.¹ The Guinea Coast
 as a whole supplied as many as from 70,000 to 100,000
 slaves yearly, and the *Liverpool Memorandum*, which con-
 tains an exact list of all the vessels belonging to that port
 that were engaged in this trade, together with a return of
 the number of slaves taken by each, shows that in 1753
 the number imported into America by 101 Liverpool ships
 alone was upwards of 30,000, and there were of course
 many other vessels sailing from London and Bristol that
 are not included in this return. This estimate is also
 confirmed by Anderson, who says that " England supplies
 her American Colonies with Negro slaves amounting in
 number to about an hundred thousand every year,"² and
 it must be remembered that England was only one of
 many nations, all of whom were actively engaged in this
 traffic. The Gold Coast alone is said to have furnished
 not fewer than 10,000 slaves every year ; and these were
 considered the most valuable, for they made the best
 labourers, though they were of a more impatient and
 mutinous disposition than those obtained from other
 parts of Guinea. In the language of the slave traders, all
 Gold Coast slaves were classed as " Koromantyns," because
 they had been largely obtained from Kormantin. Even
 ships bound for the Slave Coast, which took no slaves

¹ In 1713 the Company, by the Assiento Contract, undertook to supply the Spanish Government with 144,000 slaves during the ensuing thirty years.

² *History of Trade and Commerce.*

from the Gold Coast itself, used to obtain their canoes 1700 and canoemen there, notably from Komenda and Shama, CHAP. IX but often from Axim or Takoradi also ; for the people of the Slave Coast had but few canoes except on their rivers. Some of the Gold Coast natives thus profited indirectly by the leeward slave trade, for these canoemen were invariably well paid and were given the canoes to return home in so soon as the ship was full.

The Europeans themselves never engaged in actual slave raiding except when the trade was quite in its infancy, but used to buy their slaves from native brokers living in the coast towns. The slaves were obtained in various ways, but were for the most part either prisoners of war, criminals who had been condemned to be sold, or debtors who were sold to satisfy their creditors. The trade, therefore, apart from the cruelties inflicted on the slaves themselves, naturally tended to foster inter-tribal wars ;¹ to encourage the infliction of the severest possible punishments by the Chiefs for comparatively trifling offences ; and to tempt those who were sufficiently powerful and unscrupulous to seize persons who, as often as not, were innocent of any crime, and, after indulging them with some pretence of a trial, to sell them to the traders and divide the proceeds. The successes of the Ashantis in their wars brought great numbers of slaves into the market. They were sent to Mansu, where the great slave mart was held, and there passed into the hands of the middlemen brokers of the Coast towns, who sold them to the European traders. There was also a second regular slave market at Eguafu, but people who were sold there were more often bought for use as sacrificial victims at funeral or other customs than for export.

As the trade increased and the demand for slaves was still maintained, as much deception and cheating were practised in it as is commonly supposed to enter into horse

¹ Often mere slave raids. It has been computed that 20,000 were slaughtered in five such expeditions undertaken by the Bornu before three-fourths of that number had been obtained as slaves, and that five-twelfths of the captives often perished on the journey to the coast.

1700 dealing at the present day. All slaves when they reached CHAP. IX the coast were closely shaved and well anointed with palm-oil to give their skins a smooth and glossy appearance, so that it was often no easy matter to tell an old man from a young one. They were then carefully examined by the surgeons, who looked at their teeth, made them jump, and thoroughly over-hauled them from head to foot in order to exclude the aged and infirm or any who were diseased, who were invariably rejected, while those who were passed as fit were immediately branded on the right breast with the purchaser's mark to prevent the risk of substitution. In the case of the Royal African Company, the letters D.Y.¹ were used. This was done with a heated silver or iron brand after first anointing the skin with a little oil. When the slaves had all been marked, if no vessel was already waiting, they were confined in the slave-rooms of the forts until an opportunity occurred to ship them to their final destination.

On board the slave ships the men and women were separated, and the former placed two and two in irons as a safeguard against mutiny or escape. Large quantities of Indian corn were bought on the Coast, principally at Anamabo, on which they were fed twice daily, one chest of four bushels being allowed for each slave for the voyage. The women and children were always allowed to take exercise on deck from seven o'clock in the morning until sunset, and, after the African coast had been finally left and there was no longer any chance of escape, the men also had their irons struck off, provided they were not mutinous. The slaves required very careful watching while they were being shipped; for they would often throw themselves into the sea and be drowned or would starve themselves and so die, while mutinies on the slave ships were of frequent occurrence. There was a prevalent idea among the people that they were being taken abroad to be eaten, and they also believed that after death they would pass to a spirit world ² in all respects like their own land. Death therefore had few terrors for them, and even

¹ Duke of York.

² Sramanedzi.

at the present day a Gold Coast African will commit suicide 1700 for what seem the most trivial reasons. On the whole CHAP. IX the slaves were fairly well treated so long as the trade was lawful, for their value gave their owners a pecuniary interest in their health and well-being, and it was only after the traffic had been declared illegal that some of the greatest sufferings were endured by these people, even though their individual value was then greater. Even now, however, many terrible atrocities were perpetrated from time to time, principally with a view to preventing mutinies. The slaves are said to have believed that mutilation would prove a bar to their entry into the spirit world,¹ and some inhuman captains of ships did not hesitate to amputate the limbs of a few in order to terrorize the remainder.

As an example of the diabolical cruelties that were sometimes practised, the following story may be quoted. Some slaves who had been bought at Sierra Leone by Captain Harding of the *Robert* of Bristol mutinied under the leadership of a petty Chief named Tomba. They were aided by a female slave, who brought them a hammer by night and told them that there were only five sailors on deck, all of whom were asleep. Tomba, therefore, with one other man and the woman, who were the only persons who had the courage to follow him, went on deck and killed two of the sailors with blows on the temples with the hammer, but was then overpowered and secured. Captain Harding apparently considered the two chief actors in this scene to be of greater value on account of their courage and strength and sentenced them to be flogged and scarified, but, with the utmost barbarity, caused the woman to be hoisted up by her thumbs and flogged and slashed with knives until she died. Three of the other conspirators, who however had taken no active part in the proceedings, were condemned to death ; two of them being compelled

¹ Spirits are believed to recover from the diseases that killed their hosts within a few months, but actual mutilations might be considered permanent. The spirits of those who die a violent death before their time, moreover, unless sacrificed for a specific purpose, are believed to experience some difficulty in finding their way to Sramanedzi.

1700 to eat the heart and liver of the first before they themselves
CHAP. IX were killed. This was probably an exceptional case of wanton cruelty ; but mutinies were of frequent occurrence, and as they could only be suppressed by the severest measures, this monstrous traffic entailed endless suffering and misery to the slaves, and must necessarily have had a most degrading effect on all those who were engaged in it. The only points that can possibly be urged in its favour are that a certain number of real criminals were effectively and profitably transported, and that most of the prisoners of war would, if not sold, have been sacrificed in Africa.

Slavery in itself is an institution and condition to which the African is accustomed ; and so long as he is living in his own country, amongst his own people, and in accordance with the immemorial usages of his race, it entails very little hardship, and he does not greatly object to it. But this wholesale exportation of unwilling persons into a strange land, to face a future of which they knew nothing, but concerning which they were filled with the gloomiest possible forebodings, was a very different matter. At the same time it must be remembered that these forebodings were for the most part groundless ; for the slaves on the plantations were generally well treated and quite content, and most of the hysterical nonsense that was written at the time of the agitation for the abolition of the trade consisted of gross exaggerations of isolated cases of abuse that were put forward as representing the common state of affairs.

In addition to the other dangers and inconveniences inseparable from a voyage to the Gold Coast, the seas at this time were infested by pirates, who, after the dispersal of the buccaneers from their West Indian haunts, came in great numbers to seek fresh fields for their nefarious trade on the West Coast of Africa, where there were always plenty of ships laden with gold-dust, ivory, slaves or other valuable cargoes to be met with. They often played great havoc with the trade, and it was mainly on this account that H.M.Ss. *Swallow* and *Weymouth* were sent out to cruise in these waters. Two or three of these marauders usually

sailed in company, and were strong enough not only to 1700 capture well-armed ships, but even to take some of the CHAP. IX forts as well. Thus, in 1719, Howell Davis the pirate took James Fort in the River Gambia, but was soon afterwards treacherously murdered by the Portuguese at Prince's Island. His successor, Roberts, captured Bunce Island Fort at Sierra Leone in 1720 ; and, as has already been mentioned, Avery took the two Danish men-of-war of twenty-six guns each that had been sent out to resettle Christiansborg Castle in 1693. Their usual practice was to transfer the slaves or other cargo from the prizes to their own ships, subsequently selling them in the West Indies, and to burn or scuttle the empty vessels. As showing the enormous extent to which piracy was carried on, it is recorded that Roberts destroyed over a hundred ships along the West Coast in one year alone. Captain Snelgrave was taken by Cocklyn at Sierra Leone in 1719, when there was quite a fleet of pirate ships lying in the harbour.¹

Roberts met his end early in February 1722 when H.M.S. *Swallow*, Captain Ogle,² after a long search, found him with three ships at anchor off Cape Lopez. The pirates slipped their cables and fled out to sea, but were closely pursued by the man-of-war. Roberts himself was killed and all the ships were captured. The prisoners numbered about 300 Englishmen and 60 or 70 Negro slaves ; and from 8,000 to 10,000 pounds³ of gold-dust, besides enormous quantities of trade goods, were taken. The pirates were brought to Cape Coast Castle on the 18th of February, where, after a trial lasting twenty-six days, fifty-two of them were hanged in chains, seventy-four acquitted, twenty condemned to servitude, and seventeen to the Marchalsea. What became of the others is unknown ; but several probably died of their wounds after being captured or were killed during two mutinies that broke out before they reached Cape Coast. The climate alone is probably sufficient to account for the rest.

¹ Part of the harbour is still known as Pirates' Bay.

² Afterwards Sir Chaloner Ogle.

³ Weight or sterling ?

PART III
THE RISE OF ASHANTI
1700 TO 1803

CHAPTER X

THE ASHANTIS

1700

THE beginning of the eighteenth century witnessed the 1700 first encroachments towards the coast of the Ashantis, CHAP. X who, though hitherto unheard of, were destined in the near future to play a greater part in the history of the Gold Coast than all the other tribes combined. From this time forward, in fact, the history of the country is largely a history of its relations with this people.

Although tradition asserts and other evidence favours the belief that this people and the Fantis and other Twi-speaking races are the offsprings of a common stock, yet the Ashantis stand out in marked contrast to all the others, distinguished as much by their skill and bravery in war as by the patriotism and power of combination that ultimately led to the formation of the most powerful and in fact the only really important kingdom and empire that the Gold Coast has ever seen. From small beginnings these people gradually extended their power and authority, both by diplomacy and by force of arms, until in the end all the surrounding tribes owed allegiance to them and their countries became tributary provinces of Ashanti. Nor can there be the least doubt that that kingdom would, before the close of the nineteenth century, have included the whole Gold Coast, had not the seaboard tribes been assisted and protected by the Europeans, who feared their Settlements and trade might be endangered.

The rise and fall of the power of Ashanti furnish some of the most interesting chapters of Gold Coast history ; and no one who studies the subject with an unbiassed mind can avoid feeling admiration and some sympathy for this

1700 remarkable people, though it is difficult for those who have CHAP. X suffered many privations and losses on their account and have lived for years in almost constant dread of them to regard them without prejudice. Lord Wolseley, who as Sir Garnet Wolseley was Governor of the Gold Coast and led the expedition against them in 1874, wrote : " From the Ashantees I learnt one important lesson, namely, that any virile race can become paramount in its own region of the world if it possesses the courage, the constancy of purpose and the self-sacrifice to resolve that it will live under a stern system of Spartan military discipline, ruthlessly enforced by one lord and master, the King. In other words, if it be clearly recognized by any people that the interests and comfort of the individual, whether he be king or subject, should not be the first object of national solicitude, but rather that it should be the greatness and power of the state as a whole, a greatness which brings with it national pride, individual security and also contentment, that nation will rule over its neighbours. . . . The Ashantee and the Fantee were absolutely of the same race. The former were a proud nation of brave and daring soldiers, living happily and contentedly under the most absolute of kings. The latter, who lived and idled under the licence of our easy-going laws, were cowardly, lazy, good-for-nothing vagabonds, with all the vices of the Ashantee but with none of his manly courage. . . . Military despotism . . . in some cases supplies the nation brave enough to adopt it with a renown that makes life worth living and worth fighting for."¹

The cowardice of the Fanti has at times been exaggerated, and he has been blamed for it more than he really deserves. His inefficiency as a warrior is due to faults in the system rather than in the individual. Taken man for man the Fanti is probably nearly as good as the Ashanti. The Ashantis, however, have built up a splendid military organization, to the perfection of which everything else has been sacrificed, and they have learned to rely on themselves and to put the national interest before their own. The

¹ Wolseley, vol. ii, p. 368.

Fantis, on the other hand, have suffered from their long contact with Europeans. Their surroundings and their mode of life have to some extent become artificial, and they have been taught to rely upon the protection of a stronger race rather than upon their own efforts. Though they have a military system similar to that of Ashanti, it has never been brought to such perfection nor made to take precedence to other things, but has rather been allowed to atrophy from disuse. They have seldom or never really combined, but, in the face of the most overwhelming common danger, have proved quite unable to put aside their own petty inter-tribal quarrels and disputes ; and though they have again and again turned out in vast numbers to oppose the inroads of the Ashantis, and have on more than one occasion shown considerable bravery and fought really well for a time, yet, in the end, this lack of cohesion and common purpose has invariably shown itself, with the inevitable result that defeat, panic and flight have followed ; for no matter how brave the individual units of a badly organized force may be, it can never hope to withstand the resolute advance of a disciplined foe.

For this neglect of their military system and the production of artificial conditions, however, the English are as much to blame as the people themselves. They had no wish to see them too strong and warlike, lest their own position among them should be endangered ; but when the mischief had been done, they forgot or ignored the part they had played in its production and merely reviled the Fantis.

These conditions, however, were not brought about by the English solely for the selfish purpose of securing their own safety and power. There was another motive also ; that of the missionary and philanthropist who wished to abolish at once all those customs and beliefs which, though natural to the people, were repugnant to them. Those who were actuated by this motive, however, forgot that the evolution of civilization is as definite and gradual, though not so slow a process as the evolution of species.

1700 It is impossible to hurry a race forward in the course of
CHAP. X a few years to a stage which it would not otherwise have reached for several centuries, except by paying the inevitable penalty for interference with any such natural law. The civilization acquired or imposed by such artificial means is for the most part no more than a veneer, which is easily peeled off and has the terrible disadvantage of adding the vices and defects incidental to the new condition without having first eradicated those that previously existed, while it also tends to destroy those better qualities that were inbred in the subject in his natural state. There are, of course, occasional but very exceptional instances of men who survive this process and appear at first sight to justify it ; but they are examples of the survival of the fittest, the giants of their race, who would inevitably have come to the front by the very force of their own stronger characters.

These rapid transitions from a barbarous or semi-barbarous state to a far higher plane of civilization are harmful, and the only sure means of attaining the object aimed at is to allow Nature to follow her own methods. The process must be a gradual one and cannot be hurried, though it may be assisted and accelerated by tactful encouragement, sympathy and example. The race must advance as a whole, and no matter how rapid its advance may be, it must tread every rung of the ladder. The unnatural elevation of a small number places them at a disadvantage. It is equivalent to forcing a handful of plants into premature bloom in the artificial surroundings of a hot-house, and then relegating them to their original positions among their naturally growing companions in the open. They must nearly all perish in the struggle that follows.

But the people themselves cannot be blamed for the effects these unnatural conditions produce in them. The fault lies rather with those whose ill-advised attempts at improvement were responsible for their production. They may be studied among the people of those towns that have been longest occupied by Europeans, and better still in Sierra Leone, where the process has been carried farther

and its effects are therefore more pronounced. The moral 1700 undoubtedly is to give the people more time, and to aim at improving them in ways that are suited to their own surroundings, preserving all that is good and only eliminating that which is bad in their own institutions and customs, instead of destroying everything of their own and then forcing upon them the manners and customs and religious beliefs of a civilization that is the outcome of centuries of life in a different climate and under different conditions, which are quite unsuited to the African. Even a few of the people themselves are alive to these truths. One of them wrote : " The missionary and merchant have only succeeded in making whitened sepulchres of Africans. . . . Under the existing state of affairs the African becomes more and more useless—in fact, dangerous to himself and his country." ¹

Many charges have been made against the Ashantis. Some are baseless, others are easily explained and extenuated, and of none can it be said that they are more than could be levelled at any race in their condition. The mere fact that some of them were made at all shows ignorance or thoughtlessness, and is in itself sufficient proof of the existence of a very real spirit of hostility towards them. In fact, the Ashanti is perhaps the most abused and least understood man in Africa.

They have constantly been accused of procrastination and a policy of covering up their diplomatic failures with excuses and apologies. This charge is to some extent true, though in many instances it has been made without justification ; but there is no possible reason why these traits in their character should be set down as a special and distinctive Ashanti attribute. They are common to Africans generally ; and if they have been specially noticeable in the Ashantis, it is only because the frequent importance of the Government's relations with them and their own independence of character and national pride have combined to bring them into greater prominence. No ordinary African appreciates the value of time ; his

¹ *Gold Coast Leader*, 7th of December 1907.

1700 diplomacy, as that of other people, often takes the form of **CHAP. X** deceit ; and he is ever ready with an abundance of excuses and apologies. This has probably led to the Ashantis being suspected of making ingenious excuses on some occasions when they were in reality perfectly serious ; but if this is not so, then the greater plausibility of their statements merely proves their superiority in skill and brain power over the other tribes.

Other and more serious charges against them are that they are treacherous, bloodthirsty, and guilty of the most wanton and inhuman cruelty. The charge of treachery is absolutely unjustifiable. The Ashanti is naturally brave and, for a savage, chivalrous ; and no really brave man is ever treacherous. An occasional blackguard may of course be found ; but to quote his misdeeds as characteristic of the race is ridiculous and unjust. They have always shown themselves brave and honourable in war beyond anything that might have been expected of a barbarous race little more advanced than the ancient Britons of two thousand years or more ago, and they will easily bear comparison in this respect with some other races of modern times boasting of a far higher civilization.

Never have they been known to fire upon a flag of truce nor to murder an ambassador, and their boast that they never take up arms until they have first tried diplomacy has been repeatedly justified. The worst that could truthfully be said of them in this connection is that their unbounded ambition may sometimes have led them to seek a pretext for a dispute that might have been avoided. There are few powerful nations, however, against whom this charge could not be substantiated. Meredith, in his description of the sending of a flag of truce into the Ashanti camp after the attack on Anamabo Fort in 1807, writes : " Here we cannot forbear remarking, that although the Ashantees are so remote from polished or civilized nations, they seem not to be unacquainted with the customs of a civilized people, as they are connected with the rules of war : for they paid every respect to the flag of truce."¹

¹ Meredith, p. 148.

On the other hand, he says that the Commandant and 1700 another gentleman "not in the service" had, only a day or two before, had to escort the Ashanti bearers of a similar flag nearly to their camp, because "private information was received that the flag of truce would be violated in its return, and the men murdered."¹ In speaking of their trade and intercourse with the Accras and the improving effect that it had upon that people, he says: "The Ashantees are evidently better acquainted with the rules of decency and morality than any people we know of in this country."²

Mr. James Swanzy, too, in his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons in 1816, said, "It is a singular thing that these people, the Ashantees, who had never seen a white man, nor the sea, were the most civil and well-bred people that I have seen in Africa. It is astonishing to see men, with such few opportunities, so well behaved."³

Dupuis, again, who visited the Ashanti capital as British Consul in 1820, says of them: "The Ashantees, of all ranks, are thus loyal and zealous . . . and the king takes pleasure in recounting his forbearance, and describing the aggravation that roused the vengeance of his ancestors and himself, against those federal powers which, in an earlier age, were independent little kingdoms, and now submit to the yoke of government as provinces of the empire. The king . . . took particular pains to ingraft an impression upon my mind that it was a maxim associated with the religion he professed never to appeal to the sword while a path lay open for negotiation. He maintained that he would defy even his enemies to prove that his assertion deviated from the truth, either as regarded himself or his ancestors. Be this as it may, the Moslems themselves corroborate the assertion, although they accuse the government of unbounded ambition. . . . It is worthy of remark, that many of the whites upon the Gold Coast so far acquiesced in these sentiments as to admit that

¹ Meredith, p. 138.

² *Ibid.*, p. 190.

³ Parliamentary Paper, No. 506, 20th of June 1816, p. 32.

1700 Ashantee has never been engaged in war with the maritime CHAP. X States from sheer caprice and rapacity. I may also be permitted to quote Mr. Mollan's words to me, 'that he never knew the king to make a palaver without cause, or violate his word.'"¹

The charge of cruelty stands on a different footing. Many of their customs are undeniably cruel; but this cruelty is dependent not so much upon any innate bloodthirstiness, as upon the stage of civilization in which they are. Their principal atrocities have always been carried out in pursuance of their religious beliefs and practised on criminals or prisoners of war.

The religion of the African² has been evolved in his environment by a natural process, and is an attempt to account for those phenomena of his daily life that he is unable to understand or explain. Beliefs of this kind, being naturally adjusted to the surroundings and intellectual powers of those who hold them, and providing, to their minds at any rate, the most plausible explanations of otherwise unaccountable facts, form a very real part of the daily lives of the people, influence their habits and customs, and are clung to and gone back to with a tenacity and persistence that it is difficult for people whose daily lives and religion are often things apart to understand. The religion of the African is, in fact, the religion natural to a man in his stage of evolution, and he is probably incapable of grasping any more abstract and, to him, less reasonable theory.

A very large proportion of the so-called human sacrifices that are always adduced as evidence in support of this charge were really nothing more than public executions of criminals who, after condemnation, had been reserved until victims were required for some religious ceremony in

¹ Dupuis, p. 225.

² "The Fetishism, Ancestor-worship . . . of primitive savages are all, I believe, different manners of expression of their belief in ghosts and of the anthropomorphic interpretation of out-of-the-way events. . . . Witchcraft and sorcery . . . stand in the same relation to religious worship as the simple anthropomorphism of . . . savages does to theology." (Huxley, *The Scientific Aspects of Positivism*.)

which the sacrifice of human life was considered essential. 1700
It is true that they were not all murderers ; but it must not CHAP. X
be forgotten that it is only within comparatively recent times that the death penalty has been reserved for cases of wilful homicide even in England. Formerly, and at a time too when the English were infinitely more civilized than the Ashantis, men and women were hanged or burned almost daily for offences that would now be considered trivial.¹

The judgment of a primitive race from a civilized standpoint is absurd ; yet it is common enough. The sufferings of those unhappy wretches who were stretched upon the rack, broken on the wheel, or otherwise tortured, must have been fully as great, if not indeed greater, than those of any victim in Ashanti : and these were commonly inflicted punishments. The higher race, indeed, would seem to have used its greater knowledge only to devise more ingeniously cruel tortures.

It has been estimated that between the years 1170 and 1783 at least 50,000 persons suffered death at Tyburn alone, and were, moreover, tortured beforehand by being drawn or flogged at the cart's tail from Newgate. When the place of execution was moved there, ten men were hanged together on the first occasion and twenty on the second, of whom five had been condemned for robbing a man of something valued at threepence, some nails, a knife valued at a penny, two shillings and a counterfeit halfpenny. Men were branded on the cheek for clipping coin, and on a single morning in 1695 seven men were hanged and a woman burned for this offence. Another woman was burnt alive at Newgate in 1751, and the punishment appears to have been quite a common one for several years later. In 1767 Anne Sowerby was burnt at York for poisoning her husband, and it was not until the 18th of March 1789 that the last woman was burned in England for coining, several men being hanged on the same morning for coining, robbery and burglary.²

¹ *Vide* also p. 437.

² *Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. lix, part i, p. 272.

1700 Nor do the tastes of the English people at this time
 CHAP. X appear to have been any better than those so freely condemned in the Ashantis ; for it is notorious that so long as executions were carried out in public, they never failed to draw enormous crowds, who conducted themselves in the most disorderly manner and thoroughly enjoyed the spectacle. Macaulay, writing of the condition of England in the seventeenth century, says : " The implacability of hostile factions was such as we can scarcely conceive. Whigs were disposed to murmur because Stafford was suffered to die without seeing his bowels burned before his face. Tories reviled and insulted Russell as his coach passed from the Tower to the scaffold in Lincoln's Inn Fields. As little mercy was shown by the populace to sufferers of a humbler rank. If an offender was put into the pillory, it was well if he escaped with life from the shower of brickbats and paving-stones. If he was tied to the cart's tail, the crowd pressed round him, imploring the hangman to give it the fellow well, and make him howl. Gentlemen arranged parties of pleasure to Bridewell on court days, for the purpose of seeing the wretched women who beat hemp there whipped. A man pressed to death for refusing to plead, a woman burned for coining, excited less sympathy than is now felt for a galled horse or an overdriven ox. . . . Multitudes assembled to see gladiators hack each other to pieces with deadly weapons, and shouted with delight when one of the combatants lost a finger or an eye. . . . But on all this misery society looked with profound indifference." ¹ With such a record in England itself, it is needless to particularize regarding the habits of the Fantis and other Coast tribes, which, however, were fully as bad as those of the Ashantis for very many years after the settlement of Europeans amongst them.

The hostility that has been shown towards the Ashantis by the English was not of the former's seeking. They were always favourably disposed towards the Europeans and anxious to remain on friendly terms with them. Indeed it is ridiculous to suppose that they could have felt

¹ Macaulay, *History of England* (1849), vol. i, p. 424.

otherwise ; for they knew that it was their presence on 1700 the Coast that provided them with a profitable outlet for CHAP. X their gold and slaves and furnished them with the means of procuring such manufactured articles as they had learned to appreciate. The real cause of the subsequent troubles is to be sought, not in the hostility of the Ashantis, but in the jealousy and insolence of the Fantis, who, relying on the assistance and protection of the English, tried to keep all these good things to themselves and monopolize the whole trade. By so doing, as well as by doing it in the most objectionable manner possible, they left the Ashantis no alternative but to attack them. The English then threw in their lot with the Coast tribes instead of forming an independent alliance for trade with their enemies, and in trying to defend them from the consequences of their conduct, themselves became involved in the quarrel.

CHAPTER XI

THE EARLY HISTORY OF ASHANTI

1700 TO 1731

1700-1781 It is not known exactly when the Ashanti kingdom was first founded, and the law which makes any mention of the death of a King a capital offence has conducted to the loss of much of its earliest history. From the traditions that are now current it appears, however, that after the flight of the Akans from the districts that they had formerly occupied and the migration of the Fantis to the coast, the Ashantis remained and settled in the northern portions of the forest country, where they established several minor kingdoms or principalities, which, though united by a common interest, were nevertheless independent of each other. By 1640 this confederacy had acquired considerable influence and was esteemed a powerful kingdom. With its allies, it was able to put an army of about 60,000 men in the field. They were armed principally with bows and arrows, and their valour and determination in battle soon gave their neighbours good reason to fear them. The seat of government is said to have been established sometimes at Chichiweri, at others at Bekwai or Dompoasi ; but of their earliest rulers or wars nothing definite is now known, although several vague traditions exist.

These traditions point to the Ashanti's first home having been somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Adansi country—the "Ananse" of Bosman. The first King whose name has been handed down is Chu Mientwi, who was succeeded by Kobina Amamfi. He is said to have reigned from about 1600 to 1630. Gold was unknown during his

reign, iron being used as currency. It is probable that 1700-178 there were at least two other Kings before him ;¹ for when CHAP. XI the missionaries Ramseyer and Kühne were prisoners in Kumasi they say that there were the " chairs " of fourteen former Kings in the Royal Mausoleum at Bantama. This was during the reign of Kofi Karikari, and if Kobina Amamfi was the first King there would only have been twelve deceased Kings at this time instead of fourteen. Although other members of the royal family were buried at Bantama, they were not placed in the Kings' building. Kobina Amamfi was succeeded by Oti Akentin, who in turn was followed in about 1663 by Obiri Yeboa Manu. During his reign the Ashantis are said to have moved farther north and built Kumasi. Jabin was founded soon afterwards, and other Chiefs built Insuta and Mampon ; but the Bekwais remained where they were in the south in order to protect the kingdom from the encroachments of the Denkeras.

Denkera was presumably founded at about the same time as Ashanti, but though there are traditions of wars with Sefwi and other States during the reign of its third King Awusu Bori, nothing is really known of its early history beyond the fact that it was undoubtedly a powerful state. Obiri Yeboa's nephew and heir, Tutu, was sent to the Denkera court, where he acted as a shield-bearer ; but while there he intrigued with the King's sister, who bore him a son, Intim, and was therefore compelled to fly first to Ashanti and afterwards to Akwamu. On the death of Obiri Yeboa in about 1697, he was recalled to succeed him as King, and it was during his reign that the Ashanti stool or throne was made.

Soon after his accession, Osai Tutu removed the seat of government to Kumasi. His cousin Buatin at the same time succeeded to the kingdom of Jabin, and the two then entered into an alliance by which everything was sacrificed to the main objects of securing their independence and increasing their power. They made war in common and shared the spoils equally.

¹ Chu Mientwi and his predecessor.

1700-1781 According to another account, it was Tutu who led the **CHAP. XI** Ashantis in their migration to their new country and was then given the stool and founded Kumasi ; but the version already given is probably the correct one ; for apart from the uncertain traditions of former Kings and the alleged existence of the Royal Mausoleum at Bantama during his reign, it is known that a very large army was soon afterwards led against Denkera, which was itself a powerful kingdom, and it is hardly conceivable that the Ashantis could have been in a position to make war on such a scale if the kingdom had only just been founded and they had had but a few years in which to establish themselves.

Be this as it may, there can be little doubt that it was under Osai Tutu that the real power of Ashanti was founded. The truth probably is that there had hitherto been numerous small kingdoms or family settlements which were now amalgamated into the two new monarchies, and that Kumasi, instead of being founded at this time, was already in existence as an important provincial town, and was now merely enlarged and constituted the capital. Whether or not Kumasi was ever tributary to Denkera or Jabin is doubtful ; accounts differ, but the majority maintain that it has always been independent.

The power of Ashanti was first heard of by Europeans on the outbreak of war with Denkera in 1699 or 1700. Dupuis gives the date as 1719, partly from information received from the Mahomedans in Kumasi and partly from the date of Bosman's work. This, however, was the second English edition of Bosman, published in 1721. The original Dutch edition was published in Utrecht in 1704, and the first English and French translations appeared in 1705. The book consists of a series of letters, the first of which begins, "Sir, Your agreeable of September 1st 1700 was seasonably handed to me by Capt. N. N.,"¹ while the last or twenty-second letter is dated "Jan. 2nd 1702."² It is in the sixth letter that Bosman gives his account of this war, which he says took place "about the beginning of

¹ Bosman, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 493.

this year," from which it is evident that the correct date 1700-178 must be between 1699 and 1701. Dupuis probably took CHAP. XI this date as his fixed point in determining those of the other events in Ashanti history with which he deals, so that the error is perpetuated in them also.

Accounts differ as to the cause of this war. Some say that Kumasi was at this time tributary to Denkera, an allegation that is indignantly denied by the Ashantis, but which receives some support from the fact that Osai Tutu had been a shield-bearer at the Denkera court. But the fact that the King of Denkera offered to pay a heavy fine in order to avoid war seems to negative this view, or at least to indicate that he was well aware that Ashanti, if really tributary to him, could at any moment assert its independence. Others say that Intim Dakari, the King of Denkera, sent messengers to Kumasi with an insolent demand, requesting, amongst other things, that a large brass pan that they had brought with them should be filled with gold and that several of Tutu's favourite wives should be sent to him. Those who allege that Ashanti was tributary to Denkera at this time say that this was the annual demand for tribute, which was now for the first time withheld. The pan at any rate was kept as a trophy in the market-place of Kumasi, and a pebble was afterwards placed in it every time the Ashantis went to war.

Bosman, who was on the Coast and wrote of these events at the time, gives the following account of the events that led up to this war. Bosianti, the King of Denkera, had sent some of his wives to Kumasi to congratulate his former shield-bearer Tutu on his accession. Tutu received and entertained them well, and then sent them back to Bosianti with his thanks and a number of valuable presents. Soon afterwards, Tutu returned the compliment by sending several of his wives to Bosianti with a friendly message. On reaching Denkera, they were received and treated as persons of importance and given many presents ; " but the King cast a wanton Eye upon one of them, and hurried on by exorbitant Lust, gratified his brutal Desire ; After satiating of which, he suffer'd

1700-1781 her together with the rest to return to their Country and
 CHAP. XI their injured Husband, who was informed of this Affront."¹

Tutu promptly sent to tell Bosianti that he was determined to wash out the scandal in his blood and made immediate preparations for war, collecting his army and importing large quantities of powder from the coast, which the Denkeras very foolishly allowed to be carried through their country. Bosianti, now thoroughly alarmed, offered a large sum in gold as compensation, but Tutu turned a deaf ear to these overtures for a peaceful settlement and went steadily on with his preparations.

The question has been raised whether the pretext for this war was a genuine one. Accusations of this kind are by no means uncommon on the Gold Coast and in Ashanti, and have frequently been used as excuses for a quarrel, or, more commonly, for levying blackmail. Some unscrupulous persons have even been known to keep good-looking wives with the sole object of inducing men to commit themselves or of inveigling perfectly innocent people into compromising positions with them, in order to bring these remunerative accusations against them later. Mockler-Ferryman even goes so far as to suggest that Bosianti sent his first embassy with this object, but that Tutu saw through his design and returned the compliment, when Bosianti fell into his own trap. Whether the charge was genuine or not it is now impossible to determine, but the offer of a large sum in compensation and its refusal by Tutu seems opposed to the theory that it was entirely without foundation.

Such are the accounts given of the actual exciting causes of this war. But another important element in its production was the arrival of Europeans on the Coast. Hitherto the right of way to the sea had been of no special value; but on the arrival of traders in ships loaded with powder, guns and other merchandize dear to the heart of the African, it at once became a source of wealth and free access to it a matter of paramount importance.

Before Tutu's preparations were completed Bosianti

¹ Bosman, p. 75.

died and was succeeded by Intim Dakari, who, as has ~~1700-1751~~ already been mentioned, is said to have been Tutu's son. CHAP. XI The change of rulers, however, in no way altered his purpose to exterminate the Denkeras. So soon as he was ready, therefore, he invaded their country with a great army, and, defeating them in the first engagement, turned this defeat into an absolute rout by a second battle soon afterwards.¹ The Akims, who had fought on the side of the Denkeras, are said to have lost 30,000 men and one of their principal chiefs, while the total death-roll for the two actions is given as over 100,000.² These figures, like others derived from native reports, are quite unreliable, but the slaughter was undoubtedly very great. Other allies of the Denkeras were Wassaw, Sefwi-Bekwai and Sefwi-Awiasu. Fifteen days were occupied by the Ashanti army in collecting and removing the plunder, which was of enormous value. The body of the deceased Bosanti was exhumed, the flesh removed from the bones and thrown to serpents, and the skull and thigh-bones carried off as trophies. Intim Dakari, whose prosperity was of importance to the Dutch at Elmina, who obtained large quantities of gold and numbers of slaves from his country, had been assisted in this struggle by the loan of three small cannon. Whether or not this artillery played any part in either of the battles is unknown; but the guns now fell into the hands of the Ashantis, who carried them to Kumasi, where they were set up as trophies, and stood, until quite recently,³ in an open space near the King's palace, which was known as "The Place of Cannon."

In this war the Ashantis made yet another capture, and one that was destined to play an important part in later history. This was a "Note" or agreement for the payment of a monthly sum by the Dutch at Elmina as ground-rent for the land on which their forts stood. It had originally been made payable to the Chief of Elmina,

¹ Bosman.

² According to the Ashantis, Intim Dakari was taken prisoner and beheaded. He was succeeded by Boadu Akufu, who was also put to death later.

³ Two are now outside the Officers' Mess in Kumasi.

1700-1781 but had subsequently fallen into the hands of the Komendas, CHAP. XI from whom it passed to the King of Denkera, who had since received regular payment. The King of Ashanti now claimed it by right of conquest, and, as the Dutch were quite indifferent who received the money, it was thenceforth paid to him. This arrangement naturally implied an admission on the part of the Dutch that the Ashantis had a right to the ground on which their castle stood, and, although it could not be foreseen at the time, this admission became of great importance in later years and gave rise to a great deal of trouble. This payment of ground-rent to the chiefs or headmen of the towns in which forts were built was a general practice all along the Coast.

Before this disaster overtook them, the Denkeras had been the richest and most powerful of all the tribes near the coast and a constant menace to the safety and independence of their neighbours, who had, therefore, been only too pleased to see the Ashantis attack them and rejoiced at their overthrow. The Akims alone seem to have realized that it might be to the interest of the coast tribes to keep so powerful and ambitious a nation as the Ashantis from extending their kingdom farther south. They had, therefore, gone to the support of the Denkeras, and not only shared their losses, but now brought down upon themselves the wrath of the conquerors also. The Ashantis at once invaded Akim, and gained such a decisive victory soon after crossing the border that the Akims sued for peace. This was granted on condition that Akim became feudatory to Ashanti and paid 2,000 bendas of gold (equivalent to £16,000 currency or £14,400 sterling) as a war indemnity. Two Akim chiefs, Kakramsi and Ajumako, "took fetish" and were handed over to the Ashantis as security for this sum before the army withdrew to Kumasi.

The conditions of this peace, however, were never observed. Some say that the King of Akim tried to evade payment of the indemnity; others that his principal chiefs refused to agree to the terms or to pay their share, threatening to destool him if he did not again lead them against

their conquerors. However this may be, no payment was 1700-1781 ever made, and after a reasonable delay, Osai Tutu raised another army and sent it against the Akims, while he himself went to the mausoleum at Bantama to perform the necessary ceremonies and invoke the aid of the gods for the success of his arms. These rites completed, he followed in the wake of his army, accompanied by all his principal chiefs and a bodyguard. The party amounted in all to two or three hundred persons, amongst whom were about sixty women and children.

The Akims found themselves quite unable to resist the advance of the main Ashanti army ; but having gained news of the King's movements, sent a strong detachment through the forest, and after allowing the army to pass them, lay in ambush on the banks of the River Pra to await the arrival of the King and his staff, whom they greatly outnumbered. When the royal party began to cross the ford, they opened fire on it and wounded the King in the side at the very first volley. Springing from his litter, Tutu was in the act of rallying his men when he received a second wound and fell forward dead. His body fell into the river, from which it was never recovered. The death of their King produced such consternation among the small party of Ashantis that they broke and fled, and the enemy, falling upon them, slaughtered them to a man.

The Ashantis thus lost at one blow, not only their King, but almost the whole of their nobility. The attacking force had slept the previous night in Akromanti, a small village near the ford, and the disaster, which occurred on a Saturday, is commemorated by the Ashanti oath " Akromanti Miminda " (Akromanti Saturday). That day of the week has ever since been regarded as an unlucky day, upon which no Ashanti would commence any journey or enterprise, however trivial. The oath itself is considered the most solemn and weighty that it is possible to use. It is comparatively seldom referred to directly, but rather implied by the use of some oblique phrase such as " that great oath," " the dreadful day " or " the day of the gods' punishment." Even then it is usually mentioned in a

1700-1731 **whisper.** According to Reindorf, the disaster at the Pra CHAP. XI occurred on a Monday, and is commemorated by the first half of this oath only. The complete oath, according to him, unites two oaths ; for he says the second half refers to the death of Osai Bonsu (Tutu Kwamina). There are valid reasons, however, for asserting that this explanation is incorrect and that that already given is the true one.

After the King's death, the main army returned to Kumasi, bringing many prisoners to be sacrificed at his funeral custom. A terrible vengeance was wreaked on Akromanti, which was burned to the ground and every living thing in it, even to the sheep and fowls, killed. Tutu, besides conquering Denkera and Tufel, had also subdued Kwahu and Assin and a large tract of country beyond the River Tano. He was succeeded in 1731 by his younger brother Opoku Wari.

While these events had been happening in Ashanti, several others had occurred on the coast. On Sunday the 4th of September 1701 the Anamabos rose against the English. Great numbers of them came down to the fort and succeeded in breaking open the outer spur-gate, and, having set fire to the outbuildings and corn-room, directed a heavy fusillade against the fort itself. They were unable to withstand the fire of the guns, however, and were at length driven off. During the night the English retaliated by setting fire to the town, which was almost entirely destroyed. This little war lasted for twenty-two days, and the Factor and some of his men were so roughly handled that they fled to Cape Coast in nothing but their shirts. Finally the King of Saboe, at the request of the Anamabos, undertook to act as mediator, and a truce was agreed to by which the Anamabos guaranteed to make good the damage they had done to the fort, and gave hostages for its due performance. The Dutch were freely accused of having assisted the people in this affair by supplying them with powder, but whether they had really done so or not is not very clear. Peace had not long been restored when the Anamabos began to be as troublesome and turbulent as

ever, being encouraged in their outbreaks by the captains 1700-1781 of some of the ten-per-cent ships.

CHAP. XI

In June 1701 Father Godfrey Loyer, a Jacobine of Rennes in Brittany, arrived at Assini, where a mission had been established as early as December 1687 by Father Gonsalvez ; but the Father left in charge by him had died a few years later and the place had since been neglected. Loyer, on his arrival, chose a site on a narrow peninsula on the east bank of the River Tano, and, having entered into an alliance with the local Chief, built a small fort¹ there. It was a very insignificant place, composed of a curtain and two half-bastions terraced with earth on the inside. It was built of palisades about ten or twelve feet high and had no ditch. Each bastion mounted four three-pounder guns and a few patereros. Behind these frail defences there were a few huts used as quarters and some very small storehouses for the goods and provisions. The ships, after landing a few men to garrison the place and a very scanty supply of ammunition and provisions, returned to France, promising to bring out further supplies within eight or ten months. This promise, however, was never fulfilled, and the Settlement was forgotten for four years, so that the garrison was soon reduced to great straits, and the news of its weakness, combined with the fear that the French might gain too much ascendancy over the people, then brought the Dutch down from Elmina to attack them.

William de la Palma, the Dutch Director-General, having first made an unsuccessful attempt to induce the Assinis to desert the French, or at any rate to remain neutral, sailed for the place with four ships. The fleet anchored three leagues away on the 4th of November 1702, and, on the following day, one ship flying French colours stood in and anchored close to the fort, which she saluted with three guns. This salute was repeated at intervals throughout the day, but without eliciting any response from the garrison. On the fourth salute, however, the fort fired one gun and hoisted the French flag to oblige the vessel, if

¹ This fort—in later years at any rate—was known as Fort Joinville.

1700-1781 she were really French, to send a boat ashore ; and the CHAP. XI Dutchman, finding further concealment impossible, at once rejoined the squadron. In the meantime, the Governor had been renewing his efforts to corrupt the Assinis, who, however, had been told by the French that they expected eight or nine ships very shortly and therefore stood firm. Their obstinacy so exasperated the Dutch that they poured a few broadsides into them, and the whole fleet then sailed down and anchored off the fort on the afternoon of the 11th.

The Assinis now went to the French, advising them to defend themselves vigorously with their guns and leave the rest to them, as they would undertake to prevent the landing of any Dutch troops. At eight o'clock on the morning of the 13th, the Dutch moved still closer in and the fort opened fire on them. The French did enormous damage to the Dutch ships, and the flagship soon had to draw out of the line to effect repairs ; but they were so short of ammunition and supplies of all kinds that they had very little hope of ultimate success : in fact, they were already reduced to their last two barrels of powder, which they decided to reserve for use with their small arms. In the meantime, the ships had kept up an incessant fire on the fort with crossbar-shot, firing over a thousand rounds, but had done very little damage. At two o'clock, however, one of these shots knocked over a hive of bees in the fort, and the infuriated insects at once brought about more than all the Dutch bombardment had been able to effect and compelled the garrison to quit the place. The Dutch, seeing them run out, concluded that they were abandoning it and sent six canoes ashore to land fifty men. But the French, in the meantime, had re-entered the fort through one of the embrasures towards the river where they could not be seen by the enemy, and no sooner had the Dutch landed than they were furiously attacked by the Assinis, who had been lying concealed behind some bushes. Nine of the Dutch fled to the fort crying for quarter, two more were taken prisoners, and the whole of the remainder, including the officer in command, were

killed. After this disaster the Governor gave up all hope 1700-1781 of taking the place and returned to Elmina. On reaching CHAP. XI Axim on the 14th he sent back a letter to treat for the release of the prisoners, and, after some negotiation, a peace was arranged ; but the final settlement of its terms had to be left in the hands of the Assinis, who were much afraid the French might make some independent agreement. In June 1704 a French man-of-war arrived to take off the garrison, and the fort was then abandoned.

In 1703 three fifty-gun ships belonging to the French Assiento Company, one of which, the *Medenblick*, was a Dutch man-of-war they had captured, came to trade in the neighbourhood of Cape Coast ; but finding the people would not come off to them for fear of the English, they anchored their ships in line within close range of the castle and began to bombard it. The English replied with a spirited fire from the sea battery and towers, but within an hour they had been driven from their guns and forced to show a flag of truce. They then had to agree to allow the townspeople and all others in the neighbourhood to trade freely with the French, who obtained large quantities of gold and slaves before they left.¹

The Brandenburg trade had now dwindled to nothing, and their officers were on such bad terms with the people, who had recently murdered one of their Governors, that there seemed little prospect of its recovery. They therefore determined to abandon their Possessions, and on the 28th of March 1708 the English Governor, Sir Dalby Thomas, wrote to inform the African Company that he had heard the Portuguese had made an offer of £40,000 for their forts. This he thought was far too much to pay for any place on the Coast, and gave it as his opinion that even if the sale were completed, the Portuguese would lose the whole of their money, as the Dutch would certainly take the place from them. The negotiations, however, appear to have fallen through, for the Brandenburgers soon afterwards abandoned their forts and left the Gold Coast for ever. Groot Fredericksburg then came into the

¹ Barbot, p. 445.

1700-1781 possession of John Conny, the local Chief, whose village lay
CHAP. XI about three miles to westward of the fort, and he then carried on such little trade as the place still afforded and used to charge all ships that called to water there an ounce of gold for the privilege. It is uncertain whether, as some allege, the Brandenburgers merely vacated the fort and John Conny then appropriated it, or whether they actually handed it over to him, as he himself averred. Probably the true facts of the case were that the Brandenburgers, having failed to effect a sale before they left, installed the Chief as caretaker pending further negotiations ; for it is hardly likely that, if they had already had offers for the place, they would have been ready to abandon all claim to it, and when they themselves vacated it there would have been no one else in whose charge they could so conveniently have left it.

As Sir Dalby Thomas had foreseen, it was not long before the Dutch began scheming to gain possession of this fort. In 1720 Governor Bullier of Elmina collected what men he could spare from his garrison and, sailing down in three ships, anchored off Groot Fredericksburg, which he claimed on the ground that the Dutch had purchased it from its former owners. There is little doubt that this assertion had no foundation in fact : John Conny, at any rate, did not believe it, and refused to surrender the place. He challenged the Dutch to produce the deed of sale, and added that the Brandenburgers could at most only have sold the guns and the materials of which the fort was built, for the ground on which it stood was not theirs to dispose of, but belonged to him ; that during the time of their occupation they had always paid him rent for it, and that he was not prepared to renew the lease to any other nation. This answer so disappointed and enraged the Dutch that they landed a party of forty men under a lieutenant to take the place by force. They fired one volley without doing any damage, and were then furiously attacked by the Chief and his men, who charged down upon them from behind the houses and cut the whole party to pieces. The heads of the Dutchmen were afterwards cut off, and John

paved a little pathway leading to the door of his house 1700-1781 with their skulls, but kept the largest to be mounted in CHAP. XI silver and used as a punch-bowl. According to the Chevalier de Marchais, the Dutch had a total of 156 men killed and their Governor wounded in this encounter. He further says that after they had returned to Elmina, Conny offered the place to Captain Morel of the French ship *Rochefort* which happened to be there at the time. A treaty was signed and preparations were made to leave six men with a French flag as a temporary garrison until the Settlement could be placed on a proper footing ; but as Morel was returning to the ship, his nose began to bleed, which he regarded as such a bad omen that the project was at once abandoned.

A year later, on the 7th of June 1721, two English men-of-war, the *Swallow*, Captain Chaloner Ogle, and the *Weymouth*, both fifty-gun ships that had been sent out to look for pirates, anchored off the fort and landed a party to get fresh water. A man soon arrived with John Conny's stick to demand the customary payment of an ounce of gold, but this was refused and the messenger himself treated with scant courtesy. Next morning John himself came down with some of his men and took ten or a dozen of the seamen prisoners, while the officer in charge of the party got his head broken as he was trying to explain the difference between a King's ship and others. John's reply was, " By God, me King here, not only for my water, but the trouble has been given me in collecting it."¹ He quite understood, however, that the seamen had to obey their orders, and did not blame them, but treated them remarkably well. In the end the dispute was settled by the payment of six ounces of gold and an anker of brandy to the Chief as compensation. John Atkins, a naval surgeon who wrote an account of this voyage,² describes how he and some other officers subsequently paid John a visit. He received his guests on the beach with a guard of honour of twenty or thirty men, and then led the way to his house, which had been built from some of the materials of the

¹ Astley, vol. ii, p. 449.

² In Astley's Collection.

1700-1781 fort and contained three good rooms, one of which was used as an armoury, besides courtyards and out-buildings. The officers asked John what had become of the Dutchmen's skulls, and were told that about a month before their ships arrived he had put all malice aside and, packing the skulls in a chest with some brandy, tobacco and other articles for the use of the spirits, had buried them. The jaw-bones, however, were still kept strung on a cord hanging from a tree in the courtyard, where they saw them. It was not until 1725 that John Conny was finally driven out by the Dutch, who then came down with a large force and, laying siege to the place, ultimately compelled him to fly to Fantin. They renamed it Hollandia Fort.

About 1721 the English Governor, Mr. Phipps, built a circular tower on a hill overlooking Cape Coast and mounted it with seven guns. It was surrounded by a dry ditch and a palisade. Here a small garrison was kept for the double purpose of overawing the inhabitants and defending the town in case of need from an inland enemy. Ellis¹ says this tower, which for many years was known as Phipps' Tower, is identical with that now known as Fort William. This, however, is an obvious error, for all the descriptions of the place indicate the building now called Fort Victoria. Smith,² the surveyor sent out by the African Company of Merchants in 1726, says this tower and Fort Royal were equidistant (three-quarters of a mile) from the Castle, and the plan of Cape Coast³ that he made, as well as the plate⁴ in Major Ricketts' account of the Ashanti war of 1823-24, plainly show Phipps' Tower where Fort Victoria stands, on a hill to the north-west of the Castle near the lagoon. In a letter dated Sun Court, March 23 1838, moreover, the African Committee wrote—"We have to support Cape Coast Castle (Phipps' Tower and King William's Tower, keeps of the Castle), with a lighthouse on the latter,"⁵ and Webster's view of Cape Coast published

¹ Ellis, *History of the Gold Coast*, p. 93.

² Astley, vol. ii, p. 602; Smith, p. 127.

³ Astley, vol. ii, plate 65; Smith, *Drafts of Guinea*, No. 20.

⁴ Ricketts, p. 96.

⁵ Parliamentary Paper, *West Coast of Africa* (1842), part ii, p. 155.

in October 1806 shows Fort Victoria, but the hill on which Fort William now stands has no building on it. This Governor Phipps had endless disputes with the Dutch Governor Bullier of Elmina, and is said never to have gone beyond the precincts of the Castle.

1700-178
CHAP. XI

The miserable condition of the English garrison at this time has already been described. While Atkins was at Cape Coast the officer commanding the garrison attempted to escape to England and succeeded in boarding a homeward-bound brigantine by night. He was soon missed, however, and the ship chased and brought back by the *Weymouth*. Her captain was fined seventy ounces of gold and sentenced to a flogging for his share in the transaction.

Ever since the passing of the Act of 1698, by which the trade had been made open and a ten per cent *ad valorem* duty imposed on imports, the Company's trade had steadily decreased. This Act expired on the 24th of June 1712, but was at once renewed. The duty, however, was generally evaded, so that the Company, instead of having this money to expend on their forts, had to maintain them out of their own profits and found themselves quite unable to compete with the private traders, who had no local expenses and could therefore easily undersell them. The cost of maintaining the forts averaged about £20,000 per annum, amounting in fourteen years to £280,000. During this period the duties actually paid by the private traders only brought in £73,785 10s. 6½d., and ten per cent on the Company's own imports produced £36,387 13s. 1½d. In 1721 the Company was compelled to "raise by subscription £392,400, and in the following year made a call of five per cent, allowing the proprietors, as had been accustomed, a dividend of three per cent. In December 1723 they exposed to sale two hundred thousand pound stock at thirty per cent." At length, in 1730, they petitioned Parliament, and the House of Commons passed the following resolutions on the 26th of March of that year: first, that the trade to Africa should be free; secondly, that the trade should be charged with no duties

1700-1781 for the upkeep of the Company's forts ; thirdly, that it
CHAP. XI was necessary that these forts should be maintained ; and
fourthly, that Parliament should grant an allowance for
this purpose. This allowance was fixed at £10,000 a year,
and the Company was thus enabled to continue in existence.

CHAPTER XII

THE SECOND ANGLO-DUTCH WAR

1731 TO 1803

DURING the period of gloom and inaction that immediately followed the death of Osai Tutu, Assin and Denkera, 1731-1803 CHAP. XII encouraged by the successful resistance that had been offered by the Akims, had revolted and joined them, and it was Osai Opoku's first care to resubdue these tribes and restore the power of Ashanti to its former position. To this end Akim was once more invaded and, together with Assin, utterly reduced; after which Denkera was also reoccupied. With the conquest of Akim some additional "Notes" came into the hands of the Ashantis. These were the "Notes" for the Accra forts and Christiansborg Castle, which had originally been issued to the local Chiefs by the English, Dutch and Danes, but had subsequently been captured by the Akims.

Dagomba, Gonja and Brong were next invaded. They were defeated in the first engagement, and soon found that, in spite of their superior numbers and some slight successes obtained by their cavalry, they were handicapped by want of firearms and had no hope of ultimate victory. Their trade, moreover, was being ruined by the war, and peace was therefore made upon these tribes giving an undertaking to pay a yearly tribute to Kumasi. In this campaign the Ashanti army first crossed the Volta at Krachi, and, having subdued Dagomba and Gonja, recrossed it at Yeji, which at once submitted. Though Prang offered some feeble resistance, it was quickly subdued; but when Dawia, the King of Attabubu, was summoned to acknow-

1731-1808 ledge the suzerainty of Kumasi, he refused, and was killed
CHAP. XII in the engagement that followed. Jaman, Buromi, Inta and Tekiman were soon afterwards reduced. For the purpose of the war against Amio the King of Tekiman, Opoku entered into an alliance with Bafu Pim the King of Inkoranza, which was really a Brong kingdom. This alliance was afterwards continued, and the Ashantis thereby gained by diplomacy what they could otherwise only have obtained by force, for, from being an ally, Inkoranza gradually became an Ashanti province.

Opoku now enacted a new code of laws ; but as these had a tendency to diminish the individual power of the Chiefs and to convert the government from an aristocracy into a personal despotism, the latter began to intrigue against him, and a dangerous conspiracy was quickly formed. News of this reached Opoku, who fled by night to Jabin, where he tried to convene a meeting for the discussion and settlement of the dispute. Some of his enemies, however, had already taken action and were in open armed rebellion, so that he, too, was compelled to collect his adherents and oppose force with force. The rebels were utterly defeated near Dinkenni, and the King then returned to Kumasi, where the friends of those conspirators who had escaped the slaughter interceded on their behalf and ultimately obtained their pardon. Opoku did not long survive these events, but, in 1742, was taken suddenly ill while sitting in the Council and expired as his attendants were removing him.

Opoku was succeeded by another brother, Osai Kwesi, also known at Kwesi Bodom, whose enthronement was made conditional on the revocation of the obnoxious laws and the restoration of the old constitution. Early in his reign Akim, Buromi and Kwahu rebelled at the instigation of the King of Dahomi, who promised to send an army to their support. They mobilized their forces in Kwahu, near the Volta, expecting that the Dahomis would soon cross the river and join them. Kwesi, however, fell upon and utterly defeated them before their preparations were completed or their allies had arrived. The Kings of Buromi and

Kwahu were taken prisoners, and the King of Akim, though 1781-1808 he escaped at the time, soon found himself hard pressed and blew himself and all his principal Chiefs up with a barrel of gunpowder, together with most of his wives and children. CHAP. XII

Kwesi next crossed the Volta to take his revenge on the Dahomis for the injury they had done him. Two days later, news of the enemy's approach was received in the Ashanti camp and a terrible battle ensued, which lasted until nightfall without either side being able to claim any material advantage ; but the next morning, when the King wished to renew the conflict, the fetish priests declared the omens were not propitious and the attack was therefore postponed. The Dahomis naturally attributed the inactivity of the Ashantis to want of resolution, and themselves advanced, whereupon Kwesi ordered a precipitate retreat to the Volta, which he recrossed ; but, owing to the small number of canoes available, a great many of his men were still on the opposite bank when the enemy came up with them. They were thus compelled to make a stand against an immensely superior force and suffered very heavy losses. On the arrival of the defeated army in Kumasi, enormous numbers of prisoners were sacrificed during the funeral customs of the fallen Chiefs, and every tributary province was called upon to furnish supplies of victims. It took the Ashantis some time to recover from this disastrous campaign ; but an expedition was then undertaken against Banda, in which Osai Kwesi received a wound which, though he lingered for some months, proved fatal in 1752.

The Ashantis, and in fact all the Akan tribes, trace their descent through the female line. They thus ensure the preservation of the blood royal ; for it is but seldom that the King's wives are themselves of the royal family, and consequently, should they prove faithless, the strain would be entirely lost in their sons, whereas it is of necessity preserved in the sons of the princesses. Another reason that is given by the Ashantis for the existence of this rule is that it was essential for so warlike a race to make

1781-1808 some arrangement whereby the heir to the stool should CHAP. XII usually have reached years of discretion. Had the reigning monarch been killed in battle and the stool descended to his son, a long regency might often have been involved ; whereas, by adopting a law of succession through the brothers and nephews, this risk was reduced to a minimum. In the absence of a brother therefore, the heir-apparent is the King's sister's son or next relative traceable through the female line, and on the death of Osai Kwesi his nephew Kujo succeeded to the stool.

Several of the dependent provinces had taken advantage of the war with Banda and the subsequent illness and death of the King to avoid payment of the customary tribute, and Osai Kujo now sent to demand it. They first tried to excuse themselves on the ground that the late King's death had prevented their receiving a share of any plunder that might have been obtained in the war in which they had fought under him ; but, finding that payment would be enforced, the King of Jaman openly revolted and was quickly joined by those of Denkera, Wassaw and Tufel and by some auxiliary cavalry from Kong and Gofan. The struggle that followed taxed the resources of the Ashantis to the utmost. Twice the King invaded Jaman, only to be driven back with heavy loss. He then returned to Kumasi to consult the Fetish ; but finding the omens still favourable, at once led a third expedition against the enemy and gained a complete victory. Great numbers of prisoners were brought back to Kumasi, where all the principal rebels were sacrificed, but their children and the women were spared to make good the heavy losses that had been incurred by the army. Those adults who escaped sacrifice, and many of the women, were sent to the great slave mart at Mansu, where they were sold to the coast brokers to be afterwards transported to the West Indies. Expeditions were then sent to confirm the subjection of Banda, Wassaw, Akim and Akwapim. The subjugation of Jaman had laid open all the country beyond to the attack of the Ashantis, who might now have pushed their frontier forward in this direction for an immense

distance, had the King cared to follow up his victory ; but he contented himself with merely accepting the oaths of submission of the Chiefs in the immediate neighbourhood, and then returned to Kumasi. During this reign a civil war broke out between Mampon and Jabin, in which the latter was defeated. The two Kings were then sent for by Osai Kujo, who inquired into the dispute and gave judgment in favour of Mampon. Sefwi was also subjugated at about this time and its King, Buman Kuma (or Abirimoro), killed.

A new king now came to the throne of Dahomi, and, seeing the rapid extension of the Ashanti Empire and the steady growth of its power, seems to have been afraid another attempt might soon be made to avenge the defeat of Osai Kwesi. He therefore sent a friendly embassy to Kumasi to announce his accession and bear presents and a complimentary message to the Ashanti king. These ambassadors were well entertained and the compliment was soon afterwards returned by the despatch of a similar mission to the court at Abomi. According to Cruikshank, it was during Kujo's reign that the first mention of Ashanti occurred in the records at Cape Coast Castle. On the 10th of July 1765, and again in 1767 and 1772, the Council took into consideration the probability of hostilities arising between the Ashantis and Fantis, and in 1767 asked for men-of-war to be stationed on the Coast until affairs became more settled. They feared that if the Ashantis proved victorious their Settlements might be endangered, while, should the Fantis conquer, it was expected that the Company's trade would be ruined.

Osai Kujo was now getting very old and infirm and seldom left the palace. This gave rise to false reports of his death, which encouraged the Assins, Akims and Akwapiems once more to revolt, and they now sent insulting and defiant messages to Kumasi. Kujo sent ordering them to keep the peace, but they murdered his messengers and derisively threatened to march to the capital and place one of their women slaves on the stool. She, they said, would soon reduce the haughty Ashanti Chiefs to a more

1781-1803 becoming state of humility and subjection. Great preparations were at once made for war ; but before they could be completed Osai Kujo died in 1781, and was succeeded by his great-nephew Kwamina, who was a mere boy still in his teens.

In the meantime, the annual allowance that had been voted by Parliament to the Royal African Company in 1730 had been regularly paid down to the year 1747, when nothing was granted ; in 1744 however, it had been doubled on account of the wars with France and Spain, and the payments had since been regularly made. Although these grants were very insufficient, they and some improvement in the trade that followed the French war enabled the Company to hold out until 1750, when an Act was passed by which the Charter, lands, forts and other property of the Royal African Company were surrendered, after due compensation,¹ and vested in a new company called the African Company of Merchants. The new company continued to receive an allowance of from £10,000 to £15,000 a year from Parliament for the maintenance of its forts, and its membership was open to all British merchants on payment of a fee of £2.

During the Seven Years War, in 1757, the French made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Cape Coast Castle. The enemy's fleet, which consisted of two ships of the line and a large frigate, was commanded by De Kersaint, and immediately on its arrival the Governor, Mr. Charles Bell, collected about fifty Europeans from the vessels then on the Coast to reinforce his garrison, and mounted a few extra guns on a temporary battery. The townspeople also raised a force of 1,200 men. When the French fleet opened fire, the Castle guns immediately replied, and poured so well-directed and steady a fire into the enemy's ships that, after an action that only lasted two hours, they were driven off and sailed away to the West Indies without having been able to do any material damage to the fortress. The long continuance of the war, however, prevented the usual supplies reaching the Coast, and the garrison would

¹ The payment of its debts, amounting to £107,262.

have been reduced to great straits for provisions had not 1781-1801 the local Chief, Brempon Kujo, sent them food. In CHAP. XII recognition of this service two silver goblets, suitably inscribed, were presented to him after the war and still form part of the stool property of Cape Coast.

About this time the Dutch, who for some years past had been trying to establish their authority in Apollonia to the exclusion of the English, raised a mixed force of Europeans and Africans, and, taking a few guns with them, crossed the River Ankobra and invaded the district. They were soon met and defeated by the inhabitants under their Chief Amonihia, who took their artillery and drove them back across the river. Soon afterwards Amonihia, hearing that they were preparing to attack him again, invited the English to build a fort in his country. They accordingly built a small fort at Beyin, thereby securing the whole of the Apollonian trade and extending their influence as far as the River Tano.

This Amonihia was a man of great courage and determination, though inclined to be boastful and tyrannical. It is recorded of him that, being annoyed by the depredations of a leopard which had evaded every attempt to destroy it, he called his Chiefs together and gave orders for the bush in which it lay concealed to be surrounded and the animal captured and brought to him alive, adding that he was quite prepared to risk the loss of half his subjects in order to accomplish his purpose. Strange to say, this extraordinary order was promptly carried out ; and though several persons lost their lives and others were badly mauled, the animal was eventually secured and dragged before the Chief, who kept it tied to a stake in the courtyard of his house, where he was in the habit of pointing to it as evidence of his power and supremacy over everything in his kingdom, even to the wild beasts.

Amonihia was succeeded by a man named Kwashi, who made himself an object of dread and aversion to all his subjects by his despotic rule and many cruelties, though when he died in June 1801 he was as much beloved as he had at one time been hated. This change was brought

1781-1808 about in the following manner : three children were born **CHAP. XII** to him, all of whom were deaf-mutes, which so puzzled him that he inquired of everyone what could be the explanation of such a misfortune. Finally he was told, after giving assurances that he would not be displeased if the real reason were made known to him, that the affliction had been caused by the Fetish as a punishment for his cruel government, and that even worse calamities would follow if he persisted in his present line of conduct. This alarming statement had such an effect on Kwashi that he thereafter governed his people in the mildest manner and never failed to consult his Chiefs and be guided by them in every matter of importance.

On the death of Kwashi, there was no heir in the direct line of succession (brother or nephew), and his eldest son Suki was therefore chosen King, but was at once opposed by his younger brother Anahoma, who compelled him to fly to the forest. Anahoma's adherents, however, deserted him soon afterwards and joined the forces under Suki, who then advanced against the usurper. Anahoma, finding himself without men and unable to make any further resistance, threw all his gold and valuables into the lagoon, and collecting his wives and family, took them into the forest, where he killed all but one son, whom he spared to help him in burying the bodies. This done, he committed suicide, or, as some say, compelled this son to shoot him. Suki afterwards discovered where the bodies were buried and caused them to be exhumed and brought down to the beach, where they were set up in a long row supported by stakes. This ghastly spectacle was left as a warning to all rebels until the bodies were finally disintegrated. A little later the people, disgusted by the acts of Suki, killed him and all Kwashi's children, with the exception of two of the deaf-mutes, who still survived but were deemed incapable of intriguing to disturb the peace of the kingdom. The stool was then given to an old man, who acted as regent.

On the 20th of December 1780 England declared war on Holland, and a few months later, early in 1781, an unsuccessful attempt was made to capture Elmina. The plan

of operations comprised a simultaneous attack by sea and land. The ships were to bombard the Castle while the CHAP. XII
troops stormed Fort Conraadsburg. The naval force consisted of H.M.S. *Leander*, a fifty-gun ship under Captain Shirley, and a sloop of war, while the troops were commanded by Captain Mackenzie and numbered between 400 and 500 men, of whom 300 were natives and the remainder soldiers in the service of the Company of Merchants and seamen who had been landed from the warships to assist them. The plan failed miserably for want of co-operation between the two commanders, which must be attributed either to gross lack of judgment or more probably to jealousy. Captain Mackenzie received no support whatever from the men-of-war while he was making his attack on Fort Conraadsburg, and this naturally destroyed his chances of success and he was driven back. It was only after his defeat that Captain Shirley began to bombard the Castle, and was in turn repulsed. The Dutch had a decided advantage in being able to devote their whole attention to each party singly, though it is doubtful if the English force was really strong enough to have captured such a fortress as Elmina, even had the original plan been carried out.

But though they were worsted at Elmina, the English got the best of the Dutch in several other places. In the following year, 1782, H.M.S. *Argo* arrived on the Coast, and thus reinforced, Captain Shirley captured the Dutch forts at Mori, Apam, Kormantin and Beraku, all of which were very poorly garrisoned and offered but a feeble resistance, while Governor Mills, assisted by fifty men from the *Argo*, took Fort Vredenburg at Komenda. The ships then sailed down to Accra to attack Fort Crève Cœur. A determined and prolonged resistance was offered by the Dutch Accras, while the fort was bombarded by the ships and James Fort. In the end the Accras were driven into the bush, but it is uncertain whether the fort itself was ever taken. Presumably it must have fallen after the flight of the Accras, and Meredith distinctly states that it was captured. Reindorf, on the other hand, says that the garrison had

1781-1808 been greatly reduced on account of the war in Europe, CHAP. XII and that only the Commandant and a few native soldiers remained. Reinforcements from Winneba and other places were drafted into British Accra and strongly advised the people of the Dutch town to leave the place instead of attempting to oppose the English. They, however, were determined to defend the fort, and collected as large a force as possible from Teshi, Ningo and other towns, while the people of Christiansborg, being Danish subjects, had of course to remain neutral. He says that while the ships and Fort James bombarded Fort Crève Cœur, a battle was fought on the ground between the two forts between the marines and English allies and the people of the Dutch town and their allies. The fighting lasted from dawn till dusk for twenty-four days, until the Dutch Accras at length became so exhausted and so short of ammunition that they were compelled to relinquish the struggle and retired to the bush. According to this writer, the fort was never taken, though it suffered considerable damage from the bombardment. The only success scored by the Dutch during this war was the capture of the English fort at Sekondi, which they completely destroyed.

Captain Kenith Mackenzie, an officer commanding an Independent Company in the service of the Company of Merchants, was Commandant of Fort Nassau at Mori while it was in the possession of the English ; this was the same Captain Mackenzie who had led the attack against Fort Conraadsburg in 1781. The garrison at Mori, as at the other English posts, consisted largely of convicts who had been sent out to serve in the Company's forces on the Gold Coast, and the proportion of these to volunteers was as sixteen to five. Among these convicts was a man named Kenith Murray Mackenzie, a nephew of the Commandant, who had formerly been a drummer in the 3rd Regiment of Foot Guards, but having on at least three occasions been sentenced to death for robbery and reprieved, and indicted for several other burglaries and thefts and acquitted through non-appearance of the prosecution, he had eventually been transported to Africa

and drafted into the service of the Company. Ever since 1781-1808 his arrival on the Coast his conduct had been notoriously bad, and he had twice deserted and more than once been guilty of insubordination. He was, moreover, strongly suspected of being in the pay of the Dutch and of conspiring to murder Captain Mackenzie and surrender the fort to them. At one time he had acted as Adjutant, but having committed some fresh breach of discipline, was placed under open arrest and confined to barracks. On the 3rd of August 1782¹ he came down to the gate and persuaded the sentry, Brooks, to let him pass, saying he only wished to speak to one of the Moris and arrange with him to get him some brandy and promising to return within a few minutes. This, however, he failed to do; and when it was found that he had already sent a bundle of clothes away by a native, little doubt was entertained that he had deserted to the Dutch. The unfortunate Brooks was tied up from seven o'clock until one, and was computed to have received about 1,500 lashes, while Captain Mackenzie sent Sergeant Andrews and two men to find and bring back the deserter. They went as far as Cape Coast without seeing or hearing anything of him, and then turned back to Mori, as they were afraid to go any farther lest they themselves should be captured by the Dutch from Elmina. On their return it was decided that the man must still be hiding in Mori, where the people were well known to be friendly with the Dutch, and Captain Mackenzie, without warning the Chief or making any inquiries, caused two six-pounders to be fired into the town. The Moris at once fled into the bush, but returned the next morning and surrendered the runaway. He denied any intention of deserting, but said he had gone to the village and, having got drunk and fallen asleep in the garden, had been seen and seized by the Moris as he was making his way back to the fort later in the day. Captain Mackenzie, however, refused to listen to any explanations,

¹ The dates are those given in the report of the trial, but they are not correct. An old Cape Coast letter-book of this period still exists, in which is Captain Mackenzie's letter reporting the desertion, dated 20th of July, and another reporting the execution, dated 24th of July.

1731-1808 and within an hour of his surrender, caused him to be
 CHAP. XII executed without any form of trial whatever. He was seated in one of the embrasures in front of a loaded gun, and his hands and legs were then made fast to it above and below. One of the men read part of the burial service to him, and Captain Mackenzie, after producing his own nightcap to be pulled over his head, gave the signal for the gun to be fired. The man was killed instantly, and his body, which had been blown clear over the battlements, was picked up later and buried by some of the garrison.¹

For this act Captain Mackenzie was brought to England to take his trial at the Old Bailey before Mr. Justice Willes on the 10th of December 1784. The rather curious indictment was as follows : " Kenith Mackenzie was indicted by the name of Kenith Mackenzie, late of London, Esq., for that he, not having the fear of God before his eyes, but being moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil, on the 4th day of August in the 22nd year of his present Majesty's reign, with force of arms, at Fort Morea, on the Coast of Africa, in parts beyond the seas, in and upon Kenith Murray Mackenzie, feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault, and that he a certain great gun, called a cannon, value 20s., then and there charged with gunpowder and one iron ball, did discharge and shoot off, to, against, and upon, the said Kenith Murray Mackenzie, and by the said iron ball so shot off and discharged from the said cannon as aforesaid, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did strike, penetrate and wound, the said Kenith Murray Mackenzie, giving to him, on the left side of the belly, one mortal wound, of the length of six inches, and of the breadth of three inches, of which he then and there instantly died ; and so the jurors say, that he, in manner and form aforesaid, then and there did kill and murder him the said Kenith Murray Mackenzie."²

For the defence it was urged that the deceased was a desperate character and was conspiring against the

¹ Mackenzie reported this act in a postscript to one of his letters to the Governor, as follows : " I have sent Murray to the other world by means of a nine-pounder to answer for his conduct in this world."

² *Life and Trial of Kenith Mackenzie*, p. 3.

accused, whose life was threatened, and that it was absolutely necessary, in view of the number of convicts in the garrison, to make an example of him. The Judge, in summing up, pointed out that such an execution without trial was not in accordance with martial or any other law, but, though he touched on the fact that there was a safe prison at Cape Coast, left the question of justification on the ground of self-defence to the jury. They found the prisoner guilty, but recommended him to mercy, and he was sentenced to death. He was afterwards reprieved, partly on account of the great gallantry that he had shown in Guernsey when the French attacked the Channel Islands in 1778 ; but although he received His Majesty's pardon for the murder, he was still detained in Newgate prison to answer a charge of piracy which the Portuguese ambassador had lodged against him for having cut out from under the guns of a Dutch fort a Portuguese ship sailing under Dutch colours. The Government in the meantime kept £11,000 worth of gold-dust belonging to him until he gave an account of the stores, etc., that he had had in his charge ; but what eventually became of this enterprising but reckless man is not known.

On the conclusion of peace in 1785 all the forts that had changed hands during the Anglo-Dutch war were restored to those who had held them at its commencement.

Since the sale of Fort Fredericksborg to the English in 1685 the Danes had made no attempt to form any fresh Settlements, with the exception of a small fort that they had built in 1734 at Ningo, about thirty-five miles to the east of Christiansborg, which they called Friedensborg ; but wishing now to extend their influence and trade, which had been greatly interfered with by continual inter-tribal wars, and not caring to risk disputes with the other Europeans, they decided to exploit the still unoccupied eastward coast. In 1784 they built a square fort with four bastions and mounting twenty-four guns at Adda, which they named Konigstein ;¹ but before they could form any

¹ The foundations were laid on the 15th of October 1783, and all the stone was taken by sea from Christiansborg.

1781-1803 further Settlements on this part of the coast it was necessary to subdue the Awunas. This unruly tribe had for a long time been at almost constant war with the Addas. These wars arose from a variety of causes, but were principally due to disputes about the fishing rights of the two tribes in the River Volta or to panyarring. Quarrels had also arisen over the collection of salt in the lagoons, and the alliance of the Addas with the Accras provided yet another cause of enmity. A great war had broken out between the two tribes in 1750 and lasted for many years. The Addas had then been assisted by the Akims and Akwapims, and had eventually overcome the Awunas. The latter, however, had taken the two Kings prisoners, and it was not until 1767 that peace had been made and the royal captives ransomed. The Awunas had again assumed the offensive in 1776, and the slaughter during this war had been appalling, more than half the population being killed. The Danes therefore determined to make a great effort to crush these people once and for all, and in 1783 an army raised by Major Kioge in Christiansborg and Accra, and, reinforced by Addas, Akwapims and others, was sent across the Volta for this purpose. The Awunas were defeated, and a treaty was concluded on the 18th of June 1784 by which they agreed to the erection of a fort at Kitta and factories elsewhere in their country, and guaranteed the safety of traders. By virtue of this treaty a fort which had already been begun at Kitta was completed and occupied the same year and named Prinzenstein. It mounted eight brass three-pounders. The Danes also built a redoubt called Augustaborg at Teshi in 1787 and mounted it with sixteen guns.

Fort Vernon at Prampram was built by the English at about the same time. It soon fell into ruins however, and a second building that was raised on the same site in 1806, being built with more haste than care, was soon in a similar condition.

The Danes devoted a great deal of attention to agriculture and had several excellent plantations. One at the foot of the Akwapim Mountains was known as Fredericks-

gaor, another near Akropong as Fredericksnople, and a 1781-1808 third at Dodowa as Frederickstadt. In 1798 a botanical expert, P. Thonning, was sent out by the Danish Government to examine and report upon the agricultural possibilities of their Possessions. They were particularly successful in the cultivation of coffee, but this part of the country was unfortunately overrun during the wars that broke out a few years later and the plantations were ruined.

Osai Kwamina, on his accession in 1781, swore that he would neither enter his palace nor see his wives until he had avenged the insult that had been offered to his predecessor by the Assins, Akims and other rebels by bringing the heads of the leaders of the revolt to Kumasi. He quickly joined the army, and Akim was invaded by forced marches. The rebellious tribes were taken by surprise and defeated, and Ofusu the King of Akim, and Akombra, a Buromi Chief, were killed and their heads brought to the capital. Embassies then arrived from Dahomi, from Salaga, and from Yendi congratulating the King on his accession to the stool and his triumph over his enemies. According to Bowdich, there was another war with Banda during this reign, and its King, Odrasi, finding he must inevitably fall into the hands of the Ashantis, preferred to commit suicide. He left orders that a pregnant woman should be sacrificed, her belly ripped up and his head sewn inside it to save it from being taken as a trophy by the enemy. In spite of these precautions, however, the head was found, and the skull afterwards became one of the principal ornaments of the King's drums. Dupuis, however, denies that there was any war with Banda during Kwamina's reign, and declares this story to be without foundation. Insuta and Inkoranza, however, who had tried to assert their independence, were both subjugated.

In 1792 the Danish Governor of Christiansborg, Andreas Biörn, found himself in difficulties with the Popos, and so great had the fame of the Ashantis as a race of warriors now become, that he applied to the King for 5,000 auxiliaries. The English, alarmed at the prospect of an Ashanti

1781-1808 army being marched down to the coast, sent messengers CHAP. XII to Osai Kwamina begging him to refuse ; but they met with no success and found the Ashantis making great preparations for war. Governor Biörn, however, was succeeded by Andreas Hammer, who was rather diffident about entangling himself in any such alliance and sent 250 ounces of gold to purchase the return of the army, which was already on its way to the Coast. The despatch of these messengers to Osai Kwamina constitutes the first record of any intercourse between the English and the Ashanti Court.

Osai Kwamina, who was the most merciful of all the Ashanti Kings, now became the victim of a conspiracy amongst his own Chiefs, which soon afterwards led to his destoolment. He is believed to have been secretly converted to the Mahomedan faith and to have meditated the introduction of the Koranic law into his kingdom. Bowdich further asserts that he neglected all the affairs of state for not less than twelve months while he stayed at Jabin paying his attentions to the King's daughter Gyawa, with whom he was infatuated. Towards the end of his reign he prohibited a great many of the customary human sacrifices, reserving this rite almost exclusively for use at funeral customs ; and these innovations, combined with the fear of what else he might do in the future, led the Chiefs to depose him in 1797. He was given a few of his wives and slaves and sent into retirement in the bush, where he was put to death a few years later at his own request and by the following peculiar method. His feet were made fast to the ground, and he was then bent backwards over a prop on which his body rested, while some heavy elephant's tusks were hung by a cord from his neck and strangled him. These strange means were adopted in order to avoid the unlawful shedding of royal blood.

Kwamina was succeeded by his brother Osai Opoku II. He was almost immediately involved in another war with the Jamans, who, at the instigation of Kong, had seized the opportunity of the late King's deposition to rebel, pre-

tending that they wished to restore him to the stool and 1781-1808 threatening to march to Kumasi for this purpose. The CHAP. XII Jamans were joined by a large army from Kong, and, crossing the River Tano, invaded Ashanti territory. Opoku at first acted on the defensive, but on being joined by the tributary forces from Jabin, Inkoranza and Banda, gave battle on the banks of the river near "Barbanou." The engagement lasted for several days, but the Jamans were eventually defeated, although their army is said to have outnumbered the Ashanti force by four to one. This war with Jaman lasted altogether for fifteen months, and great numbers of prisoners and large quantities of plunder were brought back to Kumasi, the Mahomedan prisoners alone numbering over 5,000. Opoku did not long survive this victory, but died in 1799 after a lingering illness which was commonly attributed to the practice of witchcraft by the deposed King. He was succeeded in 1800 by a third brother, Osai Tutu Kwamina, also known as Asibi or Bonsu : the greatest ruler who ever sat upon the Ashanti stool.

From some correspondence in one of the old, but unfortunately very incomplete, letter-books at Christiansborg Castle, it appears that the French had formed a small Settlement by about 1788 at a place not far from Anamabo, the name of which is given as Amoku. The French Commandant's name was Mougin, and he had a surgeon with him named Mallat ; but the vessel that had brought them to the Coast had evidently left them with stores for only a short time, and no more were sent out, probably owing to the wars that followed the French Revolution. Governor Dalzel was, of course, most anxious to turn out these intruders ; but, though prisoners were occasionally taken and deserters sometimes gave themselves up at Anamabo, he did not feel strong enough, with the small force at his command, to attack them.

In June 1794, however, negotiations were opened with Amonu Kuma, the King of Anamabo, for the neutrality of the Fantis, and he was told that the whole Fanti nation would be held responsible for any hostile act committed

1781-1808 army being marched down to the coast, sent messengers CHAP. XII to Osai Kwamina begging him to refuse ; but they met with no success and found the Ashantis making great preparations for war. Governor Biörn, however, was succeeded by Andreas Hammer, who was rather diffident about entangling himself in any such alliance and sent 250 ounces of gold to purchase the return of the army, which was already on its way to the Coast. The despatch of these messengers to Osai Kwamina constitutes the first record of any intercourse between the English and the Ashanti Court.

Osai Kwamina, who was the most merciful of all the Ashanti Kings, now became the victim of a conspiracy amongst his own Chiefs, which soon afterwards led to his destoolment. He is believed to have been secretly converted to the Mahomedan faith and to have meditated the introduction of the Koranic law into his kingdom. Bowdich further asserts that he neglected all the affairs of state for not less than twelve months while he stayed at Jabin paying his attentions to the King's daughter Gyawa, with whom he was infatuated. Towards the end of his reign he prohibited a great many of the customary human sacrifices, reserving this rite almost exclusively for use at funeral customs ; and these innovations, combined with the fear of what else he might do in the future, led the Chiefs to depose him in 1797. He was given a few of his wives and slaves and sent into retirement in the bush, where he was put to death a few years later at his own request and by the following peculiar method. His feet were made fast to the ground, and he was then bent backwards over a prop on which his body rested, while some heavy elephant's tusks were hung by a cord from his neck and strangled him. These strange means were adopted in order to avoid the unlawful shedding of royal blood.

Kwamina was succeeded by his brother Osai Opoku II. He was almost immediately involved in another war with the Jamans, who, at the instigation of Kong, had seized the opportunity of the late King's deposition to rebel, pre-

tending that they wished to restore him to the stool and 1781-1808 threatening to march to Kumasi for this purpose. The CHAP. XII Jamans were joined by a large army from Kong, and, crossing the River Tano, invaded Ashanti territory. Opoku at first acted on the defensive, but on being joined by the tributary forces from Jabin, Inkoranza and Banda, gave battle on the banks of the river near "Barbanou." The engagement lasted for several days, but the Jamans were eventually defeated, although their army is said to have outnumbered the Ashanti force by four to one. This war with Jaman lasted altogether for fifteen months, and great numbers of prisoners and large quantities of plunder were brought back to Kumasi, the Mahomedan prisoners alone numbering over 5,000. Opoku did not long survive this victory, but died in 1799 after a lingering illness which was commonly attributed to the practice of witchcraft by the deposed King. He was succeeded in 1800 by a third brother, Osai Tutu Kwamina, also known as Asibi or Bonsu : the greatest ruler who ever sat upon the Ashanti stool.

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1781-1808 crew to come ashore and made them prisoners. This CHAP. XII insult, however, was not allowed to pass unnoticed by the English, and Governor Dalzel remonstrated so strongly that he not only secured the release of the prisoners and an apology, but compelled the Dutch to waive this claim in future in the case of ships that did not wish to call at a Dutch port.

Now that another century had elapsed, great changes had taken place in the native States. Ashanti, which at the commencement of Osai Tutu's reign had consisted merely of the country in the immediate neighbourhood of Kumasi, now ruled over a vast extent of country. Inkoranza, Banda, Jaman, Wassaw, Sefwi, Denkera, Tufel, Aowin, Tekiman, Assin, Akim, Akwapim, Kwahu and Akwamu all owed allegiance to its King. It is true that this great empire was but loosely bound together and that there were frequent rebellions, calling for constant activity on the part of the Ashantis in order to maintain their position. This was due to the one great fault of their administration: though they could conquer, they could not govern: in fact, they never made any serious attempt to do so. On the reduction of a new State and its inclusion as a province of the Empire, no army of occupation was left, but the district was handed over to one of the Ashanti Chiefs as Governor or Resident, and beyond the payment of an annual tribute and the rendering of military service when called upon, nothing was required. The amount of tribute payable by these provinces was in some cases fixed and in others left indefinite, the amount actually levied depending upon the exigencies of the State and its varying needs for war or other purposes. Those provinces whose soil was auriferous paid in gold; others, in which gold was not found, were taxed by towns according to their size and importance, paying tribute in cattle, slaves, etc. Thus Sefwi paid 200 peredwins (£2,000) annually, Monsi (Adansi) 50 bendas (£450), and Jaman 100 peredwins (£1,000). Salaga and the other large Dagomba towns were assessed at 500 slaves, 200 cows, 400 sheep, 400 cotton cloths and 200 silk and cotton cloths.

The so-called Residents seldom lived in their districts, but 1781-1808 stayed in Kumasi and only went to the provinces nominally CHAP. XII under their control when the tribute was to be collected, or on other special occasions. The Ashanti Empire, therefore, though extensive, lacked cohesion ; and each province, being left practically under the rule of its own Chiefs, seized upon the first opportunity to rebel as soon as it felt strong enough. Had the Ashantis possessed half as much talent for government and organization as they had for making conquests, it is difficult to imagine to what extent their power might have grown.

On the Gold Coast itself, too, there were further changes. Fanti, once a small State, had now, by mingled diplomacy and force, subjected its neighbours until its country extended from the Sweet River to Beraku. The whole of this territory, however, was not ruled over by one man. The King of Abra was its nominal head ; but in practice the government was administered by a federation of several more or less independent Kings and Chiefs, each of whom ruled over his own district, but made his local policy subservient to the general interest.

The forts, as has been seen, were held primarily for the purpose of carrying on the Slave Trade, and a ground-rent secured by monthly pay-notes was paid to the Chiefs. The English, up to this time, had made no attempt to exercise any jurisdiction over the people nor to improve their condition by education or other means. Strictly speaking, of course, they had absolutely no right to interfere with them. They were merely tenants, and had no concern in their landlords' business. It was only when their own convenience or property was threatened by the outbreak of inter-tribal wars and the consequent interruption to trade that they took any action and made occasional attempts at mediation ; and it was not until many years later that the inevitable consequences of the long association of two races so far apart in the scale of civilization began to make themselves felt.

Cruikshank gives an excellent idea of the relations that existed between the European settlers and Coast peoples

1781-1808 at this time. " The native, keenly alive to his interests, **CHAP. XII** supple and fawning, readily acknowledged the superiority of the white man in words, and hailed him, without any scruples of pride, as his master. But he had, and ever has had, a reservation in his own mind which limits the signification of the term to his own construction of it, and has no more intention of giving implicit obedience, if he can help himself, when his pleasure and profit appear to him to be compromised, than if he had never entered into any undertaking upon the subject. Neither would he wish to shake himself free from the necessity of obedience. His object is to endeavour, on all occasions, to magnify the sacrifice which he is making to gratify your wishes, not so much from a determination not to obey them, as to obtain some bribe or concession for his obedience. A service of this description appears to have been the nature of the dependence of the African upon the European on the Gold Coast from their earliest intercourse. It has certainly given rise to an incessant struggle, productive of every species of artifice on both sides, in the attempts of the one party to extend their power and influence, and of the other to obtain new privileges. The relation in which they stood to each other never, in fact, appears to have been clearly defined or understood. Indeed, it is possible neither party wished it to be so, as any certainty upon the point would lessen the probability of advantages which might possibly turn up in the chapter of accidents."¹

Thus, though nominally masters, the English really had no authority whatever ; and the supply of slaves being entirely in the hands of the people, who well understood the advantage they held, led them to raise frequent disputes and obstructions to the trade, with the object of obtaining some advantage as the price of peace ; and although the English had from time to time made attempts to resist these extortions, yet the natives had invariably triumphed. So outrageous did the conduct of the people of Cape Coast eventually become that they not only insulted but actually assaulted in the streets officers of

¹ Cruikshank, vol. i, p. 28.

ships, merchants, and even officers of the Company. In 1781-1803 1802 they handled the captain of an English ship so roughly that he died soon afterwards ; but this seems at last to have convinced the Governor that there must be no more trifling, and the English then began to show a more determined spirit. The Chiefs and Headmen were summoned to the Castle, and an agreement was then drawn up by which it was arranged that any outrage against Europeans should render the people liable to a fine of forty ounces of gold, and that all complaints against Europeans should be laid before the Governor under a similar penalty. But although these terms were agreed to at the time and publicly proclaimed, it was not long before they were violated and a great riot took place.

In 1803 Mr. John Swanzy, a trader living in the town, complained to the Governor that one of his gold-takers had accepted false gold. These gold-takers were employed by traders to weigh and test the gold brought by their customers in payment for goods, and were required to replace any base metal taken by them. Mr. Swanzy employed two of these men, and the gold, therefore, had to be passed by them both. A man had come to buy cloth, and paid eight ackies (£2) while one of the gold-takers was out, and Mr. Swanzy had ordered the man who was on duty not to mix this gold with that already taken until the other had returned and passed it also. On the arrival of the second gold-taker, two-thirds of this " gold " was found to be base metal, and the man who had taken it had then run away and could not now be found. It would clearly have been useless to take this case before the Chief's court, for it involved the question of cheating the white man, and African and European alike had been accustomed to regard the cheating of each other as their rightful prerogative. As the delinquent gold-taker could not now be found, the man who had bought the cloth and who was suspected of being an accomplice, was brought to the Castle as security for his appearance. This man happened to be a person of some importance in the town, and no sooner had he been secured, than a great crowd

1781-1808 armed with guns and swords assembled in front of Mr. CHAP. XII Swanzys house, which was just in front of the Castle gate and within fifty yards of it, demanding the instant release of the prisoner. The Governor, Mr. Jacob Mould, sent out a message ordering the people to disperse, but they only replied with insults and defiance and openly challenged the garrison to come out and fight them.

The mob now threatened to attack Mr. Swanzys, who was preparing to defend the property in his house. At their first attempt they broke in the front gate, but finding the occupants ready to oppose them, quickly retreated. Soon afterwards, a party was seen trying to force an entrance at the back of the premises in order to take the defenders by surprise, and Mr. Mould then released the prisoner, who was carried off in triumph by his friends. This tame submission on the part of the Governor by no means pleased his officers, who at once drew up and delivered to him a very strongly worded protest. This had the desired effect. Mr. Mould immediately gave orders for the guns commanding the town to be loaded, and made every preparation to punish the people for their violent and unreasonable conduct, while a message was sent to the Chiefs demanding payment of forty ounces of gold under their agreement. This, however, was defiantly refused, and time then had to be given to allow the Europeans living in the town to remove their property to the Castle. While this was being done, the people busied themselves with their own preparations, collecting all their removable property and sending it, together with the old men, women and children, to the bush villages.

As soon as everything was ready, two guns were fired over the town, but failed to produce the submission of the people, and the bombardment was then commenced in earnest. Fires soon broke out in several quarters and destroyed the greater part of the town before they could be extinguished, and the people then began firing into the Castle from some houses standing close in front of it which had escaped the conflagration. The balls from the Castle guns had very little effect on the mud walls of these houses,

but either remained embedded in them or dropped harmlessly on the other side. The people, on the other hand, being under cover, were comparatively safe from small-arm fire, though their muskets could tell against the men who were working the guns. The struggle continued in this way for nearly a month ; but the people then asked for a truce, and after some tedious negotiations, security was given for the payment of a penalty, and the opportune arrival of H.M.S. *Romney* finally brought this little war to a close.

About this time, too, another dispute arose between the English and the Anamabos on account of an attempt by the Commandant to put a stop to the commission of nuisances under the walls of the fort, and a fight ensued, which lasted for three days, during which the greater part of the town was destroyed and several lives were lost.

From these incidents it will be seen how little authority the English really had and how strictly that was confined to the forts themselves.

Considering the class of men who were employed by the Company and the truly extraordinary ideas of justice that these officials seem to have held, it is not surprising that the people showed themselves thus restless and turbulent. Cruikshank, who had access to the records in Cape Coast Castle that have since been destroyed, gives several instances illustrating the spirit in which these men regarded the people and the manner in which they were accustomed to treat them. One officer at Winneba wrote complaining of an affront he had received from a man there, saying, " I seized a musket, and made a rush at him ; but the villain had the audacity to elude the bayonet ! "¹ while a Commandant of Wida, where the Company then had a fort, seized a quantity of goods from a schooner in the roads and justified his action by saying that " the vessel was from the Island of St. Thomas, and a man at Prince's Island owed him a debt."² As an example of illiteracy, a Commandant of Komenda wrote in explanation of the inefficiency of his garrison, that " They are all sick,

¹ Cruikshank, vol i, p. 34.

² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

1781-1808 not from any acute distemperary disorders, but from old CHAP. XII chronicle ones."¹ Even the highest officials seem to have had most distorted ideas of justice and protection, for the following minute appeared in the Council Book of May 1802, signed by a Governor and other members of the Council : "A free family from Great Cormantine, consisting of two males and nine females, having claimed the Company's protection, saying they were free people without any man to defend them, in consequence of which they had been exposed to many vexatious palavers, and that several of their relatives had already been panyarred and sold, the Council having taken the case into consideration, ordered them to be incorporated with the Company's slaves.

(Signed) ARCHIBALD DALZEL,
JACOB MOULD,
HENRY HAMILTON."²

The climate, always bad, at times played frightful havoc amongst the Europeans, and in some specially bad years the death-rate among them was simply appalling. Thus in 1756 Governor Melvil and nearly the whole of the officers and garrison of Cape Coast succumbed to it. So bad was it, in fact, that Dr. Lind wrote that "the living were scarce sufficient to remove and bury the dead." Other exceptionally bad years were 1763, 1769 and 1775.³

¹ Cruikshank, vol. i, p. 34.

² *Ibid.*, p. 35.

³ Possibly yellow-fever epidemics.

PART IV

*THE WARS BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND
ASHANTIS*

1803 TO 1872

CHAPTER XIII

THE FIRST ASHANTI WAR

1803 TO 1807

OSAI TUTU KWAMINA is the first of the Ashanti Kings 1803-1807 of whose reign anything like a complete account is given CHAP. XIII by contemporary writers. What is known of the history of the preceding reigns is principally derived from accounts that were given to these writers by him and his Linguists.

Soon after his accession, Tutu Kwamina was involved in a war with Gofan, whose King was joined by Gobago to attack the Bandas, whom he utterly defeated. The victors then advanced upon Inkoranza ; but by this time the news had reached Kumasi, the army had been mobilized, and Tutu Kwamina met the invaders near Kuka and drove them back. The Ashantis followed the retreating enemy northwards into the open country and inflicted a second and decisive defeat. The turning-point in this engagement was a brilliant charge by the Ashanti General Amankwa Tia and an army corps of 50,000¹ men. The enemy broke and fled precipitately across the River Volta with terrible loss. Great numbers fell and many more were taken prisoners, amongst whom were the King of Gofan and one of his principal allied Chiefs.²

Jaman, ever ready to seize an opportunity to revolt, now rebelled once more ; but the rising was quickly put down and a peace lasting five years then ensued. The prestige of the Ashanti arms was now high, and embassies bearing friendly messages and presents arrived from

¹ According to the Ashantis.

² The Ashantis claim to have killed or captured 100,000.

1808-1807 Dahomi, Yendi and Salaga ; but this period of tranquillity
CHAP. XIII was soon broken by a series of events which led to the first invasion of the Gold Coast by the Ashantis and brought the English into conflict with them.

Assin at this time was governed by three Chiefs. Chibu and Kwaku Aputai jointly ruled over the western half, while the eastern districts were under Amu. All three were, of course, vassals of the King of Ashanti. The trouble began with the death of one of Amu's Chiefs, with whose body a quantity of gold and other valuables were buried in accordance with the usual custom. A subject and relative of Aputai, who happened to be present at the funeral, afterwards returned and rifled the grave, and it is to this insignificant occurrence, of no great importance outside the village in which it happened, that all the subsequent trouble between England and Ashanti, ending in the downfall of that kingdom, can be directly traced.

The crime was discovered ; and Amu, having failed to capture the thief, sent messengers to demand satisfaction from Chibu and Aputai. They, however, refused to listen to his complaint, declaring that the whole story was a pure invention on his part, and Amu then laid the matter before the King of Ashanti. Tutu Kwamina seems to have been genuinely anxious to preserve peace, and deferred judgment for some time in the hope of bringing about a reconciliation between the parties. It was only after he found this was impossible that he announced his decision and ordered Aputai to repay the amount that had been stolen to the relatives of the deceased. Aputai was detained in Kumasi pending compliance with this order ; but he contrived to escape and collected his followers to oppose Amu, who then advanced to meet him. The fortunes of war at first favoured either side alternately ; but before long Amu was driven back and forced to await the arrival of reinforcements. He then moved into the enemy's country, and after burning several large towns, defeated Aputai in a pitched battle, in which the thief who had been the cause of all the trouble was among the killed.

Considering that both combatants were his subjects,

that the war was being waged within the limits of his dominions, and that every man slain was a loss to his own army, Tutu Kwamina would have been fully justified in adopting the strongest measures to quell the disturbance. He was still anxious, however, to bring about a peaceful settlement, and sent presents of gold to both Chiefs, ordering them at the same time to cease hostilities. Amu at once obeyed and fell back on the Monsi Hills, where, however, Aputai continued to molest him and several skirmishes took place. Further messengers now arrived from the King, bringing additional presents for the Chiefs and instructions to Amu to break up his camp and let the dispute stand over until the next Adai Custom, and to Aputai to keep the peace and allow Amu to retire unmolested. Aputai then withdrew his forces in apparent compliance with the King's commands ; but Amu had no sooner set out for his own district than Aputai again attacked him, and taking him completely by surprise, put his army to flight with great slaughter. Not content with this, Aputai, intoxicated with the success of the moment, and with that utter disregard for consequences and inability to look into the future which is so characteristic of the African, then murdered the King's messengers and suspended their mutilated bodies from trees on the frontier.

Further forbearance on the part of the King was now out of the question, and Tutu Kwamina at once raised a great army and marched into Assin to punish the offenders. Chibu and Aputai tried to oppose his advance near Chichiveri, but were quickly put to flight and driven across the River Pra. Many prisoners fell into the hands of the Ashantis, who say that 30,000 Assins were killed ; but the two Chiefs made good their escape and fled to the Fantis, who promised them protection.

Tutu Kwamina now sent messengers to Akum, the Chief of Essikuma, who owed him some allegiance, demanding the surrender of the fugitives and giving assurances of his friendly disposition towards the Fantis. This request was accompanied by a present of twenty ounces of gold, a state umbrella and fifteen slaves. Akum would probably have

1808-1807 complied with the King's demand, but the fugitives CHAP. XIII suspected his intentions and promptly fled to Abra, where the Council of Chiefs declined either to surrender them or to send delegates to discuss the matter in the Ashanti camp. The King, therefore, sent an ultimatum demanding permission to follow the remnant of the Assin forces through Fanti ; but his messengers were tortured and killed, and he then gave orders for a general advance, leaving his mother Kun Ajua in charge of his kingdom.

The army, under Ado Mata and Appia Dunkwa, invaded Fanti, where they twice defeated the Assins and their allies. The second engagement took place near " Buinka " and ended in the total rout of the allies, who fled in disorder to Abra and the coast towns. Amongst the numerous prisoners who were taken was Atta, the King of Abra ; but the request of his subjects to be allowed to ransom him was declined, and he was placed in the custody of Akum, who, however, let him escape.

Kwaku Aputai now made overtures for peace, promising to deliver hostages for his future loyalty provided the King would pay some debts which he had incurred by the war and swear not to depose him ; but he was not sincere, and was only trying to gain time. Tutu Kwamina, however, agreed to this proposition ; and in proof of his desire for an amicable settlement again sent presents of gold to both Chiefs. The bearers of these gifts shared the fate of his previous messengers and were decapitated. Their headless trunks were suspended from trees, and their heads, with the mouths crammed with excrement, placed in regular succession along the path in the line of the Ashanti advance, while the principal Fanti and Assin Chiefs are said to have eaten their still quivering hearts. It is probable that the Fantis were relying to some extent on the belief that the Ashantis would not dare to advance to the coast and come under the guns of the forts, and it is indeed unlikely that they originally had any intention of doing so ; but this last insult was so outrageous and so exasperated the King, that he swore his great oath (Akromanti Miminda) that he would never sheath his sword

nor return to Kumasi until he had gained the heads of 1803-1807 both Chibu and Aputai.

CHAP. XIII

Akum, who had in the meantime been pardoned for allowing Atta to escape, and had since been employed in supplying provisions to the Ashanti army, now committed one of those rash and apparently motiveless acts which seem so inexplicable to those unacquainted with the character of the African. After faithfully supplying convoys with provisions on six separate occasions, he, in April 1806, betrayed a party of about a hundred Ashantis who had come to fetch another supply and sold them as slaves. Thus he also became involved in the war and was quickly defeated. The utter extermination of the Fantis was now decided upon, and neither woman nor child was spared. The Ashantis met with little or no opposition to their advance until they reached Abra ; and all prisoners, with the exception of a few important Chiefs who were reserved for sacrifice in the capital, were killed. A terrible battle was fought at Abra in May, and after a prolonged struggle resulted in the practical annihilation of the Fantis engaged there. Barely a hundred of them are said to have escaped from the field, but one Chief, Kwesi Beni, rallied a few men and tried to make a second stand at Emperu. He was quickly put to flight, and Abra and Emperu were burned. Mankesim was next destroyed, but the Ashantis respected its famous fetish grove, which they left untouched, and then continued their march towards the coast, from which they were now only fifteen or twenty miles distant.

Chibu and Aputai had in the meantime escaped to Anamabo ; but not feeling altogether safe there, went to the Governor at Cape Coast, Colonel Torrane, who promised them his protection "either by mediation or force of arms." The Governor now became alarmed at the near approach of the Ashantis to the Settlements and was anxious to send a flag of truce to the King, offering himself as a mediator in any dispute between him and the Fantis. But the King and Chiefs of Anamabo¹ and Cape Coast

¹ Amonu Kuma (Amonu II) was the King of Anamabo.

1808-1807 would have none of it, and assured him of their ability to beat the Ashantis. They were indeed confident that they could make good their words and were loath to be deprived of the plunder and numerous slaves that they expected to obtain. It must be allowed, as some excuse for these vainglorious boasts, that the Fantis were at this time the most powerful nation on the Coast and had had no experience of the enemy they were now to meet, but who soon afterwards so rudely undeceived them. It is ridiculous to suppose, however, that the King would have accepted any mediation at this stage of the war, even had the Fantis permitted its offer ; for the repeated murders of his messengers and the other injuries that had been done him, apart from his oath, had already made it impossible for him to consent to any amicable settlement.

It seems almost inconceivable, however, that the Governor should only now have awakened to the fact that the safety of the Settlements might be endangered, and should have failed to realize long before this that, if the English were to throw in their lot with the Fantis, it was to their interest to give them some practical assistance and support. The King's conduct throughout renders it almost certain that, had mediation been offered in the earlier stages of the trouble, he would have been only too ready to accept it. The war had certainly not been of his seeking. The affairs of the English on the Gold Coast had indeed reached a crisis ; and the time had come when they must choose definitely between the Fantis and Ashantis. It is true that they were dependent on the former for their information ; yet they cannot have been altogether ignorant of the causes of the war and the turn affairs were now taking. The Fantis had already given them more than one sample of their character, but their knowledge of the Ashantis was only derived from hearsay. They were, moreover, afraid of the latter, and believed that they might attack their Settlements and ruin their trade ;¹ but they do not seem to have realized that the bulk of that trade was already with Ashanti, the Fantis only acting as

¹ *Vide* p. 213.

middlemen, and that the Ashantis would never destroy the **1808-1807** fountain from which they obtained all that they valued **CHAP. XIII** most. It is probable, however, that the English then had a very imperfect idea of the real power and resources of this people, and so long as the war was being waged at a little distance inland, were quite unable to appreciate its importance to themselves and the necessity of deciding upon a definite policy regarding their relations with the combatants.

In the meantime the Ashantis steadily advanced towards the sea, burning the towns and killing those of the inhabitants who had not already fled, until the advance guard, under the King of Denkera, reached Kormantin. The inhabitants were quickly put to flight, the town was burned, and Fort Amsterdam surrendered by the Dutch Commandant without firing a shot. The King of Denkera then took up his quarters in the fort and sent several calabashes full of sea-water to the King in token of his success. The Ashantis were thus in possession of an European fort within three miles of the English fort at Anamabo.

Mr. Edward William White, the Governor or Chief Factor of Anamabo, now sent a message to the King of Denkera enquiring what had induced the Ashantis to invade the coast and what their intentions might be, at the same time offering himself as mediator in any dispute pending between their King and the Fantis. The King of Denkera, however, found it hard to believe that the English could really be ignorant of the causes that had led to the invasion, and thought this message was a mere pretext to gain time and that Mr. White was making game of him. The next day, therefore, he sent an answer by three messengers under a flag of truce that if he would send him twenty barrels of powder and a hundred muskets he would be pleased to furnish him with all the information he desired. This request, of course, was not complied with ; but the bearers of it were entertained and told that if the Ashantis could advance any just grounds of complaint against the Anamabos, Mr. White would see that satis-

1806-1807 faction was given ; but that in the absence of any such **CHAP. XIII** justification, he should give the people the protection of the fort, and, in the event of any hostile movement on the part of the Ashantis, should not hesitate to fire upon them with his guns. Two or three of these were then fired to give the messengers some idea of their power, and Mr. White and a Mr. Wilson escorted the three Ashantis to within a short distance of their headquarters, as private information had been received that the Anamabos were preparing to murder them on their way back.

The Anamabos, now that they found the Ashantis so near them, were far less confident of victory than they had formerly professed to be and showed the greatest anxiety to be assured of the protection of the English. Mr. White ordered them to put the town in the best possible state of defence and to post strong guards on all the roads leading into it, promising, if they were attacked, to admit as many of the old men, women and children as there was room for into the fort, and advising the others to collect under its walls, where they would be under the protection of the guns.

Thus the English, though merely the tenants of the people from whom they rented the ground on which their forts stood, now for the first time definitely undertook to give them protection.

The Ashantis made no move until a week later, when a detachment of the force at Kormantin took possession of Egya, whence, being only a mile distant, they could watch every movement of the Anamabos. On the 14th of June it was decided to dislodge this party, and a large force of Anamabos, outnumbering the Ashantis at Egya by three to one, advanced against it. The fire of the Anamabos was so wild and ill-directed that in spite of their superior numbers the issue was for some time in doubt ; but the enemy then retreated into the lower part of the town and seemed to give them the victory. The Anamabos would not follow them into the valley however, and this apparent success soon cost them dear ; for they had withdrawn all the guards around the town to take part in the attack on

Egya, and while their attention had been occupied by the 1808-1807 party there, the King, with the main body of the Ashanti CHAP. XIII army, had taken possession of every road.

On the following day, Monday the 15th of June, the town and fort were attacked, and the gallant defence of the latter by its small garrison against the hosts of Ashanti furnishes one of the finest chapters in the history of the English on the Gold Coast.

The garrison at this time consisted of Messrs. White (Commandant), Henry Meredith (Second in Command), F. L. Swanzy, T. A. Smith and Barnes, with only twenty men, including soldiers, artificers and servants' and four mulattos. The Ashantis made a move early in the morning, the alarm was given, and the Anamabos able to bear arms went out to oppose the enemy's advance, while crowds of old men, women and children flocked to the fort. About 2,000 of these were admitted ; but the place could hold no more, and after the gate had been shut and strongly barricaded, the remainder of the refugees crouched down under the walls, where it was confidently expected that the fire of the guns would afford them full protection.

The battle could not be seen from the fort, though the heavy volleys of musketry could be plainly heard. The rapid approach of this sound soon made it clear that the Fantis were retreating ; and Mr. White, whose previous experience of the people had been limited to the more timid coast tribes, fired two of the guns over the town in the vain hope that the report might frighten the Ashantis and cause them to fall back. Needless to say, no such result was obtained. By eleven o'clock the Anamabos had been defeated and came pouring into the town like a flock of sheep, hotly pursued by the victorious Ashantis ; but they were far too panic-stricken to think of rallying and making another stand under the fort. Their one idea was to escape. Some ran to their canoes and put off to sea, and others plunged headlong into the surf and swam out to a rock¹ at a little distance from the shore, to which

¹ The Anamabos still swear by this rock.

1808-1807 about two hundred of them were soon clinging in terror ; **CHAP. XIII** but the great majority were too closely pursued by the Ashantis to have any chance of escape, and a terrible massacre took place on the beach. Mr. White did all he could to help the wretched Anamabos, and round after round of grape was poured into the enemy from a 24-pounder and a 3-pounder that pointed along the beach to the westward. The Ashantis suffered fearful losses at every discharge, for they came on in such dense masses that they were mown down by scores ; yet they never wavered for an instant, but crowded forward to take the places of those who had fallen, and having completed their work of carnage on the beach, charged up to the very walls of the fort to seize and drag away the women and other refugees who cowered there in terror.

Bullets were now coming into the fort from every side, and the garrison began to suffer. Mr. White was twice wounded, one ball entering his left arm, while another struck him in the mouth and knocked out four of his teeth. Another officer and two men were also wounded and a third man killed. Mr. White, faint from the pain of his wounds and loss of blood, was soon forced to hand over the command to Mr. Meredith and retire. A similar difficulty was now felt to that experienced by Bosman in the defence of Fort Vredenburg in 1695 ; for the embrasures yawned so widely that it was found impossible to work the guns under the hail of lead to which the fort was now exposed, and the garrison had to rely almost entirely on their small arms. By noon their numbers had been reduced by further casualties to eight efficient, including officers, who collected in two small bastions on the western side of the fort flanking the gate, and even there they had to lie prostrate to avoid the murderous fire of the enemy. The Ashantis were now making every effort to gain possession of the fort, feeling confident that they would thus obtain much valuable plunder. Twice they made a determined assault on the western gate, only to be driven back with heavy loss ; yet they came on for the third time, and one man was seen carrying fire to place against the gate, but a fortunate

shot killed him, and his body falling forward on the fire 1803-1807 extinguished it. On the eastern side alone was it found possible to use any of the guns. Here two 3-pounders inflicted fearful losses on the Ashantis, who charged bravely up to their very muzzles ; but the western gate had to be defended entirely by small arms. Meredith and Swanzy alone fired nearly 300 rounds, until their shoulders were so bruised by the repeated recoils of their muskets that for days afterwards they could not move their arms without pain. The attack was continued with unabated vigour until six o'clock in the evening, when the Ashantis drew off and the exhausted garrison found an opportunity to repair some of the damage they had suffered.

“ On the following day a scene replete with the horrors of war exhibited itself : heaps of dead and wounded around the walls, and for a mile along the eastern shore, tossed about by a violent surf : houses unroofed, and others on fire : the sorrowful countenances of the old men, who sought refuge in the fort ; the mournful lamentations of the women, and the pitiable cries of the children, presented a picture of exquisite feeling, and of the greatest distress ! Of the number the town contained, and which we will calculate to have been at least 15,000 souls, we may suppose that two-thirds of that number perished. . . . Without going into further inquiry, we may venture to state that 8,000 Fantis were destroyed ; and although they were attacked by at least three times their number, yet if they were actuated by one-third of the bravery of their opponents, they would have committed some execution, and doubtless would have checked that intrepidity and ardour which were so pre-eminently conspicuous in their enemy. Their resistance was very feeble ; terror seized them at the commencement of the attack, and it impressed them so forcibly, that the sea formed but an indifferent barrier to their precipitate flight. . . . What loss the Ashantis sustained cannot be precisely laid down : the King, prior to his departure from Anamabo, said he lost 3,000 men ; but in that number he probably included

1808-1807 those who were carried off by disease.¹ His men, however, CHAP. XIII suffered very severely; for their approach was made with such large bodies, that twenty, thirty, or perhaps more, fell with every discharge of grapeshot; and the musket not only killed but very often wounded at the same time, so close were the enemy."²

When day broke on the 16th of June, the garrison, though having every reason to congratulate themselves on their brilliant defence of the fort, were unable to close their eyes to the very serious and critical position in which they were still placed. By land they were completely blockaded, and even by sea any communication with the other Settlements was fraught with considerable danger and difficulty. The garrison, originally small enough, had now been still further reduced by death and other casualties, and those who had escaped the bullets of the enemy were worn out with anxiety, exposure to the sun and bodily fatigue. Their store of provisions, too, had never been intended for any more than the garrison and was quite unequal to meeting the necessities of the numerous refugees now under their protection, so that within the next few days famine must be added to their other troubles. The beach on all sides was strewn with the bodies of the slain, rapidly decomposing under the almost vertical rays of the tropical sun, and it was abundantly evident that no amount of bravery or endurance could enable them to hold out much longer. Peace was therefore ardently desired, and it would appear that the Ashantis, after the fearful slaughter of the preceding day, were equally ready to welcome a cessation of hostilities. Neither side, however, cared to make the first overtures, and a report of the state of affairs was therefore sent by canoe to Colonel Torrane.

The Governor at once despatched two ships from Cape Coast with reinforcements. They anchored off Anamabo the same afternoon, and at about four o'clock Messrs. Bold, Galloway and Woolbert with a corporal and twelve men were landed under cover of the smoke from the guns.

¹ Dysentery broke out.

² Meredith, pp. 143 and 145

The party was not attacked and entered the fort in safety, 1803-1807 but the Ashantis fired on the canoe as it put back to the CHAP. XIII ship and wounded one of her crew.

Thus reinforced, the garrison were anxious to continue the defence ; but the officer in charge of the party from Cape Coast had brought definite orders from the Governor that a flag of truce was to be sent to the Ashanti King and an attempt made to come to terms. Two of the soldiers bearing a white flag and Union Jack were accordingly lowered over the walls of the fort. Their appearance was greeted with unmistakable signs of joy and satisfaction by the Ashantis, who pressed around them so eagerly that it was only with difficulty that the King's officers, who came forward to conduct them to his presence, could force a passage through the excited throng. The King received them well, made them a present of a sheep, and sent them back to the fort about seven o'clock the same evening with three of his own messengers. The Ashantis in the meantime had observed the truce ; and though a few individuals had at first made towards the rock to which many of the Anamabos were still clinging, they at once understood the meaning of a couple of shots fired over their heads and retired.

The messengers sent to the Commandant recounted the history of the origin of the war, detailing all the events by which the King justified his invasion of Fanti and disclaiming any intention of commencing hostilities with the English, and after an interview lasting two hours returned to their lines. It was now found necessary, before any terms could be settled, to arrange a meeting between the Governor and the King, and every effort was made to induce the latter to go to Cape Coast. This, however, he persistently refused to do, though he sent a deputation of his Chiefs to wait on the Governor ; but they were not authorized to conclude a peace, and Colonel Torrane, therefore, sent them back to the King with a present and decided to come to Anamabo.

Torrane was now guilty of a most dastardly act, which, though only one of several infamous transactions, was

1808-1807 in itself sufficient to nullify all the glory derived from **CHAP. XIII** the spirited defence of Anamabo Fort. This was nothing less than the seizure and delivery into the hands of the Ashantis of Chibu, the Assin Chief, to whom he had promised his protection. He and Kwaku Aputai, with about 500 of their faithful adherents, were living in fancied security in Cape Coast ; but in order to curry favour with the Ashanti King and pave the way for a favourable conference, this wretched fugitive was now seized and surrendered. Even the Chiefs of Cape Coast opposed this horrible treachery when they heard of the Governor's intentions ; but Torrane sent an armed force unexpectedly to the houses in which the Assins were staying, and seems to have bought the consent of the Cape Coast people by playing on their fears and permitting them to capture and enslave as many of the Chiefs' followers as they could lay hands on. Chibu, old, feeble and blind, and many of his men, were secured and borne off after a struggle, but Aputai fortunately contrived to escape. Chibu was promptly sent to Anamabo, where he was put to death with the most excruciating tortures and his jaw-bone suspended as a trophy from the King's " death-horn."

Naturally, Tutu Kwamina was much pleased by this delivery of his enemy into his hands, and indeed said to Mr. Dupuis in Kumasi in 1821, " From the hour Torrane delivered up Tchibbu, I took the English for my friends, because I saw their object was trade only and they did not care for the people. Torrane was a man of sense, and he pleased me much."¹ Well, indeed, may the King have said " they did not care for the people " with such an example before him. Beyond pleasing the King and possibly averting an attack on Cape Coast however, there was nothing whatever to be gained by this atrocious act, and the price paid—the loss of British honour and the distrust it inspired in the minds of the people, which lingered for many years—was surely too high. If Torrane found himself unable to defend the Assins as he had promised, or did not feel justified in risking an attack on

¹ Dupuis, p. 263.

Cape Coast, it is a pity he did not tell them plainly that he 1808-1807 could not give them further shelter and send them into CHAP. XIII the bush to fend for themselves. These Assins, it is true, richly deserved their fate ; but once they had been promised protection they were certainly entitled to receive it. Tutu Kwamina, moreover, was himself an honourable man, and would probably have been equally friendly, and in his heart have had a far higher opinion of the Governor had this been explained to him. The mere knowledge that he was capable of such baseness would have been more than sufficient to account for the King's obstinate refusal to go to Cape Coast or to enter the fort at Anamabo, quite apart from any question of Ashanti etiquette.

The meeting between Torrane and Tutu Kwamina took place under a group of trees midway between the Ashanti lines and Anamabo Fort. The proceedings on the first day were of a purely ceremonial nature, the whole time being occupied by the customary round of visits to the Courts of the King and his principal Chiefs and their return visits to the Governor. With the Ashantis was a Mahomedan, a native of Katsina, who had visited Tunis and made the pilgrimage to Mecca : he now commanded a company of men who were armed with bows and arrows in addition to their muskets. This man was one of the Hausas living in Kumasi, some of whom often accompanied the Ashantis in their campaigns, but he caused a great deal of astonishment at the time.

The King expressed his concern at Mr. White's wounds, and said that he should soon leave Anamabo, as his army was suffering from the effects of the foul air and bad water caused by the putrefying and still unburied bodies of the slain. On a subsequent occasion he promised to return and conclude a peace with the Governor after he had completely subdued his enemies, for Aputai had now rejoined Akum and they were advancing towards Anamabo at the head of a large force. A temporary agreement was made, but it was never reduced to writing, so that some doubt exists as to its exact terms. Dupuis gives the following account : " The treaty of peace was a formal

1803-1807 and solemn acknowledgement on the part of the Governor, CHAP. XIII that by right of conquest Fantee, including Cape Coast and every other town in the neighbourhood, belonged exclusively to the empire of Ashantee, with the reservation of a judicial authority to the Company over such towns as stood in the vicinity of any of the castles ; and in confirmation or ratification of these terms, the Governor expressly admitted the King's title to those deeds, called notes, upon which he paid him the arrears then due, and a tribute, called perhaps a present, which was demanded of the Cape Coast people."¹ This is generally borne out by Meredith,² who was present, though he does not mention that any payment was made on the "notes." It was specially stipulated that so long as the English remained strictly neutral they should not be molested in any way. Some difficulty arose over the disposal of the refugees in the fort : the King at first claimed them all by right of conquest, but eventually agreed to divide them equally with Torrane.

On the 3rd of July, the Ashantis broke up their camp and left Anamabo to meet the force under Aputai and Akum, and an engagement took place a little to the east of Kormantin which was witnessed by Torrane. It ended in the total defeat of the Assins, and those who escaped at all only saved their lives by retreating across the Oki River, with the fords of which the Ashantis were unacquainted. This battle practically put an end to the war ; but a kind of guerilla warfare continued for some months, during which small predatory bands roamed over the country and occasionally succeeded in cutting off a foraging party of Ashantis. The Ashantis then slowly continued their march towards Accra, devastating all the country through which they passed ; but in October 1807, while they were encamped near Winneba, small-pox broke out among them, and this, in addition to the dysentery that had previously appeared at Anamabo, induced the King to return without further delay to Ashanti. A small detachment was left at Accra to sell those prisoners that

¹ Dupuis, p. 262.

² Meredith, p. 160.

he did not wish to take with him, while he, with the main 1808-1807 army, marched direct to Kumasi without revisiting Anamabo CHAP. XIII to complete the proposed treaty with Colonel Torrane.

Besides giving up Chibu, Torrane took the Anamabo refugees who had fallen to his share to Cape Coast and sold them to the slave dealers. Meredith, in one of his letters to Torrane, dated from Anamabo on the 17th of June 1806, wrote : " The King seems to say that he must have those who sought protection in the fort ; this he only hinted at, and probably the same may be hinted to you, but in giving them up we ought to be assured of their being used kindly . . . but if you can gain their protection it will be a humane act."¹ Nevertheless, the only real protest against the infamous betrayal of these people seems to have been made by Mr. John Swanzy, who was then Commandant of Fort James at Accra. He was ill in bed when he heard of what the Governor and Council—of which he himself was a member—had done, but he got up and came by canoe to Cape Coast. His threats to expose them so alarmed Torrane and the others that they guaranteed to undo what could still be undone ; but this, unfortunately, was not much, for most of these people had already been sold off the Coast. The few who remained, however, were promptly released. The performance of this act of mercy cost Mr. Swanzy his life, for the fatigue and exposure he had undergone so aggravated his illness that he died on his return to Accra. Torrane died in 1808, and according to a letter written soon afterwards by Governor White, he died in debt to the people of Cape Coast for the value of forty slaves, " Assins whom they seized at the time the Governor captured Tchibbu and whom he sold off the Coast." From this it is only too clear that after bribing the people of Cape Coast not to resist the surrender of Chibu by allowing them to enslave his followers, he undertook their sale and kept the money for himself.

In Torrane's favour, however, it must be said that he undoubtedly appreciated the fact that in the preservation of friendly relations with Ashanti lay the only hope

¹ Meredith, p. 152.

1808-1807 of success for British trade on the Gold Coast, a fact that **CHAP. XIII** few others, with the notable exception of Maclean, seem to have grasped. He also did his best to encourage agriculture and laid out a plantation at Napoleon, a village about four miles from Cape Coast, where in 1807 he had 4,000 coffee plants doing well, besides a great variety of English vegetables.

The stubborn resistance that had been offered by the small garrison of Anamabo must have greatly impressed the Ashantis ; and it was fortunate that this happened to be the fort they attacked, for most of the others could not have withstood them. It was, in fact, the height of its walls that chiefly contributed to its safety. Had the Ashantis had any knowledge of artillery and brought down one or two of the guns from Fort Amsterdam, which was then in their possession, nothing could have saved the place. Even as it was, it became known later that arrangements had been made and the men actually told off for a well-planned attack that was to have been carried out on the 17th, the day after the truce was made : 6,000 Ashantis were to have taken part in it, 3,000 of whom were to have kept up a heavy fire on the garrison while the other division exploded a quantity of gunpowder at the foot of the walls and then scaled the breach and took the place by storm. There is little room to doubt that this plan would have proved successful. Any increase of prestige among the Fantis however, that might otherwise have accrued from this defence of the fort was utterly destroyed by the actions of Torrane, whose surrender of the refugees to Tutu Kwamina was universally regarded by the people as an admission of the superiority of the Ashantis. This, perhaps, he could not help : the fort had capitulated to the King, and he naturally claimed some advantage and would have insisted on receiving it. It was the use the Governor made of those he had saved that must be cavilled at.

The year 1807 will be ever memorable in the history of all parts of West Africa ; for on the 25th of March the agitation that had been carried on in England for the past half-century by Thomas Clarkson, Granville Sharpe,

William Wilberforce, Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, Zachary 1808-1807
Macaulay and others at length bore fruit, and the Slave CHAP. XIII
Trade was abolished by an Act of Parliament which came
into force on the 1st of May in the same year.¹ This was
the first, and probably the chief, real benefit that the
English have conferred on the people of the Gold Coast.

Hitherto this traffic had constituted fully nine-tenths
of the Coast trade and had been freely participated in
by all the Company's officers, who relied upon it for the
greater part of their incomes. The Company, therefore, in
order to compensate them in some measure for the losses
they suffered by its abolition, largely increased their
salaries, which, in most cases, were now doubled. Parliament
also increased the Company's annual subsidy from
an average of £13,000 to £23,000. The real effects of the
Abolition Act, however, were not visible until some years
later ; for the country at this time was convulsed by
wars and it was impossible to judge its effect on the trade.
The coast people, especially the more influential natives,
were bitterly opposed to it ; for it deprived them of an
easy means of becoming rich, and it doubtless led to a
considerable increase in the number of human sacrifices ;
for the numerous prisoners that were taken in the wars
and who would otherwise have been sold to the slave dealers,
now became a drug on the market and were readily spared
to swell the number of victims at any great custom. The
officers of the Company, too, felt another inconvenience
besides their pecuniary loss. They had no power to put
criminals to death, and were now deprived of the very
effective means of transportation of which they had
hitherto availed themselves ; but in course of time the
benefits of the Act became manifest in the decreasing
frequency of disputes and panyarring and in the increased
attention paid by the people to agriculture.

Although it was not until 1807 that the Slave Trade
was actually abolished, it had been regulated to some ex-
tent by Act of Parliament since 1788, until when it had been

¹ The first example had been set by Austria in 1782, followed by Denmark in 1792 and America in 1794.

1803-1807 wholly unrestricted. These regulations referred chiefly to CHAP. XIII the number of slaves that ships were allowed to carry according to their measurement. During the later years of the unrestricted and of the regulated Slave Trade, the condition and sufferings of the slaves on board many of the ships must have been terrible. According to the evidence given before a Committee of the House of Commons in 1792, the slaves were so closely packed that they always lay touching each other, and were often obliged to lie on their sides for want of enough room for the breadth of their backs. They had no room to sit up, and the surgeons had to remove their boots when they went below to avoid treading on them. Many were horribly sea-sick, and several surgeons gave evidence of the great mortality that often occurred from disease or from want of sufficient ventilation, or even from despair alone.

Some idea of the enormous number of slaves that was exported can be formed from the fact that from 1700 to 1786 not fewer than 610,000 were computed to have been landed in Jamaica alone, while the total number imported into the British West Indies between 1680 and 1786 was 2,130,000.

Prior to the abolition it was no uncommon thing for planters visiting England from the West Indies to bring one or more of their slaves with them, and they would openly advertise for their recovery if they ran away, or sell them by auction with other property. Thus the *Gazetteer* of the 18th of April 1769 contained the following announcement : "At the Bull and Gate Inn, Holborn, a Chestnut Gelding, a Tim Whisky, and a well-made, good-tempered Black Boy."¹ The following advertisement, again, appeared in the *Public Advertiser* on the 28th of November in the same year : "To be sold, a Black Girl, the property of J. B——, eleven years of age ; who is extremely handy, works at her needle tolerably, and speaks English perfectly well ; is of an excellent temper, and willing disposition. Inquire of Mr. Owen, at the Angel Inn, behind St. Clement's Church, in the Strand."² This kind of

¹ Fox, p. 45.

² *Ibid.*

thing, however, was finally put a stop to in 1772, when 1808-1807 Granville Sharpe secured the judgment of Lord Mansfield CHAP. XIII in the case of James Somerset, a slave who had run away and been recaptured by his master, that a slave by setting foot in England became free.

The abolition followed the loss of Britain's American Colonies. Slaves were no longer wanted, and the wickedness of the trade was then suddenly perceived. Numbers of black servants were turned adrift to wander destitute and starving through the streets of London, till, in the end, the scandal became so great that a Committee for Relieving the Black Poor was formed, which led to the foundation of the Colony of Sierra Leone for the repatriation of these men in Africa.

CHAPTER XIV

THE SECOND ASHANTI WAR

1808 TO 1813

1808-1818 THE sudden withdrawal of the Ashanti army at the end
CHAP. XIV of 1807 had been due to the outbreak of disease and the scarcity of supplies ; but though it put a stop to actual hostilities, it left affairs in a very unsatisfactory state, for no definite peace had been concluded. The Fantis therefore continued under arms, and formed a large camp at Abra, where, relieved of the pressing danger of the presence of an Ashanti army, their courage or their self-conceit so far revived that they soon began to boast that it was they who had driven the enemy from their country. The effect of such a state of affairs upon trade was, of course, most disastrous. The principal trade of the Settlements had always been with Ashanti, and, now that the roads were closed, it was either cut off altogether or had to be conducted at great risk and by more circuitous routes. Very few traders, therefore, found their way to any of the Settlements, and none at all came to Cape Coast.

The Ashantis made no move ; and the Fantis, sitting idle in their camp at Abra and still smarting from their recent ignominious defeats, now decided to wreak their vengeance on those of their neighbours who had remained neutral during the invasion. War was accordingly declared against the Elminas, who had seized and sold numbers of Fanti fugitives, and the Accras, who were also accused of having given the Ashantis some assistance. Both these tribes were allies of Ashanti ; and although they had not been required to take any active part in the war, yet they

had undoubtedly favoured the enemy's cause. The wrath **1808-1818** of the Fantis was specially directed against an Elmina **CHAP. XIV** named Neizer, who was accused of having been the cause of all their recent troubles by prompting the King to invade their country and supplying him with munitions of war, and against an Accra man named Sackey, whom they charged with having converted to his own use a quantity of gold that had been given into his care and with having sold Fanti fugitives who had sought an asylum in his town. They hoped to extort large sums of money from these two men as the price of peace. Sackey, indeed, did pay 320 ounces, 12 ackies of gold (about £1,283), but finding this had not brought him perceptibly nearer the limits of Fanti avarice, soon regretted his weakness and declined to be blackmailed any longer. Neizer from the first refused to pay anything at all.

The people of Cape Coast had taken no part in the war, and had since made their peace with the King ; but the Fantis, who had been appeased by the payment of a sum in gold, thought it advisable to conceal their animosity towards them and now sought to gain them as allies against the Elminas. Governor White warned the people against taking any part in this quarrel, and they really seem to have been drawn into it rather against their will ; nevertheless, drawn into it they were, and by mixing themselves up in this way in an attack on the allies of Ashanti, once more incurred the wrath of Tutu Kwamina, who, in 1817, mentioned in a letter to the Governor that "Colonel Torrane, by giving up Cheeboo, induced the King to consider the Cape Coast people as his friends, and they took fetish accordingly, but their joining the Fantees afterwards to fight against Elmina for assisting the King has made him distrust them always since."¹ Thus the people of Cape Coast, who had nothing to gain by this war, and towards whom the King was then favourably disposed, were only storing up trouble for themselves in the future ; for the King never forgot this unfriendly action, and demanded satisfaction for it a little later.

¹ Bowdich, p. 88.

1808-1818 In 1809 one party of Fantis proceeded eastward to CHAP. XIV attack Accra, while a second division, which was joined by the Wassaws under King Intifu and his Tufuhin Attobra, advanced on Elmina and blockaded it. The Fantis and people of Cape Coast camped around its northern and eastern sides, while the Wassaws took and occupied Ampeni and guarded the western approaches. Several attempts were made from these camps to capture the place, but the Elminas, who were well supported by the guns of Fort Conraadsburg, had little difficulty in driving back the enemy. After one of these unsuccessful attacks the Elminas pursued the Wassaws—who however retired in very good order—almost to within range of the guns of Komenda Fort. The Wassaws burned Komenda and then occupied the old Dutch Fort Vredenburg. This fort had been almost destroyed by the bombardment when Governor Mills captured it in 1782, since when it had never been occupied, and the Wassaws now completed its ruin and wrecked the only parts of it that were still habitable. The Komendas fled to join the Elminas, and a few days later took the Wassaws by surprise while they were eating their dinner at Ampeni and completely routed them, inflicting such heavy losses that they soon afterwards retired to their own country.

Mr. Blenkerne, the English second in command at Komenda, had passed along the beach on the morning after the occupation of Ampeni by the Wassaws and found two Ampenis still clinging to some rocks in the sea, whom he rescued and sent to Elmina. This brought Intifu and Attobra to Komenda Fort a day or two later, demanding two slaves or their value in goods in payment for these men. The Commandant refused, saying that if the men had been Wassaws instead of Ampenis it would have been all one to Mr. Blenkerne, who would have saved them just the same. Intifu acknowledged the justice of this, but said, "This is what I do not complain of; for had you kept these men in your fort as slaves until the war was over, and then sent them back to their own country, I should have had no cause to feel aggrieved, but instead of

doing so, you sent them to Elmina to join my enemies in 1808-1818 attacking me at Ampeni, and thereby gave them two CHAP. XIV strong men to fight against me after I had once destroyed them by driving them into the sea, where they must inevitably have perished, had not your second saved them. I therefore now demand two men from you, to fight against those two you sent to Elmina." There was so much sound sense in this argument that the Commandant finally paid the value of two slaves, which at that time amounted to £40.

Finding that they could not take Elmina, the Fantis closely invested it so that the inhabitants could not go a mile beyond the town and suffered great privations ; for provisions could only be brought in by sea, and, in spite of the efforts of Mr. White and the Dutch Governor, Mr. A. de Veer, to arrange peace, the blockade was continued for nearly six months. It was partially raised in May 1810, but a camp was maintained a few miles behind Elmina until the following year. In order to strengthen the defences of the town against such attacks in the future, the Dutch then built a small fort near the shore and about half a mile to westward of the Castle, which was afterwards known as Fort de Veer.

In the meantime the Fantis who had gone to attack Accra had been defeated with a loss of about a hundred men, whose hands were cut off by the Accras and roasted in their streets ; but a desultory warfare was kept up for some time, and it was nearly five years before communication by land between Accra and Cape Coast was again open.

While these events were happening, the Elminas had contrived to get a message through to Kumasi, informing the King of the state of affairs on the coast and imploring his assistance. Tutu Kwamina, however, was still in favour of peace, and sent messengers to Accra, who arrived there during the Fanti attack on the town and informed the Commandant of James Fort that the King desired peace and a resumption of trade, which was only being prevented by the obstinacy of the Fantis. These overtures, however,

1808-1818 were of no avail, and the King found himself compelled **CHAP. XIV** to adopt stronger measures. Early in May 1810 further ambassadors from Kumasi arrived in Elmina and communicated their King's intentions to Mr. de Veer, asking him to inform the Governor at Cape Coast. This he did in a letter dated the 7th of May 1810, in which he stated that the King was about to make war upon and severely punish the Fantis and Wassaws, but would always regard the Europeans of all nations as his friends, provided of course they remained neutral ; but that if they protected his enemies he should be obliged to turn his arms against them also. Early in October, again, two more messengers reached Accra and were sent on by canoe to Cape Coast. They brought word that the King hoped the Governor had not taken offence at his sending his previous message through the Dutch Governor, " that he regarded the white men as his masters, and he should be happy to keep in friendship with them ; that it was his intention to send an army against the Assins ; that their ill-treatment of the Ashantis some years back was the sole cause of his visit to the waterside in the year 1807, as it would be that of the army he was about to send ; that if the whites, Fantis, or others protected his enemies he should be obliged to wage war with them." The King can hardly have imagined that this message, after the one he had already sent through Mr. de Veer, would be taken literally, and though it may have been mere diplomacy, it seems more likely that it was intended as a hint to the Fantis that he was now quite ready to take the field again, and that they had therefore better leave his allies in peace and save him the necessity of compelling them to do so.

The King's message was communicated by the Governor to the Fanti Chiefs, who, however, still persisted in declaring themselves at war with the Elminas ; and the Ashantis, after a stay of about fourteen days, during which they had ample opportunity to take note of the state of affairs, were sent back to Accra on their return journey on the brig *Cockatrice*. They took presents for the King and the Governor's reply that it was the sincere wish of the

English to remain on friendly terms with all the natives ; **1808-1818** that they had come to the Gold Coast to trade and not **CHAP. XIV** to make war and were most anxious to establish and maintain free communication with Ashanti, and that they would therefore be glad to assist the King in any possible way to restore peace and harmony throughout the country.

On the arrival of these messengers in Kumasi, the King, finding his overtures for peace disregarded by the Fantis, and that they were still avowedly at war with his allies the Elminas and Accras, determined to punish them. Accra was of special importance to the Ashantis at this time, for it was the only maritime State to which they could trade without interruption. Appia Dunkwa was therefore despatched with 4,000 men to support the Elminas, while Opoku, with an army of 25,000 men, was ordered to destroy the Fantis who were making war against the Accras.

The King then sent a present of gold and large supplies of powder and lead to Atta, the King of Akim, ordering him to join the army under Opoku with his people. This Chief had fought with the Ashantis during the last invasion, and had done good service at Anamabo, but he had always longed to avenge the death of his predecessor, Ofusu, and throw off his allegiance to Kumasi. He believed the opportunity had now come ; and after recounting all the wrongs that his people had suffered in the past at the hands of the Ashantis, declared that he would no longer submit to their rule, but would use the powder the King had now sent, not for him but against him. On the receipt of this message, Tutu Kwamina sent to enquire from Atta if it had been correctly given ; but before the arrival of this second embassy the Chief had already gone too far to admit of any hope of a reconciliation. Hearing that Kwamina Guma and a party of Ashantis were on their way from Christiansborg to Kumasi with a large sum in gold as tribute, he had waylaid and robbed them, murdering all but one man, who was spared to carry the news to the King with a further message of defiance. Atta had then

1808-1818 succeeded in inducing Kwow Safachi the King of Akwapim
CHAP. XIV to join him in revolt, and their allied army was now awaiting
the advance of Opoku, who had not yet crossed the Pra.

Opoku entered Akim in February 1811, and an action followed in which the Akims and Akwapims fought so well that neither side could claim the victory, though the battle lasted till nightfall. The Ashantis lost so heavily in this engagement that Opoku dared not risk a second encounter without reinforcements and called on the Accras to join him. They obeyed his summons in such numbers that further resistance on the part of the allies was out of the question and they retreated, the Akims to Fanti and the Akwapims towards Adda, with Opoku in hot pursuit. The majority of the Akwapims sought refuge in the Krobo Hills and mountain ranges of their own country, but Kwow Safachi and his immediate followers remained in Adda.

On the approach of the Ashantis early in March, the Addas fled to an island in the Volta, while Kwow Safachi doubled back to Akwapim by small and unfrequented paths. Opoku's army occupied and pillaged Adda, but made no attempt to molest the Danes at Fort Konigstein. Opoku believed that Kwow Safachi was still with the Addas and spent some time in fruitless negotiations for his surrender; but realizing at last that he had really escaped him, was convinced that Mr. Flindt the Danish Commandant must have either assisted or connived at his flight, and on the 2nd of April made him a prisoner while he was visiting his camp. He was required to march with the Ashanti army, but was otherwise well treated, sharing Opoku's table and having a hut to himself whenever they halted. He was finally ransomed by his Government on the 2nd of September for gold and goods to the value of £400 after a captivity lasting exactly five months.

On leaving Adda, Opoku took the bell from Fort Konigstein as a trophy and followed the enemy into the mountains, where they had now rallied their forces; but the difficulties of the country and the superior knowledge that the Akwapims had of it combined to prevent his doing

more than compel them to fall back. The Ashanti army 1808-1818 was now much weakened. They had lost many men during CHAP. XIV the war, and most of those who remained were thoroughly worn out with the fatigue of campaigning in this mountainous district, and suffering from the effects of drinking the brackish water at Adda, to which they were unaccustomed. Hearing of their distressed condition, Kwow Safachi advanced to give them battle in June ; but after a severe struggle, lasting till night, fell back before dawn and thus gave the victory to the Ashantis. Opoku now laid the whole country waste and, in August, invested Krobo Hill, where a number of the enemy were encamped. This hill, however, is a natural fortress with precipitous and almost perpendicular sides, and though the Ashantis twice tried to storm it, they were easily repulsed, and in September the King recalled them to Kumasi before they had been able to effect the capture of Kwow Safachi, who then re-established himself in Akwapim.

While these events were taking place in the eastern districts, the army under Appia Dunkwa had reached the coast near Winneba after but slight opposition from the Fantis. Mr. Smith, the Commandant of Tantumkweri Fort, sent to inquire what its intentions were, and was told that it was on its way to Elmina to compel the Fantis to raise the blockade. The Fantis of Anamabo, Ajumaco, Mumford, Apam, Winneba and Gomoa had formed a camp near Mumford, and on the 1st of March 1811 a battle took place at Apam, in which the Fantis fought well. The Ashantis, however, beat them in the end and destroyed the town, taking many prisoners, amongst whom was Bafo one of the Chiefs of Anamabo. About a week later Atta marched down at the head of his Akims to attack the invaders, who were now encamped near Tantumkweri. Appia Dunkwa, however, whose originally small force had been considerably reduced by the casualties at Apam, thoroughly appreciated the difference between the fighting qualities of the Fantis and those of the warlike Akims, and thought it wiser to retreat. Atta followed, and having engaged and defeated him, drove his army over the border.

1808-1818 He then returned south and joined the Fantis ; but before **CHAP. XIV** he could complete his preparations for an attack on Opoku in Akwapim, he contracted small-pox and died in October 1811. Had he lived and been well supported by the Akwapiams and other tribes, it is possible that this Chief might have struck a severe blow at the power of Ashanti ; for though he acted at times in a wild and irresponsible manner, he was undoubtedly a brave and skilful general.

Throughout the invasion the King's promise that the Europeans should not be molested, provided they remained neutral, had been strictly observed, with the single exception of the arrest of Mr. Flindt ; and there can be little doubt that Opoku genuinely believed that he had given Kwow Safachi some assistance, for had he really intended to go against the King's word and molest the Danes, he could easily have taken the fort and would certainly have attacked and looted it.¹ Mr. Flindt, moreover, was very well treated. But though the English and Dutch suffered nothing more from the Ashantis than the unavoidable interruption to their trade, they were less fortunate with the Akims. Atta pillaged the Dutch Fort Leydsamheid at Apam, throwing all the guns over the walls and damaging the building to such an extent that it was little more than a ruin when he left, while the garrison, which consisted only of a sergeant and a few of the Company's slaves, fled to Beraku. He also visited the English fort at Tantumkeri, where he helped himself to everything in the Commandant's quarters that happened to take his fancy. In March, and again in July, Atta sent to the English Commandant at Winneba demanding in the most peremptory terms to be supplied with powder and lead, but on each occasion his request was refused. A mulatto named Vanderpuye was then in charge of the Dutch fort at Beraku, and after supplies had been denied him at Winneba in March, Atta went to him and threatened to put the whole garrison to the sword if he did not give him what he wanted. Vanderpuye was then allowed to go to the

¹ The Danes apparently offered no objection to his taking the bell.

English at Winneba, where Mr. Meredith lent him a 1808-1813 sufficient sum to buy Atta off.¹

CHAP. XIV

During the whole of this period the country had been in a most distracted state, and the utmost lawlessness prevailed everywhere. Murders, kidnapping and other crimes were of almost daily occurrence, and the little authority that the Europeans had ever had was now entirely disregarded. In August 1808 the Elminas murdered the Dutch Governor Mr. Hogenboom, who, from all accounts, had shown them very little consideration and made himself odious not only to the people, but to his own officers also. They lay in wait for him one night while he and some of the officers were playing billiards in the house of one of the traders in the town, and suddenly attacked and assassinated him as he was returning to the Castle. He was buried close to the spot where he fell, and his tomb still stands in Elmina, where it is known as the "Marble Stone." At that time the beach was used as the highway to Cape Coast and there was only a narrow footpath at this spot, by the side of which the murdered man was buried; but when the present roads were laid out they included this tomb, which now stands near the centre of Marble Stone Street at its junction with Cape Coast Road.

In April 1811, too, one of the traders from Cape Coast called at Accra to settle some business before leaving for England. He had some Fanti canoemen with him, but left them on board the ship, fearing some trouble might arise if he took them ashore as the Fantis and Accras were still at war. Some Accras who came alongside discovered them however, and insults and defiances were freely exchanged, until the Accras, finding they could not revenge themselves on these men, went ashore and collected a large mob, who seized their master and refused to release him until the officers of Fort James had paid them £42.

A still greater outrage was committed at Accra a little later. While Mr. Vanderpuye, the mulatto Commandant

¹ Thirty ounces of gold, which, after Vanderpuye's death, Governor De Veer refused to repay to Meredith.

1808-1818 of Beraku Fort, was there on business, one of the Accra CHAP. XIV fetishmen went to fish in the River Sekum some miles to the west of the town, and was there surprised and captured by a party of Fantis who took him to Beraku and beheaded him. When the Accras missed their fetishman and learned what had become of him, they went by night to Fort Crève Cœur, where Mr. Vanderpuye was staying, forced an entrance, and seizing him and six Berakus who were with him, murdered them all.

At Winneba the people had always been notorious for their violence. They had already flogged one Commandant through their streets and nearly beaten the captain of a ship to death ; but these atrocities reached a climax in 1812, when Mr. Meredith, the gallant defender of Anamabo Fort, who was now Commandant at Winneba, was done to death.

When the Winnebas were about to join the Fanti army during the Ashanti invasion in 1811 a man named Assibata brought a locked chest to the fort and gave it into the charge of a sergeant named Weuvès for safe keeping. Assibata was killed in the battle of Apam, and about six months later his relatives came to the fort and received the chest from the sergeant, but returned it a few days later with the message that " as he had kept the gold which was in it, amounting to a thousand ounces (£4,000), he might also keep the chest."

Accusations of this kind are very commonly made on the Gold Coast as a means of extorting money even at the present day, and as likely as not the charge was quite without foundation. The sergeant, at any rate, denied it ; and although the matter was discussed on several occasions, no decision was come to. It was therefore decided to refer the dispute to the great fetish at Mankesim, and the sergeant obtained an advance on his pay from Mr. Meredith with which to pay the customary fees of the priests. Messengers were then sent to Mankesim to consult the oracle and the sergeant was declared guilty. Conscious of his innocence, he refused to accept this as final, and sent messengers a second time to the priests, who then returned an answer desiring to know " if he doubted the

infallibility of the oracle, or whether he had forgotten 1808-1818 having taken the gold out of the chest about seven o'clock in the evening, carrying it to Mr. Meredith about eight o'clock and telling him to take good care of it, with a promise of dividing the spoil." The people, or at any rate those who were not in the conspiracy, never of course for a moment doubted the truth of the fetish verdict ; and as the sergeant still persisted in declaring his innocence, the Headmen went to Mr. Meredith and told him what the oracle had revealed. He asked them if they really believed that he had stolen the gold, and they had to admit that they had never heard of a white man stealing from a black man, but repeated that the fetish had said so—an argument which they probably deemed conclusive.

On the following morning, Thursday the 6th of February 1812, the people suddenly seized Mr. Meredith as he was walking in the garden of the fort and carried him off. Mr. Richter of Danish Accra, who happened to be staying in the fort, heard the disturbance and ran out, trying to persuade the Winnebas to release their prisoner. But they would scarcely allow him to speak to him, but hurried him on towards the bush and would not even let him hand over his keys to Mr. Richter for fear lest the key of the magazine might be amongst them. After accompanying them for nearly three miles therefore Mr. Richter returned to the fort.

The Winnebas treated Mr. Meredith with the utmost brutality ; for they not only made him walk in the sun without his hat, but even set fire to the grass, and, taking off his boots, compelled him to walk barefooted through the flames. On reaching their destination in the bush, they tied his outstretched arms as tightly as possible to a heavy piece of wood, which passed across and pressed upon his throat, and would have put him in irons also had he not avoided this by promising to pay them two ankers of rum, thirty-two heads of cowries and a hundred hands of tobacco, for which he gave them an order on the fort.

On his return to the fort, Richter sent a letter to Mr. Smith, the Commandant of Tantumkweri, telling him what had happened ; but the Winnebas gained news of this and

1808-1818 kept watch throughout the whole night. Mr. Smith **CHAP. XIV** arrived the next morning, but he had no sooner set foot on the beach than the people seized him also and carried him off to the bush, where they demanded eight ounces of gold before they would let him see Mr. Meredith. This sum was afterwards reduced by one half. He found the prisoner in a most pitiable condition, so worn out by fatigue and the ill-treatment that he had received that he could barely stand. He was quite unable to walk, and had to be carried to the spot where the meeting took place on a man's back. All Mr. Smith's efforts to convince the people of their prisoner's innocence and of the folly and danger to themselves of their unreasonable conduct were of no avail, and they refused to listen to any other terms than the immediate payment of 800 ounces of gold. After a long discussion however, this amount was reduced to 226 ounces, and in view of the urgency of the case, this demand was acceded to and the two officers were brought down to Winneba on the 8th and lodged for the night in a house in the town.

Mr. Meredith's condition was now most critical. His neck was so swollen and his throat had been so injured while he lay tied to the stake that it was only with the greatest difficulty that he could breathe. The Winnebas let the whole day pass without proceeding further with the negotiations for his release ; but in the middle of the night it was seen that he was dying, and Mr. Smith was allowed to fetch Richter from the fort to make some alterations in his will. On the following morning, Sunday the 9th, while Mr. Smith was in the act of delivering the gold and goods that had been agreed upon, word was brought that Mr. Meredith was dying. Just before he expired he called Esilfi, the leader of his tormentors and murderers, and with his last breath, in the presence of Mr. Smith, called the Almighty to witness that he had been unjustly accused and that the money that had been extorted from him had been taken without cause. His body was brought into the fort and buried at four o'clock the same afternoon. Nevertheless the Winnebas claimed and actually received the price of his ransom.

Sergeant Weuvres had been seized at the same time as 1808-1818 Mr. Meredith, and after his release was more than once CHAP. XIV examined by Mr. Smith and by the Governor. He absolutely denied ever having given any of the property to Mr. Meredith, but said that he had been taken to the market-place soon after the Commandant was carried off, where he had found a great crowd assembled, and been told that if he did not say what his captors wanted he would be killed. They had then flogged him so severely and seemed so determined to put their threats into execution that he consented to tell the lie that saved his own life but cost Mr. Meredith his.

The Dutch, chiefly for want of sufficient force, had never taken any steps to avenge the murders of Hogenboom and Vanderpuye; but the general condition of affairs on the Coast had now become so bad that Governor White felt it was imperative to make an example of the Winnebas, and, while avenging the murder of Mr. Meredith, to strike such terror into the people as would check the universal lawlessness that then prevailed. He accordingly wrote to Commodore the Honourable F. P. Irby of H.M.S. *Amelia*, telling him what had happened and asking his assistance. The Commodore put in at Cape Coast on the 28th of June, and taking Mr. Smith, four other officers and twenty-two of the Company's soldiers on board, sailed down to Winneba. There they found the people had kept Mr. Meredith's successor, Mr. James, shut up in the fort for the past three months. The inhabitants had nearly all fled to the bush on the approach of the man-of-war, and the few who were still busy removing their property were not interfered with; but the town itself was destroyed and the fort emptied and blown up, while for several years afterwards it was the practice of all ships passing the place to pour in a broadside as an intimation of the relentless vengeance that would always be exacted for the murder of an European.

This example was very necessary, and had an excellent effect. Had any more of these murders been allowed to pass unnoticed it is impossible to imagine what the con-

1808-1813 dition of affairs would soon have become. Only a few days earlier the Komendas had drawn their knives on the officer in charge of the fort and stoned the garrison ; but the news of the retribution that had overtaken the Winnebas struck such terror into the people along the whole Coast, causing them to fear a withdrawal of the protection afforded by the forts, that this affair was quickly settled and the people were far more careful of their conduct for many years afterwards.

The demolition of the fort was probably the very best and most convincing step that could possibly have been taken. It showed the people to what lengths the English were prepared to go in case of need, and undoubtedly alarmed them far more than the destruction of a dozen of their towns or the execution of any number of their men would ever have done ; for they understood very well that the removal of the protection afforded by the forts would leave them an easy prey to the Ashantis, who would not be slow to avail themselves of so favourable an opportunity to punish a people who had given them so much trouble and offered them so many insults. The African Committee in London, however, were unable to regard the loss of a nearly new fort in this light, and were far from pleased when they heard of it.¹ In fact, they reprobated the measure in the strongest terms, and ordered the Governor to take immediate steps to have the fort rebuilt. This, however, was delayed for some time for want of means, and the people were thus afforded more time in which to learn their much-needed lesson. The Winnebas themselves very soon took the initiative and began to beg that the fort might be rebuilt, promising to give their services as labourers and offering to pay whatever compensation the Governor might think proper in atonement for their offence. By December 1813 they had repaid fifty-seven ounces of the sum they had extorted from Mr. Meredith and had promised to collect the balance shortly.

¹ *Vide* letter from the Committee to the Governor and Council dated 28th of November, 1812 ("Report from the Committee on African Forts," 1817, p. 56).

CHAPTER XV

THE THIRD ASHANTI WAR

1813 TO 1816

ON the death of Atta in 1811, his brother Kwaku Ashanti 1818-1816 succeeded him to the stool of Akim. He soon incurred CHAP. XV the displeasure of his Chiefs by his apathy and failure to carry out the patriotic schemes of his predecessor, and they therefore plotted against him and finally resolved to depose him and put him to death ; but being unwilling to have his blood on their hands, compromised matters by ordering him to commit suicide. After an interval of a week, which he spent in making a great custom for his own funeral, he took his life and was succeeded by Kujo Kuma. The new King was of a much more warlike disposition, and during the next two years he kept his people continually under arms in readiness for another attack by the Ashantis, and finally, when they made no move, joined Kwow Safachi in Akwapim in making a combined attack on the Accras, against whom, as allies of Ashanti, they entertained the bitterest animosity. But although the Accras had been greatly weakened by an epidemic of small-pox that had broken out a year or two before, they succeeded in driving off their enemies after a severe struggle.

Since their last unsuccessful invasion in 1811, the Ashantis had made no attempt to revenge themselves on the rebels ; but in 1814 the King determined once and for all to crush Akim and Akwapim, which had now been in open revolt for as long as three years. The roads to the coast had, of course, been closed during the whole of this time, and the

1818-1816 Ashantis had, consequently, suffered much loss and in-
CHAP. XV convenience from the stoppage of their trade and the difficulty in obtaining powder, salt and other necessaries from the seaboard towns.

A large army of 20,000 men was at once raised and placed under the command of Amankwa Abinowa, who received orders to advance into Akim; while a smaller force, under Appia Dunkwa, was sent in the direction of Winneba to cut off Kujo Kuma if he should attempt to repeat the tactics of Atta and fly to Fanti. It was expected that on the approach of such an overwhelming force and with their previous means of escape cut off, the Akims would immediately sue for peace, in which case Amankwa was instructed to receive their submission and exact a fine and then return to Kumasi. These expectations, however, were never realized, though the Akims retreated before the invaders to within a day's march of Akwapim. Here Kujo Kuma succeeded in cutting off a foraging party of the enemy, killing seven of them, and the next day a general engagement took place at Egwa-arru. After a battle lasting six hours the Ashantis routed the allies and gained a victory, which Amankwa announced by sending a jawbone and a slave to each of the Accra towns. He soon afterwards followed with his army to receive the tribute, now overdue, and the payments on the "Notes" for the forts, which, owing to the recent disturbances and the closure of the paths, the Ashantis had been unable to collect before.

The Ashantis remained in this district for nearly twelve months, causing great discontent among the Accras, who found that their long and faithful allegiance and the many services that they had rendered in the past could avail them nothing now in preventing extortion and privations from the scarcity of provisions. After this long delay, finding there was no likelihood of the submission of the enemy, Amankwa returned to Akwapim, where he received a present of gold and a message from the King forbidding him to return to the capital unless he brought the heads of Kwow Safachi and Kujo Kuma with him.

He therefore returned once more to Accra, where he 1818-1816 deposited the baggage of his army and took a fetish oath CHAP. XV with all his Captains to carry out the orders of their King.

Meanwhile Appia Dunkwa's advance had been opposed by the Fantis, whom he had defeated on several occasions towards the end of 1815. In an action near Ajumaco, the people of that place and the Winnebas were routed with great losses in killed and prisoners. Winneba, which had been rebuilt since 1812, Beraku, and several other towns were plundered and burned. During the operations in Assin, Appia Dunkwa had died and been succeeded in the command by his brother Appia Nanu, with Bakki as second. This general, however, was not sufficiently energetic to satisfy Tutu Kwamina, who, on learning of his indolence and inactivity, sent orders to Amankwa to amalgamate the two armies and take over the supreme command. The junction was effected at Essikuma in February 1816, and the combined force then moved through Ajumaco and marched on Abra, where the Fantis had assembled in great numbers to give them battle ; but on the approach of the Ashantis their valour quickly evaporated and they fled before the enemy arrived, leaving them to encamp on the ground they had so hurriedly vacated. The beach to leeward of Anamabo was now crowded with fugitives, and numbers of men, women and children came flocking in to seek the protection of the forts.

On the 12th of March 1816 the Governor sent two soldiers with a Union Jack and flag of truce to ask Amankwa why he was approaching so near to Cape Coast, and on the 13th the greatest alarm was caused by the arrival of a strong body of Ashantis at the back of Mori. The Moris, together with the inhabitants of the other leeward villages and crowds of people from the bush, poured into Cape Coast in a continuous stream and about 5,000 women and children were admitted to the Castle. Many of the fugitives slept in canoes anchored at a little distance from the shore, but others, wishing to put as many miles as possible between themselves and the Ashantis, would not even stay in Cape Coast, but continued their headlong flight

1818-1816 to westward. On the 14th, at about four o'clock in the CHAP. xv afternoon, the panic of the preceding day was still further increased by the sudden appearance of a detachment of the enemy on the outskirts of Cape Coast itself. About a hundred Assins under Kwesi Amankwa were seen near the lagoon on the western side of the town ; but they seemed to have come only for plunder or to reconnoitre, and were easily driven off.

On the 15th the Governor's messengers returned from the Ashanti camp with the following reply from Amankwa : " That he was determined to pursue Kwow Safachi, Kujo Kuma and Kofi Ashanti to whatever place they might retreat ; in fact, that should they throw themselves into the sea, bury themselves in the earth, or secrete themselves in a rock, he would follow them." They also reported that six Ashanti messengers were then waiting outside the town with a message for the Governor. These men were escorted into Cape Coast and provided with lodgings in the town, where they were seen by two of the officers from the Castle, Messrs. James and Mollan, for the Fantis were too ashamed to let them be admitted to an audience in the Castle—the usual course—because they would have seen the crowds of women and children who had taken refuge there. They were promised that if it lay in the Governor's power to seize Kwow Safachi or Kujo Kuma he would do so in order to restore peace, and would instruct the Commandant of Anamabo Fort to make the people of that place " take fetish " to the same effect, as those of Cape Coast had already done. The messengers then returned to their camp, escorted by two soldiers bearing the Company's flag and a flag of truce and a present from the Governor to Amankwa. On the 21st they returned ; and as the Dutch Governor, General Daendels, had expressed a wish that one of his officers might be present to co-operate with the English in any negotiations for peace, a message was sent to Elmina to notify him of their arrival. On the 28th two Dutch officers, Messrs. van Neck and Huydecoper, came over, and most of the women and children having first been sent out of the Castle,

the Ashanti messengers were received in the Palaver 1818-1816
Hall.

CHAP. XV

After conveying their general's thanks for the presents that had been sent him by the Governor, they explained that he had received strict orders from the King not to molest any of the people living under the protection of the European forts, but having sworn that he would pursue Kwow Safachi, Kujo Kuma and Kofi Ashanti to whatever place they might retreat, he had been compelled to come to Cape Coast in order to ascertain whether these men were in the town. He was now fully satisfied that they were not there, and only required that Kwow Aggri, Paintri and Amissa, three Chiefs who had fought for them and assisted them to escape to leeward, should return with his messengers and help him in his search for them. These men, being in town, were sent for, and said they were quite ready to go with the messengers if they would first swear on the King's head that no harm should befall them. The messengers, however, explained that they could not give such a guarantee because they were not of high enough rank to do so without the consent of Amankwa, and it was therefore arranged that they should return and inform him of what had passed, while the three Chiefs swore that they would not leave the town until his answer was received. A little later, however, the Fantis borrowed a hundred ounces of gold from the Governor, Mr. Hope Smith, which they paid to Amankwa in consideration of his agreeing to waive all claims on Aggri, Paintri and Amissa, and both parties then took a fetish oath to abstain from any further hostilities against each other.

Peace having thus been restored between the Fantis and Ashantis, great numbers of the latter began to arrive in Cape Coast, and for a time trade was very brisk. The people, nevertheless, suffered severely from famine owing to their inability to visit their farms during the war and the consequent failure of the crops. So great was the distress at one time that Mr. Dawson and some other officers subscribed a considerable sum for its relief. Corn was purchased from other parts of the coast and distributed daily

1818-1816 from the Castle, and similar arrangements had to be made
CHAP. XV for the supply of the garrison.

During this war the Elminas had not forgotten their feud with the people of Cape Coast and the Fantis, and had, as on former occasions, ill-treated those who had fled to their town. They had also joined with the Wassaws and Assins in threatening to attack Komenda, but the garrison of the fort was reinforced and they gave up the idea. In June the Ashantis broke up their camp and moved towards Accra in search of the proscribed Chiefs. During their progress through the country they inflicted great misery on the people by their seizures of provisions and other exactions. Near Inkum, Kujo Kuma was surrounded by a small party under Appia Nanu, and finding escape impossible, preferred to commit suicide rather than fall alive into the hands of his enemies. His head was cut off and smoke dried to be sent to Kumasi. Soon afterwards Kwow Safachi, whose people had now grown tired of him, was also killed. He had made good his escape to Akwapim, and was living in hiding in the village of Amanprobi ; but his brother Adu Dunkwa offered to betray him on condition that he was given the stool. Amankwa promptly agreed to these terms and Adu Dunkwa led a party of the Ashantis to Amanprobi, which they surrounded, while he himself went to Kwow Safachi and advised him to commit suicide. Safachi, however, believed that he would soon succeed in wearing out the King's patience and be left in peace, and refused. Adu Dunkwa then turned to go, which was the signal for the waiting Ashantis to shoot the unfortunate Chief down. He struggled to his feet four times, accusing his brother of being his murderer, but was finally killed and his body brought down to Accra. His head was then smoked and sent with that of Kujo Kuma to Kumasi. Kofi Ashanti was not considered of any real importance, and as he had some influence at the Ashanti Court was allowed to escape.

Amankwa had thus achieved the object of the invasion by obtaining the heads of the two chief rebels and compelling Akim and Akwapim to return to their allegiance.

He had also established the King's authority throughout 1813-1816 Fanti, and now returned to Kumasi with the army, leaving CHAP. XV Ashanti residents in the principal towns to preserve order and collect tribute. On the least suspicion of disloyalty these men exacted heavy fines from the Chiefs, and Amori of Anamabo especially suffered in this respect. The Ashantis made some attempt to avenge their former defeat by the Kroboes during the return march, but, as on the previous occasion, the inaccessible nature of their mountain strongholds enabled these people to hold their own and the project was soon abandoned.

It was at about this time that the first real efforts were made by the English to extend their jurisdiction and do something to improve the condition of the people. Hitherto they had seldom ventured to interfere with them, but now we find the Governor sending to demand the release of some Cape Coast canoemen who had been panyarred by the people of Lagu, upon whom, after they had surrendered the men, a fine was inflicted and its payment enforced. In the proceedings of the Council at Cape Coast on the 28th of January 1815, too, it is recorded that a fine of four ounces of gold was imposed on the Chiefs of Anamabo on account of some misconduct towards a trader there, and the Governor banished from Cape Coast a native named Brew who had been detected in intrigues with Ashanti for the continuance of the Slave Trade. Again, when on the death of one of the Cape Coast Chiefs one of the Headmen was accused of witchcraft and sentenced to death by torture, he was rescued by the Governor and sent for safety to Sierra Leone. Every effort was made, too, to check the cruel practice of offering human sacrifices at funeral and other customs. In 1816 a girl was sacrificed at Dixcove on the death of Kujo Tando, the Chief, but Mr. Hutchison interfered in time to save the life of a man who was to have shared her fate; and in April 1817, at Komenda, four persons who were about to be sacrificed at a funeral custom were rescued by the Acting Commandant, Mr. Aitken, in spite of the violent resistance of the people. To such heights had British authority now

1818-1816 grown that ten ounces of gold was actually paid by the
CHAP. XV Komendas as a fine, besides all the expenses that had been
incurred.

At the end of 1815 a school for the education of the children was established at Cape Coast under a head-master specially sent out from England, who was assisted by three or four educated mulattos ; and in March 1817 the Governor reported that there were forty boys in attendance and that this number was daily increasing. There had been a native chaplain in Cape Coast for between fifty and sixty years. He had been educated at Oxford, but being now over eighty years of age and past all duty, he was relieved by an English chaplain sent out by the African Committee in 1816.

The Abolition Act of 1807, though it declared the Slave Trade illegal, had by no means put an end to the traffic ; and great numbers of slaves were still secretly smuggled off the coast, who endured quite as great hardships and sufferings as those who were taken when the trade was recognized. Then the slaves had usually been fairly well treated from interested motives ; but though they were now of greater value than ever, owing to the increased difficulty and risk in obtaining them, they were often half starved and the ships horribly overcrowded in order that the greatest possible profit might be made on the voyage, while small-pox or measles not infrequently broke out with the most terrible results. Yet, though the losses from disease on individual ships were at times appalling, the average mortality in the whole trade was less after the Act was passed than it had ever been before. Formerly it was stated to have been about 14 per cent ; but this was now reduced to 9 per cent, though when dysentery or some other disease broke out the proportion of deaths among individual cargoes would often be as high as 35 or even 50 per cent.

While partly due to increased care of the slaves owing to their enhanced value, this diminution in the death-rate was mainly attributable to other causes. In the old days the slave ships were nearly all slow vessels, and lay

off the coast for several months while they were collecting 1818-1816 their full cargo. During the whole of this time the slaves CHAP. XV that were first purchased were kept closely confined in the vessel's hold, where they were stowed in tiers one above the other, and anything approaching a satisfactory degree of ventilation was hopelessly unattainable. When the trade was declared illegal, on the other hand, faster ships had to be employed to escape the cruisers, and as the models that were best adapted for fast sailing only admitted of one tier of slaves, the air in the holds was very much purer than it had previously been. At the same time, the length of the voyage was shortened and all the slaves were taken on board as soon as the ship arrived on the coast and she left again at once. The loss due to the long confinement of some of the slaves in the vessel's hold was thus obviated ; for they were kept in barracoons on shore and under more or less natural conditions, and there held in readiness for shipment in bulk whenever a slaver put in.

The Commissioners sent out by His Majesty's Government to investigate the condition of the Settlements and Forts on the West Coast of Africa in 1811 reported that the Slave Trade was still being carried on to a vast extent. Before the passing of the Abolition Act this trade had been principally in the hands of the English ; and as America had also passed some stringent laws to the same effect, it had been hoped in both countries that the traffic had received a mortal blow. For the first few months a cessation of the trade did indeed take place ; and though slaves were still brought down to the coast, yet, when it was found that they could not be disposed of, they were either taken back again or retailed locally as domestic slaves, and before long they ceased to arrive altogether. But " the great advantages to be derived from occupying the opening thus left on the Coast of Africa by the retreat of the English were soon perceived by the Americans, particularly those of the Southern States, who, setting the laws of their country at defiance, boldly engaged to an immense extent in this trade, covering their vessels by a

1818-1816 fictitious sale, at the Havannah, Teneriffe, or any other CHAP. XV of the Spanish Colonies, where they were easily furnished with false papers."

But the Americans were not the only culprits. Many English ships also sailed in this way under the Spanish flag, and by the autumn of 1809 the whole coast swarmed with such vessels. Nor were the people themselves less willing than the Americans, Spaniards and others to profit by the renewal of the trade. The King of Ashanti, in consideration of some concessions he made a few years later, specially asked that the trade might be re-established, and the Governor and Council of Cape Coast reported to the African Committee in March 1817 that "it must be seriously impressed that this traffic is the only object of commerce congenial to the natives or to which they are actively disposed ; they will cling to it to the last moment ; they may be deprived of it, but they cannot be diverted from it ; they will quit it but from necessity and make opportunities rather than neglect them. The people of the coast are the brokers of those of the interior, who supply the slaves, and as they are established from necessity as the sole medium betwixt the vessels and the sellers, they have every facility of adding to their regular profit by impositions which can neither be noticed by one party nor detected by the other. This trade is, consequently, beyond all comparison, so indolent and lucrative, that even were there any appeal to their feelings, it would not influence in competition with such inordinate gain ; every other trade requires, comparatively, activity and exertion, and yields very inferior profit ; it is unreasonable, therefore, to expect any conduct on the part of the natives but such as may be auxiliary to the slave traders."

It is not surprising, therefore, that in the face of so much opposition and so many difficulties the British cruisers made but a small impression upon this trade. The slave ships were fast and were seldom overtaken, and there was at first considerable doubt as to the legality of interference with ships nominally of Spanish nationality. The effect of this revival of the Slave Trade was soon visible on the

Gold Coast in the increased number of crimes of violence 1813-1816 and a renewal of panyarring and other practices that had CHAP. XV been almost unheard of for some years.

The effect of the Act on legitimate trade was very noticeable, and though now that the attention of the people had been diverted to general commerce, the exports of other produce from the coast showed a steady increase, yet the imports of European goods were markedly less on account of the lower value of the whole of this new trade as compared with that of the slaves for which these goods had formerly been bartered. The means by which the people had once made great profits was now closed to them, and their purchasing power had suffered. This is clearly shown by the following figures, which are not, however, confined to the Gold Coast alone, but include the other British Settlements on the West Coast of Africa also.

Year.	Exports. ¹	Imports.
1805 . . .	£193,034 . . .	£1,156,555
1806 . . .	£226,396 . . .	£1,655,042
1807 ² . . .	£242,747 . . .	£1,022,745
1808 . . .	£374,306 . . .	£820,194
1809 . . .	£383,926 . . .	£976,872
1810 . . .	£535,577 . . .	£693,911

In connection with the above table it was estimated that the total value of cargoes sent from Africa to England was at least a fifth or a sixth more, for the slavers often combined piracy with their other business and many vessels were lost or captured on the voyage home.

A great deal of the Slave Trade that now existed was carried on from places on the Slave Coast. At Wida especially the people had rehoisted the flags on the abandoned English and other forts as an intimation to passing slavers that they could be supplied there, and the forts themselves were used as barracoons. Slavers trading to these ports had to obtain canoes on the Gold Coast and these

¹ Exclusive of gold.

² Slave Trade abolished 1st of May.

1818-1816 were actually supplied by Governor White for a long time, CHAP. XV until Commodore Irby ordered him to stop the practice. The Dutch were even less particular and openly abetted the slavers by furnishing their ships with water and canoes at Elmina and selling them goods suitable for the trade.

In December 1810 a schooner flying Spanish colours was seen lying off Elmina by H.M.S. *Nemesis* and Captain Ferris ordered an officer to board her and examine her papers. Both the Castle and Fort Conraadsburg opened fire on the man-of-war's boat, and one of her crew was wounded by a volley of musketry from the schooner. The boat, therefore, put back to the ship, and Captain Ferris came to an anchor within range of the Castle and sent his First Lieutenant ashore to demand a perusal of the schooner's papers and the attendance of her Captain on board his ship to answer for his conduct. The papers were produced; but the Dutch Governor represented that as the schooner was under the protection of the guns of his fort, he could not very well hand over her Captain. That night, however, two of the man-of-war's boats cut her out under cover of darkness and took her to Cape Coast, where her Captain was cautioned to be more respectful to His Majesty's ships in future and then discharged. In 1817, too, though the Dutch Government had issued strict orders for the prevention of the Slave Trade, Governor Daendels was still regularly supplying the Portuguese and Spanish slavers with canoes, water and goods, and in February of that year a large Spanish ship lay off Elmina Castle for four days and then sailed down to Apam, where the Dutch Fort Leydsamheid stood, and shipped 400 slaves.

In the absence of the men-of-war it must be admitted that the forts made very little effort to interfere with vessels taking slaves on board, even in their immediate neighbourhood. In March 1810 the *Anna*, a Spanish brig from Havanna, took a cargo of slaves on board at Cape Coast with no other interruption from the Castle than a threat to fire on her. These slaves were supplied by a

mulatto named Howell, who lived within a quarter of a mile of the Castle and consequently under its protection. CHAP. XV
He was a considerable trader in the town, the son of an European officer in the Company's service, and had been educated in England. This brig was captured in May by H.M.S. *Crocodile*. This, however, was no isolated instance of such open defiance of the forts ; for according to Cruikshank, there were not fewer than seven large ships in February 1818 all taking slaves on board close to Cape Coast Castle.

It was probably at about this time that Winneba Fort was rebuilt ; for in the minutes of a meeting of the Committee of the Company of Merchants in London, held on the 19th of May 1815, the following passage occurs : " The Committee understanding, from the information of gentlemen who have received late advices from that part of the Coast, that the natives are very desirous that the Fort should be rebuilt ; and continuing impressed with a sense of the importance of the possession, as well for the reasons above stated, as from the consideration that the station, if abandoned by this Country, may be taken possession of by some other power ;—Resolved unanimously, That the Governor and Council be directed to demand from the natives, a sum of money, in satisfaction of the injury done to the late Mr. Meredith ; and if the same shall be recovered and sufficient security can be obtained for the safety of the persons to be employed in rebuilding the Fort, that the work be proceeded in, provided it shall appear, on an inspection by the Surveyor, that it can be accomplished within a reasonable time, and at an expense not exceeding £1,500 currency, including such articles as it may be necessary to send from this Country, and which the Committee imagine would not exceed £300 currency."

CHAPTER XVI

TREATY WITH ASHANTI

1816 TO 1818

1816-1818 **ON** the conclusion of peace in 1816 the English took into **CHAP. XVI** serious consideration the losses that they had sustained by the interruption of their trade during the recent wars, and contemplated the possibility of still further outbreaks with considerable uneasiness. They felt that, although for the time being everything was quiet, they had absolutely no guarantee that this satisfactory state of affairs would continue, and determined therefore to make an effort to come to some definite understanding with the Court at Kumasi.

At the end of the first invasion in 1807 the King had expressed a wish to keep communication open with the British, and in proof of his sincerity had asked that an officer of the Company might be sent up to reside in the Ashanti capital as British Ambassador or Consul, and had undertaken to guarantee his safety. This request had never been complied with, principally on account of the expense such an arrangement would entail. At the end of the last invasion, however, it became known that the Dutch Governor Daendels had given large presents to the King and was still in communication with him, and a promise of similar presents had then been made by the English. It was, moreover, strongly suspected that the Dutch were trying to come to some understanding with the Ashantis which might eventually prove very detrimental to the interests of the English Company. Representations were therefore made to the African Committee

in London, asking that suitable presents might be sent **1816-1818** out and suggesting the advisability of sending an embassy **CHAP. XVI** to the Ashanti Court to make a treaty with the King for the double purpose of extending their trade and preventing a recurrence of the recent calamities.

The Committee readily fell in with these proposals, and early in 1817 sent out presents for the King and a letter of instructions to the Governor. Public attention in England had recently been turned to the exploration of the interior of Africa, and the acquisition of geographical information was to be an important item in the duties of the mission, second only in fact to the main object of concluding a treaty of peace and commerce with the King. The Committee fully realized the great importance of having a free line of communication and an open trade route between Ashanti and their Settlements, and advised that the King should be induced to keep a road cleared from Kumasi to the River Pra, and that the Company should undertake to continue it to Cape Coast. These, and the establishment of a permanent friendly understanding with the Ashantis, were to be the principal objects of the embassy.

On the arrival of the ship bringing the presents, there was no time to communicate with the King, as the rainy season was nearly due and any further delay would have necessitated the postponement of the departure of the mission for several months; and as this was not considered advisable, it was decided that it should set out immediately. The officers employed were Mr. Frederick James the Commandant of James Fort at Accra, who was in charge, Mr. T. E. Bowdich a nephew of the Governor and a writer in the Company's service, Mr. Hutchison another writer, and Mr. Henry Tedlie one of the assistant surgeons. It was intended, if all went well, that Mr. Hutchison should remain in Kumasi as the first British Resident.

The Ashanti Captain who had been left by Amankwa Abinowa as Resident in Cape Coast provided the party with guides, and they set out on the 22nd of April 1817

1816-1818 with three interpreters, two native soldiers, and a number **CHAP. XVI** of hammock-men and carriers for their own baggage and the presents, which brought their total number up to about 130. As they passed through the country, they were deeply impressed by the widespread scenes of desolation and misery that marked the train of the Ashanti army. On every side they saw farms laid waste and villages burned to the ground, while the few inhabitants who yet remained were gaunt with famine, and for days together they passed through absolutely deserted country. Nothing was left of the once prosperous town of Mansu and its great slave market but the immense clearing and a few scattered sheds. It was not, in fact, until they had crossed the Pra and entered Ashanti territory that they found any populous villages and saw the first signs of prosperity.

After several delays, due to the bad state of the road and the usual troubles with carriers, they entered Kumasi at about two o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of May. Here they were received with every mark of favour by the King and accorded a public reception. A full account of the tedious but rather impressive formalities involved by this is given by Bowdich. The whole of the remainder of that day was taken up with purely ceremonial business and the customary round of visits to the Courts of the various Chiefs and their return visits afterwards ; for this routine is very strictly observed on all state occasions, especially in Ashanti, and it was nearly eight o'clock in the evening before the whole ceremony was over.

The officers of the mission, hitherto acquainted only with the Kings and Chiefs of the coast-line, most of whom are of comparatively little importance, were greatly astonished at the display of wealth and magnificence presented by the Ashanti Court. They estimated that the number of soldiers alone who were present on this occasion could not have been less than about 30,000 ; while the gorgeous silk umbrella canopies of the various Chiefs, the barbarous music, the incessant discharge of musketry, and the ubiquitous abundance of the purest gold, far surpassed anything that they had ever imagined. Bowdich's account

of the splendour of the Ashanti Court in these years of its **1816-1818** prosperity is fully borne out by all who visited it. He **CHAP. XVI** says : " The sun was reflected, with a glare scarcely more supportable than the heat, from the massy gold ornaments, which glistened in every direction. . . . The Caboceers, as did their superior captains and attendants, wore Ashantee cloths, of extravagant price from the costly foreign silks which had been unravelled to weave them, . . . and massy gold necklaces, intricately wrought. . . . Some wore necklaces reaching to the navel entirely of aggy beads ; a band of gold and beads encircled the knee, from which several strings of the same depended ; small circles of gold like guineas, rings, and casts of animals, were strung round their ancles . . . and rude lumps of rock gold¹ hung from their left wrists, which were so heavily laden as to be supported on the head of one of their handsomest boys. Gold and silver pipes and canes dazzled the eye in every direction. Wolves and rams heads as large as life, cast in gold, were suspended from their gold-handled swords, which were held around them in great numbers,"² etc.

The first audience with Osai Tutu Kwamina took place on the morning after their arrival, when the King showed every sign of his readiness and anxiety to come to a good understanding with the English. In fact, the success of the mission seemed fully assured until the subject of the " pay-notes " for the forts was introduced. For more than a century the Kings of Ashanti had received payment for Elmina Castle on the Note that had been captured by Osai Tutu from the Denkeras in 1700, and ever since their conquest of Akim had been paid on the Notes for the English and Dutch forts at Accra and the Danish Castle at Christiansborg also.

The actual Notes for these forts were in Tutu Kwamina's possession. They had always been regarded by their original holders as evidence of the fact that the ground on which the forts stood still belonged to them and was merely leased to the Whites as tenants, and as proofs that the latter had never acquired any permanent right to such

¹ Nuggets.

² Bowdich, pp. 34-35.

1816-1818 lands either by purchase or conquest. Their possession, **CHAP. XVI** therefore, was of great political importance to the King, as showing a recognition of the sovereign rights that he had acquired over the coast districts by his various wars. When Colonel Torrane, however, after the first invasion of Fanti had paid the King the arrears on the Notes for Cape Coast Castle and Anamabo, the actual documents had remained in the hands of the local Chiefs, who had afterwards persuaded Governor Hope Smith to issue fresh Notes in their place, by which the King was to receive four ackies (£1) a month and they retained the balance of the original sum of four ounces (£16). This impudent attempt to defraud him of his rights was discovered or suspected by the King, who now produced these new Notes for four ackies a month, and, after asking for them to be read, vehemently demanded an explanation from Mr. James and flatly accused the Governor of having leagued himself with the Fantis to cheat him of his just dues.

Mr. James was quite taken aback and became so embarrassed and bewildered that he did not know how to reply. A tremendous uproar broke out, the King furiously exclaiming that he was being intentionally made a fool of before the Fantis, and the Chiefs loudly crying for war and swearing that they would march at once to the coast and avenge the insult that had been offered to their ruler. Mr. James was absolutely overawed—in fact, he completely lost his head and made no attempt to offer any explanation, but could only plead his own ignorance of the matter and lay the whole responsibility for this strange transaction on the Governor, saying he would return at once to the coast and inform him of what the King had said. The meeting was on the point of breaking up in disorder, when the exercise of a little tact might have put matters straight and restored harmony. Bowdich, however, seeing the critical position in which matters stood, and realizing that unless something were done the success of the mission was likely to be wrecked at its very outset, sprang forward and demanded to be heard.

He assured Tutu Kwamina that it had never been the 1816-1818 Governor's intention to do anything but gain the friendship CHAP. XVI of the King and settle all disputes between him and the people of Cape Coast ; that this question of the Notes could doubtless be explained, and that so far from leaving with matters in this unsatisfactory state it was his intention to write to the Governor and await his reply. He assured the King of his conviction that the Governor would do what was just and right, and that this difficulty would soon be got over. His manner and evident earnestness impressed the King and his Chiefs as much as or more than his actual words, and order was restored. The King then proceeded to explain his views and his grievance directly to Bowdich, telling him that " what he spoke was good and that he liked his palaver much " ; and gave an outline of the history of his wars with the Fantis, in which he so clearly demonstrated the insults and injuries he had received and the long but unavailing forbearance that he had shown, that he thoroughly convinced his hearers of the justice of his demands.

Messengers left Kumasi on the 29th of May with Mr. James' despatch, a letter from the other officers recounting the whole of the foregoing incidents, and a letter from Tutu Kwamina in which he stated his case very clearly and laid stress on his claims to the Notes. These letters are given in full in Bowdich's work, and that of the King especially is well worth reading.

On the 5th of July the messengers returned with the Governor's answer. Referring to the issue of the new Notes, he wrote to Bowdich : " The King has received a very erroneous impression of the affair of the Fantee Notes, which I regret to hear was the cause of a serious disturbance. I am glad, however, to find that by your prompt mode of conduct you were in some measure able to repress the unfavourable bias it seems to have occasioned, and I have no doubt that an explanation of the circumstance will effectually remove any remaining prejudice. This transaction was entirely between the Ashantee messengers and Fantees, negotiated and determined on by them at

1816-1818 Abrah, and afterwards ratified here by their mutual
CHAP. XVI consent. Hearing that messengers from the King were
 at Abrah, I invited them down, wishing through their
 medium to communicate with him concerning the con-
 veyance of the presents I had received from the Committee.
 After some delay they arrived, and on their first interview
 made known their errand to the Fantees and the manner
 it had been arranged, applying at the same time for two
 Notes to be made out in favour of Zey,¹ at four ackies
 each, which was to be deducted from the Notes of Amooney
 and Aduecoe. Not being perfectly satisfied from the
 representation of these people as to the justness of the
 claim, I delayed complying until it was stated to be a
 pledge of good faith and allegiance on the part of the
 Fantees, and a confirmation of the final adjustment of all
 differences between the two parties, and as such they were
 given them. The nature of the claim having been fully
 and satisfactorily explained, I have no hesitation in com-
 plying with the wishes of the King ; and this I do the
 more readily, knowing that by the extension of his au-
 thority good order and subjection will be better preserved.
 This will, I hope, evince to the King my friendly intention
 towards him ; and you will impress upon his mind that
 it is my earnest desire to cultivate his friendship, the
 establishment of which will be mutually beneficial,"² etc.

Mr. James was recalled and the future conduct of the
 mission entrusted to Bowdich. The Governor also for-
 warded a separate reply to the King's letter, in which he
 once more expressed his regret that any misunderstanding
 should have arisen, and wrote : " I observe, by the many
 instances quoted in your letter, that the Notes of conquered
 countries have been transferred to your ancestors ; there-
 fore it shall be the same on the present occasion. Here-
 with I send you two Notes, one for two oz. per month,
 formerly held by Amooney, also one from the caboceer at
 Abrah for two oz. The latter was only twelve ackies per
 month, and I have added one oz. four to it. These, and
 the Notes you hold from Akra, will make your Company's

¹ Osai (Tutu Kwamina).

² Bowdich, p. 77.

pay six oz. per month, which shall be regularly paid at 1816-1818 the Castle."¹

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How much of this explanation was a statement of fact, and how much of it was of a purely diplomatic nature, it is not easy to determine. The whole transaction was at best an extraordinary one, and viewed in the light of Mr. Hope Smith's subsequent conduct in relation to these very Notes and other matters, and his general treatment of the King at a little later date,² it seems at any rate not impossible that Tutu Kwamina's suspicions may have been only too well founded. Although there is a great wealth of literature dealing with the events of this and the next few years, yet the statements of some of the writers are so contradictory, and there was so much personal animosity between them, that it is far from easy to form any definite opinion as to what actually occurred, and it is more than likely that the true history of this period will never be known with certainty. Pages might easily be written in discussing these questions, but the works of Bowdich, Dupuis, Hutton and others must be read and compared, and the evidence afforded by each carefully analyzed before any opinion can be formed on the subject.

The Governor, in his explanation quoted above, certainly insinuates that he had had no idea of the existence of any such claims as those now advanced by the King until he received his letter; yet such ignorance, if in fact it really existed, would have been very remarkable, considering the precedents there were. Apart from the Elmina Note, there were the Notes for the Accra forts, among which was that for James Fort, and it can hardly have been outside the knowledge of an English Governor that one of the Notes for his Company's forts was held by the King of Ashanti and for what reason. Mr. Hope Smith indeed proves that he was well aware of this fact by writing in his instructions to Mr. James before the mission ever left Cape Coast, " You will acquaint the King it is my wish that in future he receive his Company's pay at this Castle, and not at Akra, as formerly."³ It was only

¹ Bowdich, p. 80, ² *Vide* pp. 301 *et seq.* and 320. ³ Bowdich, p. 12.

1816-1818 a few years, too, since Colonel Torrane had understood CHAP. XVI the matter well enough and paid up all the arrears then due, so that it is fairly clear that this ignorance was only assumed, and if it was not, then it was wholly inexcusable.

Mr. Hope Smith, moreover, asserts in his letter that his object in sending for the Ashanti messengers was to communicate through them "concerning the conveyance of the presents" which had been sent out by the Committee; yet it had been definitely decided long before their arrival on the Coast that these presents were to be taken up by the officers of the mission, so that there was no object in consulting the King about their "conveyance," and unless the Governor meant to imply that he merely wished to notify him that they were coming, this statement will not bear examination at all.

Dupuis gives copies of the revised Notes that were now sent to the King. That for Anamabo Fort reads as follows :

"CAPE COAST CASTLE,
"April 1, 1817.

"Zey Tooto Quamino, King of Ashantee, at 160s. per month.

(Signed) "JOHN HOPE SMITH,
"Governor in Chief. L.S.

"This note was held by Amoney, Cabocean of Annamaboe, but in consequence of the conquest of the Fantee country was claimed and transferred to Zey, King of Ashantee, by the consent of the former owner."

(Here followed a list of the goods supplied in payment.) That for Cape Coast Castle is similar, but the footnote to it says "held by Adooco, Cabocean of Abrah . . . the former owner. The Note of Adooco was only 60s. per month, now increased to 160s., as above. . . . This is the Note of Cape Coast Castle."¹

These Notes are dated the 1st of April 1817; yet they

¹ Dupuis, p. 119.

were clearly not issued until the Governor wrote the 1816-1818 explanatory letters on the 20th and 21st of June. The CHAP. XVI first date, therefore, is presumably that on which the former Notes which formed the grounds of the King's complaint had been written, and was now adhered to so as to make the new issue retrospective. It follows, therefore, that these alleged transactions with the Ashanti messengers and the Fantis from Abra must have taken place only nineteen days before the Governor issued his instructions to Mr. James for the conduct of the mission and three weeks before it actually left Cape Coast, and it is therefore very extraordinary that none of the officers employed on this service should have known anything about any such arrangements, more especially as the Governor himself admits that he was not altogether satisfied with the statements made to him and was well aware that he was so soon to be in direct and reliable communication with the King.

Nor does this alleged act of generosity in raising the rent for the site of Cape Coast Castle from three to eight pounds a month lend itself any better to close scrutiny. It was presumably made with the idea of removing from the King's mind the last traces of suspicion that the Governor had been trying to cheat him ; yet there is evidence which seems to show that this suspicion was not altogether groundless. In a return of stipends paid on these and similar Notes which was laid before the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1816 "Zey Coomah, King of Ashantee" is shown as receiving 160 shillings a month as ground landlord of James Fort, but the payments for Cape Coast Castle and Anamabo Fort are still being made to the local Chiefs. The return itself is undated ; but a number of documents which precede it all bear the date 31 December 1814, and that next following it is an estimate founded on the accounts for that year, so that this is undoubtedly the return for 1814, and was produced before this Committee at least a year before the issue of the Notes now in dispute. In it the King of Anamabo is shown correctly enough as receiving

1816-1818 160 shillings a month, but the payment for Cape Coast
CHAP. XVI Castle appears as follows :

Place where.	Names.	Station or Office.	Monthly Stipend.	Service.
Cape Coast Castle	Ando	Dey of Fetue	120s.	Cape Coast is in the kingdom of Fetue : the Dey has always received ground-rent for the Castle ¹
	Ahenebrah	King of Fetue	40s.	

From this it is evident that 160 shillings was the amount that had always been paid on this Note, and that by no pretence could it have been made 12 ackies (£3), as the Governor now tried to represent. This professed generosity, therefore, had no existence in fact.

On the whole, therefore, although at first sight Mr. Hope Smith's explanation may look plausible enough, it will hardly bear a close scrutiny without leaving at least a very strong suspicion that all that the King alleged was perfectly true, and that his strictures on the Governor's conduct were fully justified.

However, the issue of the new Notes and the Governor's explanation satisfied the King, and another preliminary difficulty was then broached. This was an old-standing quarrel with the Komendas, who were accused of having spoken insultingly of the King and of having committed overt acts of hostility against his allies the Elminas. After the invasion of 1807, the Komendas had threatened the Elminas with punishment for the assistance they had given the Ashantis ; and again, when Elmina was blockaded by the Fantis, they had obtained supplies of powder from them under the pretence that they would help them, and had then seized ninety-eight of them and sold them as slaves. For these wrongs the King now demanded an indemnity of 2,000 ounces of gold, and sent his favourite nephew Adu Bradi, and a Captain named Kwantri to assist the Governor in settling the matter. After some lengthy negotiations, this difficulty was finally disposed

¹ Parliamentary Paper, *Report of Select Committee* (1816), p. 100.

of by the payment of 120 ounces by the Komendas, with 1816-1818 30 ounces more as fees to the messengers. A complaint CHAP. XVI was then brought against the people of Amissa ; but Mr. Bowdich refused to listen to this on the ground that the Governor neither had nor desired any authority over them. The subject was therefore dropped, although Bowdich's statement was quite incorrect ; for in the return already quoted, it is stated of Amissa and some other places that "these are little States on the sea-shore, inhabited chiefly by fishermen, through which towns all communications must necessarily pass ; but being situated at a distance from our Forts, and those people being much addicted to piratical acts, . . . pay has been given to ensure a free communication ; with the additional consideration that they acknowledge allegiance to the English nation. The British flag is hoisted in those towns."¹ If, therefore, the Governor had no authority over these people, it is difficult to imagine who had.

All obstacles had now been cleared away, and a preliminary treaty was made on the 29th of August, by which the King declared his acceptance of the offer of 120 ounces of gold by the Komendas in full settlement of his claim. It was further stipulated² that "the people of Komenda shall acknowledge their fealty to the King, and be entitled to all the benefits of his protection." Adu Bradi and Kwantri, who were still in Cape Coast, were authorized to receive the indemnity from the Komendas, and on the 7th of September the general treaty was signed by the King, and by Buatin the King of Jabin on the following day. The text of this treaty as given by Bowdich³ is as follows :

"TREATY made and entered into by THOMAS EDWARD BOWDICH, Esquire, in the name of the Governor and Council at Cape Coast Castle on the Gold Coast of Africa, and on behalf of the British Government, with SAI TOOTOO QUAMINA, King of Ashantee and its Dependencies, and BOITINNEE QUAMA, King of Dwabin and its Dependencies.

¹ *Vide* note, p. 296. ² Article II.

³ Bowdich, p. 126 ; *vide* also p. 308.

1816-1818 CHAP. XVI " 1st. There shall be perpetual peace and harmony between the British subjects in this country and the subjects of the Kings of Ashantee and Dwabin.

" 2nd. The same shall exist between the subjects of the Kings of Ashantee and Dwabin, and all nations of Africa residing under the protection of the Company's Forts and Settlements on the Gold Coast, and, it is hereby agreed, that there are no palavers now existing, and that neither party has any claim upon the other.

" 3rd. The King of Ashantee guarantees the security of the people of Cape Coast from the hostilities threatened by the people of Elmina.

" 4th. In order to avert the horrors of war, it is agreed that in any case of aggression on the part of the natives under British protection, the Kings shall complain thereof to the Governor-in-Chief to obtain redress, and that they will in no instance resort to hostilities, even against the other towns of the Fantee territory, without endeavouring as much as possible to effect an amicable arrangement, affording the Governor the opportunity of propitiating it, as far as he may with discretion.

" 5th. The King of Ashantee agrees to permit a British officer to reside constantly at his capital, for the purpose of instituting and preserving a regular communication with the Governor-in-Chief at Cape Coast Castle.

" 6th. The Kings of Ashantee and Dwabin pledge themselves to countenance, promote and encourage the trade of their subjects with Cape Coast Castle and its dependencies to the extent of their power.

" 7th. The Governors of the respective Forts shall at all times afford every protection in their power to the persons and property of the people of Ashantee and Dwabin who may resort to the water-side.

" 8th. The Governor-in-Chief reserves to himself the right of punishing any subject of Ashantee or Dwabin guilty of secondary offences, but in case of any crime of magnitude, he will send the offender to the Kings, to be dealt with according to the laws of his country.

" 9th. The Kings agree to commit their children to the

care of the Governor-in-Chief, for education, at Cape Coast 1816-1818 Castle, in full confidence of the good intentions of the CHAP. XVI. British Government and of the benefits to be derived therefrom.

" 10th. The Kings promise to direct diligent inquiries to be made respecting the officers attached to the Mission of Major John Peddie and Captain Thomas Campbell; and to influence and oblige the neighbouring kingdoms and their tributaries, to befriend them as the subjects of the British Government.

" Signed and sealed at Coomassie, this seventh day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventeen.

The mark of SAI TOOTOO QUAMINA X (L.S.)

The mark of BOITINNEE QUAMA X (L.S.)

(Signed) THOMAS EDWARD BOWDICH (L.S.)

In the presence of

(Signed) WILLIAM HUTCHISON, Resident.

(Signed) HENRY TEDLIE, Assistant Surgeon.

The mark of APOKOO X } Deputed from the General
ODUMATA X } Assembly of Caboceers and
NABBRA X } Captains to swear with the
ASHANTEE X } King.

KABRA SAPHOO X } Linguists to the King

QUAMINA SAPHOO X } of Dwabin.

QUASHEE APAINTREE X Accra Linguist.

QUASHEE TOM X } Cape Coast Linguists."

QUAMINA QUATCHEE X }

Unfortunately this treaty, from which the English expected to derive so many advantages, was destined to be broken very soon afterwards, although, as will be seen, it was the English and not the Ashantis who were to blame.

The object of the mission had now been accomplished, and Mr. Hutchison was left in Kumasi as the first British Resident, while the others returned at once to the coast.

Much valuable information concerning the geography of the country had been collected by Bowdich during his

1816-1818 stay in the capital, and others now tried to learn more **CHAP. XVI** about the interior. In this same year the Dutch sent exploring parties for some distance up the Ankobra and Pra under Colonel Straenburg, though this was not the first time these rivers had been ascended ; for the first, at any rate, had been well known to the Portuguese for many miles from its mouth, and the Dutch themselves had sent an expedition up the Pra prior to 1700.

Soon after Bowdich's return to the coast, another war broke out between Ashanti and Jaman. Adinkra, the King of Jaman, made himself a golden stool in imitation of the "Golden Stool" of Ashanti ; and as this was deemed a gross presumption on the part of a tributary Chief, one of the Kumasi Linguists was sent to Bontuku and confiscated it. Soon after this a Jaman criminal was sent to Adinkra by the King ; but he was afraid to punish him, as the King himself had not done so, and let him go. The man then turned round and insulted the Ashanti messengers who had brought him, but Adinkra took no notice. Some of his wives then began to taunt him with his tame submission in the matter of the golden stool and eventually succeeded in goading him into returning an insulting message to the King and throwing some of the Ashanti Residents into some old gold-pits. These acts were reported to Tutu Kwamina, who, after sending to warn him without effect, began to make preparations for war.

It was thought that the King would prefer to carry on this war unobserved and would be unwilling for Mr. Hutchison to witness any reverse his arms might meet with, and the latter was recalled. The King then, in 1818, raised a great army, which he led in person against Adinkra. The Ashantis finally conquered, though not until after a severe and prolonged struggle in which thousands fell on either side and few trophies were secured. Adinkra himself was slain, and Apaw, his heir, captured ; but he, too, was killed soon afterwards while attempting to escape. Adinkra's skull was so shattered that the King caused a duplicate to be cast in gold, which was then preserved as a trophy in place of the damaged original. During the King's

absence from the capital, his sister, who had been left in **1816-1818** charge, and several of his wives were persuaded by the **CHAP. XVI** Chief of Buromi to intrigue with him to seize the kingdom ; but on the return of the army these conspirators were all beheaded, with the exception of the princess, who, being of royal blood, was strangled.

This war naturally stopped the trade with Ashanti, which for a time had been very brisk, more especially while preparations were being made for this campaign ; for the King had strictly observed the sixth article of the treaty and obtained all his supplies from the English. A few traders, however, still reached the coast from time to time, but they had all been sworn to secrecy before they left Kumasi and refused to give any information about the war or what was happening in the interior. This absence of all news and the evident desire of the Ashantis to keep their doings secret soon led to rumours of an Ashanti defeat. The wildest stories were spread about the coast, and though strenuously denied by the Ashanti Resident at Cape Coast and by Governor Oldenburg and the Elmina Chiefs, they coincided so well with the wishes of the Cape Coast people that they rapidly gained ground and of course lost nothing by repetition. It was currently reported and generally believed that the Ashantis had been utterly defeated. Some even went so far as to say that the King himself had been killed and that Adinkra was advancing with a victorious army to crown his success by occupying Kumasi.

Greatly elated by this news of the downfall of their much-dreaded enemy, the Fantis in general and the Cape Coast people in particular openly exulted over the Ashanti Residents, but the Governor never made the least attempt to restrain them. Perhaps he, too, was glad to delude himself with the hope that the power of the nation which had caused so much trouble in the past had at length been broken, and was pleased to see the coast tribes making some attempt to assert their independence. Be this as it may, the Governor's conduct was certainly not in accordance with the spirit of the treaty that had just been made.

1816-1818 The joy of the Cape Coast people, however, was doomed CHAP. XVI to be very short-lived ; for while they were still indulging their fancy with these beliefs and congratulating themselves on the imaginary defeat and death of the King, Ashanti messengers suddenly arrived in the coast towns bearing the jawbones of some of his enemies in token of his victory. Two of these messengers were sent to Komenda, where they were met with defiance and insult ; for the Komendas, relying on the false reports that had been spread about, met the Ashantis outside their town and refused either to let them enter it or even to supply them with a drink of water after their journey—in fact, the men were most disgracefully treated, and even children turned out to hoot at them and pelt them with stones and dirt.

The messengers then came to Cape Coast and laid their complaint before the Governor in accordance with the fourth article of the treaty ; but he declined to interfere, and one of the messengers then set out for Kumasi to tell the King what had happened, while the other, who said he dared not convey such an insult to his master, remained behind in Cape Coast to watch the course of events.

CHAPTER XVII

THE TREATY BROKEN BY THE ENGLISH

1819 TO 1820

IN January 1819 Mr. Joseph Dupuis, formerly His 1819-1820 Majesty's Consul at Mogador, who had just been appointed CHAP. XVII British Consul at Kumasi directly by the Crown, arrived at Cape Coast. He was accompanied by a Mr. Collins as Vice-Consul, and soon after his arrival accepted the offer of Mr. William Hutton, a writer in the Company's service, to go with him also. Both Dupuis and Hutton have left accounts of the events that occurred at this time, and they are also dealt with by Cruikshank and Major Ricketts. Their several accounts, however, differ on some points, and it is very far from easy to decide which is the more correct version. Dupuis and Hutton are both more or less interested parties, and the one point on which there is certainly no room for doubt is that there was from the very first considerable ill-feeling and jealousy between Mr. Dupuis and the Governor, which seems to have gradually degenerated into personal spite and hostility. These facts naturally detract from the value of their writings as evidence; and as neither Cruikshank nor Ricketts were on the coast at the time and give no authority for the statements they make, their accounts are of no greater value.

The appointment of Mr. Dupuis was perhaps unwise, because in the event of any disagreement between him and the local government it would be almost impossible that any benefit could arise from his negotiations. Apart from the fact that this new appointment must have had a

1819-1820 distinct tendency to weaken the Governor's authority in the **CHAP. XVII** eyes of the King of Ashanti, matters were only likely to be still further complicated by the introduction of another official with independent powers, whose views on the politics of the country differed so widely from those of the local authorities. From the very first Mr. Hope Smith was jealous of the appointment of Mr. Dupuis and determined to thwart him—in fact, he put so many obstacles in the way of his going to Kumasi at all, that he succeeded in detaining him in Cape Coast for over twelve months. Dupuis in turn made no secret of his contempt for the Governor and Council, and strenuously denied that they had any right to dictate to him or give him any instructions whatever. He maintained that, as an officer appointed directly by the Crown, he was entirely beyond the control of those whom he contemptuously referred to as "the servants of a mercantile board."¹

Dupuis, however, was in the right, and his view of his position was openly supported by Mr. Swanzy, one of the Members of Council, and receives further confirmation from the terms of his Commission ; " giving and granting unto him, the said Joseph Dupuis, full power and authority, by all lawful ways and means, to aid and protect as well Our said merchants and other Our subjects trading, or that shall trade, or have any commerce with the said Kingdom of Ashantee . . . and also to examine and hear, and as much as in him lies to compose and determine all and all manner of differences, contentions, suits and variances that shall or may happen or arise, or that are now depending at Coomassie aforesaid, or within any of the dominions of the Kingdom of Ashantee as aforesaid, between Our said merchants and subjects, or any of them, and to do and execute, from time to time, all and every other act or acts, thing or things, that may advance and encrease, and be for the benefit of trade and mutual commerce between Our said Kingdoms and the ports in the Kingdom of Ashantee aforesaid. . . . Wherefore We will, and by these presents, do strictly charge and command all and every Our said

¹ Dupuis, p. xxxvii.

merchants and other Our subjects coming into, trading 1819-1820 or residing in the Kingdom of Ashantee aforesaid, or any CHAP. XVII of the dominions thereof, to own and acknowledge the said Joseph Dupuis," etc.¹

Towards the end of March, a sword-bearer named Akra Dehi arrived from the King to lodge a formal complaint with the Governor of the insult that had been offered to his messengers by the Komendas. He intimated that these men had told the King that they had been unable to obtain any redress ; but on the faith of the treaty, which stipulated that in the event of any aggression on the part of the people living under British protection the King was to seek redress from the Governor, he had been sent to ask that justice might be done and thus spare the King the necessity of sending a punitive expedition against the Komendas, which, however, he was prepared to do in the event of the Governor's further refusal. The messenger added that the King had heard of the foolish reports that had been spread by the people of Cape Coast, and hoped the Governor would attend to this matter for him also.

According to Dupuis, it was asserted by many of those who were present at this meeting and understood the language and were not known as supporters of Ashanti, that this moderate and very reasonable message was considerably exaggerated and distorted, and even added to, by de Graft the Castle interpreter, who concluded it by saying that " the King would certainly come down to Cape Coast in forty days and punish those who had abused him." However, as Mr. Hope Smith himself is said to have understood the language, there is no reason why he should have been misled by any such unauthorized additions to the message. The Governor refused to take any action in the matter, and returned the message that the King might come down " in forty days, or in twenty, or as soon as he thought proper." Finding he could obtain no satisfaction, Akra Dehi lingered in Cape Coast for some time, saying he was afraid he would lose his head if he took such a message back to the King, but eventually

¹ Dupuis, p. cxvii, etc.

1819-1820 left for the camp and reported the result of his mission
 CHAP. XVII to Tutu Kwamina. His fears were to a large extent justified ; for the King could not reconcile such conduct with his ideas of British honour and absolutely refused to believe him, ordering him to be tortured and imprisoned to compel him to speak the truth.

Meanwhile the people of Cape Coast were instructed to arm themselves in readiness for the expected attack, and a loop-holed "swish"¹ wall was hastily built round the town, reaching from the sea on one side to the sea again on the other. Great faith was apparently put in this defence, but it would have formed but a trifling obstacle to the advance of an Ashanti army. The Cape Coast Chiefs readily promised to obtain reinforcements from the bush, but their promises remained promises and nothing more ; for every village was either overawed by the fear of subsequent reprisals or in secret league with Ashanti, and wisely declined to implicate itself.

In June another messenger reached Cape Coast. He had been sent merely to inquire whether Akra Dehi had spoken the truth, and was sent back with another message of defiance. He naturally informed the King of the warlike preparations that were being made in Cape Coast and of the wall the people had built, which, of course, made the Ashantis furious, and the Chiefs begged to be allowed to march against the town without further delay. Tutu Kwamina, however, though he would have been fully justified in giving his consent, showed more respect for the treaty than the Governor had done, and said that he could not commence hostilities so long as it remained in his possession. It was therefore sent down by a messenger of high rank, accompanied by a large retinue, who reached Cape Coast in September and was received in the large hall of the Castle.

The Ashanti ambassador then said : "The King, my master, feels very much hurt at the message which was returned to him by the Governor of Cape Coast, importing that he would neither suffer the Komenda people to do

¹ Puddled clay.

him justice for their ill-treatment of his messengers, nor the 1819-1820 natives of Cape Coast, for their conduct in bidding him CHAP. XVII defiance by building up entrenchments, and refusing to settle his palaver with the Komendas, and by their indecent conduct in laughing at what they supposed to be his misfortunes with the Bontukus (Jamans). The King knows they have said there is no King on the stool of Ashanti and that the Bontukus have killed him. But the King is more hurt than all to think that the white men should believe it, and that they should put shame on his face before his own people, and before the Fantis in the Castle hall. The King denies having sent any indecent message to the Governor, and therefore has put his first messenger under arrest ; who, if he has been guilty of any misrepresentation, shall forfeit his head. How could the King wish for war with the white men, whom he considers his friends, and with whom he took fetish ? The King cannot make war with any nation with whom he has made fetish, and therefore sends back your book (the treaty), and desires that it may be read over by the Governor, in order that he may know that he has not been deceived by the white men who visited Ashanti. But if the articles are right, he desires that you will keep your book, that he may make war ' proper.' The King's army is now stationed on the opposite side of the river (River Pra) ; but he will not suffer his troops to cross until he knows your answer; nor will he suffer any more trade, until the palaver is settled. The King says, Take back your book since you have broken it ; for I acknowledge the forts to govern the towns under them, and therefore demanded of you satisfaction for injuries done me by the people of those towns, when it would have been easy for me to have marched an army and obtained satisfaction myself. The King wishes proper respect to be paid by the Ashantis to the white men, but he cannot suffer an indignity to be offered to him without cause, when he wished to cultivate a good understanding with them, and when he thought the book he had signed secured to him their good-will and the friendship of their great King. But the King is afraid he has been

1819-1820 deceived, and therefore desires to know decidedly whether
CHAP. XVII you wish for peace or war. He is ready for either, and will
soon convince his enemies that he is not dead, as the Fantis
say. But if you wish for peace, the King will have ample
satisfaction for those injuries."¹

Here the messenger produced from under the folds of his cloth a small morocco leather case, from which he drew the treaty and passed it to the Governor, who read it aloud. This, the King's copy, subsequently passed into the possession of Mr. Dupuis, who gives its contents. In it no mention is made of the King of Jabin, and consequently few of the articles read the same as in the copy produced by Bowdich on his return to the coast. In the fourth article, too, the words "even against the other towns of the Fantee territory" and "affording the Governor the opportunity of propitiating it, as far as he may with discretion" find no place in the King's copy. The ninth article, again, commences "The King agrees to commit . . . children," which is certainly a very different matter to the "Kings" agreeing "to commit their children." From this it will be seen that, though generally similar, there were very real discrepancies between these two versions of what was ostensibly one and the same treaty.

The account of these events written by Dupuis is not only the fullest, but should naturally be the most accurate and reliable. Its value as evidence, however, is impaired by the jealousy that existed between him and the Governor and by his numerous attacks on Bowdich. Nevertheless, after making all due allowance for partisanship and personal bias, it is impossible to ignore the leading facts given by him and supported by Hutton; and it is absolutely inconceivable that he should have ventured so utterly to misrepresent every transaction or to have written as he did of this treaty, unless there was real foundation for his assertions. Exaggerated, and to some extent distorted by personal feeling, his account may possibly be; but taken as a whole it is probably a very fair representation

¹ Hutton, p. 125.

of the facts. Bowdich's work, it must be confessed by 1819-1820 anyone who has read it, is plainly written in a spirit of CHAP. XVII egotism ; and the differences between the two copies of the treaty certainly go some way towards supporting the contention of Dupuis that the " pompous name of Boitene Quama, King of Dwabin, is nowhere to be found. It would seem that this association of two sovereigns was calculated to awaken a more lively interest, and thus only can I account for an attempt to deceive government and the public, by means, I believe, unprecedented in the annals of British diplomacy. The article, No. 9, showing the King's disposition to send his own children to Cape Coast for education is falsely inserted, and every other article is disfigured or misrepresented more or less."¹ In fact, he describes the version given by Bowdich, as compared with the copy now produced by the King, as a " garbled statement," and this comment appears to be justified.

It is true that the absence of all mention of the King of Jabin in the King's copy is to some extent explained by Bowdich's account of the transaction ;² for he says the King of Ashanti signed the treaty on the 7th of September, and that of Jabin on the 8th. Yet, on the other hand, Tutu Kwamina 'seems to have had no idea that Buatin had been represented as signing as a principal party, but rather as a consenting vassal or witness ; for Jabin now seems to have become a subsidiary principality or province instead of an independent kingdom holding equal rights with Kumasi, as it had been in the days of Osai Tutu. When Dupuis afterwards went to Kumasi and casually expressed a wish to meet the King of Jabin, Tutu Kwamina was most indignant, saying, " The King, who is he ? Am I not the King ? Is there any other King besides me ? Does the book say that too ? If so, it spreads a shameful lie in the white country."³ On the other hand, Bowdich says that a messenger who was sent during his stay in Kumasi to demand gold from Jabin returned without it, and brought back the message that

¹ Dupuis, p. 135.

² Bowdich, p. 124.

³ Dupuis, p. 138.

1819-1820 there was "no war on foot to require gold, and as it could only be for the individual benefit of Ashanti, the government must be reminded that Dwabin had formerly exacted gold, and was not now to be subjected to imposition because the right had been yielded from respect to a sister kingdom."¹

As the Governor read the treaty aloud, it was translated into Ashanti. At the fourth article, and again at the seventh, the messenger demanded satisfaction in the name of his King on the strength of those articles. A scene of great excitement followed. The people, now thoroughly convinced of their folly in having indulged themselves with imaginary pictures of Ashanti misfortunes and in having openly defied the King by building the wall, tried to excuse themselves and lay the whole blame on the Governor; but the messenger would listen to none of the arguments and excuses advanced by Chiefs Aggri and Biney, but adhered rigidly to his original statement of the King's case, saying that his orders were peremptory and his duty imperative, and repeating that he must leave the treaty with the Governor unless justice was done.

Mr. Dupuis, who was present at the meeting, now asked the Governor to inform the messenger of the nature of his appointment and his anxiety to see the King. This was done; and when the envoy heard that an officer had been sent direct from England to the King, he seemed to consider this might be a fact of sufficient importance to warrant a departure from the strict letter of his instructions. He therefore retired to take time for his decision, and finally resolved to send news of this fresh development to the King, while he remained in Cape Coast to await the receipt of further instructions.

Soon after this it became known that a messenger of exceptional rank was on his way to the coast, and on the 15th of January 1820 he made his entry into the town with great pomp and magnificence. This was no less a person than the King's nephew Adum, who was accompanied by Inkansa an Assin Chief, and 500 armed men. His whole retinue numbered about 1,200 persons, half of

¹ Bowdich, p. 245.

whom were Ashantis and Assins, and the remainder natives 1819-1820 of Dunkwa, Mori and Elmina, who had identified their CHAP. XVII interests with those of Ashanti and joined him on the road. At a meeting in the Castle Hall on the 17th of January, Adum, attended by a number of less important messengers, was received by the Governor and Council, with whom were Messrs. Dupuis and Hutton, Captain Kelly, R.N., and the Chiefs and Headmen of Cape Coast.

Adum then made a long speech, recounting from their commencement the causes of the present dispute.

"The King says you (the Governor) sent white men to Kumasi, and they told him it was because the whites wished for peace and a good trade ; on hearing which he rejoiced to think that he should gratify the great King and his Captains. These white men saw the King's face, and they knew he was a good King and wished well to the Governor and white men who lived in the country ; therefore they made a treaty of strict friendship. Then the King sent down all the trade to the Governor, thinking he loved him as a true friend.

"The King was afterwards obliged to make war against Adinkra, who had defied him, and refused to pay him gold as before. He ordered his Captains to bring all the people together, and clean the guns, and when the white man who lived with him heard that he said now I must go back to the water-side ; and the King, considering that to be right, let him go.

"The trade went down as before, and the King was happy because he thought, as the white men were friends, they would not allow the Fantis to do foolish things and shame him before his Captains.

"When the messengers went to Komenda, it was because he loved the people ; he therefore sent a jawbone of Adinkra's Captain, that they might know the King's enemies were dead and rejoice at it. Now the Governor knows that these messengers were robbed and beaten, and the people laughed at the King ; therefore the messengers went to complain to the Governor of Cape Coast, but he would not hear them.

1819-1820 "When the King heard that he was much grieved, and
CHAP. XVII he sent Akra Dehi to make his compliments and tell the Governor to examine that affair, and do what was right. When Akra Dehi returned to the camp and told the King that the Governor did not care for him, and said that he might come down in twenty days, it broke his heart, because it shamed him before his Captains and all the Kings and great Caboceers who fought for him. He could not think the Governor would use him in that manner, because he never sent an offensive message to the Castle. The King then punished the messenger, but the Captains said it was wrong and that the people of Cape Coast were insolent, and they took their swords to march against the Fantis. But the King forbade them, saying he must do what was right according to the book, and he should have satisfaction. Then the King sent more messengers to the Governor, but they tell him the Governor will not give satisfaction according to the book, and the Captains believe that it was true he sent a defiance, saying if the King chose to come and fight he was ready. Then the King called all the Chiefs and the old men together and told them the truth, and they said, 'This dishonours you, King ; we cannot hear this and sit upon our stools, for the people will laugh at you and us ; it is a very bad thing : you must have satisfaction.' Then the King sent down another messenger and gave him the book, that the Governor might see what was true with his own eyes, and say whether he wanted peace or war. But still the Governor refuses satisfaction, and yet he says the book is right.

"The King is sorry for the sake of the old men and women and children, but then he cannot help it, if the Governor will have war ; the King has nothing to do with white men, and if they choose to make palavers with him, it is not his fault. He knows that they come to trade in his country, and they have a great King of their own in the land of the white men. This is all true, but then the King (of Ashanti) is a great King too, for all the black countries, and the people must serve him, and if they will

not serve him, but are foolish and do evil, they must die. **1819-1820**
 Now the Governor knows that Cape Coast is very insolent, **CHAP. XVII**
 and when the King complained to the Castle, the people
 were told to build a wall and fight him. Is that like good
 friends, as the book says ? The other towns of Fanti do
 what is right, and the King has no palaver with them, and
 he is unwilling to make war for one town only. And now
 he sends to the Governor to ask if he will settle that
 palaver or not ; because, otherwise, the army will certainly
 go down and destroy the place ; for it is a great palaver,
 and the King and all his Captains are very angry, because
 they believe that Aggri and de Graft cheat them and tell
 the Governor lies ; therefore the King says they had better
 look to it, and take care what they do, for he is not a King
 to play the fool with.”¹

After some confusion on account of these direct accusations against the Chief of Cape Coast and the Castle interpreter, Adum went on to say that, in consequence of the provocation they had given, he was empowered to demand a fine of 1,600 ounces of gold from the people of Cape Coast, and a similar sum from the Governor as a forfeit for his infraction of the treaty. In the event of these terms not being complied with, he was authorized to say that the King would grant no peace until he had taken the fullest satisfaction.

Inkansa and many other speakers followed Adum, one of whom, Ando, addressed the meeting with great fluency for upwards of two hours. After some deliberation, the Governor asked the Ashantis whether they had ever heard of any instance of the payment of a fine by the Governor of a British fort to the King of Ashanti or any other native ; and having been answered in the negative, replied that he was not going to establish such a precedent now, and intimated that nothing more could be done until this demand had been withdrawn ; but Adum said he could not do this without special authority from the King.

To return to the original cause of all this trouble—the offence of the Komendas—it is asserted by Major Ricketts²

¹ Dupuis, p. xxx.

² Ricketts, p. 4.

1819-1820 that the messengers who took the jawbones to Komenda
CHAP. XVII demanded in the King's name cloth, powder and rum to
the value of 100 ounces of gold, and that it was this demand,
made upon a people who were living in extreme poverty,
that first occasioned their hostility. Upon what authority
Major Ricketts makes this statement he does not say,
and as he was not on the coast at the time he cannot have
been writing from his own knowledge. The fact, moreover,
that no contemporary writer has made any mention of any
such demand, combined with the improbability that, if
made at all, it should have been made before the messengers
entered the town, leaves the authenticity of this assertion
open to very great doubt and makes it appear far more
probable that this was merely an excuse invented by the
Komendas themselves to justify their conduct to Major
Ricketts.

It is hardly likely that the King would have made such
a demand upon the Komendas while sending them jaw-
bones, which, according to native custom, was an act of
courtesy and friendship, and would have been suitably and
sufficiently acknowledged by a return message of thanks
and a small complimentary present. The position of the
Komendas as vassals of the King of Ashanti had been
definitely recognized by the second article of Bowdich's
preliminary treaty, and as such they were peculiarly en-
titled to receive a compliment of this kind. There is no
allegation, even by Ricketts, that any such demands were
made on the inhabitants of the other towns to which
jawbones were sent ; and to believe that they were made
in the case of the Komendas alone, is to believe that the
King deliberately went out of his way to demand what
he knew could not be granted for the sole purpose of
fastening on the refusal as an excuse for war. His subse-
quent long forbearance and the increasing importance
of his messengers during many months of negotiation
sufficiently disprove any such intent ; while everyone of
his messages, the chief of which have purposely been
quoted in full, and the accounts of all those who knew him
personally, point to the conclusion that Tutu Kwamina

was a well-disposed and honourable man who had no wish 1819-1820 to resort to war unnecessarily. It is far more probable CHAP. XVII that the Komendas, who to this day are notorious for their turbulent spirit, were relying on the reports they had heard of the King's defeat and death and took this opportunity of expressing their defiance. It would, therefore, be unfair to accept the unsupported statement of Major Ricketts too readily.

Colonel Ellis, however, seems to have taken this version as correct and repeats it, after which he sums up the Governor's refusal to interfere as follows : " Mr. Hope Smith had not endeavoured to persuade the Komendas to comply with the King's extortionate demand, and for this he has been considered to blame ; but on a more careful consideration of the question it will be seen that he acted wisely. The fourth article of Mr. Bowdich's treaty was framed with the object of settling, if possible, in a peaceable manner, through the mediation of the Governor, any differences that might arise between the Ashantis and the inhabitants of the towns under the guns of the forts ; the presumption, of course, being that the Ashantis should have a *bonâ-fide* cause of complaint. But this case was quite different. The Komendas had committed no offence beyond refusing compliance with an unwarrantable demand that had suddenly been made upon them ; and for the Governor to have used his authority and influence to induce them to submit to it would, besides being a gross injustice, have been highly impolitic, and would only have led to the local government being regarded as responsible for the acceptance and fulfilment by the protected natives of all future demands, however unreasonable, that Ashanti might choose to make upon them." ¹

Now the probabilities are, as has already been shown, that the King never made this demand at all ; but even assuming for the moment that he did, Ellis seems scarcely to have appreciated the position adopted by Tutu Kwamina. The King's complaint against the Governor was not, as Ellis suggests, that he " had not endeavoured to persuade

¹ Ellis, *History of the Gold Coast*, p. 139.

1819-1820 the Komendas to comply," but that he had refused to CHAP. XVII take the trouble to investigate the matter at all or to satisfy himself of its justice or injustice, which, according to the treaty, he was clearly bound to do. Instead of this, he had treated the King's reasonable request with absolute contempt. Had Mr. Hope Smith heard and adjudicated upon the dispute between the first messengers and the Komendas, the King would in all probability have been perfectly satisfied, even had the Governor, after hearing both sides, decided against the Ashantis but shown reasonable and just grounds for so doing. But when instead of doing this he treated their application with contemptuous neglect, and subsequently, when the King asked for an explanation of such conduct, assumed an attitude of defiant obstinacy, he must, in face of the treaty, be held to have given Tutu Kwamina just cause for complaint and for the very low opinion of British honour that he undoubtedly held.

Still assuming that this alleged demand on the Komendas was really made, it is very questionable if they ought not even then to have been held in the wrong. To refuse to comply with an unreasonable and extortionate request and to refer the matter, if necessary, to a third party for arbitration is one thing, but to resort to violence against the messengers, whose persons are held sacred by civilized and uncivilized nations alike, is quite another matter. Were these alleged demands however non-existent, which seems far more probable, the necessity for an immediate investigation of the case was even greater still. How far-reaching in its effects this breach of faith, whether intentional or not, has been, it is impossible to over-estimate. There is no room to doubt that Tutu Kwamina regarded the Governor's action as a deliberate infraction of the terms of the treaty, which he, a savage, held sacred and inviolable. This, too, is the opinion held by the Ashantis to the present day ; and they have more than once, in their dealings with those responsible for the administration of their country, alluded to this instance and charged the British with having broken the first treaty ever made,

and that at the very first opportunity. As Cruikshank 1819-1820 justly observes, "it is humiliating to be compelled to make this admission, and to confess that a King of Ashantee had greater regard for his written engagements than an English governor."¹

At the meeting in the Castle Hall some attempt was made by the Governor to represent the King's action in sending jawbones as a menace and threat instead of a mark of friendship. But if he really believed this to be the case, he showed a most lamentable ignorance of the customs of the country he was supposed to govern; for such missions were by no means peculiar to Ashanti, but were an equally well-recognized custom among the coast tribes also, and as much the practice of the Komendas themselves as of any other people, so that the meaning of these trophies was perfectly understood by them. When Amu Teki of Komenda defeated Teki Ankan in 1699 Bosman says that he "sent a civil Message to our Governor, together with several of the Sculls of his Vanquished Enemies, in Token that he had resolved to live and die in the Service of the Hollanders; his Messenger was civilly received, and after Thanks and Presents to the General dismissed."² Such messages were therefore of a friendly character, and the position assumed by Mr. Hope Smith in attempting to distort them into acts of hostility was untenable.

At this time the Dutch had recently abandoned Fort Creve Cœur at Accra, and the people immediately took advantage of the absence of a garrison to engage extensively in the Slave Trade. Great numbers of slaves were collected and kept in the Dutch town by Chief Ankra, who was the principal broker for the slave dealers, and were shipped whenever a vessel put in. The slavers calling here were mostly Portuguese, and the cargoes were put on board by night to avoid detection and interference by the English and Danes at James Fort and Christiansborg. Ankra's business, however, soon became known; and in August 1819 an English man-of-war arrived and bom-

¹ Cruikshank, vol. i, p. 141.

² Bosman, p. 38.

1819-1820 barded his house, reducing it to ruins and knocking down **CHAP. XVII** the big fetish tree in the town. A few months later, as this trade was still being carried on, a squadron of seven British warships visited Accra and landed a number of marines at James Fort to stamp it out. The Dutch Accras, however, retired to their bush villages, whence they were able to cause much inconvenience to the people of British Accra and the garrison of the fort by cutting off the supply of provisions from the farms, so that all this expedition really accomplished was the demolition of Ankra's house, and the people returned to the town soon after it left.

At about this time a ship which was being chased by the English cruisers put in at Temma and landed a cargo of 160 slaves to avoid being taken with this incriminating evidence on board. The Danish Governor at once sent a detachment from Christiansborg to rescue them; but Ankra had already come down from the bush with his men, and when the Danes arrived on the scene they found only a few men who had been left behind in the hurry of his retreat. Temma was plundered, however, as a punishment to the people for having permitted slave trading within the jurisdiction of the Danish Government.

CHAPTER XVIII

CONSUL DUPUIS' TREATY

1820 TO 1821

AFTER the meeting in the Castle Hall on the 17th of 1820-1821 January, Adum had delivered a separate message to Mr. CHAP. XVIII Dupuis, expressing the King's regret that he should have been delayed so long upon the coast and inviting him to visit him in Kumasi. It was therefore decided to allow him to proceed at once, and the presents that he had brought out with him were now augmented by the Governor by the addition of 100 kegs of gunpowder, 100 muskets, and 100 ankers of rum and some cloths, presumably as a peace offering. Dupuis had received full written instructions from the Home Government before he left England, but the Governor and Council now gave him fresh directions, at which, though possibly intended only for his guidance and advice, he took great offence. He declined to receive them, returning them with a written protest soon after he had set out on his journey to the capital, and when he thought he was beyond the reach of further communications.

After a delay of a few weeks, necessitated by the precarious state of his health, Dupuis left Cape Coast on the 9th of February 1820 and reached Kumasi on the 28th, having found the whole of the Fanti country through which he passed still in much the same condition as Bowdich had described it. He was accorded a ceremonial reception in the market-place, at which Tutu Kwamina received him very well and showed every sign of his readiness to adjust all the existing differences without resorting to war.

1820-1821 At the subsequent meetings the first important matter **CHAP. XVIII** to come under discussion was the old subject of the Notes for the forts which had been the cause of so much trouble on the occasion of Bowdich's visit in 1817. These Notes were now produced by the King, and copies of them are inserted in Dupuis' book.¹ Dupuis was asked to read them, and the King then complained that because he had previously refused to accept four ackies a month and had then gained his point and obtained the whole amount for which the Notes had originally been issued to the Fanti Chiefs, the Governor had since attempted to nullify this advantage by making an extravagant profit and charging exorbitant prices for the goods, often of very inferior quality, that were supplied in payment. This accusation is unfortunately borne out by the Notes themselves, in which the goods supplied and the prices charged for them are all entered. In the Appendix to Hutton's book² there is a price list of the goods that were then stocked at Cape Coast Castle, and a comparison of this with the Notes makes it only too plain that the King's contention that the Governor was still trying to cheat him was justified. Amongst other items he was charged £96 for twenty-four ankers of rum, the true price of which was only £72; for sixty-six lead bars he was debited with £8 5s. instead of £5 10s.; for cotton cloths £6 10s. instead of £4 11s., and the other charges are in proportion. It must be remembered that the payments on these Notes were made on the coast and that the King's own carriers came down to the Castle to receive the goods, so that there can be no question of an extra charge for transport or any other expense to be considered.

At his various interviews with him, the King constantly impressed upon Mr. Dupuis that it was not his wish to go to war, but that he rather desired peace and trade; and though he still insisted that he must have satisfaction from the people of Cape Coast for the insult they had offered him by the erection of the wall round their town and the other warlike preparations they had made, there is

¹ Dupuis, p. 119.

² Hutton, pp. 465 *et seq.*

good reason to believe that had the efforts of the Governor 1820-1821 and Consul been united, every difference might have been CHAP. XVIII adjusted and peace established.

When asked by Dupuis upon what grounds he had felt justified in demanding the payment of a fine by the Governor, the King immediately replied that it was for having broken the treaty, and confidently passed it¹ to him, saying, "Here is the book; you will find the gold mentioned in it." He was much astonished when he was informed that no such clause existed; and both he and his Chiefs, and Kofi, Mr. Dupuis' servant, who had been with Bowdich, asserted that when the treaty was first made and the articles were read over Mr. Bowdich had told the King that if he broke it he must pay gold, and that if the Governor broke it then he would have to pay. It is not at all unlikely that some such statement may have been made in the endeavour to impress upon the Ashantis the importance of adhering strictly to their agreement, and there was plenty of evidence to support the King's word. It is true the boy Kofi would hardly have dared to contradict the King when called upon to confirm his story, but he might have withdrawn his statement when questioned by his master afterwards if he had merely been terrorized into making it at the time. The King, however, gave proof of his anxiety to come to terms by withdrawing this claim upon the Governor altogether, but still adhered to his demand for compensation from the Cape Coast people for having set him at defiance. An offer by the Governor to compromise this claim by the payment of 100 ounces of gold was indignantly rejected, and after some further negotiation a treaty and supplementary treaty were signed on the 23rd of March, the texts of which are as follows.

"TREATY made and entered into by JOSEPH DUPUIS, Esquire, his Britannic Majesty's Consul for the Kingdom of Ashantee in Africa, in the name and on behalf of the British Government, with SAI TOOTOO QUAMINA, King of Ashantee and its dependencies.

¹ It had apparently been taken back by Dupuis.

1820-1821 "1st. The King of Ashantee agrees to receive and acknowledge Joseph Dupuis, Esquire, as his Majesty's Consul at Coomassy, to the full intent and meaning of his commission, and if at any time ill health should oblige the said Joseph Dupuis to leave this country the King will receive and acknowledge any gentleman that he may appoint to succeed him.

"2nd. The King of Ashantee, having taken his sacred oath of allegiance and fidelity to the Crown of Great Britain, in the person of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, makes known to all to whom these presents shall come that he will, with all his power and influence, support, aid, and protect the British interests in this country, and that he will, if necessary, on all occasions march his armies to any part of the country where the interests of Great Britain may require their aid and assistance.

"3rd. The claim recently made by the King of Ashantee, on the Governor of Cape Coast Castle, amounting to one thousand six hundred ounces of gold, or £6,400, is hereby acknowledged to be relinquished; and it is agreed that there are now no differences or palavers existing between the King of Ashantee and the Governor, or between the King and any other of His Britannic Majesty's subjects, collectively or individually.

"4th. The King of Ashantee agrees and binds himself to support and encourage the commerce of this country with Cape Coast and its dependencies by all the means in his power; and pledges himself not to allow any differences that may occur to interrupt the trade with the English merchants on the Coast.

"5th. The King of Ashantee claims the Fantee territory as his dominions, which the Consul, on the part of the British Government, accedes to, in consideration and on the express condition that the King agrees to acknowledge the natives, residing under British protection, entitled to the benefit of British laws, and to be amenable to them only in case of any act of aggression on their part.

"6th. After the final adjustment of the present claims upon the natives of Cape Coast, the King binds himself

to submit all future complaints to the Consul only, and 1820-1821 on no account whatever to make war with the natives, CHAP. XVIII at any of the English Settlements, without first allowing the Consul an opportunity of settling such differences.

“ 7th. The Consul, on the part of the British Government, guarantees all the protection in his power to the subjects of the King of Ashantee who may have any commerce with the British Settlements on the Coast.

“ 8th. The Consul binds himself on the part of the British Government and the Governor and Council, to keep half the path that is at present made between Cape Coast and Ashantee well cleared, and the King of Ashantee agrees to keep the other half of the path constantly in good order, so that there shall always be a free and easy communication with the Ashantee dominions.

“ 9th. It is expressly agreed and understood that the Consul shall at all times be at liberty to visit the capital of Ashantee, and to take his departure therefrom whenever he may think fit, without being subject to any interruption or detention, and that the Consul's residence may either be at Coomassy or at Cape Coast, as he may, from time to time, deem expedient for the public good ; but if at any time during the Consul's absence from Coomassy the King of Ashantee has any complaint or palaver against the natives of the British Settlements, the same is to be submitted to the Consul at Cape Coast, and if it cannot be settled without his presence at Coomassy, it is agreed that the Consul shall immediately proceed to the capital on all such occasions.

“ 10th. The King of Ashantee, having publicly and repeatedly complained of the exorbitant prices charged on the Notes he holds from the forts for the goods he receives in payment of those Notes, and in consequence of the manifest dissatisfaction expressed by the King on this subject in particular, the Consul, in order to obviate any objections to the ratification of the present treaty, concedes this point to the King, agreeing in future to take upon himself the payment of those Notes ; and the King declares he will not from henceforth receive any payment

1820-1821 of those Notes except through the medium of the
CHAP. XVIII Consul.

“11th. The King, on the part of his principal Captains and Counsellors, hereby acknowledges to their having also taken the oath of allegiance and fidelity to the Crown of Great Britain.

“12th. In virtue of this treaty, it is mutually agreed and expressly understood that all former treaties between the King of Ashantee and the authorities of Cape Coast Castle, on the behalf of His Majesty's Government, particularly the treaty of 1817, are from henceforth to become null and void, and are hereby declared so accordingly.

“Given under our Hands and Seals, at the King's Palace, at the capital Coomassy, this 23rd day of March, in the year of our Lord 1820, and in the fifty-ninth year of the Reign of His Majesty George III, etc.

The mark of X SAI TOOTOO QUAMINA.
JOSEPH DUPUIS.

In the presence of

BENJAMIN SALMON.
FRANCIS COLLINS.
DAVID MILL GRAVES.”

“SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLES annexed to the GENERAL TREATY entered into this day between SAI TOOTOO QUAMINA, King of Ashantee, on the one part, and CONSUL DUPUIS on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government on the other part, which articles are hereby considered to be equally binding to the said contracting parties as if they were inserted in the primary or general treaty itself.

“1st. The King of Ashantee having, by force of arms, subdued the kingdom of Gaman or Buntooke, which he now governs in full and undisputed sovereignty, and whereas, from political motives, it has been deemed prudent to station troops in Amanaha, on the banks of the Assinee River, and other parts of the said kingdom, to prevent the inhabitants from trading or holding any communication with the sea coast, the King now pledges himself, in virtue of this article, to remove the before-mentioned obstacles

to the commerce of the kingdom of Buntook or Gaman ; **1820-1821** and he guarantees the same privileges of trade to the **CHAP. XVIII** natives of that country which the Ashantees themselves enjoy, provided their intercourse with the sea coast is confined to Cape Coast Castle, or any other of the British Forts and Settlements on the Gold Coast. In promotion of this object the King has already nearly completed a road forming a direct communication to the heart of the said country of Gaman, and he hereby binds himself to support, aid and encourage the trade of that country.

" 2nd. The King of Ashantee, being decidedly averse to relinquishing his claim on the natives of Cape Coast Town, and in consequence of certain private negotiations which are now pending through the medium of Mr. Smith, the Governor of Cape Coast Castle, on behalf of the parties concerned (and whereas the Consul possesses no authority to guarantee payment to the King of any sum of money on behalf of the natives of Cape Coast beyond the limit of one hundred ounces of gold, which has only tended to excite the King's anger and indignation), as well as for other reasons unnecessary to introduce in this treaty, it is hereby stipulated that the natives of Cape Coast Town, being subjects of the King of Ashantee, are excluded from participating in the benefits of either of the treaties, as the King is resolved to eradicate from his dominions the seeds of disobedience and insubordination ; nevertheless, in consideration of the friendship existing between him and the King of England, and as the King of Ashantee is particularly anxious to convince the world of the sincerity of his regard for the honour and dignity, as well as the interests of the British Government and people, he will endeavour, as much as possible, to avoid giving offence either to the Consul or to the authorities of Cape Coast Castle, directly or indirectly, and, therefore, whatever plans the King of Ashantee may think it advisable to adopt, in order to bring his people under due subjection, he binds himself not to destroy the town of Cape Coast, nor will he allow a gun to be fired in the town, or suffer his troops to commit any act of hostility or depredation

1820-1821 therein on the inhabitants or on their property ; and in **CHAP. XVIII** particular, as regards the white part of the population, to say all the free merchants and traders, he guarantees to them not only full security of person and property, but also full protection in case of need. Moreover, the King will not suffer his difference with the Cape Coast people to interfere with his plans for the promotion and extension of the commerce between the interior and the British Settlements on the sea coast, which he promises shall be immediately restored.

" 3rd. (Not granted. Referred to the establishment of schools at Dunkwa.)

" 4th. The King of Ashantee pledges himself for the security and protection in person and property to missionaries or others, being subjects of His Britannic Majesty, who may wish to establish themselves in any part of his territory for the purpose of propagating the Christian religion ; and the King hereby cordially invites to his country such well-disposed men.

" Given under our Hands and Seals at the King's Palace, at the capital of Ashantee, this 23rd day of March, in the year of our Lord 1820, and in the fifty-ninth year of the Reign of His Majesty George III, etc.

The mark of X SAI TOOTOO QUAMINA.
JOSEPH DUPUIS.

In the presence of

BENJAMIN SALMON.

FRANCIS COLLINS.

DAVID MILL GRAVES."

Dupuis left Kumasi the next morning with the treaty, and the King sent special messengers with him, who were deputed to go to England with a number of valuable presents for King George III. But when they reached Cape Coast on the 5th of April, the Governor and Council declined to ratify the treaty, mainly on account of the stipulations concerning the people of Cape Coast ; nor would the Commodore, Sir George Collier, give the Ashanti ambassadors a passage with the Consul. This hostility

was even carried so far that Adum himself was refused admission to the Castle by the Governor's orders. 1820-1821
CHAP. XVIII

It is difficult to understand on what grounds the Governor and Council felt competent to repudiate this treaty. Dupuis himself explains their action by saying that they were men "predetermined, from interests of their own, to thwart every plan which did not originate with themselves."¹ The treaty should properly have been dealt with by the authorities in England, for Dupuis had been appointed directly by the Crown and had been sent out with the fullest powers, whereas Smith was the servant of a trading company, and though entrusted to some extent with the management of local affairs and styled Governor, was in reality little more than the manager of a store, or, at most, the chief local agent of an English firm. Certainly it was not to him that an officer specially appointed by the King was to answer for what he did.

It is equally impossible to justify the Governor's refusal to recognize the King's sovereignty over Fanti, including Cape Coast. The mere fact that payments had been made to the King on the Notes was in itself sufficient evidence that the subjugation of their original holders was admitted, and most of the Fantis themselves acknowledged it. There could be no disputing the fact that the King had conquered the country, and if conquest was not to confer the right of sovereignty and possession it is only necessary to point out that these rights have since been claimed and exercised on similar grounds by the English over Ashanti.

Sir George Collier based his refusal on an Admiralty order forbidding naval officers to carry any natives away from the country. This was evidently an order issued at the time of the abolition of the Slave Trade, and it must have required some stretch of the imagination to apply the term "carry away" in the sense in which it was undoubtedly used, to the conveyance of willing and even anxious passengers. Dupuis did all he could to induce the Commodore to reconsider his decision, but without avail. Among other letters he wrote, "The King of

¹ Dupuis, p. 188.

1820-1821 Ashantee is so perfectly disposed to co-operate in all things
CHAP. XVIII for the mercantile interests of Great Britain, that if the present opportunity is allowed to pass, it may be the means of crushing at a single blow all future advancement towards commerce, or the cultivation and civilization of this part of Africa."¹ No one can say what might have been the result if a different course of action had been followed at this time, but in the light of subsequent history these words certainly appear prophetic.

So far from any good arising from Dupuis' mission, therefore, matters had only been still further complicated ; for naturally the King was furious when he heard of the rejection of the treaty and the contemptuous treatment of his messengers to the King of England. The people of Cape Coast, moreover, became more openly aggressive, and on the 7th of April it was decided still further to increase the defences of the town by the erection of a small fort on a hill that overlooked it at a short distance from the Castle. This fort was hastily completed and mounted with guns landed from H.M.S. *Tartar*. It was then known as Smith's Tower, but is now called Fort William and is used as a lighthouse and signal station. After some further bickering with the Governor and Council, Dupuis finally left the Coast on the 15th of April, promising the Ashanti messengers that he would do what he could for them on his arrival in England.

The sum demanded from the people of Cape Coast was paid ; but they had to borrow £800 from the Government to make up the amount, for half of which they deposited 100 ounces of gold ornaments in pawn and signed a bond agreeing to clear all the land around Cape Coast and do other work for the remainder. It is a pity, however, that it was not decided to pay it a little sooner. The stipulations about Cape Coast might then have been excluded from the treaty, which in other respects was as satisfactory a document as could reasonably be desired.

Affairs were now in a most unsettled state. The King's position was that he had made a new treaty with Mr.

¹ Dupuis, p. 189.

Dupuis, by which that of 1817, with which he was now 1820-1821 thoroughly dissatisfied, was cancelled, and that the CHAP. XVIII Governor had broken it and the people of Cape Coast were still increasing their defences and openly preparing for war ; while the Governor apparently adopted the view that, as he had declined to ratify the new treaty, the former one must still be in force even though the King had repudiated it.

When Dupuis left the coast he had sent word to the King that he would lay the whole case before the Home Government and asked him to await his report. This, in spite of his annoyance and the undoubted provocation that he had received, the King did. For ten months he made no move ; but Adum was recalled from Cape Coast and ordered to form a camp with his men a short distance inland. This camp was established at Mansu. Throughout this time the King observed the conditions of the new treaty ; but when ten months had passed and he received no word from Mr. Dupuis, Ashanti traders gradually ceased to visit the British Settlements and resorted instead to those of the Dutch and Danes. The English themselves, therefore, by their conduct of this affair, laid the foundation of the trade of which the Dutch held a practical monopoly for very many years.

These events clearly show that, in spite of previous misunderstandings, it was not yet too late to effect a definite agreement with Ashanti. Had a wiser and more temperate policy been adopted at this time ; had Mr. Dupuis been fairly treated and supported by the local government, instead of being thwarted and obstructed at every turn ; had the control of Gold Coast affairs been in any other hands than those of a few traders whose principal object was their own enrichment ; or had they been able to take an impartial view of the situation, instead of accepting it as an axiom that because a request or a suggestion for an agreement emanated from a King of Ashanti it must necessarily be extortionate and unjust ; had any or all of these things been ; a definite and lasting understanding with Ashanti might have been come to,

1820-1821 and much subsequent trouble, expense and loss of life **CHAP. XVIII** have been saved ; and possibly the later history of the Gold Coast would never have been marred by the continual disagreements and wars with that kingdom that ultimately led to its overthrow.

In the meantime a Fanti Chief named Paintri, whom the Ashantis had placed on the stool of Abra as a reward for former services, had attacked an outlying village of Cape Coast belonging to a man named Tando and carried off several of the inhabitants. Soon afterwards, the leader of this raid came to Cape Coast, where he was recognized by Tando, who inveigled him and his followers into a house in the town and blew both them and himself up with gunpowder. This affair reached the ears of the King, who at once sent instructions to Adum to hold an inquiry and impose a fine of 100 peredwins (about £1,000) on whichever party he found to be in the wrong. Adum accordingly summoned Paintri to appear before him and the Chief came down to Mori. While he was there, a former slave of his, a native of Cape Coast named Kwamin Teti, who had run away to one of the soldiers in the Castle and subsequently quarrelled with his protector, was, for a consideration, handed back to him by the soldier. The unfortunate man was sent gagged and bound by canoe to Mori, where he was barbarously put to death by Paintri on the 10th of February 1821. When news of this outrage reached Cape Coast, the greatest excitement prevailed in the town and Mr. Colliver was immediately sent from the Castle with four officers and eighty-five men of the garrison to arrest the murderer.

On reaching Mori, they found the mangled body of the victim, but were at once opposed by a force of 2,000 or 3,000 men, principally Moris, who opened fire on them. The party from Cape Coast returned their fire and, having driven them back, occupied the deserted Dutch Fort Nassau. Adum now sent some Ashantis to the assistance of his allies, who rallied the Moris and prepared to waylay the English and oppose their return to Cape Coast. Their preparations, however, were seen from the Castle, and the

Governor at once mustered all his available men and 1820-1821 sent them with several officers and a contingent of about CHAP. XVIII 5,000 Cape Coast people to the assistance of Mr. Colliver's party. On the approach of this force the enemy retired. The whole affair resulted in the loss of one man killed and four wounded on the English side, and forty-seven killed and about a hundred wounded among the Moris. Paintri himself was among the slain, and his body was brought back to Cape Coast and buried just outside the Castle ; but his people soon afterwards obtained permission to remove it to their own country.

Adum, from his camp at Mansu, maintained a strict blockade of Cape Coast, which now had to depend entirely on sea transport for its supplies, and all trade of course ceased. Soon afterwards, messengers arrived from Kumasi to ask for an explanation of this affair and the death of Paintri. This was given, and further messengers were then sent down to say that the King was perfectly satisfied and had dropped the matter altogether and given orders that the trade with Cape Coast might be resumed.

This action on the part of Tutu Kwamina can only be construed as additional proof of his intention to abide by the terms of the treaty he had made, and of the sincerity of his repeated statement that he was not seeking a pretext for war. Indeed, if the Governor really thought he was, it is very strange that he should have deprived the Castle and town of practically the whole of their garrison while a large party of Ashantis was encamped in the immediate neighbourhood.

In 1821, as a result of the report of the Commissioners appointed by the House of Commons in 1816, a Bill¹ was passed abolishing the African Company of Merchants and transferring all its Possessions on the Gold Coast to the Crown to be placed under the Government of Sierra Leone. The main reasons for this step were the inefficient manner in which the prevention of the slave trade was carried out and the belief that the grants voted by Parliament were not spent to the best advantage, but

¹ Act of the 1st and 2nd George IV, c. 28.

1820-1821 rather with a view to keeping the trade in the hands of a few local agents. Dupuis' report too, probably went far to determine this measure.

The principal officers of the Company of Merchants were the Governor-in-Chief, and the seven Commandants of out-stations who were known as the Governors of their respective forts. The Governors of Anamabo, Tantumkweri, James Fort, Komenda and Winneba, and the Accountant, were Members of Council, and officers were definitely appointed to their several stations and promoted to the senior ones as vacancies arose, so that under the Company's administration a continuity of policy was assured. Besides these principal officers, there were the secretaries, chaplain, officers of the guard, factors, surveyors, writers, schoolmaster, etc. Ivory and gold were almost invariably shipped to England by men-of-war, and ordinary trade goods were frequently imported in the same way. All the Company's officers, with the exception of the Governor-in-Chief, were allowed to trade on their own account and received their salaries in trade goods instead of cash. The following table shows the chief forts that were now handed over to the Crown and the armaments of each :

Port.		Guns (pounders).										Mortars (inches)	
		42	24	18	12	9	6	4	3	2	1	33	7
Cape Coast													
Castle	Mounted	6	9	2	11	18	5	—	26	—	—	—	I
Anamabo	Mounted	—	7	5	4	—	5	—	14	—	—	—	—
	Unmounted	—	1	3	3	—	7	—	—	—	—	—	—
James Fort	Mounted	—	—	3	2	9	—	—	—	5	—	—	—
	Unmounted	—	2	4	3	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—
Tantumkweri	Mounted	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	14	—	—	—	—
Apollonia	Mounted	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	12	—	—	—
Dixcove	Mounted	—	—	—	—	—	15	—	13	1	—	—	—
	Unmounted	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Komenda	Mounted	—	—	2	—	—	4	7	—	—	—	—	—
	Unmounted ¹	—	—	—	17	5	3	7	—	—	—	—	—

¹ Most of these were taken from the Dutch Fort Vredenburg.

Besides these the Company had their new fort at Winneba **1820-1821** and small stations at Prampram, Sekondi and elsewhere. **CHAP. XVIII**
At Prampram Fort Vernon had been destroyed many years before by the Danes, and the officers at Sekondi occupied a large house in the town as the fort had never been rebuilt after the Dutch destroyed it in 1698. The total number of Europeans in the Company's service was forty-five and of Blacks about four hundred and fifty.


CHAPTER XIX

THE OUTBREAK OF THE FOURTH ASHANTI WAR

1822 TO 1824

1822-1824 **SIR CHARLES M'CARTHY**, the Governor of Sierra Leone, under whom the British Possessions on the Gold Coast were now placed, arrived at Dixcove on board H.M.S. *Iphigenia*, Commodore Sir Robert Mends, on the 27th of March 1822 ; and having been ashore there to explain the change to the inhabitants, re-embarked and reached Cape Coast the next day to assume the Government. He was accorded a most enthusiastic welcome by the people ; and on the 29th the new Charter and Proclamation were read, the ships were decorated with flags, and a royal salute was fired from the Castle. The transfer having been quietly effected, the Governor re-embarked on the 30th to visit Anamabo and Accra, and then returned to Cape Coast at the end of the second week in April.

The difficulties with which Sir Charles had to contend were very great, and can hardly be over-rated. He was a complete stranger to the country, knowing nothing of the people or their customs and character, and the officers of the old Company of Merchants, many of whom could have given him valuable information and advice, were so jealous of the transfer of power that they refused almost to a man to serve under him or to take any part whatever in public affairs. The Governor was thus left to grope in the dark, with no one who was really competent to do so to assist or advise him. Before he left England he had seen Dupuis, who gave him all the information he could and has left it on record that Sir Charles then seemed fully impressed with the importance of coming to a friendly



understanding with Ashanti ; but after his arrival on the 1822-1824 Coast, where he heard nothing but the one-sided version of recent events given by interested natives and others, he seems to have been too easily persuaded that the Fantis were a grievously oppressed race who had been most unjustly menaced and ground down by the Ashantis, and that the only possible way of relieving them from this tyranny was by means of the sword. He had now forgotten all that Dupuis had told him, or had allowed his judgment to be overruled by the tales he had heard and by the officials of the old Company, any one of whom would have been only too ready to ridicule any statement made by the former Consul, and the other side of the case, upon which it must be admitted there was a great deal to be said, was never again properly laid before him. Moreover, though it is true that after his arrival a few persons warned him that the Ashantis were not foes to be despised, he never seems to have had any real conception of the extent of their military organization and resources.

Sir Charles M'Carthy's measures, therefore, were all directed to crush the power of Ashanti. His first step was to reorganize the old garrisons of the Company of Merchants into a new corps consisting of three companies and called the Royal African Colonial Corps of Light Infantry. The people were also assisted to combine their forces with some show of method and provided with munitions of war, and a native militia¹ was enrolled. A "swish" redoubt or fort was also raised on the summit of a hill—still known as M'Carthy's Hill—on the eastern side of Cape Coast town and called Fort M'Carthy. The Governor recommended that only Cape Coast Castle and the forts at Accra, Anamabo and Dixcove should be retained, for most of the others were in a dilapidated condition and it was not thought worth while to incur the expense of their repair. In 1823 Parliament granted £17,800 for the Civil Establishment on the Gold Coast and separate provision was made for the Military.

¹ The Royal Cape Coast Militia and the Royal Cape Coast Volunteer Corps.

1822-1824 The Governor, believing that he had now done all that
CHAP. XIX was possible to improve the defences of Cape Coast, re-
turned to Sierra Leone during the second week in May, leaving Major Chisholm in charge of the Gold Coast, with Captain Laing¹ of the 2nd West India Regiment to complete the organization of the new forces. Unaided as he was by those in whose power it lay to assist him, it never seems to have occurred to Sir Charles that there might be more than one reason for the silence of the Ashanti King, and that the cause to which he himself attributed it, namely fear, was the least likely of any to be the true one. The few Ashantis who still came down to the coast had all been sworn to silence before they left Kumasi and consequently no information was obtainable as to what was taking place in the interior. It was therefore quite possible that the King might be engaged for the time being with some other war inland. The Governor moreover knew nothing of the amount of preparation necessary and the length of time required for the propitiation of the gods by various ceremonies before the Ashantis ever engaged in a war of any magnitude, but which would alone have been sufficient to account for a few months of apparent inactivity.

The King, however, was anxious to avoid the necessity for going to war at all, and hoped that, now that Mr. Smith had gone, he might at last be able to settle the differences between himself and Cape Coast peaceably. He was in fact waiting to see what this change of Governors would bring forth. Had negotiations been reopened at this time, the King, now that his old enemy Smith was no longer in office, would have been found ready to listen to reason. But unfortunately, Sir Charles felt so convinced of the uselessness of such a course that he never attempted it, and did not even send the customary formal message notifying the King of the change in the Government and his own assumption of power. He therefore not only

¹ The same who had already opened up a road to Falaba. He was afterwards sent out by the African Association and was the first European to visit Timbuktu, where he was murdered by the Tuareks.

remained in ignorance of the King's sentiments, but also 1822-1824 deprived himself of all opportunity of hearing what there CHAP. XIX was to be said on the other side of the case and weighing the arguments for and against the justice of the Ashanti claims.

Tutu Kwamina, therefore, conceiving himself to have been deeply wronged and insulted, and believing that the English had broken faith with him over the treaties, after patiently waiting for ten months for further news from Mr. Dupuis and renewing the trade with Cape Coast, now found the new Governor showing every sign of a determination to continue the policy of his predecessor by treating him and his claims with contempt and encouraging the people of Cape Coast in their rebellion against him by the enrolment of an army and a further increase in the defences. Sir Charles M'Carthy was so severely handicapped and was so obviously contending against great difficulties for what he honestly believed was right and just, that he scarcely ought to be blamed for the opinions he formed and the action he took ; but this is unfortunately only one of several instances, some of great and others of minor importance, in which ignorance of the history or customs of the people has led to most regrettable and even disastrous results.

In May 1822 an Ashanti trader who had come down to the coast quarrelled with a mulatto sergeant named Kujo Otetefo at Anamabo. The sergeant lost his temper and grossly abused the King of Ashanti, and it was this insignificant event that provided the spark that was soon to set the whole country in a blaze of war. Tutu Kwamina must by this time have become convinced that war was inevitable, and that it would be vain for him to temporize and oppose the wishes of his Chiefs any longer. It is possible, therefore, that he may have seized on this pretext for commencing hostilities ; but at the same time it must not be forgotten that the offence of the sergeant was, according to Ashanti law, an extremely serious one and punishable by death. The King, therefore, knowing full well that it would be useless to make his complaint and

1822-1824 ask for redress under Article IV of Bowdich's treaty, and **CHAP. XIX** feeling that if he persisted much longer in opposing the wishes of his Chiefs and ignoring the continued insults of the Fantis his own position on the stool might be endangered, may have felt constrained to deal with the matter himself, without having any motive beyond the actual punishment of the offender. According to one account, indeed, the King was so loath to give the British Government any cause of offence that he pardoned the sergeant after his arrest, and it was his Chiefs who then took the matter up and issued orders for his execution. There is at any rate no clear evidence that the King himself was directly responsible for the man's death.

Be this as it may, in the following November the sergeant was seized between Anamabo and Egya and taken to Dunkwa, a village about fifteen miles inland. There he was put "in log," that is, secured to a heavy piece of wood by means of an iron staple over the wrist or ankle, the usual native method of securing a prisoner. The Dunkwas, who were on friendly terms with the Ashantis, were probably only too glad to have an opportunity of gratifying their revenge on a soldier for the death of their Chief Paintri, who had been killed in the skirmish at Mori.

The news of this hostile act quickly brought Sir Charles M'Carthy back from Sierra Leone. He landed at Cape Coast in December and at once went over to Anamabo to investigate on the spot the circumstances in which the sergeant had been seized. His journey was a triumphal progress. The Anamabos and people of the other villages through which he passed hailed him with enthusiasm, while, on his return to Cape Coast on the 10th, he was accorded a perfect ovation and the streets and hills were thronged by crowds of Fantis who showed every sign of delight and vied with one another in cheering, firing guns, drumming and blowing horns to do honour to him whom they now regarded as their deliverer. The people of Cape Coast, indeed, had every reason to rejoice at the attitude adopted by the Governor; for they were in a serious predicament. Cut off as they were from their neighbours, and the objects

of Ashanti wrath, nothing could now have saved them 1822-1824 from destruction, and even complete extermination, had CHAP. XIX the English declined to interest themselves on their behalf and undertake their salvation.

Captain Laing now volunteered to go to Dunkwa or even to Kumasi to negotiate for the release of the sergeant, but his offer was declined ; though it is quite possible that, had such negotiations been permitted, war might even yet have been averted. On the 2nd of February 1823, news was brought to Cape Coast that the sergeant had paid the penalty of his treasonable utterances with his head. A nephew of the King had arrived at Dunkwa with one of the state executioners and 200 or 300 men a few days before and put him to death, taking his skull, jawbone, and one of his arms to be shown on his return to Kumasi.

On the 21st it was reported in Cape Coast that Aduku the King of Mankesim and his people had left Dunkwa, where the Ashantis concerned in the execution of the sergeant were thus left practically alone. Sir Charles therefore determined to secure them. The regulars and Cape Coast Militia were quietly called into the Castle at six o'clock that evening, ammunition was served out, and the party marched before seven. Dunkwa is only about twenty miles from Cape Coast and they should have reached it long before daybreak and have been able to surprise and capture the Ashantis without trouble ; but, whether from wilful treachery and fear of the enemy, or through carelessness or ignorance only, Sam Brew, who was acting as guide, took the wrong road and the troops never reached Dunkwa at all ; but after suffering greatly from fatigue and hunger, were suddenly ambushed long after sunrise on a narrow path in dense bush near Tuanko. The Ashantis, who had a strong party of Fantis with them, opened a heavy fire ; and though the advance guard of men of the 2nd West India Regiment under Captain Laing and Ensign Wetherell returned it and pushed steadily forward, they soon found they were only going farther from their destination and could not possibly accomplish

1822-1824 the purpose for which they had been sent out. They **CHAP. XIX** therefore fell back on Anamabo. The losses of the English in this affair were six men killed, four missing, and Lieutenant Swanzy of the Royal African Colonial Corps and thirty-eight men wounded. But though the expedition had failed in its object, it had the effect of convincing the people once and for all that the Governor was thoroughly in earnest and would not shrink from any means he might think necessary to gain his ends ; for an expedition of this nature was quite a new departure, and no British force had ever before left the Settlements to assume the offensive against an enemy in the bush.

According to Cruikshank's account, Tutu Kwamina now made a last effort for the preservation of peace by sending an offer of negotiation for the settlement of all differences through the Dutch Governor, but it was contemptuously rejected. Although this statement is not supported by other writers, it is quite possibly true ; for when Cruikshank was writing his book he had access to the old records of Cape Coast Castle, now long since lost, and the historical portions of his work were largely founded on them. Possibly therefore he had seen a letter from the Dutch Governor in reference to this matter. Moreover, this statement receives some support from an Accra tradition given by Reindorf, which alleges that the skull of the Anamabo sergeant was sent down by one of the Ashanti princes—Owusu Pera—and other important messengers to Accra with proposals for peace, and that these were rejected and the messengers ordered by Mr. Blenkerne the Commandant of James Fort to return.

The Accras were still friendly with Ashanti and a steady trade in powder, salt and other articles was being carried on there, not only with the Ashantis themselves, but also with a number of Fanti smugglers who were supplying them with ammunition. Sir Charles therefore determined to try to wean these people from their allegiance. He left Cape Coast on board H.M.S. *Glendower* on the 14th of April and landed at Accra on Wednesday the 16th, when he was accorded an enthusiastic welcome by the people

and, with the help of the Danish Governor, persuaded them 1822-1824 to join the other English allies. This task was rendered CHAP. XIX all the easier by the vivid recollections the people had of the extortions and privations they had endured when Amankwa Abinowa's army had been encamped in their country in 1814. The Governor then enrolled a local Militia and returned to Cape Coast on the 8th of May.

It was not long before the Accras were afforded an opportunity of proving the sincerity of their promises, for Sir Charles had barely left the town when some Ashantis arrived at Christiansborg to purchase powder and were promptly attacked and dispersed by a company of the new Militia and a detachment of the garrison of James Fort. A few days later a second party of Ashantis arrived for a similar purpose and, being refused by the people of Christiansborg, deliberately shot a mulatto and four other men who were coming out of the Castle. The Accras at once flew to arms and fell upon the Ashantis, fourteen of whom were killed, while the remainder made their escape and hid themselves, either amongst the bushes or in the houses of those they still considered were their friends, and others again sought protection in the Castle. Later, when they endeavoured to escape to Ashanti, forty more were killed, and twenty-four, with five Fanti smugglers, were brought prisoners to James Fort. The Governor now thought he had put the whole country in a thoroughly satisfactory state of defence, and believing there was no immediate danger of an invasion, sailed for Sierra Leone on the 17th of May.

When the Crown took over the Gold Coast Settlements it had been decided not to retain any European garrison, chiefly on account of the terrible mortality¹ that had always existed amongst the men serving in the old disciplinary corps. They had been sent to the Cape of Good Hope and Sir Charles M'Carthy had brought a company

¹ Two-thirds of the Corps died annually, and in 1824 the deaths nearly equalled the mean strength of the garrison. Few lived to complete one year in the command, the average death rate being 1,500 per 1,000 per annum.

1823-1824 of the 2nd West India Regiment from Sierra Leone to **CHAP. XIX** replace them ; but he now applied for the return of these white troops and at the same time asked that their strength might be made up to 1,000 by recruiting in England. Two companies of the Royal African Corps were therefore sent up from the Cape and had arrived at Cape Coast in April 1823. Besides these men, there were three black companies of the same Corps and the company of the 2nd West India Regiment, which altogether provided a force of about 500 regulars.

The Ashantis now made their first move. An advance party of about 3,000 men crossed the Pra at Prasu on the 4th of June, and on the 11th Captain Laing was sent up by Major Chisholm with a large force composed of regulars, the new militia, and native allies to oppose their advance. The approach of these troops compelled the Ashantis to fall back across the border, and at the same time removed the last doubts of the still wavering Fantis as to the real intentions of the English. Appia the Chief of Ajumako, who had hitherto held aloof, now joined Captain Laing with 1,200 men, and most of the other Chiefs quickly followed his example ; but Kwesi Amankwa the Chief of Essikuma still remained loyal to Ashanti, and, not being strong enough to risk an engagement, retired before Captain Laing's advance and retreated to the banks of the Pra. Essikuma was burned and the English force then returned to Cape Coast.

At the end of July, news was brought to Cape Coast that a second Ashanti army had crossed the Pra with orders to proceed to Elmina. Captain Laing therefore proceeded to Dunkwa to intercept it ; but though he remained encamped there for some time, he never saw anything of the enemy and then moved up to Yankumasi Fanti. Before leaving Dunkwa, he visited Elmina and received the assurance of the Acting-Governor that the Dutch and Elminas would observe a strict neutrality and not allow any Ashantis who might succeed in penetrating to the coast to remain in the town.

In the meantime, Kwesi Amankwa had been reinforced

by the Ashantis and reoccupied Essikuma, where he was 1822-1824 attacked at dawn on the 13th of August by Appia, who CHAP. XIX put him to flight and took eighty prisoners. On the 18th however, Amankwa, who had again been reinforced by the Ashantis, returned and pressed Appia so hard that he was forced to send an urgent appeal for help to Captain Laing at Yankumasi Fanti. A detachment of the 2nd West India Regiment, the Anamabo Militia, and some native allies were at once sent to his support. This force reached Ajumaco on the 20th and arrived next day at Essikuma, where Appia's advance guard had been defeated by the Ashantis that morning after a sharp engagement. The enemy were still occupying the place, but on the approach of this force they retired without firing a shot. The bodies of the Fanti prisoners they had taken in the morning were found lying in the camp, still warm, having been massacred immediately before the retreat. It was then nearly dark and immediate pursuit was out of the question, but next morning the troops advanced in five divisions and suddenly came upon the enemy, who were taken so completely by surprise that they were seized with panic and fled in the greatest disorder, leaving their dinners still cooking on the fires and the camp strewn with arms and baggage. The Fantis, now that they had the Ashantis in full retreat, might have struck them a severe blow ; but they were tired by their march and nothing would induce them to pursue. They were tempted by the food and plunder they saw all around them and preferred to sit down and eat, and loot the deserted camp, rather than follow the enemy and run the risk of being defeated.

The Accras were now called up and a force of 1,600 men, including the Danish Accras, was soon ready to take the field. Two standing camps were formed ; one at Mansu garrisoned by the Anamabo Militia and most of the Fanti irregulars under Captains Hutchinson and Fraser, and a second at Jukwa, where a detachment of regulars and the Cape Coast Militia with a few other natives were stationed under Lieutenant King, R.N. The object of this second

1823-1824 camp was to cut off the enemy from all communication **CHAP. XIX** with Elmina and prevent them from obtaining further supplies of ammunition. Captain Laing himself, with most of the regulars, then returned to Cape Coast.

On the 28th of November Sir Charles M'Carthy arrived from Sierra Leone bringing with him a third white company of the Royal African Colonial Corps which had been raised in England. He was welcomed everywhere with every sign of loyalty and delight, and very soon after his arrival went up to Jukwa and inspected the camp there. On his return, he proceeded on the 15th of December to Anamabo, where he inspected the Militia and was received by all the Chiefs, including Appia who came down purposely to see him and made a most imposing entry into the town with an enormous retinue. All the Chiefs were loud in their protestations of loyalty and devotion, and on the 20th the Governor visited the other camp, which had now been moved from Mansu to Yankumasi Fanti. Here other Chiefs, before swearing allegiance, required the Governor's solemn assurance that he would never make peace with the Ashantis without first consulting them and their interests ; for they had not forgotten how Chibu had been betrayed by Colonel Torrane and had no wish to meet a similar fate themselves. After visiting Dunkwa, the Governor returned to Anamabo and on the next day to Cape Coast, where he inspected the Royal African Colonial Corps on the 25th and presented it with colours.

It had been Sir Charles' intention to visit Accra and inspect the force under Captain Blenkerne, but news was now received that the main Ashanti army had crossed the Pra and was rapidly marching towards the coast in twelve divisions. Orders were, therefore, sent to Captain Blenkerne to advance with his force and threaten the enemy from that side, while Captain Laing was instructed to lead the Fantis into Assin and create a diversion in that direction. The Governor himself then proceeded to Jukwa on the 29th, where the Royal African Colonial Corps, a detachment of the 2nd West India Regiment, and some of the Militia were then encamped. A force of 2,000 men

had been concentrated here by the 4th of January 1824, 1822-1824 and troops were then sent to occupy Ampensasu, a village CHAP. XIX on the left bank of the Pra, and Major Chisholm was called up from the coast.

On the 8th, definite information of the enemy's movements was at length received. They were reported to have entered Western Wassaw and to have defeated the native allies in that district, who were now in full retreat. Major Chisholm was at once sent to Ampensasu with orders to take over the command of the troops stationed there and to await the receipt of further instructions from the Governor, while Sir Charles took the remainder of the troops and, leaving Jukwa on the 9th, advanced through Bensu and Himan to Deraboasi. He was accompanied by Captain Ricketts of the 2nd West India Regiment who acted as his Brigade-Major, his Aide-de-Camp Ensign Wetherell of the same corps, Mr. Williams the Colonial Secretary, and Surgeon Beresford Tedlie. The whole force with him consisted of 80 Fantis but recently enrolled in the Royal African Colonial Corps under Ensign Erskine, 170 men of the Cape Coast Militia officered by some of the traders in the town, and about 240 unorganized Fantis under their own Chiefs. With this insignificant and almost undisciplined force, with only twenty rounds of ammunition for each man and some loose powder and slugs, most of which was soon spoiled by rain or in fording streams, Sir Charles, falling into the too common error of underrating his enemy and deaf to the remonstrances and advice of the King of Jukwa and other Chiefs, now purposed disputing the advance of an Ashanti army of unknown strength, composed of men who were not only inured to bush fighting, but were also confident of success and flushed with recent victories, and who, as it afterwards turned out, were from 10,000 to 20,000 strong. Not content with splitting up his available force into several divisions, he must needs select the weakest of these with which to meet the enemy. Nothing more foolhardy can well be imagined.

On the morning of the 13th this miserable little handful

1822-1824 of men crossed the Pra, an operation that took some time **CHAP. XIX** as there were only eight small canoes available, none of which could carry more than two men besides the canoe-man at each journey, and on the 14th, after many difficulties with the carriers and delays from the almost impassable state of the road, Sir Charles reached Insamankow, where he halted for five days to give the people of the surrounding districts an opportunity to join his force. Here they fortunately found Mr. Brandon the ordnance store-keeper, who had come up from Sekondi with supplies of ammunition. On the 17th the Governor sent orders to Major Chisholm, whose force comprised the main body of the army, to join him without delay ; but by some extraordinary blunder this letter was entrusted to a man who knew nothing of this part of the country, and who was so long in finding his way to Ampensasu that it was not until the 22nd that it was delivered.

The Wassaws and Denkeras, who had tried to dispute the advance of the invading army, were now reported to be in full retreat, and Mr. Williams, the Colonial Secretary and Adjutant-General of the Militia, was sent to intercept them and induce them to halt in a suitable camping ground until the Governor could join them with his troops. He found some difficulty in checking their flight, but finally succeeded in persuading them to form a camp on the banks of the Adumansu, a small tributary of the Pra. On the 20th, Captain Ricketts arrived in the camp after a very trying march over the twenty miles of road from Insamankow. The paths in many places were waist deep in mud and water, and he and his party had been compelled to spend the night in the forest in drenching rain. He brought up the whole of the force under Sir Charles with the exception of a small guard that was left to bring on the ammunition. Captain Ricketts at once ordered the Denkera and Wassaw Chiefs to set their men to clear the bush around the camp, and very soon afterwards had to mount a strong guard of militia over the Wassaws, who were already trying to cross the river and desert. During the afternoon, an alarm was suddenly raised that the

Ashantis were about to attack the position, and the whole 1822-1824 force stood to arms for five hours in pouring rain ; but no CHAP. XIX attack was made and nothing was seen of the enemy, though they were known to be no great distance away.

On the 21st Sir Charles M'Carthy arrived, escorted by a body-guard of 200 Fantis provided by Chief Appia of Ajumako and forty Cape Coast men. With him came Kwesi Yaku the aged Chief of Insamankow who, being too infirm to walk, had had to be carried the whole way by some of his people. Several hundred Komendas were also on the road, but they had halted to rest and had not yet come up. The Governor had come the whole distance from Insamankow on foot, but after a short rest proceeded at once to inspect the position. He then went across to see the Denkera and Wassaw Chiefs ; but while he was thus engaged, the alarm was raised that the Ashantis were upon them and about to attack.

Sir Charles can have had no idea that this was in truth the main Ashanti army ; for instead of falling back to join his main body under Major Chisholm, he gave orders for the troops to take up the positions that had been assigned to them. With such a force as he had however, which, with the exception of the small handful of regulars' was little better than a disorderly rabble, it was quite impossible to insure obedience to any orders. The Governor's Fanti body-guard, whose sole duty was to remain with him and protect his person, took up a position on the extreme left of the line and steadfastly refused to quit it and return to the Governor, saying they understood bush fighting and had now got a position that suited them. They had ; for this position was the one nearest Cape Coast.

At about two o'clock the Ashantis, who were considerably over 10,000 strong and were reinforced by another large body of men during the action, were heard advancing through the forest with drums beating and horns blowing. They halted within about half a mile of the English position, and Sir Charles then ordered the band of the Royal African Colonial Corps to play the National Anthem

1822-1824 and the buglers to sound because he had conceived the CHAP. XIX idea, from some strange source of information, that great numbers of the enemy, including several important chiefs, only wanted an opportunity to come over to him. He was soon undeceived ; for the Ashantis defiantly sounded their horns and beat their drums in reply, but none of them of course came over. The pitiful absurdity of these proceedings surely culminated here.

After some little time had been spent in this way, the enemy advanced by divisions in regular succession, each sounding the calls of their several chiefs, and lined the opposite bank of the river. A steady fire was now kept up for some time by both forces, which were only separated from each other by a stream about sixty feet wide. The Ashantis made more than one attempt to cross ; but the river had been swollen by the rain and was unfordable, and though they felled several trees and tried to reach the opposite bank by climbing over them, they were driven back each time. By four o'clock the English had expended the whole of their ammunition. Mr. Brandon, who had been specially ordered by the Governor to have forty rounds for each man packed in kegs and ready for immediate issue, had arrived during the action and was now applied to ; but with the grossest mismanagement he had come on ahead of the carriers instead of driving them before him, with the natural result that, when left to their own devices, hearing heavy firing in front of them and meeting the fugitives from the field of battle, they had not shown much enthusiasm in pushing forward, but had promptly thrown down their loads and fled. The consequence was that, now that the ammunition was so urgently needed, there was only one barrel of powder and one of ball to be had : nor was this all, for three other cases that had arrived at the same time proved on being opened to contain macaroni.

The British force was now in a hopeless position, and no sooner did the Ashantis perceive that their fire was slackening than they made another determined effort to cross the stream, which had now subsided a little, and

succeeded in fording it. The enemy closed in upon the 1892-1894 little force from every side, pressing irresistibly forward CHAP. XIX and threatening to overwhelm it with their numbers and cut off its retreat. All who fell into their hands were instantly beheaded, and the fate of those who yet remained alive was plainly sealed. The Wassaws and Fantis had long since taken to their heels, and Sir Charles, who had been wounded, now joined Kujo Chibu who was still fighting bravely with his Denkeras on the right of the line. It was evident that there was nothing to be done but to retreat in the best order possible, but every man of the Royal African Colonial Corps had gone to join his company and not a bugler could be found to sound the call. A small brass field-piece¹ was found lying on the ground, still lashed to the poles on which it had been carried. This was quickly cut loose, its muzzle raised a little and the gun loaded with some powder and a few musket balls obtained from the Denkeras and fired through the bush in the direction of the enemy in the vain hope of checking their advance. It only served, however, to attract their attention to the spot and induced a charge in which the Governor's and Captain Ricketts' West Indian orderlies were both killed.

The Governor had in the meantime left the Denkeras, and Captain Ricketts saw him a short distance ahead and was trying to overtake him, when a sudden volley was poured in by the enemy and he lost sight of him. Knowing it would be hopeless to search for him in the dense bush, Captain Ricketts then turned back with the interpreter de Graft and some wounded men with the intention of rejoining the Denkeras, who, though retiring, were fighting bravely all the time and disputing every yard of ground.

A militia sergeant now seized a Wassaw man as he ran past, and de Graft gave him a silver whistle and chain to guide them through the forest. They then pushed slowly

¹ This gun—calibre 2·2in., one trunnion marked N593 and the other 144—lay for many years at Mamposu, but was removed to Kumasi in October 1912 and mounted outside the Gold Coast Regiment Officers' Mess.

1822-1824 through the undergrowth, one man holding the guide to **CHAP. XIX** prevent his deserting them, until it became too dark for them to see each other. All this time small parties of the enemy had been scouring the forest and had more than once come so near to the fugitives that they had been forced to lie down and hide in the dripping undergrowth until they had passed. As soon as the moon rose, a fresh start was made ; but it was not until after another halt and day had broken that they finally struck a small path leading to Insamankow. The guide left them here, and they almost ran into the arms of a party of the enemy, only retracing their footsteps just in time. A little later they fell in with about fifty Wassaws and Denkeras, and it was agreed that they should push on together in the direction from which Major Chisholm was expected. That night was spent on a small island in the midst of a swamp, in reaching which Captain Ricketts lost both his shoes. While they were encamped here in the greatest discomfort, two Ashantis, who had mistaken them for a party of their own people, suddenly walked into their midst : they were promptly seized by the Denkeras, who extracted all the information they could from them and then cut their throats.

On the next day, as they were continuing their retreat towards the Pra, they fell in with another small party of the enemy, with whom a kind of running fight was kept up for some time ; but they were eventually shaken off after several of them had been killed. During their march through the forest Captain Ricketts and his party rescued several Wassaw women, but numbers of children were found starving on the ground or lying with their brains dashed out, whose mothers had been captured by the Ashantis and compelled to abandon them that they might be able to carry more plunder. At length, after a terrible march in which everyone suffered acutely, they reached the Pra and halted on its banks for the night.

Early the next morning, they prepared to cross the river but could only find one small canoe, which was so damaged that it would scarcely float. The women, how-

ever, were sent across and after some delay the whole party 1822-1824 reached the opposite bank. Captain Ricketts was now CHAP. XIX in a terrible condition ; his clothes hung in ribbons, his feet were cut, bleeding and swollen, after his long march barefooted through the forest, and he was so exhausted from exposure, hunger and fatigue, and the pain and loss of blood from his wounds that he could scarcely move. Soon after crossing the river however, they fell in with two soldiers of the Royal African Colonial Corps, who, when they heard who he was, carried him to a village near by, where a detachment of Major Chisholm's force that had been sent on to persuade the people on the line of march to join him was then halted. Major Chisholm himself arrived on the opposite bank a little later, and, on being told of Captain Ricketts' terrible plight, sent him some clothes and provisions and soon followed in person.

Nothing was yet known of the fate of Sir Charles M'Carthy and the other officers with him, and it was even thought possible that they too might have contrived to escape. It was not until towards the end of March, when Mr. Williams, who had been taken prisoner by the Ashantis, was released, that the full details of this disaster became known. He explained that he had left the field of battle with the Governor, Mr. Buckle, and Ensign Wetherell and retreated along the path towards Insamankow. They had not gone far, however, when they were attacked by a party of the enemy. One of Sir Charles' arms was broken at the first volley and he almost immediately afterwards fell with a second wound in the chest. He was carried to one side and laid at the foot of a tree,¹ and Mr. Williams only had time to see Ensign Wetherell, who was also wounded, lying near the Governor and cutting with his sword at some of the enemy who were trying to tear off Sir Charles' uniform, when he himself received a wound in the thigh and lost consciousness. He was brought to his senses by the clumsy attempts of one of the Ashantis to cut off his head. He had already received one gash in the

¹ This tree still stands and is pointed out and reverenced by the people of the district.

1822-1824 back of his neck when an Ashanti Captain, to whom he **CHAP. XIX** had once done some little kindness on the coast, recognized him and ordered his life to be spared. Lying near him he saw the headless trunks of his three companions and was then taken to the Ashanti camp at Insamankow.

The Ashantis positively assert that Sir Charles committed suicide. He was badly wounded and helpless, escape was absolutely out of the question, and he doubtless felt sure that if he was taken alive he would be subjected to many indignities and possibly tortured before being put to death, and he may have felt that the wound in his chest was mortal. It is quite possibly true, therefore, that he did take his life at the last moment to avoid capture. No European actually saw the end, and the Ashantis can have no valid reason for inventing such a tale, unless in admiration, for it is a point of honour with their own Chiefs to kill themselves when capture is inevitable.

During the period of his captivity, which lasted two months, Mr. Williams was kept by day under a thatched shed and shut up each night in a hut with the heads of Sir Charles and the other officers. These heads had been so well preserved that the features of the Governor especially presented almost the same appearance as they had done in life. It was also stated that the principal Ashanti Chiefs ate Sir Charles' heart in the belief that they would thus derive a portion of his indomitable courage, and that pieces of his flesh were smoke-dried and carried on their persons as talismans to protect them in battle. His head was afterwards taken to Kumasi and deposited in the Treasury at Bantama to be carried in procession as a signal trophy at every Yam Custom. Mr. Williams' only food was as much snail soup as he could hold in the palm of his hand, and had it not been for the wound in his thigh, he too would have been sent to Kumasi. The surgical procedures of the Ashantis, intended to force out the bullet, were as ineffectual as they were painful and consisted in the application of very tight ligatures round the limb above and below the wound. On the occasion of any sacrifice, he was made to sit on one side of the big Death Drum

while the victim's head was being struck off on the other. 1822-1824
 Among these victims was Mr. Jones, one of the traders in CHAP. XIX
 Cape Coast and a Captain in the Militia who, having
 received five wounds in the action, was by custom deemed
 to belong to the Fetish. Another merchant, Mr. Raydon,
 was also put to death because he could not keep up with
 the Ashantis on the march after they had stripped him of
 all his clothes.

In this battle, generally known as the battle of Insaman-kow, though really fought on the banks of the Adumansu some twenty miles from that place, the British losses were as follows :

KILLED

Officers—

Brigadier General Sir Charles M'Carthy, Governor.
 Ensign Wetherell } 2nd West India Regiment.
 Surgeon Beresford Tedlie }
 J. S. Buckle, Colonial Engineer.
 Captain Heddle } Merchants holding Commissions in
 Captain Jones } the Cape Coast Militia.
 Captain Raydon }
 Captain Robertson, Cape Coast Volunteer Company.
 —Brandon, Ordnance Store-keeper.

TOTAL 9

Men—

2nd West India Regiment	.	.	.	2
Royal African Colonial Corps	.	.	.	41
Royal Cape Coast Militia	.	.	.	81
Royal Volunteer Company	.	.	.	54
TOTAL	.	.	.	178

WOUNDED

Officers—

Captain Ricketts, 2nd West India Regiment.
 Ensign Erskine, Royal African Colonial Corps.
 William Williams, Colonial Secretary.

TOTAL 3

354 OUTBREAK OF THE 4TH ASHANTI WAR

1822-1824 *Men*—

CHAP. XIX	Royal African Colonial Corps	.	.	.	17
	Royal Cape Coast Militia	.	.	.	58
	Royal Volunteer Corps	.	.	.	14
	TOTAL	.	.	.	89

What loss the irregular native allies sustained was never known ; but in the case of the Wassaws and Fantis it was probably slight as they seized the first opportunity to run away, very few of them remaining till the end. The Denkeras however, who acquitted themselves with great credit, must have lost very heavily indeed, though no figures could ever be obtained. The regulars, including the Militia, fought well and bore the brunt of the battle. Only twenty-two of the Royal African Colonial Corps, thirty-one of the Cape Coast Militia, and eight of the Volunteer Company escaped unscathed. The Ashantis also lost heavily. Many fell before the bayonets of the regulars and many more must have lost their lives in the earlier attempts to cross the river and in the close fighting that took place afterwards. Probably their total loss reached several hundreds.

Such then was the immediate result of this rash expedition, in which a mere handful of partly trained men was blindly led against unknown numbers of an enemy by no means to be despised and thoroughly conversant with the peculiar conditions of bush warfare. Its more remote results were still more serious. The Ashantis had hitherto entertained a profound respect for the power of the white man ; but this decisive victory at once destroyed it and seemed to them conclusive proof of their own superiority. At the same time, this terrible reverse and the loss of the Governor did more than anything else to produce that feeling of unreasoning and bitter hostility towards Ashanti that has existed ever since. It is this hostility, combined with the Ashantis' self-deception, that has done so much to create ill-feeling and prolong disputes, and caused

losses of trade, wars, and other troubles that should never have been necessary.

1822-1824
CHAP. XIX

Sir Charles M'Carthy, who thus paid the penalty of such foolhardiness with his life, must be pitied rather than blamed. As a stranger to the country, he had no idea of the strength and fighting qualities of his enemy nor of the unreliable character of some of his allies, with many of whom the mere approach of an Ashanti army was sufficient to cause panic and flight. But even they cannot be blamed for running away on this occasion, for it was indeed their only chance, and they doubtless realized what the Governor refused to believe, that he was attempting the impossible. As has been shown too, he was placed at a great disadvantage by the refusal of nearly all the officers of the old Company of Merchants to serve under him, and was probably too easily led away by the vain boasts of the Fantis while the enemy was still at a distance, and really believed that they would justify their words when the battle began. His folly in splitting up his small force into three and attempting to give battle with the weakest of all is, however, inexcusable.

The gallant conduct of the Cape Coast Militia, the Volunteers and the Denkeras must always stand to their credit. But their numbers were not sufficient to avert the inevitable defeat, while the disgraceful and inexcusable blundering of the officer responsible for the supply of ammunition turned this into the greatest disaster the English have ever suffered on the Gold Coast and ended in the practical annihilation of the whole force.

CHAPTER XX

CONTINUATION OF THE WAR

1824

1824 **MAJOR CHISHOLM**'s orders from the Governor had been
CHAP. XX to remain in camp with his troops at Ampensasu until he received further instructions ; but, as has been seen, the letter telling him to advance, though sent off on the 17th of January, was not delivered until the 22nd. In fact, a second urgent summons that had been sent off during the battle on the 21st actually reached him two hours before it. While he had been awaiting the arrival of these orders he had heard that a strong party of the enemy was somewhere in the neighbourhood of his camp, and sent Mr. Henry Barnes out with a small scouting party to obtain definite information of its movements.

After some hours had been spent in the search, this party heard the confused hum of a multitude near at hand and climbed to the top of some rocks overhanging the Pra, where they concealed themselves among the bushes and plainly saw a force of about 2,000 Ashantis encamped on the other side of the river. The enemy's position was so unprotected and they were so evidently unsuspicous of any danger, that the party, instead of returning to report to Major Chisholm and enable him to surround and surprise the Ashantis, fired three volleys into their midst and then, standing up to show their red coats on the brow of the hill, gave a loud cheer. This struck consternation into the enemy, who immediately deserted their camp, leaving all their baggage and many valuables behind them, and retreated as quickly as possible along the river bank to

rejoin the main body of their army. It was this force 1824 that had arrived during the battle of Insamankow and CHAP. XX taking Sir Charles' force in the rear, cut off its retreat. Had Major Chisholm been kept informed of the position and movements of the several divisions of the Ashanti army by a well-organized system of native scouts, he might have routed and pursued this force and, by pressing them hard now that they were panic stricken, have kept them in full flight until they reached Insamankow, where their disorderly arrival would have greatly confused the Ashantis engaged there, and they themselves would have been hemmed in between two British fires.

On the arrival of the letters on the 22nd, Major Chisholm hastened to join the Governor and, fearing the delay that had already occurred might seriously interfere with his plans, elected to go by the shortest route which, however, lay over a very bad road and necessitated crossing the Pra within five miles of Ampensasu. Only one canoe was available and the whole of the 23rd was occupied in ferrying the troops and stores across the river. It was while he was thus detained on the banks of the Pra that the first news reached him that an engagement had taken place, but it was not until he fell in with Captain Ricketts the next day that he heard the result and learned of the disaster that had overtaken Sir Charles M'Carthy's force.

Feeling that he could no longer be of any assistance to the Governor, and knowing that his force alone could never hope to withstand the advance of the victorious Ashanti army, Major Chisholm decided to return by forced marches to defend Cape Coast, against which the enemy were believed to be rapidly advancing. He left on the 25th; Captain Ricketts, who was still unable to walk, being carried in a basket palanquin on the heads of some of the native soldiers. They had been scarcely an hour on the road when Captain L'Estrange of the Royal African Colonial Corps, who was with the advance guard, dropped dead from exposure and fatigue. That night was spent in a deserted village; Efutu was reached early on the following afternoon, and Cape Coast late the same evening,

1824 Here they found Captain Laing who, in accordance with
CHAP. XX his instructions, had advanced about thirty miles from
his camp at Yankumasi Fanti in the direction of Assin,
but had then heard of the defeat of the Governor from a
messenger sent him by the officer commanding at Cape
Coast who, in turn, had had the news from some wounded
stragglers from the battle who had reached Sekondi and
come on from there by canoe. He had then deemed it
prudent to return, and succeeded in bringing his whole
force in safety to Cape Coast.

The expectations of an immediate attack on the town
were not realized. The Ashantis remained for some time
at Insamankow. In fact an Ashanti army seldom derives
the full benefit of such a victory by immediately following
up its advantage, but remains encamped in the neighbour-
hood, pillaging and burning the villages and destroying
the plantations and farms, and when it does finally renew
its advance it generally proceeds at a very leisurely pace.

In the meantime, the inhabitants of Dutch Sekondi
had been committing some outrages against the English.
Captain Woolcomb of H.M.S. *Glendower* and two of his
officers had landed there on the 25th of January to see the
place and try to gain some reliable news of the battle
which they understood had taken place, and had been
attacked. The people had pursued them with drawn
knives and compelled them to run to their boat ; but on
reaching his ship, Captain Woolcomb had immediately
fallen in a party of marines and returned, intending to
administer a warning against any repetition of such conduct
that would not soon be forgotten. Much to his surprise,
the Sekondis had mustered in full strength on the beach
and prepared to oppose the landing of his men, who had
to disembark under a heavy fire, which, however, they
amply returned. The marines then advanced into the
town and drove the people into the bush beyond. Two
marines and a Kru-boy were killed and several others
wounded in this encounter ; but all attempts to destroy
the town failed, as the thatch was too wet to burn. The
Sekondis, moreover, had brutally murdered several

wounded fugitives who had fled to their town after the 1824 battle of Insamankow, and Major Chisholm now determined CHAP. XX to punish them for these acts.

On the 5th of February, Captain Laing was sent to Jukwa with a detachment of the Royal African Colonial Corps and a few Anamabos and other Fantis, who brought up the total strength of his force to about 400 men. By the 14th, nearly 1,000 men had been collected, and orders were then sent him to move to Komenda, where Major Chisholm joined him the next day. Here the embarkation of the whole force on board H.M.Ss. *Swinger* and *Glendower* was commenced at daybreak on the 16th and completed by sunset, when H.M.S. *Bann* also arrived. The three ships then left for Sekondi, which they hoped to reach the same night and so surprise and capture about 400 Ashantis who were known to be in the town. But they had both wind and current against them, and it was three o'clock the next afternoon before they anchored off it. The troops were at once disembarked ; but the Ashantis and Sekondis had already fled. The town, however, was set on fire, and by eight o'clock that evening the whole place had been completely destroyed, everything in it having been either burned or blown up, and the troops returned the same night to Cape Coast.

In the meantime, Osai Tutu Kwamina had died in Kumasi, having passed away on the 21st of January on the very same day as Sir Charles M'Carthy had lost his life. This King, who was probably the finest man who ever sat on the Ashanti stool, might well be named " the Misunderstood." All that is known of him, and it is a great deal, for several Europeans came in close contact with him and knew him personally, tends to show that he was a man of high character, honourable in his dealings, peaceable in his disposition, and forbearing with his enemies ; a man of sound sense and one who regarded his plighted word as sacred and did not make vain promises, but who expected to find the same characteristics in others, especially those whom he acknowledged to be his superiors, and to receive what were his just dues. Colonel Torrane, who with all

1824 his faults was certainly an able man, wrote of him : " In CHAP. XX all my negotiations with the King I had cause to remark what I have not experienced on the sea coast, to wit, the strictest regard to his word ; in fact, I look on King Zey, so he is called, to be a high character."¹ Mr. James Swanzy again, said of him : " I think, of all the native sovereigns of Africa that I have either read or heard of, he is the man most likely to act with good faith."² No one can read the various accounts of the history of these times without feeling some pity for the keen disappointment this King must have felt, and a sense of shame that he should have been so much misunderstood and so unfairly treated. Savage he was, and as might therefore be expected, some of his demands may have seemed unreasonable in the eyes of more civilized people ; but that his intentions were honourable there can be little doubt, and it is equally certain that if at any time he made excessive demands, he was always willing to listen to reason and, being a just man himself, was ready to modify or abandon any extortionate or groundless claim if proper cause were shown. The African, in any case, habitually asks for more than he expects or even wishes to receive, and this is so well known a trait in his character that the first thing done is to ask for a reduction and, were it not given, the original demand would, on that ground alone, be considered extortionate and absurd. " Osai Tutu Kwamina is of all the Ashanti monarchs the one on whom the Englishman should look with the most interest, for he was the first of the line who came into contact with Europeans, and by observing the attitude which he adopted towards them before the occurrence of those hostilities by which the relations of the two powers were subsequently embittered, we may learn what was the position that the Ashantis would have spontaneously adopted towards the white men."³

¹ Letter dated Cape Coast Castle, February 1807, to Committee of the Company of Merchants.

² Evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons (1816), p. 160.

³ Austin Freeman, p. 441.

The history of this King's reign affords much food for 1824 both reflection and regret. The English Companies who CHAP. XX held the Forts and Settlements along the sea-board were, as has been shown, merely the tenants of the coast tribes and had no interest in the country beyond trade. When these tribes came into collision with the Ashantis, the English, as a third party having no concern with the quarrels of the people, were at first inclined to remain neutral. Had they done so, it is unlikely that they would have suffered any harm at the hands of the Ashantis, who always declared that they had no quarrel with the Whites and had no wish to make war on them. The real object of their invasions, apart from the extension of their Empire and the punishment of wrongs and insults, was to gain free access to the trading settlements on the coast, and thus avoid the profits of the Fanti middlemen brokers and the risk of having the market closed to them at inconvenient moments.

The English, therefore, were not likely to be molested ; and it was not until they received fugitives into Anamabo Fort and opened fire on the Ashanti army that they definitely abandoned their neutrality and declared for the Fantis. No reasonable person can doubt the originally friendly intentions of Tutu Kwamina, and putting altogether on one side the question of what may or may not have been a wise policy in later years, it is certainly very doubtful if it was wise at this time for a Company, with very limited resources both in money and men, openly to espouse the cause of a weak and practically conquered race, and, by so doing, to place itself in antagonism to a powerful nation, whose military prowess was a byword, and from or through whom the greater part of its trade came. With no standing army and no one but the none too valorous Fantis to whom they could look for assistance, this mere handful of men could never aspire to the subjugation of Ashanti ; and it would certainly have been more to their own interest, and that of the country generally, if they had kept the treaty they made, or hastened to come to a fresh understanding with this people as a recognized

1824 power when they were given the opportunity after the first treaty had been broken. A passive neutrality would have been difficult to maintain unless their position had been clearly defined. Unfortunately, as has been seen, this was not the course followed ; and the arrival of the ill-fated Sir Charles M'Carthy, who rashly concluded that the position was hopeless and greatly under-rated the power of Ashanti, inaugurated what has been an almost continual policy of hostility to that kingdom. "With the unerring instinct of a professedly philanthropic nation, they (the English) have selected the sturdiest, most enterprising and most courageous tribe as the special object of their hostility, and have consistently endeavoured, after the fashion too common among philanthropists, to secure in the most perfect manner the survival of the unfittest."¹

Tutu Kwamina was succeeded by his youngest brother Osai Yow, usually known as Okotu (orange) from the light colour of his skin.

It was indeed fortunate that the Ashantis had remained quiescent after the battle of Insamankow ; for this defeat and the death of the Governor caused such a revulsion of feeling and such keen disappointment amongst the Fantis, that it would have been almost impossible to raise another force at this time. Many of the Chiefs, indeed, bitterly repented their hurried repudiation of the Ashanti alliance and sincerely regretted that they had ever been induced to identify their interests with those of the English ; for they believed they had now lost everything, and that the vengeance of Ashanti must soon overtake them, and some time had to elapse before they began to recover themselves.

The Ashantis were still encamped at Insamankow ; but towards the end of February it was reported in Cape Coast that they were actively preparing to renew the campaign and intended to start for the coast on the 1st of March. Their actual numbers were now given as 15,000, and, as it was not deemed prudent to risk an engagement with any force that the English could now put in the field, it was decided to offer no opposition to their advance until

¹ Austin Freeman, p. 471.

they reached the Pra and then to dispute the passage of 1824 the river and make a last determined effort to protect the CHAP. XX actual Settlements from attack.

The Accra Militia under Captains Hansen and Bannerman was now ordered to join Captain Laing at Komenda, whose force was thus brought up to about 6,000 men ; but no sooner had this junction been effected than Captain Laing was taken ill and had to be invalided to England, and Captain Ricketts, himself far from well, was sent to take over his command. A detachment of the 2nd West India Regiment was now stationed at Deraboasi, and other small bodies of troops were sent to occupy Himan and the other villages through which it was thought the Ashantis might advance. It was believed, however, that they would attempt to cross the Pra somewhere in the neighbourhood of Shama, and the main body of the British force was therefore moved to the mouth of the river where a large camp was formed. The troops presented a formidable appearance when drawn up in line, and were distinctly visible from Dutch Sekondi where a small detachment of the enemy was again quartered. But though several skirmishes took place between these troops and scattered parties of the enemy across the river, the expected general advance did not take place. The strength of the force had now been increased to 8,000, and the men began to chafe at the enforced inactivity and delay, and their impatience was further increased by the growing scarcity of provisions. The Chiefs therefore informed Captain Ricketts that they wished to cross the river and attack the enemy at once, saying that their men would lose their courage if they remained idle any longer. It does not seem to have occurred to them, however, that their courage might evaporate even more quickly when they found themselves face to face with an Ashanti army. The Chiefs were told that the object of the encampment was not to attack the enemy, but to dispute his passage of the river and protect the country beyond it ; but they continued their importunities and were at length informed that an advance could only be made if they provided

1824 carriers for the ammunition, which they had hitherto
CHAP. XX neglected to do. Affairs were in this condition when, on the 10th of March, Captain Ricketts was recalled to Cape Coast, owing to the illness of Major Chisholm, and the command of the army on the Pra devolved upon Captain Blenkerne.

A few days later, Governor Last, who had but recently arrived on the coast from Holland, wrote to inform Major Chisholm of the arrival of some Ashanti messengers at Elmina, who had asked that a British officer might come over and hold a palaver with them. Captain Ricketts accordingly went to Elmina, where he met the messengers and the Ashanti Resident Atjiempon at a meeting in the Castle. When called upon by Governor Last to state their business, these messengers said that their master the King of Ashanti had not sent his army with any intention of waging war on the white men, but in order to capture and bring to Kumasi Kujo Chibu the King of Denkera, Awusuku Chief of Tshiforo or Tufel, and Enimil the King of Western Wassaw, who had revolted and taken up arms against him their sovereign ; that if these three men were now given up the Ashanti army would at once retire, but that the orders of the King, in the case of Kujo Chibu especially, were peremptory, and they had instructions to take him at all hazards, even if he should seek an asylum within the Castle at Cape Coast.

This demand was the direct outcome of the precedent set by Colonel Torrane, and the cause of this special animosity against the King of Denkera makes it likely that the King's assertion that his army had been sent against him and not against the English may have been quite true. Some time before the war broke out Kujo Chibu had been ordered to appear at Kumasi, but accounts differ as to the exact reason for this summons. He appears, however, to have given the King reason to believe that he was meditating a rebellion, and was detained for some time in the capital, but was privately informed that he would be put to death and determined to escape. He therefore spent the greater part of the night in singing

and dancing and then, ordering the drummers to continue playing till daybreak, stole quietly away with thirty of his followers and soon afterwards joined a strong force of his own people and the Wassaws. He then openly declared war against Ashanti, and some Ashantis who were mining gold in Denkera were sent to Kumasi to convey a defiant message to the King and inform him that his Captains were not very trustworthy persons seeing that he had been able to bribe them to let him escape. This charge of course created a great stir in the capital, all the Chiefs swearing on the King's head that the accusation was false, and vowing they would bring Chibu back to prove his words. Die Kra had then set out with a large army to capture him, and it was this army, which was already driving the Denkeras before it, that had met and defeated Sir Charles M'Carthy at Insamankow.

The Ashanti messengers also positively denied that the King had ever issued any orders for the execution of the sergeant who had been seized at Anamabo, but asserted that the Fantis at Dunkwa had committed the act on their own initiative. This of course was quite untrue, though if, as was rumoured, Tutu Kwamina pardoned the man and his Chiefs afterwards took the law into their own hands, it does not necessarily follow, nor is it indeed likely, that he would have been informed of it, and the account Okotu now gave may have been the one given to him.

The reply given by Captain Ricketts to these messengers was unfortunately rather ambiguous. He said that the English had not come to the Gold Coast to make war against the natives, but rather to befriend them, and in proof of his words instanced the abolition of the slave trade, adding that if properly accredited messengers were sent down for the purpose, there need be no difficulty in concluding a peace at Elmina if the Ashantis so desired. It is a pity that he did not at once make it clear that the treacherous precedent set by Colonel Torrane would in no case be followed; for there is no doubt that the absence of any specific allusion to this definite demand led the Ashantis to infer that no objections would be raised on

1824
CHAP. XX

1824 that score and caused others also to fall into the same CHAP. XX error. It was finally agreed that, pending the arrival of ambassadors with full powers to conclude a peace, the British troops should make no further attack on the Ashantis, and that they in turn should remain where they then were and not molest the allies. Orders to this effect were issued to the troops on the 16th of March.

After the meeting was over, Governor Last suggested to the Ashantis that in order to prove the sincerity of their proposals for peace, they should release the Colonial Secretary Mr. Williams, who was still a prisoner in their camp, and this they finally consented to do provided they were allowed to hand him over to the Dutch Governor and he gave an undertaking that he should not go to Cape Coast nor to any other place except Holland. He was brought from Shama by canoe a few days later, and after being marched in triumph through the streets of Elmina, stark naked and with his hands tied behind his back, was handed over to Governor Last.

In the meantime Captain Blenkerne, who was still encamped near the mouth of the Pra, had been supplied by the Chiefs with carriers for the ammunition, and had already fixed a day for crossing the river and attacking the enemy, when he was informed of the amnesty and had to countermand his orders. This sudden determination not to molest the Ashantis, combined with the vague reply given by Captain Ricketts at the conference at Elmina—which was, of course, well known to and had been freely discussed by the Chiefs—led them to fear that the Government contemplated purchasing a peace at the price of their surrender ; and it must be admitted that, with the recollection of Colonel Torrane's proceedings before them and the very indefinite nature of Captain Ricketts' remarks, it was perhaps only natural that they should have entertained this idea.

Kujo Chibu and the other Chiefs therefore, conceiving that if they wished to avoid being delivered into the hands of their enemies they must rely upon their own efforts, determined to attack the Ashantis at once ; and in spite of

all Captain Blenkerne could do to dissuade them, crossed 1824 the Pra on the morning of the 24th of March and began CHAP. XX cutting a series of paths through the bush towards the enemy's position, leaving him with only the regulars, some militia and a small body of Accras, who altogether amounted to barely 600 men. When Major Chisholm heard of their proceedings and of the misunderstanding that had arisen, he sent Captain Hutchinson of the Anamabo Militia to explain the whole matter to them and assure them that the English would never consent to give them up in order to conclude peace nor for any other reason ; but he failed to convince them, and they steadily persisted in their preparations for attacking the Ashantis.

It was, of course, impossible that the movements of such a large body of men could long escape the notice of the Ashantis, who naturally regarded this breach of the amnesty that had been arranged at Elmina as but another example of the small amount of reliance that could be placed on British promises and at once made a counter-move by marching a strong force from Insamankow to the bank of the Pra opposite Deraboasi, where they too threatened to cross. Captain Blenkerne therefore, moved the men he still had with him to Deraboasi to watch the movements of this force and oppose any further attempt to advance. The Ashantis were unusually well supplied with ammunition, for all that had been lost on the road to Insamankow had of course fallen into their hands. A great deal of sniping therefore went on across the river, while small skirmishes were of almost daily occurrence, and Ensign Erskine of the Royal African Colonial Corps, amongst others, was disabled by a bullet which entered his thigh one morning while he was sitting in a hut by the river bank.

After more than a week of arduous toil, the allies at last succeeded in carrying their paths to within easy reach of the Ashanti position, and by the ninth day they were ready to attack it. But now that the crucial moment had arrived, their courage failed them and the Wassaws fled incontinently to the river under cover of night and

1824 recrossed it. Their desertion was soon discovered, and **CHAP. XX** Appia sent word of what had happened to the other allies along the line and advised them to postpone the attack—which had been arranged for the next morning—until a little later. The news, however, struck panic into them all and a headlong flight to the Pra immediately ensued. In their frantic haste to recross it many men were drowned and over 2,000 guns and nearly all the ammunition were lost. The panic-stricken and hungry survivors of this disgraceful flight, who in spite of the darkness and confusion had succeeded in reaching the eastern bank, at once separated and made their way to their own homes and the native force then and there ceased to exist.

Captain Blenkerne, who was thus left with only a handful of half-starved men, believed that the Ashantis, who had heard the noise made by the allies in their midnight stampede, were preparing to advance and pursue them and decided to retire. Accordingly, on the 2nd of April, he retreated through Efutu to Cape Coast with his main body, while a smaller detachment fell back on Komenda, whence it was hurriedly conveyed to headquarters by H.M.S. *Swinger* and the Sierra Leone packet, as the Ashantis were believed to be close behind them. During his march, Captain Blenkerne fell in with Kujo Chibu and a few Denkeras at Bensu ; but it was only after he had repeatedly given him the most solemn assurances that he would on no account be surrendered to the enemy, that he finally succeeded in overcoming his distrust of the English and induced him to accompany him to Cape Coast. The Ashantis, however, never made any attempt to pursue the allies, but contented themselves with encamping on the ground they had vacated.

On the 10th of April Major Chisholm ordered Captain Blenkerne to move his men to Efutu and form another camp there ; while Kujo Chibu and Appia, who had in the meantime rallied many of their people, were sent to occupy Dompim. The Ashantis were drawing their water from a small stream flowing near the latter place and the two

Chiefs determined to prevent this and opened fire on 1824 some of them as they came down. The Ashantis at once CHAP. XX took cover and called out from the dense bush that they would soon see who was master, and, on the 25th, attacked the position. The allies fought well and seemed to be driving the enemy before them, for the centre of the Ashanti line began to give way ; but this was merely a ruse on their part, and, as the Denkeras and Ajumakos pressed forward to follow up the advantage they thought they had gained, they suddenly wheeled in on either flank and inflicted a terrible slaughter. The survivors fled through the bush in all directions. Appia himself contrived to escape, but lost himself in the forest, where he was found many days later, crawling on his hands and knees through the undergrowth, terribly emaciated and almost dead. He was carried down to Cape Coast, but smallpox was raging there at the time and soon afterwards claimed him as a victim. Captain Blenkerne had heard the firing from his camp at Efutu and hastened to the support of the allies, but arrived too late to be of any assistance to them, and, finding that they had been routed and that the Ashantis, contrary to their habit, were preparing to follow up their victory at once and were rapidly cutting paths in the direction of Efutu, he fell back once more on Cape Coast. So rapidly, indeed, did the Ashantis advance on this occasion, that they dashed into Efutu at one end as the English were leaving it at the other. Ensign Mackenzie, who only escaped capture by leaping through the window of a house, covered their retreat with a small party, who killed several of the enemy before falling back to join the main body. Patrick Riley and two other privates of the Royal African Colonial Corps were the only men who failed to escape. When the order was given to retire, they had gone into a house to loot some rum that they had seen there, but before they could leave again the Ashantis were upon them. One of the men fixed his bayonet and tried to defend himself as they broke into the house, but was instantly beheaded. Riley and the other man, however, offered no resistance and

1824 were quietly secured and soon afterwards sent to Kumasi, where one of them died about twelve months later, but Riley himself remained a prisoner in a village just outside the capital for four years. The Ashantis then occupied Efutu and, a few days later, when it was found they made no further move, the troops were again ordered out from Cape Coast and encamped in the government garden at Beula about five or six miles from Cape Coast and three or four from Efutu. Great difficulty was found in collecting any native force to assist the regulars and militia, but eventually about 6,000 men were got together in this camp.

News was now received that Osai Okotu was advancing in person with 10,000 men to reinforce his army, and Major Chisholm decided to attack before the junction could be effected. Orders were accordingly issued for the troops to cross the Sweet River and advance against Efutu. The next few days were fully taken up by the quarrels of the allies as to the positions they should respectively occupy. The Fantis insisted on being placed on the right of the line, but the Denkeras were very strongly opposed to this; for they understood their cowardly nature only too well and knew that the sole reason for their choice was that Cape Coast lay on that side. They declared that if the Fantis were placed there they would bolt as soon as the firing commenced, and wanted them to be put on the extreme left, where the proximity of the Elminas would cut off all hope of retreat and they would have no alternative but to fight. After much heated argument however, the Fantis finally declared that if they were not allowed to have their own way they would go home at once without even making a pretence of fighting, so the point was reluctantly conceded to them and the several divisions began cutting paths through the bush towards Efutu.

On the 18th of May, Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland arrived at Cape Coast on board H.M.S. *Driver* to assume the government of the Gold Coast and went out with Major Chisholm on the 19th to join the troops. They found

the men still busily employed in cutting their paths, 1824 which were now nearing completion, and the Governor, CHAP. XX not wishing to deprive Major Chisholm of the credit of the attack he had planned, left him in command and returned to Cape Coast to superintend the transport of the ammunition and other supplies. On the 21st, every available man in the Cape Coast garrison was sent out to help Major Chisholm, while the Castle and Towers were temporarily held by marines landed from the warships in the roads.

The paths had now been carried right up to the Ashanti position. The enemy were encamped on the summit of a densely wooded hill just outside Efutu, from the foot and lower slopes of which they had cleared the bush so that they could have a clear view of the British force as it advanced and yet remain under cover themselves. The battle commenced at one o'clock on the afternoon of the 21st of May and lasted until dusk, but the Ashantis, though they had fought throughout with their accustomed bravery and made more than one attempt to turn the British flank, were then driven back with heavy loss. Kujo Chibu and his Denkeras on the left of the line greatly distinguished themselves. In the midst of the battle he had sent a bowl containing six Ashanti heads to Major Chisholm to show him what he was doing, and then, after fighting for five hours with extraordinary valour, followed the retreating Ashantis right into Efutu. The Fantis, as had been expected, nearly all ran away at the first volley without even firing a shot, and though others remained till the end of the battle, no one seems to have been more surprised than themselves. In fact, now that the day had been won, they actually seem to have taken alarm at their own success and promptly fled. As Cruikshank says : " These gallant warriors seemed to have been inspired somewhat with Macbeth's fears :

' I am afraid to think what I have done—
Look on't again, I dare not.' "¹

¹ Cruikshank, vol. i, p. 158.

1824 Had the Fantis only behaved with the most ordinary **CHAP. XX** courage, this Ashanti army might have been cut up altogether. But darkness was now coming on, the ammunition was almost expended, and the carriers who were coming up with further supplies and with water and provisions, meeting the Fantis in full flight towards Cape Coast, naturally thought the English had again been beaten, were seized with panic, and threw down their loads to join them. The Denkeras and a few of the Cape Coast people were now the only native auxiliaries who remained, and all the men being hungry and without water owing to the flight of the carriers, the force had to fall back on the Sweet River instead of continuing the pursuit. This retrograde movement dispirited the men and destroyed any enthusiasm they might have had for a pursuit the next morning. The troops were, therefore, recalled to Cape Coast and only a small outpost under Lieutenant Rogers of the Royal African Colonial Corps was left at Beula to keep watch on the movements of the enemy.

When this action took place, the main body of the King's army had only reached Mansu ; but a few men who were in advance are said to have taken part in the engagement and it was currently reported that the Ashantis were also reinforced by a strong detachment of Elminas. The British force consisted of 2 officers and 99 men of the 2nd West India Regiment, 3 officers and 136 men of the Royal African Colonial Corps, 470 Militia of all ranks, and 77 Chiefs with about 5,000 of the native allies. No officer was killed, but Lieutenant Hutchinson of the Anamabo Militia was wounded, being shot through both wrists as he was in the act of urging on his men. The other losses were : 9 killed and 20 wounded among the Regulars, 83 Militia killed and 54 wounded, and 84 killed and 603 wounded among the native allies ; giving a total loss of 176 killed and 678 wounded. What the losses of the Ashantis were was never ascertained, but they must have been very heavy.

CHAPTER XXI

THE BATTLE OF DODOWA

1824 TO 1826

Two days after their defeat, on the 23rd of May 1824, the 1824-1826 Ashantis returned to Efutu, and on the 28th were joined CHAP. XXI by the army under Osai Okotu, who, soon after his arrival sent a "fetish boy" to the Governor at Cape Coast with a message of defiance, advising him to have the walls of the Castle made higher and to land all the guns and men he could obtain from the men-of-war, as he, the King, was fully determined to throw every stone of the building into the sea. The next three weeks were spent by the Ashantis in making preparations for an advance on Cape Coast, and during this time the allies succeeded in cutting off more than one of their foraging parties and killed several stragglers whom they shot down from ambuscades in the forest, a kind of warfare in which they showed greater proficiency than in the fighting of pitched battles.

On the 21st of June the whole Ashanti army left Efutu and, driving in the Beula outpost, advanced to within five miles of Cape Coast. The army itself was concealed by the bush, but the smoke from its camp fires could be seen rising along a line about three miles in length. During the next two days the Ashantis moved still nearer the town until, on the 23rd, great numbers of them could be distinctly seen on the hills behind Smith's and Phipps' Towers. Captain Hutchinson signalled their near approach from Smith's Tower, and all the able-bodied male inhabitants were at once ordered out to repel the expected attack,

1824-1826 while the women and children, many of whom were refugees **CHAP. XXI** who had been driven in from the outlying villages, crowded round the Castle gate clamouring for admission. Room was found for about 5,000 of them, and, in the hope of preventing a rush, only the small wicket in the big gates was opened, through which it was impossible for more than one person to pass at a time. But so great was the crush of terrified, screaming and struggling women and children, that several were squeezed or trampled to death. Seamen and marines were then landed from H.M.S. *Victor* and the merchantmen in the roads and told off to man the guns, and every preparation was made to defend the town.

The houses immediately in front of the Castle and overlooking its walls, which had been such a source of inconvenience during the riots in 1803, were still standing, but on the 22nd, Colonel Sutherland gave orders for their immediate demolition. The people, however, made no attempt to carry out his instructions, and, as there was no longer time to pull them down and an attack on the town seemed imminent, it was decided to burn them. Four of them were, therefore, set on fire. But a high wind was blowing, and the flames spread rapidly to the dry grass roofs of the adjoining houses, until, in a very short time, the whole town was in a blaze and added still further to the terrors of the moment. Fortunately, nearly all the removable property had already been taken for safety to the Castle and, as the mud walls could not burn, the actual damage done by the fire was not so great as might have been expected and most of the houses only required slight repairs and a new door and roof to make them habitable again.

According to Cruikshank's account, however, this conflagration was not so unintentional as is generally supposed. He says the Ashantis, acting on the advice of the Elminas, had arranged to send a small party disguised as Chibu's men into Cape Coast by night, who were to set fire to the town in several places, and, in the confusion that was sure to follow, the army was to enter

and make a general attack. This plan, however, reached 1824-1826 the ears of Mr. Williams while he was still at Elmina, and CHAP. XXI he at once sent to warn the Governor. Colonel Sutherland then determined to show the Ashantis that he was prepared to go to any extreme to defend the town and, knowing that the people would never consent to the destruction of their houses, acted without consulting them and set fire to the place in a hundred different quarters by firing rockets from the Castle, thus preventing the Ashantis from carrying out the plan which they had arranged for that very night.

However this may be, and whether the town was destroyed accidentally or intentionally, the fire had the effect of dismaying the Ashantis, who, believing that the people had set fire to their town in a frenzy of despair and were prepared to perish in its ruins, decided to postpone their attack until a more favourable moment and withdrew to Beula the next day. There they remained until the end of the month, sending out strong parties in every direction to lay waste the surrounding country and burn the villages. The garrison meanwhile, numbering as it did but 360 men, of whom 104 were in hospital, with a few artificers and militia and a very small native force upon which but little reliance could be placed, was powerless to prevent them.

On the 4th of July H.M.S. *Thetis*, Captain Sir John Phillimore, arrived from England with a much needed reinforcement of 101 officers and men of the Royal African Colonial Corps, and two days later a force of about 5,000 natives from Accra and the neighbouring towns marched into Cape Coast. They had been raised by Major von Richelieu, the Governor of Christiansborg, and sent to the assistance of the English with a few Danish soldiers under the command of Captain Peloson. Throughout the whole war indeed, the Danish Governor had shown the greatest friendliness, and now gave this very practical proof of his sympathy and sent word by Captain Peloson that he himself was busy collecting another large force, with which he intended to advance into Akim so as to threaten an

1824-1826 invasion of Ashanti territory and create a diversion on **CHAP. XXI** that side. The supply of ball had for some time been running very low, and on the arrival of these troops, none of whom had brought any ammunition with them, every available piece of metal was seized. The water pipes from the Castle, the lead from the roofs of the merchants' houses, and every pewter vessel that could be found were all taken in their turn, and the whole garrison was employed day and night in cutting them into slugs and casting bullets.

On the 7th, the Ashantis again advanced towards Cape Coast and were seen in great force defiling over a hill and making for some heights behind the town, upon which they soon took up their position. Osai Okotu's tent was pitched near the left of their line where, the bush having been cleared for some distance around, his movements could easily be watched with a glass. Many of the enemy were seen wearing the uniforms they had taken from those who had fallen in the battle of Insamankow, and they had several English, Danish, and Dutch flags with them, besides others of their own design. On the following day the allies took up a position on some hills facing those occupied by the Ashantis, and for the next three or four days were constantly employed in clearing the bush from their front and keeping watch on the enemy, who were busily engaged in cutting paths towards the English camp.

Some slight skirmishes between small parties took place, but it was not until the 11th that several strong divisions of the enemy were seen descending into the valley, where they formed into line about midway between the two camps. About two o'clock in the afternoon their advance party was fired on by some skirmishers under Mr. Gordon and a general engagement at once ensued. Although it had hitherto been necessary to drive most of the allies out of the town to their posts every morning at the point of the bayonet, they fought extremely well on this occasion and steadily drove the Ashantis back, taking and plundering two of their camps. The enemy, however, offered a stout resistance, especially those on

the right ; but the allies on Prospect and Connor's¹ 1824-1826 Hills acquitted themselves with great credit and eventually forced them to retire. Darkness then put an end to the action after it had lasted for four hours.

It has been argued that, because the Ashantis never make night attacks, their retreat on this and some similar occasions was only a voluntary return to their camp at sunset. But it is absurd to suppose that they would have retired from a successful engagement until absolutely forced to do so, or until it was so dark that the Fantis would have been unable to follow them, and this assertion is merely the outcome of the unwarrantable belief that, because the latter have often behaved badly, they are never capable of fighting well—a belief that is absolutely contradicted by facts.

The British force engaged and their losses in this action were as follows :

	Engaged.	Killed.	Wounded.
Royal Marine Artillery :			
Officers	1	—	—
Men	2	—	—
2nd West India Regiment :			
Officers	1	—	—
Men	90	—	3
Royal African Colonial Corps :			
Officers	15	1 ²	—
Men	193	—	—
Militia :			
Officers	2	—	—
Men	118	1	5
Native Allies	4,650	102	410
TOTALS	5,072	104	418

How many of the Ashantis were engaged or what their losses were, are unknown ; but their casualties must have been heavy, for the fighting at times was desperate and at very close quarters.

On the morning of the 12th the enemy again marched

¹ The Fantis attributed their unaccustomed success to the assistance of the god Dwi-janu, who is believed to reside in this hill.

² Lieut. Swanzy.

1824-1826 down into the valley and drew up in line of battle with **CHAP. XXI** the evident intention of renewing the engagement. A small party of skirmishers was therefore ordered to move cautiously through the bush, fire on the Ashantis, and retire. The enemy continued blazing into the under-growth in the direction from which this attack had been made for nearly half an hour, but they made no forward movement and at about two o'clock in the afternoon a few shots from a field piece were fired at random through the bush, which at once caused them to retire to their original position on the opposite hills.

Early the next morning the Ashantis were seen descending in single file by several paths into the valley and a renewal of the battle was momentarily expected. This movement, however, was continued till evening, and during the night hundreds of camp fires were seen glowing in the valley ; but when day broke there was no sign of the enemy and it was soon apparent that the whole army had retired during the night. It afterwards became known that a retreat had been decided upon the day before, and that the apparently large bodies of men that had been seen marching down into the valley had in reality been only a small detachment detailed to cover the movements of the main body. The comparatively few men composing this party had marched down from the hilltop in full view of the British force, and then, returning by concealed paths through the bush, had again ascended the hill on the far side and once more descended. This manœuvre had been kept up throughout the day, and, after numerous camp fires had been lit in the valley to confirm the belief that the Ashantis were occupying it in force, this party also retired and joined the main army. The Ashantis had thus been enabled to remove all their sick and wounded and retire with their prisoners and carriers for some distance before the allies became aware of their intention or could do anything to hinder them. They had gone in the direction of Elmina and Efutu, but all attempts to induce the allies to follow and harass them were unavailing. They seemed to think

it was sufficient for them that the enemy had withdrawn 1824-1826 from Cape Coast and that their own safety was temporarily assured, but they had no intention of incurring any risk or inviting further danger by following them. During this retreat a brother of the Fanti King, Aduku, who was taken prisoner by the Ashantis in 1807 and had since been employed as an umbrella bearer to the King, made his escape and reached Cape Coast.

The chief cause of this sudden retreat was the great number of men the Ashantis were daily losing by disease. Small-pox and dysentery raged in their camps and had already claimed thousands of victims, and famine stared them in the face as a result of their wanton destruction of the farms for miles around. Numbers of men, principally Assins, hungry, weakened, and disheartened, deserted during the night of the 11th and afterwards joined the allies. A stray shot from one of the guns on Smith's Tower had moreover, struck the King's palanquin, and he held a superstitious belief that the English knew its exact whereabouts and would send a second ball to kill him if he occupied it. So firmly convinced was he of the truth of this theory that the arguments and persuasions of his Chiefs, his own sense of dignity, and fatigue were alike unavailing to induce him to ride again and he preferred to trudge along on foot for mile after mile with his retreating army.

On the 18th of July, Lieutenant-Colonel Grant arrived at Cape Coast from England, bringing large supplies of much-needed ammunition and a few men of the Artillery, to take over the command from Colonel Sutherland, who returned to England on board H.M.S. *Thetis*. On the 19th he sent out a strong native force to harass the Ashantis, who were now halted at a distance of about six miles from Cape Coast and were drawing their supplies from Elmina. This force returned on the 20th with several prisoners and reported that the enemy had moved off in the direction of Anamabo. They remained in that district, creating great alarm and devastating the farms and villages, until the news of the Danish Governor's

1824-1826 advance through Akim caused them to retreat with all
CHAP. XXI speed to Kumasi, leaving hundreds of their sick and wounded behind, who, falling into the hands of the Fantis, were murdered almost to a man. It was a new experience for an Ashanti army to return unsuccessful, and on their arrival in the capital, weary and disheartened, with their numbers terribly reduced and with the object of the invasion—the capture of Chibu—still unaccomplished, they had to endure the taunts of the women and many a scoffing song was heard in the streets.

The garrison and people of Cape Coast, though relieved from the pressing danger of the presence of a hostile army before their town, were nevertheless in a sad plight. The town was crowded with fugitives from the bush villages, and the famine and disease that had so sorely stricken their enemies fell equally upon them. People died of starvation by hundreds, and many more were carried off by small-pox and dysentery. The dead and dying lay by dozens in the streets, and the women and children who had found refuge in the Castle were so closely crowded that it was impossible to walk from one side of the yard to the other without treading on some of them. The stench was overpowering, and the filth that naturally accumulated under such conditions was washed into the tanks by frequent showers of rain and polluted the water supply. Five or six of the garrison died daily, and they were almost entirely without food, having no meat or flour left and but little rice. Fortunately, at this critical juncture, a vessel loaded with provisions arrived from Sierra Leone, and several others were sent out from England with large quantities of rice and arrived soon afterwards, so that those who still survived could be supplied with enough to tide them over the months that must elapse before fresh crops could be sown and harvested.

In order to give some idea of the appalling mortality from the effects of the climate and disease upon the Europeans at this time, Ellis extracted the following data from an old letter book in the Military Hospital at Cape Coast: "Out of the first two companies of white

soldiers, who arrived at Cape Coast from the Cape of Good Hope in April 1823 only one man remained alive in December 1824. Out of a second detachment that had arrived in November 1823 from England, only eight remained alive; the greater part of a third detachment which disembarked at Cape Coast on 12th March 1824 died within three months of landing; only six men remained alive of a fourth detachment that arrived on 20th March; and out of the one hundred and one men who landed from H.M.S. *Thetis* on July 4th, forty-five died within a week of arrival. The deaths of fifteen officers are recorded within the same period, viz. between April 1823 and December 1824. As if it were not sufficiently bad to send men to serve in such a climate, the Government actually sent out the soldiers' wives and children. Forty-two women and sixty-seven children arrived at Cape Coast in October 1823, and by December 1824 twenty-nine women and forty-one children were dead, sacrificed to official ignorance, and twenty-seven women and children had been sent to England to save their lives. Well might Assistant-Surgeon Bell, of the Royal African Colonial Corps, who compiled this record, say: 'The destruction of life that has taken place ought to prevent any more European women and children being sent out. . . . I sincerely hope I will never rewitnessthe many trying sights I have done this year, in beholding the father and four or five fine children, laid up with fever in a small hovel of a place, totally helpless to each other, and gradually dying, without my being able to mitigate their sufferings even in a small degree.'¹

Now that the Ashantis had finally withdrawn, some of the villagers who had sought refuge in Cape Coast during the invasion began to return to their own districts to rebuild their ruined houses and cultivate their farms. Amongst these were the Komendas, and the Elminas seized the opportunity to give fresh proof of their loyalty to Ashanti and their undying hostility towards those who had espoused the English cause and fought on their side.

¹ Ellis, *History of the Gold Coast*, p. 178.

1824-1826 The majority of the Komendas returned home by sea, **CHAP. XXI** but their women and children were sent overland, and, as they passed through Elmina, many of them were seized and brutally murdered by the people. No sooner did news of this outrage reach the ears of Colonel Grant, than he wrote to Governor Last, demanding the punishment of the offenders. The Dutch Governor, however, replied that he had not sufficient force at his disposal to keep the people in order even, and that it was consequently quite out of his power to compel them to surrender the perpetrators of this crime. Commodore Bullen was anchored off Cape Coast at the time and at once placed H.M.S. *Victor*, Captain Woolcomb, at the Governor's service to convey Captain Ricketts and Lieutenant Atchison to Elmina, where they, in the Governor's name, offered Mr. Last the assistance of the English troops. The offer was gratefully accepted, and before they left, arrangements had been made for the transport of the men and the hour of landing fixed. After they got back to Cape Coast, however, Mr. Last wrote to say that the Elminas were determined to prevent the landing of any English soldiers in their town, and the arrangements were cancelled at the eleventh hour. The Komendas were far too weak to have any chance of taking their own revenge, and the matter was dropped for the time, though not forgotten. Had this expedition been successfully carried out, the Ashantis, even if not compelled to make peace at once, would have been very seriously inconvenienced, for the Elminas were the only friends they now had among the coast tribes and they were dependent upon them for their supplies.

On the 17th of October, Lieutenant-Colonel Chisholm, recently promoted, died. His loss was keenly felt, for not only was he a most popular officer who treated all those with whom he came in contact with justice and consideration, but his many years of service in West Africa, since 1809, had given him an insight into native character and affairs that was of the utmost value. No other event of any importance occurred until March 1825, when Major

General Charles Turner, who had recently been appointed **1824-1826** Governor-in-Chief of the British Settlements in West Africa, arrived at Cape Coast. He was accompanied by three transports bringing a further detachment of the Royal African Colonial Corps from England and 200 men of the 2nd West India Regiment from Sierra Leone.

Finding that the Ashantis had retired to their own country, the new Governor issued the following proclamation.

“ By His Excellency Major-General Turner, C.B., Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of the British Settlements on the Western Coast of Africa :

“ Charles Turner to the people of Cape Coast, to the people of the other British Settlements on the Gold Coast, and to the surrounding nations, friends and allies of England : The King of the Ashantis has, by assistance of the Elmina people, waged a cruel and unjust war against you and us : he has suffered for his crimes and rashness, and Elmina is only suffered to stand because the King of the Dutch and the King of England, my master, are at peace ; but I have represented their conduct, and their fate will depend on the orders I may receive. You have all stood forward in defence of your rights, and I thank you in the name of the King, my master. England does not wish for any wars : she wishes the natives of Africa to be free, happy and rich ; she wishes for nothing in this country but lawful trade and commerce. If the King of Ashanti will content himself with governing his own nation and his own people, and does not stop the trade of the interior with the coast, or attempt to oppress his neighbours, let him say so to me, and I will make a treaty with him on these terms ; but I will not make peace with him on any other terms, nor until he gives up every claim to tribute or subjection from the surrounding nations.

“ Given at Cape Coast this 2nd day of April 1825.

“ By His Excellency's command

“ (Signed) WILLIAM WILLIAMS,

“ Acting Colonial Secretary.

“ God save the King.”

1824-1826 The bombastic tone of this proclamation was hardly justified by the facts. The Ashantis had not asked for a treaty and in the circumstances were not likely to do so. This war had been the final result of the treatment meted out to Osai Tutu Kwamina by Governor Hope Smith in the matter of the former treaties and the "notes" for the forts, and the actual invasion had been directed to the capture of Chibu, who was a revolted subject of the King of Ashanti. Though it is true that the Ashantis had met with several reverses during the campaign, yet they must certainly be adjudged the victors in the war as a whole. They had killed a British Governor and carried his head in triumph to their capital, where it still remained as evidence of their prowess ; they had practically annihilated his army, and had been in possession of large tracts of the country for not less than six months and had entirely depopulated and devastated them ; they had compelled the British troops to seek the shelter of their forts and had been the indirect cause of Cape Coast being burned, and finally, when compelled by want of provisions and disease, they had retired of their own accord and unmolested. In these circumstances it was not to be expected that they would sue for peace, and the boastful tone adopted by the Governor, in proudly declaiming that he would grant no peace except upon his own terms and demanding the renunciation by the Ashantis of all claims to tribute and allegiance from the various tribes they had subdued, was supremely ridiculous and can have deceived no one who chose to think. Even the Governor himself seems to have been none too certain what he meant ; for in the same breath he professes willingness that the King should govern " his own nation and his own people," and yet claims that he must give up all his rights over " the surrounding tribes." Unless his first words are to be taken as an example of redundancy, the use of the word " people " in addition to " nation " can only be in reference to those tribes, not Ashantis, to whose allegiance the king was entitled by right of conquest, including of course, the coast tribes, and the latter passage then becomes contradictory.

On the 14th of April the Governor returned to Sierra Leone, taking nearly all the Royal African Colonial Corps with him and sending the 2nd West India Regiment to the West Indies. The Gold Coast was thus left almost entirely without regular troops. He died in the following March, and Major-General Sir Neil Campbell was appointed on the 18th of May 1826 to succeed him. He was ordered to sail at once, as news had been received that another Ashanti army was advancing towards the coast. Reaching Sierra Leone on the 22nd of August, it was the 19th of September before he arrived at Cape Coast, but by then the most important battle in the history of the Gold Coast had been fought and won.

This new Ashanti army had left Kumasi just after the New Year, and for seven months overran Fanti, burning the towns and villages and plundering the farms, without meeting with the slightest opposition. Essikuma in particular was totally destroyed, for Kwesi Amankwa, though faithful to the Ashantis during the last invasion, had reconsidered his position since their return to Kumasi and joined the English allies.

At the end of July the Ashantis determined to inflict signal punishment on the Accras for their repudiation of their alliance, and concentrated their whole force a little to the north of the town in the neighbourhood of Dodowa. A large army, composed of the few men of the Royal African Colonial Corps that General Turner had left, the Cape Coast and Anamabo Militia and the Native Allies, was at once collected to join the Accras in repelling the threatened attack, and by the 7th of August the whole British force was encamped four miles south of Dodowa, where the country is an open, slightly undulating, grass-covered plain with scattered clumps of small trees and brushwood. The English were glad to think that they were at last to have an opportunity of trying their strength against their old enemies in a pitched battle in the open, where they would be able to avail themselves of ordinary military tactics instead of having to encounter the many disadvantages entailed by that

1824-1826 bush warfare, at which the Ashantis, from long experience, CHAP. XXI were so expert.

The 7th of August was a Monday, a day considered propitious by the Ashantis, and it was confidently expected that they would attack. The English fighting line extended east and west for about four miles. In the centre were the Cape Coast Militia under Mr. John Jackson, the Anamabo Militia under Mr. Hutchinson, the Accra Militia under Mr. J. W. Hanson,¹ the Christiansborg Militia under Mr. Henry Richter, and about 60 of the Royal African Colonial Corps posted in the rear as a reserve. The Akwamus were on the right and the Denkeras and Akims on the left. All the allies were distinguished by strips of calico tied to the barrels of their muskets and large sea shells hanging from their necks in front and behind. Lieutenant Colonel Purdon was in command, and the other officers engaged were Captains Hingston and Rogers and Lieutenant Calder of the Royal African Colonial Corps, and Doctor Young.

The King's drum was soon heard beating the advance, and at about half-past nine the Ashantis attacked from right to left. The native allies had been quarrelling amongst themselves for several days as to the positions they were to occupy, each tribe professing great anxiety to find itself opposed to the King ; but in the end they were all disappointed, for Okotu had been told there were white men in the centre and had chosen this as the place of greatest honour against which to lead his men in person. The men in the centre were the last to be attacked, and several of the others came up abusing and insulting them and charging them with cowardice, until, as they were seen to be getting out of hand under these gibes, they were pushed forward a little. They had not advanced more than a hundred yards or so when they were met with a terrific fire from the enemy and were at once heavily engaged. But though the Ashantis fought with their accustomed bravery, they could not withstand the steady

¹ Usually commanded by Mr. Bannerman, who, however, was in England in bad health.

advance of the British troops and fell slowly back, stub- 1824-1826
bornly disputing every inch of ground. CHAP. XXI

At one stage of the battle a fierce hand-to-hand fight took place. The frenzied combatants rushed wildly at each other, cutting and slashing with their knives, and a terrible slaughter ensued. Men dragged each other from the opposing ranks and wrestled and stabbed and cut until one or both fell dead. Neither orders nor entreaties were of any avail to check the allies in their mad thirst for blood. They killed the wounded where they lay, knocking those of their own side on the head to end their misery and ripping up their fallen enemies to plunge their hands into their bodies and tear out their hearts ; and while this massacre was going on, the confusion was still further increased by a sudden explosion as one of the Ashanti Chiefs blew himself up with powder, nearly involving some of the Europeans in his own destruction.

As the enemy retired, enormous quantities of plunder fell into the hands of the allies, who, tiring of bloodshed, were soon so engrossed in collecting the spoils that they neglected to follow up the advantage they had gained. But the day was not yet won ; for the whole of the Danish Accras had already fled, and some of the Dutch Accras on the left of the centre now gave way and allowed the Ashantis to press forward into their place, thereby causing the greatest alarm and quickly recalling the other allies to a sense of duty. The enemy at the same time made a furious onslaught on the centre and drove it back in confusion, while a second division opened a heavy fire on its flank.

At this critical moment, when the issue of the battle trembled in the balance and there seemed every likelihood that the Ashantis would after all gain the victory, Colonel Purdon called up the reserve and ordered them to open fire with Congreve rockets. The consternation caused by these terrible missiles, now used against the Ashantis for the first time, can scarcely be imagined. The noise they made, the long tail of fire they left behind them, the loud explosions, and the fearful wounds they inflicted,

1824-1826 led the enemy to believe that the English had some great **CHAP. XXI** "fetish" and were fighting them with actual thunder and lightning. For a few moments they stood their ground, almost too astonished to act, but panic then seized them, they broke and fled in the wildest disorder, and the victory was complete.

In the meantime, Kujo Chibu on the left had been fighting as bravely as ever, and though the Winnebas had fled at the first volley and never halted until they reached Accra, his Denkeras had stood firm and driven the enemy steadily back. On the right too, the King of Akwamu had driven all before him, penetrating right into the enemy's camp and taking him in the flank, and the issue of the battle on this side had never for a moment been in doubt. The short, dry grass had caught fire, and dense clouds of smoke covered his advance, which could only be traced by the occasional explosions and sudden columns of thicker smoke as one Chief after another blew himself up in despair.

Kwesi Amankwa the Chief of Essikuma, too, performed prodigies of valour. He had frequently been accused of treachery by the other allies and was determined to give convincing proof of his loyalty by accomplishing no less a feat than the capture, either dead or alive, of Osai Okotu himself. He lost his life in the attempt, but not before he had succeeded in reaching the King's side and had actually laid his hand on the side of his basket palanquin to pull him down. He was then shot in the neck and secured. Okotu upbraided him for his treachery and ordered him to follow him, but he flatly refused, and a party of his men who were hastening to his support only arrived in time to see his head struck off.

The people of Christiansborg who, as already stated, had fled at the commencement of the battle, actually had the impudence to return now that all danger was over and began to help themselves to the plunder. When reproached with their cowardice they merely said that it was "against their fetish to fight on a Monday," though it seemed rather late to remember it when the battle began. The value of the spoil must have been enormous;

for the whole of the Ashanti camp, with all the baggage 1824-1826 and gold, fell into the hands of the allies, but it was never CHAP. XXI ascertained how much they actually got.

About one o'clock they began to bring in the heads of the Ashantis who had fallen, amongst which those of several important Chiefs and Princes of the blood were recognized. Amongst the other plunder was a skull taken by the King of Akwapim. It was wrapped in paper covered with Arabic characters and a silk handkerchief, while the whole was enclosed in an outer cover of leopard skin, the emblem of royalty. It was believed at the time that this was the skull of Sir Charles M'Carthy, and Colonel Purdon sent it to England, but it became known later that it was really that of the deceased King Tutu Kwamina, which Okotu had brought with him as a powerful talisman after having been warned by the Tano fetish not to undertake the campaign. He had offered a libation to it on the morning of the battle and implored it to cause the heads of all the English in the field to come and lie by its side. He had also caused human sacrifices to be offered up for each great Chief or Prince as his death was reported to him in the heat of the battle.

With the exception of the officers and sixty men of the Royal African Colonial Corps and the officers commanding the militia, all the men engaged were Africans. The white troops, moreover, were not engaged until the very end, when they were called up to fire the rockets and some grape, and though this probably turned the scale, yet the only assistance the allies could possibly have had up to this time was that which the militia may have derived from the leadership of Europeans and the knowledge that there was a small body of white troops ready to support them. Contrary to the general belief, therefore, the victory of Dodowa was undoubtedly a native victory, and the battle throughout was a contest between Africans.

The militia numbered 500 and the allies 10,820, which brings the total strength of the British force up to 11,380, while the Ashantis are believed to have had about 10,000 men in the field. On the British side, the Royal African

1824-1826 Colonial Corps had no casualties, but Mr. Richter was **CHAP. XXI:** wounded in the thigh ; Kwesi Amankwa, Naboa the Tufuhin of Akwamu, and the Tufuhin of Akim were the only Chiefs killed, while of the rank and file 800 were estimated to have been killed and another 1,000 slightly wounded. The Ashantis are said to have lost fully 5,000 men, many of whom fell to the knife in the fearful melee that occurred when the allies charged. Late in the day, when they had become absolutely satiated with slaughter, the people took many prisoners ; amongst whom were Ekua Pusua one of the King's wives, Akiawa¹ an Ashanti Princess, Kokowa a wife of the King of Jabin, and many other important persons.

All that night the troops lay on their arms ; for the King had been seen walking dejectedly over the scene of his blighted ambitions and it was feared he might even yet make a last desperate attempt to retrieve his fallen fortunes by leading the remnant of his army to renew the attack. "At intervals throughout the night the drums of the different allied Chiefs were sounded, accompanied by the usual recitative of voices. Each time, the sounds were repeated all along the line, until they died away in the distance ; and the hollow beat of the drums, mingled with the weird notes of the singers, suggestive of devilish and mysterious rites and human sacrifices, caused many of the Europeans to shudder. These melancholy sounds were generally followed by answering wails and lamentations from the clumps of trees and bushes in front, where the unhappy Ashanti women were searching for their relatives amongst the heaps of slain, and whose voices rose out of the intense blackness of the night like the cries of despairing spirits. It was a veritable night of horror."²

When day broke on the morning after the battle, nothing would induce the allies to follow the Ashantis as they might reasonably have been expected to do after so decisive a victory. Their one thought was to see their booty stored in a safe place, and they set out at once for Accra, all heavily laden. Major Ricketts indeed has

¹ Or Akianwa.

² Ellis, *History of the Gold Coast*, p. 184.

recorded his belief that if the Ashantis had delayed the 1824-1826 battle for a few weeks the coalition against them would CHAP. XXI have fallen to pieces, so jealous were the various units of each other. The Ashantis might then have marched into Accra practically unopposed.

One result of this victory was that the English for the first time became the owners of the land on which their forts and castles stood and the payments of ground rent on the "notes," which had been such a source of trouble in the past, at once ceased. These notes having been claimed from the Fanti Chiefs by right of conquest, now reverted by the same right to the English, and the sites to which they referred became their absolute property. In the same way, they really became the owners of the land on which Elmina Castle, Fort Crève Cœur and Christiansborg Castle stood and entitled to the rents for them. This right however was never claimed, and the Dutch at any rate continued the payment for Elmina Castle to the King of Ashanti: a fact that gave rise to much trouble in later years.

CHAPTER XXII

NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE

1826 TO 1829

1826-1829 **MAJOR-GENERAL SIR NEIL CAMPBELL**, the new Governor-in-Chief, landed at Cape Coast on the 21st of August 1826, just fourteen days after the battle of Dodowa had been fought and won. He held an informal meeting with the Chiefs and Headmen of Cape Coast the same day and congratulated them on their recent victory, but beyond this nothing was done until the 26th of September, when Kujo Chibu King of Denkera, Awusuku King of Tufel, Amonu King of Anamabo, and Bafo one of his Chiefs, Aduku King of Mankesim, and the Chiefs and Headmen of Cape Coast were summoned to attend a meeting in the Castle Hall. The Governor, after thanking them in the name of the King of England for the parts they had played in the battle of Dodowa and congratulating them on the bravery they had shown, suggested that the present time, while the King was thoroughly beaten and humbled, would be a suitable occasion on which to send messengers to inform him that, should he desire peace, it would be granted on his giving security for his future conduct towards the English and their allies.

This, after the proclamation of Major-General Turner, was indeed going to the opposite extreme. That officer, after the Ashantis had brought a victorious campaign to its conclusion and only retired to their country on account of sickness and want of provisions, had issued a pompous manifesto in which he asserted that he would only grant them a peace and make a treaty—for which

by the way, they had never asked—upon his own terms ; 1826-1829 while now, after they had met with a crushing defeat CHAP. XXXII and been ignominiously routed, Sir Neil Campbell was proposing to make overtures to them for peace and to assure them that it would be granted upon what would certainly have been very favourable terms. Though such clemency might commend itself to certain European minds, it was so utterly opposed to all African precedent and custom that it could never be understood by the Chiefs. Amongst the people of the Gold Coast, as with other races, it is the conquered who are expected first to sue for peace, and the allies knew only too well, and far better than any newly appointed Governor could possibly do, that any overtures of this nature that they might make would only be construed by the Ashantis into a confession of fear, or possibly even into an admission of defeat, and thus render the victory they had gained fruitless. They, therefore, refused point blank to sanction any such negotiations, and although the Governor used every argument he could think of to persuade them that while such a construction might have been placed on their overtures if they had been made after a defeat, it was impossible that they could be considered in the same light after such a victory, and that their object in going to war in the first instance had been to obtain peace, nothing would induce them to alter their decision.

After a great deal of argument, the Chiefs finally asked that the further consideration of this question might be deferred for twelve months and assured the Governor that within that time the Ashantis themselves would sue for peace. Subsequent events proved the truth of their words ; but the Governor would not hear of any such delay and they then explained that in any case they could not sanction any negotiation without the concurrence of the other allies, the Kings of Akim, Akwamu, and Akwapim, who had not been summoned to the meeting on account of the distance at which they lived. The Governor objected to this on the score of the time required to send for them, but said that he had written to Captain

1826-1829 Hingston instructing him to meet these Chiefs at Accra
CHAP. XXII and ascertain their views, and finally told the Chiefs that his orders from England were peremptory, and that if they would not consent to an immediate settlement he would conclude a peace for the English without making any stipulations on their behalf.

The Kings and Chiefs, thoroughly dissatisfied with the result of this meeting, still remained in Cape Coast, and the Governor, in continuance of his policy, now decided to send presents and a letter explaining his wishes and proposals to the King of Ashanti. To enable him to do this, the King of Cape Coast was applied to for a party of three men, one of whom was to be able to write, who were to go to Kumasi on this mission ; and the Kings of Denkera, Tufel, Wassaw and Fanti and the Chiefs of Assin were each required to furnish a few men as escort. This, however, they flatly refused to do, and were reported to have said that if any harm befel those who went they would only have themselves to blame for ever having left Cape Coast. Kujo Chibu was, therefore, ordered to come to the Castle and explain his conduct ; but he failed to appear, not from any want of respect for the Governor, but because he was afraid he would be made a prisoner in the Castle and offered to the Ashantis as the price of peace. This reason, however, was not understood at the time, and he and the King of Tufel were ordered to leave Cape Coast at an hour's notice. Thus this brave old man, who had fought side by side with the English with the most consistent loyalty and valour ever since the beginning of the war, was now hounded out of the very town that he had so materially assisted to defend.

All idea of the mission to Kumasi was now abandoned ; but these proceedings of Sir Neil Campbell, who, ignorant of African custom and character, had blindly adhered to the letter of his instructions, had a very bad effect on the people throughout the whole country, reawakening all their old feelings of distrust and alienating them from that friendship for the English which had so recently been cemented by the victory of Dodowa. So universal

was this feeling that, when the Governor went to Accra 1826-1829 on the 10th of October to see the Chiefs of the eastern districts, they refused as one man to attend the meeting. Thus, thwarted on every side and unable to make the least progress, Sir Neil Campbell returned to Sierra Leone on the 15th of November, leaving Captain Ricketts in charge of the Gold Coast.

On the 15th of January 1827 messengers arrived at Cape Coast from the King of Adansi,¹ who said he had undertaken to act as an intermediary for the Ashantis in suing for peace and wanted the Governor to depute some officers to attend at Yankumasi Assin, where he would arbitrate between the two parties. Captain Ricketts, of course, declined to listen to any such proposal, and insisted that any palaver in which the English were so directly concerned must be held at Cape Coast, though he had no objection to the Cape Coast Chiefs going to Yankumasi Assin, if they so wished, to hear what the King of Adansi had to say.

A great deal of unnecessary delay now occurred, during which numerous messengers were sent backwards and forwards between Cape Coast and Assin. Amongst others, two soldiers were sent up by Captain Ricketts to ask the King of Adansi through the Assin Chiefs to deliver the following message to the King of Ashanti: "That the Commandant had received orders to make peace with the Ashantis for the English, and for such of the native tribes as were desirous of being included in this pacific proposal; and that if the Ashantis were inclined to peace, he should be happy to see any of them at Cape Coast for that purpose; that should they be afraid of obstruction in their way down, he would, on being acquainted therewith through the Assins, take measures to secure their safety both in coming and returning."² Soon after the despatch of this message a sergeant and a small party of

¹ The Adansis were those Assins who had remained north of the Pra when the remainder of the tribe migrated south during the disturbances in 1806.

² Ricketts, pp. 135-36.

1826-1829 men were sent up to Yankumasi Assin as an escort for any **CHAP. XXII** Ashanti messengers who might arrive there and wish to be conducted to the coast ; but they returned a few weeks later with a message from the King of Adansi repeating that he was the person who settled all differences between the Ashantis and those at war with them and again asking the Commandant of Cape Coast to send messengers to him, when he undertook to see the King of Ashanti at once about peace. To this Captain Ricketts replied on the 14th of May, thanking the King for his offer, but saying " that the King of England wants no war with the natives of Africa ; justice is all that is required . . . that if the King of Ashanti is willing to make peace, and if he will send to Adansi proper persons for that purpose, I will, on being acquainted therewith through the Assins, send up a guard to meet them half way : that the Ashantis need not be afraid of sending to Cape Coast, as I and the Cape Coast people will take care that none of them shall be molested, either in coming or returning ; and when peace shall be made, all quarrels will be forgotten."¹ After the interchange of innumerable messages and months of tedious haggling, during which it was more than once rumoured that Ashanti messengers were on their way to the coast, a few men did at length reach Yankumasi Assin early in September and were detained there until the Lieutenant-Governor, Lieutenant-Colonel Lumley, arrived from Sierra Leone on the 11th of October, when they were called down to Cape Coast, where they arrived on the 23rd.

At the meeting with Colonel Lumley in the Castle Hall, the chief messenger, who was a near relative of the King of Ashanti, when called on to state his business, took his monkey-skin cap with the gold plate on it and handed it with a great deal of ceremony to the King of Adansi, by whom it was passed through several of the Fanti Chiefs to the King of Cape Coast who finally delivered it to the Governor. The messenger then stated that he was authorized by the King of Ashanti to say that he was very sorry for what he had done and hoped the English would pardon

¹ Ricketts, p. 137.

him ; that he now realized that it was useless for him to attempt to fight against white men, and therefore wished to be under their control, and that in token of his submission he had sent his cap to be laid at the feet of the King of England. The Governor, on receiving this message, explained that he could arrange nothing definitely until the allied Chiefs were all present, and the discussion of the actual terms of peace was therefore postponed until they could be assembled.

On the 10th of December, a second meeting was held at which the Kings of Denkera, Tufel, Wassaw, Fanti, Assin, Anamabo and Cape Coast and many other less important Chiefs were all present. The terms of peace which should be offered to the Ashantis were then agreed on as follows :

1. That they should lodge 4,000 ounces of gold in the Castle at Cape Coast as security for their good conduct in the future ;
2. That in the event of their again commencing hostilities, this sum should be forfeited and used for the purchase of arms and ammunition for the British allies ; and,
3. That two members of the Royal Family of Ashanti should be sent to Cape Coast as hostages.

The only allies who were not represented at this meeting were the Kings of Akwamu, Accra, and Akwapim and the Queen of Akim ; but their messengers arrived a few days later, and the terms having been explained to them, signified their approval on the part of their respective Chiefs. It was, of course, understood that the allied tribes included in these arrangements were in future to be entirely independent of Ashanti rule.

While these messengers had been in Cape Coast, several attempts had been made to glean a few particulars of the different engagements in the recent war ; but they seemed suspicious of each other and nothing could be learned beyond the fact that there were in Kumasi a white man who had been taken at Efutu and a Cape Coast mulatto captured at Insamankow. The release of these men was, therefore, demanded before anything else would

1828-1829 be done, and the messengers returned to the capital accompanied by John Carr and John Buckman two educated Cape Coast men, and messengers representing most of the allied Chiefs. They arrived in Kumasi on the 4th of February 1828, and the captives were sent down soon afterwards. They proved to be Private Patrick Riley of the Royal African Colonial Corps, whose capture at Efutu on the 25th of April 1824 has already been mentioned,¹ and John Duncan, a Cape Coast Militiaman.² Carr and Buckman at the same time sent a very favourable report, saying they had been accorded a public reception and were being very well treated by the King, while the people as a whole showed every sign of satisfaction at the prospect of peace.

It now seemed as though peace must speedily be concluded ; but just as all the preliminaries had been satisfactorily arranged, a hitch occurred in the negotiations which delayed the final settlement for some months. The Fantis had never forgotten their old grievance against the Elminas for having seized and sold Fanti fugitives in 1807, and their resentment had been increased by the murder of the Komenda women in 1824. The Elminas had, moreover, fought beside the Ashantis in the engagements at Efutu, Beula and Cape Coast, and had supplied them with powder, which, in defiance of the Dutch Governor, they obtained by night from American ships. Now that they had leisure to attend to such matters, therefore, and the Ashantis were no longer in a position to give their friends any assistance, the allies determined to demand reparation for these injuries and represented their grievances to Colonel Lumley, saying they would be satisfied if the Elminas paid compensation. He accordingly wrote to the Dutch Governor on the subject, who replied that the Elminas denied all the charges against them and absolutely refused to pay any sum whatever. The allies therefore encamped around the town and so completely blockaded it that, after the local plantations had been destroyed, the inhabitants were entirely de-

¹ *Vide* p. 369.

² Captured at Insamankow.

pendant for provisions upon what they could grow under the guns of the forts or import by sea.

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This was the state of affairs when the released prisoners arrived from Kumasi. With them the King sent a message pointing out that, in order to prove the sincerity of his overtures for peace, he had released these men immediately on being told of the Governor's wishes, and asking in return that his chief wife and several other members of the royal family who had been taken prisoners at Dodowa might be given back to him, and that Atjiempon and the other Ashantis who were at Elmina and unable to leave on account of the blockade, might also be sent up to Kumasi. On the arrival of these people, he promised to try to collect the sum required as security so as to conclude peace without further delay.

These requests were certainly fair and reasonable, but unfortunately it was found impossible to comply with either of them. The King's wife was in the hands of the Chief of Christiansborg, whose people had not been included in the negotiations for peace because they were dissatisfied with the terms that had been offered to the Ashantis and hoped to utilize their possession of this important prisoner as a means of extorting even better conditions for themselves. The allies, too, who were encamped around Elmina, absolutely refused to allow any Ashantis to leave until the required security for the King's peaceable behaviour had actually been deposited in Cape Coast Castle; for they fully realized that while the two prisoners whom he had just surrendered were of no importance to him, yet those he was now asking in return were persons of some consequence, and they were afraid that if he once gained his ends and had these people safe in Kumasi, he might repudiate the terms of peace altogether, or at any rate greatly delay its conclusion. The blockade of Elmina was therefore maintained.

Both Captain Lumley and Captain Ricketts had now gone to Sierra Leone, and Captain Hingston was in charge of the Gold Coast. At the end of April 1828 a letter arrived from the King, in which he entered a formal protest

1826-1829 against the action of the allies in blockading Elmina, **CHAP. XXII** pointing out that he had supposed that all his subjects, amongst whom were the Elminas, would be included in the peace. He also complained that the sum demanded as security, namely, 4,000 ounces of gold (equivalent to nearly £16,000) was excessive, but offered to deposit 400 ounces and promised to send it down immediately on the return of his messenger.

This contention of the King that the Elminas were his subjects and should be considered as included in the peace equally with the Ashantis themselves was a just one. There can be no doubt that they not only did, but always had owed allegiance to Ashanti, and as the British allies were all to participate in the peace on the one side, the Elminas, as the allies of Ashanti, were certainly entitled to be similarly included on the other. In these circumstances, the action of the allies in establishing hostile camps around the town must be regarded as a distinct act of war against Ashanti and a breach of the armistice, to which the King was perfectly justified in taking exception. Captain Hingston, however, ignored this subject altogether in his reply and, having been instructed by the Governor to make no alterations in the terms of peace that had been offered, merely stated that no other terms than those originally proposed, namely the deposit of 4,000 ounces of gold in the Castle and the delivery of two hostages of royal blood, could be acceded to ; that At-jiempon and the other Ashantis would not be allowed to return to Kumasi until these conditions had been fulfilled ; and that only then would an effort be made to co-operate with the Dutch Governor in settling the dispute between the Fantis and Elminas. This letter was written on the 1st of May, and the King was told he must send back the messengers from the allied tribes within twenty days if he did not intend to agree to these terms.

No reply had been received from the King when Major Ricketts returned from Sierra Leone on the 5th of June, and he, therefore, wrote to Osai Okotu, saying he was sorry to find peace had not yet been concluded and asking to

be informed what he intended doing. Four letters were 1828-1829 received from Carr and Buckman during July, from which it was abundantly evident that the King had no intention of concluding peace so long as the blockade of Elmina was continued. His chief grounds of complaint were : That he had surrendered Mr. Williams after the battle of Insamankow without demanding any ransom ; that he had also released Riley and Duncan at the first request, but that the return of the Ashantis whom he had asked in exchange had been refused ; that he had reason to believe that the English and their allies were not so sincere in their desire for peace as they professed to be, but intended to kill the Ashantis at Elmina ; and lastly, that no reduction had been made in the amount of the security that had been demanded. No African ever names the price he really wants in the first instance or dreams of paying that first asked, and this strict adherence to the original amount was so contrary to all local custom that the King was apparently unable to understand it and possibly suspected some trickery or was afraid that, after he had paid the English, he might have to meet similar demands from all their allies as well.

The chief obstacle, however, was undoubtedly the blockade of Elmina ; and in order to facilitate matters as far as possible, Major Ricketts did everything in his power to induce the allies to break up their camps. For this purpose he again visited the town and met the Elmina Chiefs and the Ashantis quartered there, with the Dutch Governor in the Castle. The Elminas said they would be willing to meet the allied Chiefs and bind themselves to act with them in the event of any future aggressions on the part of the Ashantis, for they agreed that in no other way could the peace of the Gold Coast be assured ; but they evidently held the Fantis in profound contempt and said they could not be trusted and would as likely as not themselves join the Ashantis on some other occasion. The Fantis, on the other hand, refused to put faith in any promises the Elminas might make, and the negotiations consequently fell through.

1826-1829 The Home Government now decided to abandon its **CHAP. XXII** Possessions on the Gold Coast altogether. A man-of-war was sent out to remove the merchants and their property, and Major Ricketts was ordered to destroy the forts before he left. This decision was the immediate outcome of the late war. The length of time this had lasted, the heavy expenses and the disasters incurred, and the extremely unsatisfactory state of affairs that still existed, had thoroughly sickened the Government of its Settlements in the country and made it only too anxious to retire from so unprofitable a Possession ; and since the disgraceful defeat at Insamankow had now been amply avenged by the victory at Dodowa, it was able to take this step without incurring the imputation of cowardice.

These arrangements, however, by no means suited the merchants. They had calculated the risks of trade in such a country before they embarked in it, and although that trade had involved them in many heavy losses, yet they could only regard the prospect of abandoning it now, at the very time when, owing to the defeat of the Ashantis, they seemed likely to reap the reward of their patience, with the greatest dissatisfaction. Moreover, they must have realized by this time that the Ashantis were far too much alive to the advantages of having a convenient source of supply of the numerous articles that they required ever to think of driving them from the country or seriously interfering with their business, and consequently, that whether they eventually conquered the Fantis and ruled the coast or not, their own prospects would be almost equally good. The outlook was even more alarming still to the Fantis and other coast tribes, who pictured themselves thus left unprotected and at the absolute mercy of their enemies.

The merchants, therefore, represented their position to the Home Government, and their views and arguments were so well supported by Major Ricketts that a middle course was adopted and the forts on the Gold Coast were handed over to them on certain conditions.¹ The affairs

¹ *Report of Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa (1842), part ii, Appendix, pp. 1, 2.*

of the forts were to be managed principally by a committee of three London merchants nominated by the Government. They were allowed a grant of £4,000¹ annually to enable them to maintain Cape Coast Castle and James Fort Accra, which were still to be considered Dependencies of Sierra Leone. They were to appoint officers, subject to confirmation by the Government; to render accounts of the manner in which the grant had been spent and returns of the trade, by which the amount of future grants would be estimated; and all correspondence from the Coast was to be addressed to them. The local establishment was to consist of a Governor or President of the Council at £620 a year, who was to be assisted by a Council of Magistrates elected annually on the 24th of June from among the merchants on the Coast; a surgeon and an officer to command the garrison at £200 each, and a commandant for James Fort at £100. Messrs. Barnes, Brown and Forster were appointed to the London Committee. They were not paid, but their Secretary had £200 a year, and Mr. Barnes drew up a code of rules² for the regulation of affairs on the Coast, which was approved by the Secretary of State. The grant, for the proper expenditure of which the London Committee was responsible, was to be used for the payment of salaries, repairs to the forts, the maintenance of a school,³ and pay and presents to the Fanti Chiefs. It was stipulated that the harbours of Cape Coast and Accra should be open to all vessels without the payment of any duty whatever, and the Senior Naval Officer on the West African Station was to make an annual inspection of the forts and report on their condition to the Government. British law was to continue in force within the forts, but the Council of Magistrates was forbidden to "exercise authority or jurisdiction over the districts and natives under the immediate influence and protection of the forts,

¹ From 1834 to 1839 only £3,500 was granted.

² Parliamentary Paper, *Report of Committee on West Coast of Africa* (1842), part ii, pp. 147-8.

³ There were 165 boys attending a few years later.

1826-1829 but solely in the forts, roadsteads or harbours thereunto
CHAP. XXII adjoining, as well as over the persons residing therein."

Thus the peculiar system was originated by which, while the Gold Coast still continued technically a Dependency of Sierra Leone, its actual government was entrusted to a Committee of Merchants in London ; and while they corresponded with and issued orders to their own officer on the spot, who was their servant, the Government of the Crown had to rely upon them for any information it desired as to what went on there.

Pending the appointment of a Governor, the oldest trader on the Coast, Mr. John Jackson, who had been in the service of the old Company, was chosen to act as President of the Council, and Major Ricketts handed over to him the forts and such of the garrison as desired to take service under the new Government¹ on the 25th of June, though he himself did not leave for Sierra Leone until the 20th of September. During his term of office he had done much to improve Cape Coast. He had had all the houses overlooking the Castle pulled down and cleared a large open space around it, and made several good streets through the town, where the houses had hitherto been crowded together without any attempt at orderly arrangement.

Towards the end of 1829 the allies, who were beginning to find the passive occupation of their camps at Elmina rather dull, were joined by a number of the Cape Coast Militia, who came over in defiance of orders and made an attack on the town. They were very easily driven back, however, and the guns of Fort Conraadsburg converted their retreat into a veritable rout.

¹ 185 of the Royal African Colonial Corps engaged for three years.

CHAPTER XXIII

GOVERNOR MACLEAN'S TREATY AND GOVERNMENT

1830 TO 1837

MR. JACKSON's term of office did not last long ; for though 1830-1837 the Committee of Merchants in London offered to confirm his appointment, it was his opinion, as well as that of the other traders on the Coast, that the officer at the head of affairs should have no local interests and be able to devote his whole time to his duties as Governor. They decided, therefore, that it would be better to appoint someone from outside and petitioned the Government to offer the post to Captain George Maclean, an officer in the Royal African Colonial Corps, who had come under their notice when he accompanied Colonel Lumley to the Gold Coast in 1826 as his Military Secretary. He accepted the appointment and arrived in Cape Coast on the 19th of February 1830.

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The new Governor, on his arrival in the country, found its affairs in a most unsatisfactory state. Although the freedom from actual invasion had enabled the people to recultivate their farms and reoccupy many of the bush villages, yet there could be no real sense of security, for no peace had been made and everything was still in a very unsettled condition. The Gold Coast trade was absolutely annihilated ; for intercourse with Ashanti had never been renewed since the war, and such trade as the Ashantis now engaged in was carried on at Assini. The Ashantis themselves were still digesting their defeat at Dodowa and brooding over the wrong done them by the Fantis in investing Elmina ; but, though they had hitherto

1880-1887 remained sullenly inactive and given no sign of open **CHAP. XXIII** aggression, there was no guarantee that this state of affairs would continue much longer, nor was it likely to do so. Indeed, there was every probability that the conduct of the Fantis, who, as Cruikshank says, never knew any half-measures but were "ever in the extreme of hopeless dejection or arrogant assumption," and were now boastfully singing of their victory and vaunting their own invincibility, would eventually so exasperate the Ashantis that they would make a desperate effort to wipe out their defeat and resubdue the coast tribes. Had they done so, the latter were now so engrossed with intertribal quarrels and disputes that it is very doubtful if they could have repeated the victory gained by their former combination. Their repulse from Elmina, too, had by no means extinguished their hatred of the Ashanti allies, nor their hopes of ultimately being able to visit on them some of the sufferings they themselves had endured in the past.

The authority of the English, such as it had ever been, had now almost ceased to exist ; and it was only by the appointment of a man of exceptional ability that the situation could be saved and order restored out of the chaos that reigned. It was indeed fortunate for the Gold Coast people that such a man had been found in the person of Captain Maclean, who was undoubtedly one of the ablest, if not indeed the ablest, and at the same time one of the most maligned Governors the country has ever had. Cruikshank, who served under him, thus describes his character : "Calm and deliberate in forming a judgment, and carefully canvassing in his own mind all the bearings of every subject under review, his caution in coming to a conclusion appeared to a superficial observer to amount almost to timidity. He listened with attention to, and courted the discussion of, every argument, which could be adduced on both sides of a question ; not with the intention of adopting the views of either disputant, but of quietly storing his mind with all its pros and cons, and of afterwards submitting them to the ordeal of private rumination. Opinions thus formed, became a portion of

his faith, which it was next to impossible to shake. In 1880-1887 proportion to the strength of his conviction, was the decision which he displayed in carrying out his resolutions. Once fully satisfied that the course which he was pursuing was morally correct, and that he was adopting measures most likely to lead eventually to beneficial results, he shrank from no difficulty in the path. Endowed with an extraordinary degreee of moral courage, and with a persevering firmness which failures never daunted, he steadily prosecuted his schemes, convinced that sooner or later the result would answer his expectations ; for he had a most abiding belief in the over-ruling direction of Providence. While enemies were maligning his conduct, blackening his fame, and attributing motives and actions to him which his heart had never conceived, strong in conscious rectitude, his constant reply to his anxious friends was : ' I assure you, this gives me no uneasiness at all ; sooner or later the truth will appear, and God would never permit such wickedness to prosper.' And in this belief he reposed with a careless indifference, which others less interested than himself found much difficulty in practising. The same feeling gave rise to the converse idea, also firmly implanted in his mind, that a good object, undertaken from pure and disinterested motives, and prosecuted without injustice, would be crowned with success. It will be easily perceived how invaluable this disposition was to a person intrusted with the government of such a country as the Gold Coast at that time. It rendered him insensible to difficulties, which would have appalled a weaker mind, and led him to undertake measures which to ordinary men, would have seemed to require the slow process of time and progressive civilisation. He thus jumped to difficult results ; and prudently fortifying his new position, and firmly holding every inch of ground which he had gained, prepared for another step. The strongholds of iniquity, which had refused the impress of a single ameliorating influence for ages, were thus captured by a series of skilful *coups de main*, and an opening made for the introduction of a new and better *régime*.

1880-1887 By never allowing himself to be foiled in any measure, but by resolutely persevering towards the desired object, regardless of temporary obstructions and delays, every new enterprise carried with it the prestige of his never-failing success, until, at last, throughout the length and breadth of the land, his fiat became as irrevocable as the laws of the Medes and Persians."¹ Cruikshank's estimate of Maclean's character is no exaggeration, and explains at once how it was that this remarkable man was able, with the small means at his disposal and in spite of apparently insurmountable difficulties and the worry and anxiety of private troubles, to effect a change in the condition of the Gold Coast greater by far than any single man had ever done before or has done since, and lay the foundation of the widespread authority and jurisdiction that has since developed.

Maclean quickly realized that before any hope of renewed trade or the restoration of law and order on the coast could be entertained, it was essential that some proper understanding should be come to with the Ashantis and a definite peace concluded. He, therefore, turned his whole attention to the accomplishment of this object. Fortunately the Ashantis and Fantis were equally anxious to see an end put to the present unsatisfactory state of affairs and to be able to renew their trade. Maclean, therefore, had little difficulty in convening a large meeting at Accra, which was attended by deputies from Kumasi and all the Fanti Chiefs ; but it was by no means so easy to persuade the opposing parties to come to any agreement as to the terms on which peace should be made, and many stormy debates took place before he eventually succeeded in reconciling their views. The Ashantis, on the one hand, found it hard to treat on equal terms with the coast tribes, whom they had been accustomed to conquer whenever they liked and to hold in such absolute subjection and contempt ; while the Fantis, on the other, were so elated by their victory, and now thought themselves so strong, that they were unwilling to accept any

¹ Cruikshank, vol. i, pp. 171 *et seq.*

mere guarantee of future security from molestation, but wanted to claim compensation for all the losses they had suffered in the past. The revolt of the Denkeras and Assins, however, had so weakened the Ashantis and strengthened their enemies, that this, combined with the fact that many of the King's relatives were still prisoners in Cape Coast Castle, at last compelled them to listen to reason. The Fantis were then induced to moderate their demands, the Governor plainly hinting that if they failed to do so and thus obstructed the conclusion of the negotiations, the English might very possibly withdraw their protection. Their alarm at the prospect of abandonment when the Crown gave up the government of the country was too recent for this argument to fail. Maclean also warned the Ashantis that any undue delay on their part might lead to a renewal of hostilities, when greater efforts than ever would be made to crush them once and for all. Thus, after most tedious negotiations, terms were finally agreed to and the following treaty was signed at Cape Coast on the 27th of April 1831, when a salute of twenty-one guns was fired from the Castle to celebrate the conclusion of peace.

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"TREATY OF PEACE, 27th APRIL 1831

"WE the undersigned, namely :

"The Governor of Cape Coast Castle and British Settlements, on the part of His Majesty the King of England ; the Princess 'Akianvah,' and the Chief 'Quagua,' on the part of the King of Ashantee ; 'Aggery,' King of Cape Coast ; 'Adookoo,' King of Fantee ; 'Amonoo,' King of Annamaboe ; 'Chibboe,' King of Dinkara ; 'Ossoo Okoo,' King of Tufel ; 'Animinee,' King of Wassaw ; 'Chibboe,' King of Assin ; the Chiefs of 'Adjumacon' and 'Essacoomah,' and the other Chiefs in alliance with the King of Great Britain, whose names are hereunto appended, do consent to, and hereby ratify the following Treaty of Peace and of Free commerce between ourselves and such other Chiefs as may hereafter adhere to it.

1830-1837 " 1. The King of Ashantee having deposited in Cape Coast Castle, in the presence of the above-mentioned parties, the sum of 600 ounces of gold, and having delivered into the hands of the Governor two young men of the royal family of Ashantee, named ' Ossoo Ansah,' and ' Ossoo In Quantamissah,' as security that he will keep peace with the said parties in all time coming, peace is hereby declared betwixt the said King of Ashantee and all and each of the parties aforesaid, to continue in all time coming. The above securities shall remain in Cape Coast Castle for the space of six years from this date.

 " 2. In order to prevent all quarrels in future which might lead to the infraction of this Treaty of Peace, we, the parties aforesaid, have agreed to the following rules and regulations for the better protection of lawful commerce.

 " The paths shall be perfectly open, and free to all persons engaged in lawful traffic; and persons molesting them in any way whatever, or forcing them to purchase at any particular market, or influencing them by any unfair means whatever, shall be declared guilty of infringing this Treaty, and be liable to the severest punishment.

 " Panyarring, denouncing, and swearing on or by any person or thing whatever, are hereby strictly forbidden, and all persons infringing this rule shall be rigorously punished; and no master or chief shall be answerable for the crimes of his servants, unless done by his orders or consent, or when under his control.

 " As the King of Ashantee has renounced all right or title to any tribute or homage from the Kings of Dinkara, Assin, and others formerly his subjects, so, on the other hands, these parties are strictly prohibited from insulting, by improper speaking or in any other way, their former master, such conduct being calculated to produce quarrels and wars.

 " All ' palavers ' are to be decided in the manner mentioned in the terms and conditions of peace already agreed to by the parties to this treaty.

 " Signed in the Great Hall of Cape Coast Castle this 27th day of April 1831, by the parties to this Treaty,

and sealed with the great seal of the Colony in their 1880-1887 presence.

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“ (Signed) GEO. MACLEAN, Governor.

“ Their marks

- “ X AKIANVAH, Princess of Ashantee.
- “ X QUAGUA, Chief of Ashantee.
- “ X AGGERY, King of Cape Coast.
- “ X ADOOKOO, King of Fantee.
- “ X AMONOO, King of Annamaboe.
- “ X ABOOKOO, Chief of Akomfee.
- “ X OTTOO, Chief of Abrah.
- “ X CHIBBOO, King of Assin.
- “ X CUDJOE CHIBBOO, King of Dinkara.
- “ X GEBEL, Assin Chief.
- “ X OSSO OKOO, King of Tufel.
- “ X APOLLONIA, Chiefs.
- “ X AKINNIE, Chief of Agah.”

The custom of panyarring¹ referred to in this treaty consisted in seizing persons or their goods in order to obtain payment of debts or the return of property that was being unjustly withheld. It was very common on the Gold Coast and was frequently abused and did an immense amount of harm. If a resident of Anamabo was indebted to a Cape Coast man and neglected or refused to pay the debt, or improperly withheld property of any kind from him, the creditor might panyar the first Cape Coast man he could lay hands on and hold him as security. This usually had an immediate effect, for the relatives of the man panyarred would at once bring pressure on the debtor to compel him to pay and release the security. The process, however, was a costly one and while the slave trade existed it was no uncommon thing for a man to be thus panyarred and sold off the Coast before his family could ascertain his whereabouts or to which par-

¹ “ Panyarring (pronounced payaring) is rather a law than a custom, and although sometimes prostituted to bad purposes, is frequently the only way to recover a just debt. If exercised unlawfully, the amount of damages to be paid as satisfaction is so much as to cause the financial ruin of the wrong-doer.” (Sarbah, *Fanti Customary Laws*, p. 116.)

1880-1887 ticular captain he had been sold. Such cases gave rise
CHAP. XXIII to protracted and very expensive palavers, which frequently terminated in the sale of a whole family.

The prisoners taken at Dodowa were now released and returned to Ashanti, and the gold he had deposited in the Castle as security was given back to the King at the end of the stipulated time. This, in conjunction with the fact that it had never been disturbed but was handed back to his messengers in the original packages, went far to reassure the Ashantis and induce them to renew their faith in British honour, which had been so rudely shaken by Governor Hope Smith's conduct. Of the two Ashanti princes handed over as hostages, Ansa was a son of the late King Tutu Kwamina, and Inkwantabissa of the reigning monarch Okotu. They were granted a pension of £100 a year each and sent to England—where they were present at the Coronation of Queen Victoria—to be educated.¹ Inkwantabissa died² soon after their return to the Coast, but Ansa lived for many years and played his part in subsequent history.

According to Reindorf, the proceedings at Cape Coast were marred by quarrels just as those at Accra had been. He says that a stick and stone fight occurred between some of the Wassaw Chiefs, and that Maclean, to quell the disturbance, ordered a hundred lashes to be given to each Chief who had allowed his people to fight ; whereupon one of them, Boampon, felt the disgrace so keenly that he went behind a house in the town and committed suicide by cutting his throat. If this account is true, it may seem to have been a rather high-handed proceeding on the part of Maclean ; but after the long and difficult negotiations at Accra had been brought to a successful conclusion and the much-desired peace was at last about to be made, he doubtless saw in these disturbances the beginning of a fresh series of delays, or even danger of an assault on the Ashanti delegates, which might have ended in the abandonment of the treaty or

¹ They were placed in the charge of the Rev. Thomas Pyne.

² 8th of January 1859.

an actual renewal of the war, and felt compelled to adopt 1830-1837 extreme measures and treat the offenders with a degree CHAP. XXIII. of severity that he might not otherwise have shown.

Exactly what is meant by the last paragraph of this treaty which refers to "the terms and conditions of peace already agreed to," is none too clear. The question, indeed, arose at a later date. There is little doubt, however, that it really refers to the terms that had been offered on the 10th of December 1827, but which the Ashantis, after some hesitation, had rejected. These terms, therefore, were never signed and must be regarded as an abortive treaty. The new treaty modifies them in some respects, but the manner in which future disputes were to be settled now appears to have been agreed to, and this rather vague reference made to it instead of embodying the actual terms in the new document. The following extract from this former memorandum is, at any rate, the only proposal or agreement now extant that seems to cover the ground, with the exception of the similar stipulations in the treaty of 1817, which, apart from its having been abrogated by the subsequent war, was too sore a point with the Ashantis to have been referred to now.

"5. To prevent as much as possible any future war, it is agreed that in case of any of the parties subscribing to these articles committing an act of aggression, and complaint being made thereof to the Governor-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's possessions on this coast (or in the absence of the said Governor from Cape Coast, to the Commandant of Cape Coast Castle for the time being, as his representative), any satisfaction which the circumstances of the case may require, will be adjudged to the aggrieved party by the said Governor-in-Chief or his representative; who will also call to his assistance two or more of the adjacent kings or chiefs as a council.

"6. If any of the allied kings or chiefs shall be the aggressor or aggressors as aforesaid, and if such an aggressor or aggressors shall refuse to abide by the decision of the Governor, or his representative, with the chiefs assembled with him in council; in that case he or they will no longer

1880-1887 be considered as of the confederacy, and must arrange
CHAP. XXIII his or their disputes as they best can.

" 7. In the event of the Ashantees becoming the aggressors, and refusing to abide by the decision of the Governor (or his representative) and council aforesaid, then the sum of money lodged in Cape Coast Castle, for the purpose named in the 4th article of these terms shall be forfeited for ever, and the said sum of money may, if it be deemed expedient, be expended in the purchase of arms, ammunition, and other warlike stores, for the purpose of carrying on war against the King of Ashantee and his people."

Assuming, therefore, that these are the conditions referred to—and this is a point on which there is little room for doubt—then this treaty mutually binds the three parties, British, Ashantis and Fanti allies, by precise rules, and the superior authority of the former is definitely acknowledged by the implied agreement of the other two to accept the Governor as referee in any case of dispute. There was also a tacit understanding that the allies would be afforded British protection in the event of any further aggression on the part of the Ashantis.

Having thus secured the peace of the country, Maclean now had time to turn his attention to the coast tribes and did everything in his power to improve and elevate them, to encourage trade, to ensure the impartial administration of justice, and to discourage, and in course of time abolish those of their customs that were objectionable.

The task he had set himself was not an easy one. The eradication of customs that have been in use from time immemorial and which are, moreover, the outcome of, or at least intimately connected with, the religious beliefs of the people who practise them, can never be accomplished in a day ; and the advancement in civilization of a savage race must always be a slow and gradual process, to be effected by time and the increasing knowledge of the benefits to be derived from such improvement rather than by the sudden and rigid enforcement of new laws

and prohibitions. Maclean fortunately realized this fact **1880-1887**
and thoroughly understood that, although the state of **CHAP. XXIII**
society with which he had to deal sorely needed speedy
and drastic remedies, yet the desired changes could only
be effected by slow degrees and by the exercise of patient
tact and toleration and a confident belief in better things
to come. He was careful, therefore, to interfere only
with those customs which affected the rights and liberty
of the individual and with those laws which seemed to
err unduly on the side of harshness. Moreover, he effected
his reforms gradually, by exposing the unfitness of the
existing state of affairs rather than by sudden prohibitive
orders, which, if disregarded, he would have been unable
to enforce. He firmly believed in the capabilities of
the people under his care, and it was this conviction of
the possibility of improving them that enabled him to
persevere, and in a large measure to succeed, where another
might probably have given up in despair.

In order to carry out these reforms it was essential
that the authority of the Governor should be paramount,
and that whenever he did give a definite order it should be
obeyed. Maclean ruled, therefore, with a firm hand and,
while he carefully avoided giving any needless or vexatious
commands, required and enforced implicit obedience
to such orders as he found it necessary to issue. A soldier
was stationed in each of the principal towns throughout
the whole Protectorate, and in this way the country was
for the first time policed and a general supervision main-
tained by the Government. Acts of oppression or defiance
of the Governor's orders were reported, the roads rendered
safe for travellers, trade encouraged, and a simple means
provided by which the Governor's wishes or commands
could be communicated to the various Chiefs. A court
was established in Cape Coast Castle, where Maclean
sat as judge, usually assisted by some of the Chiefs. Here
justice was cheaply and impartially administered, either
in strict accordance with the Akan customary law, or, in
those cases in which amelioration of severe laws was
deemed advisable, according to a compromise between

1880-1887 this and British law. Much good was done in this way, **CHAP. XXIII** and the people soon learned to appreciate the benefits they could thus obtain and appeals from the decisions of Chiefs became more and more frequent. Apart from this direct administration of an impartial and temperate justice, the court enabled the Governor to do something towards the extinction of many superstitions, such as the belief in witchcraft ; superstitions which it would have been impolitic, and in fact impossible, to have attacked directly, but which could to some extent be undermined by his constant opposition to the infliction of punishment in such cases and his expressed contemptuous ridicule of these beliefs. The court, too, was frequently attended by the Chiefs of outlying districts with their retinues, so that in course of time, Maclean's ideas of justice became well known and widely disseminated throughout the length and breadth of the country.

It is true that this exercise of jurisdiction and authority beyond the forts themselves was contrary to the strict letter of the conditions on which they had been handed over to the merchants ; but Maclean realized that, if good were to result, they must not be interpreted too literally, and by thus blending an absolutely impartial justice with the Fanti law, he did an incalculable amount of good, and the people's appreciation was alone sufficient to justify such deviation from the original instructions.

There was also another point on which the conditions of transfer were disregarded. It had been stipulated that the harbours of Cape Coast and Accra should be "open to all vessels without payment of any duty whatever," but it appears that a duty of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on British and 5 per cent on foreign imports with extra duties on spirits and a charge of two dollars for port dues was levied at about this time, but countermanded by the Committee in London ; for a petition by the local merchants is extant praying for a renewal of these "foreign and transient duties once in force," to enable them to maintain fifty militia, the lighthouse on Fort William and canoes for boarding ships. This petition evidently had some effect,

for on the 10th of December 1839 an Ordinance was passed **1830-1837** at Sierra Leone, which came into force on the 22nd of **CHAP. XXXII** April 1840, imposing an *ad valorem* duty of one-half per cent on all imports, whether sold ashore or afloat, and a charge of three dollars for every vessel anchoring, payable only once by the same ship within any one period of six months. A return of the amount thus raised was to be rendered on the 31st of December in each year.

The export slave trade had now been absolutely abolished ; and although it was a well-established fact that up to a very short time before this slavers were taking in cargoes within sight of the British forts and in open defiance of the law, there was not a single instance in which a slave was known to have been shipped off the Coast during the whole time of Maclean's administration. Human sacrifices, too, which hitherto had been frequently made by the Fantis, even in Cape Coast itself, were rigidly put down, and though not entirely abolished, so much was done to deter the people from this practice and to ensure the punishment of offenders, that the custom became much less frequent and could only be carried out with great secrecy.

Writing of the changes effected among the people by Maclean, Cruikshank says : " Nothing could more forcibly demonstrate their need of a disinterested superior, and their estimation of the advantages derived from his superintending justice, than the fact, that with a corps of one hundred and twenty men, natives of the country, and with pecuniary resources not exceeding, annually, £4,000, Governor Maclean maintained for a series of years an undisputed sway over an immense extent of territory, comprising a numerous population, composed of different tribes, speaking different languages, and many of them possessed of great physical power. There have been few instances in the history of the world of such an extensive influence, so completely the result of moral force."¹

Yet, though Maclean with his limited means undoubtedly accomplished a marvellous amount of good without having

¹ Cruikshank, vol. ii, p. 6.

1830-1887 recourse to arms, it must not be supposed that he either CHAP. XXIII did or could effect all this without meeting with occasional instances of opposition and revolt. Many of the Chiefs lived in distant parts of the country where it was not easy to maintain constant supervision and they were consequently difficult to control, while they all realized that their own personal dignity and authority suffered by comparison with that now assumed by the Governor, and soon found that they could no longer enrich themselves easily by the extortionate methods they had hitherto practised under the cloak of administering justice. The fetish-men, too, saw that with the gradual realization of the Governor's plans their own power and influence must be proportionately diminished and therefore urged the Chiefs and people to resist these innovations.

Hence, individual Chiefs from time to time attempted to reassert their independence and defy the authority of the Governor. But though during the first few years of his administration these outbreaks were of frequent occurrence, little or nothing ever came of them. The people were too much alive to the advantages they enjoyed under the new conditions to give their own Chiefs any enthusiastic support, while the other Chiefs were only too ready to assist the Governor rather than see one of their rivals successfully defying the authority to which they themselves had to submit. The malcontents would then be cut off from all external communication and, thus shut up in their own districts, were soon compelled to give in. Fines were then inflicted or the Chief deposed, to be reinstated later when he had given security for his good conduct in the future. Eventually the system of requiring deposits of gold from the Chiefs as security was resorted to, so that in the end it came about that nearly every Chief of importance, including even those of Cape Coast who lived under the very walls of the Castle and were under the immediate supervision of the Governor, had a larger or smaller sum in gold deposited in the Castle, which was liable to forfeiture in the event of his disobedience or failure to preserve order in his district. In

these circumstances, if a complaint was lodged against 1880-1887 any Chief, Maclean only had to send a soldier with a CHAP. XXIII message to obtain his attendance in Cape Coast ; but he was careful never to summon a Chief in this manner except for some valid and important reason.

Under these improved conditions of security, the people were able to travel up and down the country in perfect safety and trade increased to an enormous extent, benefiting not only those who directly engaged in it, but also providing employment for a large number of others as carriers. The manufacture of palm oil had only been engaged in within the last ten or fifteen years and had been carried on to but a small extent ; but this trade now rapidly increased, and cowrie shells were introduced for the first time as a medium of exchange for small quantities of the oil and other articles of trifling value which had hitherto been paid for either in gold-dust or trade goods. In 1831 the value of the imports at Cape Coast had been £130,851 3s. 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ d., but by 1840 it had increased to £423,170. The value of the exports showed a similar increase from £90,282 9s. 6d. in 1831 to £325,008 in 1840.

During 1834 a number of complaints were made against Kwaku Akka the King of Apollonia. The fact that the English had built a fort in his country in about 1750, though it had long since been abandoned and was now a mere ruin, led both the natives and the Dutch to regard it as British territory, and some of the Apollonian Chiefs appear to have signed the tri-partite treaty of 1831 as delegates for their King, though it is possible there may be another explanation of the appearance of their mark on this document.

Mr. Frank Swanzy, the Commandant of Dixcove, which was now the nearest English fort, sent in several reports of the barbarities constantly being committed by Akka, and the captains of ships who had called on the Apollonian coast occasionally arrived at Cape Coast and lodged complaints, saying they had been grossly insulted and robbed by the people. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary for the Governor to take some steps to put a

1830-1837 stop to such proceedings ; but Maclean was reluctant to
CHAP. XXII, appeal to arms until he was actually compelled to do so, and therefore sent several letters to Akka remonstrating with him on his conduct. But no notice was taken of them and Kwaku Akka refused to accept the Governor's last letter and returned it unopened. Just before the arrival of the soldier who brought it, some Wassaw traders who were passing through the country had been seized by the Chief, who had caused twelve of them to be anchored in the sea and left to perish as they became exhausted, while twelve more had been crucified on the beach and left to wither in the sun. The Governor's messenger was now shown the bodies of these unfortunate men and told that they and sights like them were the King's only answer. Soon after his return to Cape Coast with this report, messengers arrived from Enimil the King of Wassaw complaining of the outrage against his people, and Maclean then decided to waste no more time in fruitless negotiations, but to lead an expedition against Akka and take summary vengeance.

Early in 1835 therefore, every man who could possibly be spared was withdrawn from the garrisons of the different forts, and a small detachment under Mr. P. Bartells was also lent by Colonel Lans, the Dutch Governor. Mr. Frank Swanzy was the only other officer who accompanied the Governor. The strength of this combined force was absurdly small, amounting to only 180 men ; but no more could be spared and they advanced towards Apollonia. They had barely crossed the border however, when, upon the very first sign of danger, the whole of the Cape Coast Militia, who, of course, were Fantis, were seized with panic, refused to fight, and deserted. Maclean was thus left with such an insignificant force that it would have been madness to go any farther and was compelled to retire on the Dutch fort at Axim. This misfortune, however, did not turn him from his purpose. Mr. Swanzy was sent out to find the deserters and succeeded in bringing them back and order was restored.

In the meantime H.M.S. *Bromart* had arrived at

Cape Coast under Commander Quin, who, at the request 1880-1887 of the merchants, at once sailed westward to co-operate CHAP. XXIII with the Governor. A second advance was then made with complete success. The Apollonians were engaged and driven along the beach for miles under a steady fire from the British force, which reached the ruins of Apollonia Fort in safety that night, though the men were completely exhausted by their long march without food or water throughout the heat of the day.

Although the fort was now occupied by a British force and his people had been routed, Kwaku Akka was still in arms and refused to come in and make submission. Maclean therefore, took a bold step and went in person to the Apollonian camp, which was situated some miles from the fort. He was accompanied only by a corporal's guard, though he well knew that the King had offered a reward of 200 crowns for his head. This was precisely one of those acts that are only justified by success and in any other circumstances are called foolhardy and rash. Maclean, however, was an excellent judge of African character and thought this plan offered a good prospect of success and, though he well understood that it must necessarily be attended by considerable risk to himself, believed that the object he had in view justified it. Events proved his opinion correct ; for he entered the enemy's camp and returned in safety after having had an interview with the Chief, at which a treaty was drawn up binding Akka to pay all the expenses of the expedition and to deposit a large sum in gold in the Castle at Cape Coast as security for his future conduct. This complete victory, gained as it was without any help from the other tribes, had an excellent effect on them by increasing their opinion of the Governor's determination to punish evil-doers at any cost, and convincing them of his power to carry out his intentions independently of them.

As has already been hinted, there is some room for doubt whether the Apollonians were among the original parties to the treaty of 1831. The occurrence of the words " and such other chiefs as may hereafter adhere

1880-1887 to it," plainly shows that it was intended to include others CHAP. XXIII at a later date if necessary. The Apollonian signature is the last but one, and therefore, if any further parties were added after the 27th of April 1831, the Apollonians and the Chief of Egya must be they. There is no mention of Apollonia elsewhere in the treaty and the question, therefore, arises whether it was agreed to and this signature added at the end of this expedition, and not in 1831 when it was first drawn up. If the latter had been the case, it seems hardly likely that Maclean would have wasted so much time in sending letters instead of taking active measures at once. The fact that Kwaku Akka's name does not appear as the person who signed is quite in accordance with this theory, for the treaty itself would have been in Cape Coast and not carried on a punitive expedition, and if he now agreed to it, it would have fallen to the lot of the Chiefs who were afterwards sent in with the gold for deposit in the Castle to sign on behalf of the tribe.¹

In the meantime, a great civil war had broken out in Ashanti between Kumasi and Jabin. This, according to Ashanti tradition, was the third or fourth such war that had occurred, but it is the first of which anything was known on the coast. Yow Sekyiri the King of Insuta had been amongst those who fell in the battle of Dodowa and there were rival claimants to the vacant stool, one party being favoured by Osai Okotu and the other by Buatin the King of Jabin. It is not quite clear whether this Buatin, in whose time the trouble began, was Buatin Penin who was alleged to have signed the treaty of 1817, or his successor Kofi Buatin, but it was certainly the latter who was reigning towards the end of the time. Buatin was invited to Kumasi for the case to be settled, and went. It is alleged that Mafo, the claimant supported by Osai Okotu, proved that for years past his rivals had been in the habit of murdering and robbing Kumasi traders as they passed through Insuta on their way to Salaga, and that not fewer than eighty persons had thus

¹ *Vide* p. 419.

been done away with. The offenders and their relatives 1830-1837 to the number of about sixty were, therefore, seized and CHAP. XXIII put in irons and subsequently put to death at dead of night. When Buatin heard what had been done, he was so enraged that he left the capital immediately and returned to Jabin.

Soon after this, one Kotiaku, a great friend of Kofi Buatin, intrigued with three of his favourite wives and fled to Kumasi; whereupon he demanded not only the head of the adulterer, to which by Ashanti law he was entitled, but those of all his family also. This exorbitant demand was refused by Okotu, who, after the resulting quarrel had lasted three years, sent messengers to Buatin asking him to come to Kumasi and settle the case. This Buatin flatly refused to do, giving as his reason that he had not forgotten what had happened in the Insuta stool case. Kotiaku and his people were then sent back, and a force left Kumasi for Jabin at the same time. Buatin ordered the execution of Kotiaku and his people while the Kumasis were actually outside his town and a battle immediately ensued in which the Jabins were utterly defeated and Buatin and his people forced to fly for refuge to Akim. After this, frequent skirmishes took place between the Jabins in Akim and parties of Kumasis, until at last an embassy was sent by Okotu to arrange a peace.

Maclean and the Danish Governor, Mr. Morck, were asked to assist in the negotiations, and a meeting was held at Accra on the 27th of May 1835, at which peace was concluded. In spite of this, however, Kofi Buatin would not return to Ashanti, though frequent messages were sent by Okotu begging him to do so and he sent some of his people back. Prior to his flight, a misunderstanding had arisen between him and his two cousins, "Aberidwesi" and "Neribihi," and he now required their execution and that of their whole families before he would consent to return. It is said that, although Osai Okotu strongly objected to such a proceeding, yet, so anxious was he for the return of the exiles that some seventy persons were executed in compliance with this demand. The Jabins

1830-1837 then, in 1839, set out on their return journey; but **CHAP. XXIII** Buatin died on the way under a strong suspicion of having poisoned himself rather than set foot again in Kumasi. He had no brother living, and his mother Jabin Saiwa succeeded him and reached Kumasi in November 1841, where a great welcome was accorded her and her people. In the following January the work of rebuilding Jabin was begun. This was carried out on a far grander scale than before and much help was given by Okotu for this purpose.

The presence of the Jabin fugitives in Akim during all these years had been a source of great anxiety to the English; for Buatin's constant refusal to return in accordance with the terms of the agreement made in 1835 had so annoyed the King that they had been living in constant dread that he would lose patience and send an expedition against him; indeed, he had once sent down to the Governor warning him that he need not be surprised if he soon did so. Maclean had used every argument to prevent this threat being put into execution; for he clearly saw that, if Buatin were attacked in Akim, he would at once retire on Accra and involve the English in the quarrel. They would have been forced to choose between giving him up, and giving him their protection and thus making an enemy of the King and almost certainly bringing about another war with Ashanti. Fortunately Maclean's efforts were crowned with success, and the death of Buatin and return of his people put an end to a state of affairs that had been a constant menace to the peace of the country for many years.

It was during Maclean's governorship that the first serious attempt¹ was made to introduce the Christian religion among the people of the Gold Coast. The Basel Mission first sent out missionaries to Christiansborg in 1827, but they soon succumbed to the climate and the sole survivor returned to Europe in 1833, so that it is not until 1843, when they made a fresh start, that this Mission, then working under the protection of the Danish

¹ With the exception of the early efforts of the Portuguese.

Government, can really be said to have commenced its 1880-1887 work.

CHAP. XXIII

As early as 1751 a clergyman of the Church of England, the Reverend Thomas Thompson, had come out to Cape Coast, where he remained for four years and acted as chaplain to the garrison ; but beyond taking a few natives to England to be educated he accomplished nothing. One of these natives, by name Philip Quacoe, was educated at Oxford and subsequently returned to Cape Coast, where he acted as chaplain for not less than fifty years.¹ He too met with no success among his countrymen, and it is even said that on the approach of death he himself lost faith in the religion he professed to teach and reverted to fetishism.

It was not until May 1835, therefore, when the first Wesleyan missionary, the Reverend Joseph R. Dunwell, arrived in Cape Coast, that missionary work among the people living under British protection can really be said to have begun. Mr. Dunwell lived less than six months, dying on the 24th of June of the same year, and was succeeded on the 15th of September 1836 by Mr. Wrigley, who came out with his wife and was quickly followed, in January 1837, by Mr. and Mrs. Harrop. The two latter and Mrs. Wrigley were attacked by fever a fortnight later and all three died. Mr. Wrigley was thus left alone and he also died in the following November. The foundation stone of the Wesleyan Chapel in Cape Coast was laid by Mr. Wrigley in 1836, and the completed building was formally opened and dedicated by Mr. Freeman on the 10th of June 1838.

¹ *Vide* p. 280.

CHAPTER XXIV

MACLEAN'S ADMINISTRATION ATTACKED AND VINDICATED

1837 TO 1843

1837-1843 IN June 1836, some time after his return from Apollonia,
CHAP. XXIV Maclean went to England for the benefit of his health, leaving one of the merchants, Mr. William Topp,¹ in charge of affairs during his absence. While he was in London he met Miss Letitia Elizabeth Landon, better known as L. E. L. the poetess, who was then at the zenith of her fame and popularity. She was staying at Hampstead with Mr. Forster, M.P. for Berwick. He was one of the members of the Committee of Merchants in London to whom the government of the Gold Coast had been entrusted and was consequently well acquainted with all that had recently passed there. He had Maclean's report on his Apollonian expedition and gave it to her to read, telling her that it would serve as an introduction to the writer, who was to dine with them that night. The story so impressed her that she seems to have been prepared to fall in love with Maclean at once. At any rate she married him very soon afterwards and decided to return with him and share his life at Cape Coast.

At this time, there were no European ladies on the Coast, and the conditions under which even the officers had to live were very far from satisfactory. Nevertheless, in spite of the warnings and entreaties of her friends, who prophesied all manner of evil consequences and said she would certainly come home by the next ship, L. E. L. adhered to her decision and she and Maclean landed at Cape Coast on the 15th of August 1838. In spite of the many inconveniences attendant on Coast life at that time, she

¹ Afterwards Commandant of James Fort, Accra.

quickly settled down and seems to have enjoyed the novelty 1887-1848 of her new surroundings. But it was not to be for long. CHAP. XXIV After living but two months in Cape Coast, she died with appalling suddenness on the morning of the 15th of October, and the mystery surrounding her death in this little-known country gave rise to the grossest calumnies in England against Maclean, which were only too eagerly believed by a scandal-loving and credulous public.

Nothing shows more clearly how entirely without foundation these reports were, than the very full account of these events given by Cruikshank. He was then Commandant of Anamabo Fort and was staying in Cape Coast with Mr. Topp prior to proceeding to England on leave. During this time, and also at an earlier date, he saw a great deal of Mr. and Mrs. Maclean, with both of whom he was on the most intimate terms. On the 14th of October he dined with them at the Castle, and at eleven o'clock that night went into the long gallery, where he walked with Mrs. Maclean for half an hour. She then seemed in excellent spirits, and the Governor joined them for a few minutes ; but he was afraid to remain exposed to the night air for long, as he had been in bad health for some time past, and soon returned to his room, where the others joined him a little latter. Cruikshank left the Castle at about half-past eleven.

Next morning, while he was having breakfast with Mr. Topp at about nine o'clock, a servant came to say that they were wanted in the Castle as Mr. Maclean was dead. They set out at once, meeting Messrs. Swanzy, Jackson and Hutton on the same errand ; but it was not until they reached the Castle gate that they learned for the first time that it was Mrs. Maclean and not the Governor who was dead. This news was even more surprising ; for she had been in excellent health and spirits, whereas the Governor had been ill for some time, though his condition had not been sufficiently serious to cause any alarm.

Mrs. Maclean's death was so sudden and unaccountable that it was at once decided to hold an inquest. Cruikshank says : " All that could be elicited, upon the

1887-1848 strictest investigation, was simply this: It appeared that **CHAP. XXIV** she had risen, and left her husband's bedroom about seven o'clock in the morning, and proceeded to her own dressing-room, which was up a short flight of stairs,¹ and entered by a separate door from that leading to the bedroom. Before proceeding to dress, she had occupied herself an hour and a half in writing letters. She then called her servant, Mrs. Bailey, and sent her to a store-room to fetch some pomatum. Mrs. Bailey was absent only a few minutes. When she returned, she found difficulty in opening the door, on account of a weight which appeared to be pressing against it. This she discovered to be the body of her mistress. She pushed it aside, and found that she was senseless. She immediately called Mr. Maclean. Dr. Cobbold was sent for; but from the first moment of the discovery of the body on the floor, there had not appeared any symptom of life. Mrs. Bailey farther asserted that she found a small phial in the hand of the deceased, which she removed and placed upon the toilet-table. Mrs. Maclean had appeared well when she sent her to fetch the pomatum. She had observed in her no appearance of unhappiness.

" Mr. Maclean stated, that his wife had left him about seven o'clock in the morning, and that he had never seen her again in life. When he was called to her dressing-room, he found her dead upon the floor. After some time, he observed a small phial upon the toilet-table, and asked Mrs. Bailey where it had come from. She told him that she had found it in Mrs. Maclean's hand. This phial had contained Scheele's preparation of prussic acid. His wife had been in the habit of using it for severe fits of spasms, to which she was subject. She had made use of it once on the passage from England to his knowledge. He was greatly averse to her having such a dangerous medicine, and wished to throw it overboard. She entreated him not to do so, as she must die without it. There had been no quarrel nor unkindness between him and his wife.

" Dr. Cobbold, who had been requested to make a

¹ In the tower now known as L. E. L.'s Tower.

post-mortem examination, did not consider it at all necessary to do so, as he felt persuaded she had died by prussic acid. He was led to this conclusion from the appearance of the eyes of the deceased ; and he believed he could detect the smell of the prussic acid about her person.

“ My own evidence proved, that I had parted from Mr. and Mrs. Maclean at a very late hour on the evening before, and that they appeared then upon the happiest terms with each other.

“ There was found upon her writing-desk a letter not yet folded, which she had written that morning, the ink of which was scarcely dry at the time of the discovery of her death. This letter was read at the inquest. It was for Mrs. Fagan, upon whom she had wished me to call. It was written in a cheerful spirit, and gave no indication of unhappiness. In the postscript—the last words she ever wrote —she recommended me to the kind attentions of her friend.

“ With the evidence before them, it was impossible for the jury to entertain for one instant the idea that the unfortunate lady had wilfully destroyed herself. On the other hand, considering the evidence respecting the phial, her habit of making use of this dangerous medicine, and the decided opinion of the doctor, that her death was caused by it, it seemed equally clear that they must attribute her death to this cause. Their verdict, therefore, was, that she died from an overdose of Scheele's preparation of prussic acid taken inadvertently. I concurred in this verdict at the time ; but I must confess that I have since then had reason to doubt of its correctness. I learned, upon my arrival in England, that L. E. L., previous to her marriage, had all but died in a sudden fit, which was likely to recur.

“ It was also afterwards proved that Mrs. Bailey, upon her return to England, with the view of attracting attention to herself and gaining notoriety, had made some flagrantly false statements in reference to this event, and that she was altogether a person undeserving of credit. I then remembered that she had made no mention of the phial having been in Mrs. Maclean's hand until some time after she had found her mistress on the floor, and only

1887-1848
CHAP. XXIV

1887-1848 then in answer to a question from Mr. Maclean ; and it CHAP. XXIV occurred to me that such a suspicious circumstance, as a phial being found in the hand of a person suddenly deceased, could not fail to be immediately noticed and mentioned without any inquiry. These considerations induced me to discredit Mrs. Bailey's testimony altogether, and to believe that the phial had not been found in Mrs. Maclean's hand at all."¹

Cruikshank's criticisms seem well founded, and although it is, of course, quite possible that the verdict returned may have been entirely correct, there is much room for doubt. The fact that Mrs. Maclean had previously suffered from attacks of some kind, for the relief of which she had been in the habit of using this medicine, renders it at least possible that she may now have had a further attack and have resorted to it again ; but it by no means follows that she took an overdose and thereby brought about her sudden end, nor indeed is this likely. The very fact that she was accustomed to the use of the drug and was well acquainted with the dose makes it improbable that she would have taken it in poisonous quantities, especially when its nature is borne in mind. All preparations of prussic acid are very dilute and keep badly, and it is almost certain that it would have lost much of its strength after having been kept for even a short time in so hot a climate as that of the Gold Coast, and consequently, a much larger dose than usual would have been required to produce any therapeutic effect and still more to cause death. As Mrs. Maclean was accustomed to use this drug and was doubtless well aware of its dangerous nature, it seems incredible that she could have inadvertently increased the dose to such an extent as to cause almost immediate death with a deteriorated sample, and it is far more probable that, if she had a recurrence of one of her previous attacks and took the usual dose from which she had formerly obtained relief, the perished medicine would have failed to act and the attack itself may have proved fatal. This probable loss of strength is further borne out by Cruikshank's

¹ Cruikshank, vol. i, pp. 224 *et seq.*

statement that the but recently emptied bottle retained 1887-1848 only a very faint odour, and it is not improbable that CHAP. XXIV the doctor may have been misled by the production of this bottle and predisposed to believe that he could detect the smell of the drug about the body—a smell that others failed to perceive although that of prussic acid is fairly pungent and quite unmistakable. No weight can be attached to the medical evidence as to the appearance of the eyes, for there is nothing distinctive about them in prussic acid poisoning. On the other hand, it must be admitted that if Mrs. Maclean took the medicine for the relief of some sudden symptom and detected its loss of strength, she may have increased the dose ; but even then it is hardly likely that she would have done so to the reckless extent necessary to cause death.

Mrs. Maclean was buried the same evening in the court-yard of the Castle. Mr. Topp read the service and all but Cruikshank were soon afterwards driven to their houses by a heavy storm of rain. He alone remained wrapped in his cloak under a temporary shelter of tarpaulins to see the work of bricking in the arch over the coffin completed by torch-light. The Letters " L. E. L." cut on a large slab of stone in the paving of the courtyard still mark the spot, and a marble tablet on a wall near by bears the following inscription

" Hic jacet sepultum
Omne quod mortale fuit
LETITIAE ELIZABETHAE MACLEAN.
Quam egregia ornatum indole
Musis unice amatam,
Omniumque amores secum trahentem
In ipso aetatis flore,
Mors immatura rapuit,
Die Octobris XV A. D. MDCCCXXXVIII
Aetat. XXXVI
Quod spectas, viator, marmor,
Vanum heu doloris monumentum
Conjux moerens erexit."

1837-1843 On the 23rd of October 1837 the Ahantas, under their **CHAP. XXIV** Chief Bonsu,¹ rose against the Dutch and treacherously murdered the Dutch Governor Mr. H. J. Tonneboeyer² and the Commandant of Fort Batenstein at Butri, at Buyamrom on the 28th of October. The first attempt of the Dutch to avenge these murders was a failure, for the Ahantas defeated them near Takoradi, killing four or five officers and a great number of men ; but in the following July a second expedition was sent against them which utterly defeated them and took Bonsu prisoner.³

In January 1838 two more Wesleyan missionaries, Mr. Freeman and his wife, arrived at Cape Coast, where they learned for the first time of the death of Mr. Wrigley. Forty-eight days later, Mrs. Freeman also died, but her husband, who was a West Indian mulatto, though very ill for a time, managed to survive. On the 30th of January 1839 he went to Kumasi with the object of establishing a mission station there. The King, of course, had heard of him as a "white fetish-man" and viewed the prospect of his visit to the capital with great mistrust, firmly believing that his journey was prompted by some secret and sinister motive which boded no good to him and his kingdom. Consequently, Mr. Freeman was stopped by his orders at Kwisa and again at Fomana on the Ashanti frontier, where he was detained for a long time and his every movement closely watched and reported to Kumasi by some of the King's boys who were constantly with or near him in the hope of discovering his real object. It was only after a delay of six weeks, when he threatened to return to Cape Coast if he was kept waiting any longer and did in fact start down the road, that he was at last given permission to proceed to Kumasi, the King fearing

¹ Baidu Bonsu II (Asuankai).

² He was on his way to attack Bonsu at Bushua to avenge the deaths of two Dutch Agents, Cremer and Maason, who had been sent to arrest Bonsu, but had been captured near Takoradi, taken to Bushua, and there murdered.

³ Another version is that the expedition of July 1838 met with no opposition and burned Sekondi and Bushua. Bonsu and some other Chiefs were then betrayed into the hands of the Dutch and executed.

that a persistent refusal, by rousing the "fetish-man's" 1887-1848 anger, might be attended by even worse results than his CHAP. XXIV visit. It was to be a contest between two powers however, and as he entered the capital he passed between two fresh mounds of earth, one on either side of the road, the graves of two victims who had been buried alive in order to avert any evil that might otherwise result from his arrival. He was received with the customary ceremonies accorded to important persons ; but although he remained for some time in the capital, he was constantly subjected to the most rigid supervision and regarded with great suspicion as a man possessed of unknown powers, and in the end was obliged to return to the coast without having attained his object. He reached Cape Coast again on the 23rd of April.

In January 1840 Mr. Freeman was joined by three more missionaries, Mr. and Mrs. Mycock and Mr. Robert Brooking, and a mission station was soon afterwards opened at Anamabo. In 1841 John Ansa and William Inkwanta-bissa, the two Ashanti princes who had been delivered to Governor Maclean ten years earlier, returned from England, and Mr. Freeman made a second visit to Kumasi in their company, taking Mr. Brooking also with him. Presents from the Queen of England and a carriage sent out by the Wesleyan Society as a gift to the King were also taken up, but the latter caused much delay on the narrow paths. It was taken to pieces and the various parts carried separately for the first twenty miles, but they made such awkward loads that it was finally put together again and completed the journey on its own wheels. A party of pioneers then had to be sent on ahead to clear the road, while the King, who knew of the approach of this gift, had the road between Kumasi and the Pra similarly widened. Osai Okotu had died in 1838 and been succeeded by his nephew, Kwaku Dua. The two princes, therefore, were cousins of the present King and what they told him probably went far to reassure him and gain the party a favourable reception. At any rate Mr. Freeman was now granted a piece of land on which to build a mission

1837-1848 house and Brooking was left in charge. About the end of May 1842 he was joined by Mr. Thomas Rowland, who, however, died within a few weeks of his arrival and was thus not only the first missionary who died in Ashanti, but also the first white man who had visited the country of his own accord and died there.

Kwaku Akka, the King of Apollonia, remained quiet for some time after the return of Maclean's expedition, but then began to resume his former ill-treatment of travellers and traders and committed a number of fresh outrages. Maclean wanted to lead another expedition against him, but the Committee in London would not allow it, and nothing was therefore done beyond the forfeiture of the gold that had been deposited in the Castle.

The false rumours against Maclean that had been freely circulated and readily believed in England after the death of his wife have already been alluded to. It was alleged that he had treated her with persistent unkindness and cruelty, that he had constantly neglected her for orgies in the town and for native women, and that there was one part of the Castle, to which she was never admitted, where he gave himself up to all kinds of debaucheries. In short, it was plainly insinuated that he had driven her to commit suicide.

The mere fact that Maclean had been ill during nearly the whole time that his wife was on the Coast should alone be sufficient to dispose of such ridiculous reports. There is, however, in addition to this, the testimony of Cruikshank—which seemingly represents the unanimous opinion of the European residents—that Maclean and his wife lived together in the most perfect harmony. Hutchinson¹ says he visited the room in which L. E. L. was found dead, with "one of the most respectable merchants of Cape Coast,"² who had been an intimate friend of hers, had seen her the night before her death, and to whom she had written a note early on the morning of her death

¹ *Western Africa*, pp. 60-62.

² Probably Mr. Topp with whom Cruikshank was staying, and who would therefore have been likely to accompany him the night before.

asking him to come and see Mr. Maclean who was not well. 1887-1848 It was while going to the Castle about an hour later that CHAP. XXIV he heard the news that she herself was dead and it was he who picked up the empty prussic acid bottle.¹ He had absolutely no doubt that her death was accidental and indignantly repudiated the charges made against Maclean, explaining that the Accra woman with whom he had formerly lived had returned to her native place long before Mrs. Maclean came out and that he had never since held any communication with her. If Maclean had had the slightest ground to suspect that his wife had any cause to complain of his conduct, he would hardly have allowed the letters she had written just before her death, which were found on her writing-table, to be sealed in his presence by Cruikshank and forwarded to her friends in England, as was in fact done. It is much to be regretted that these reports should again have been circulated in England, and with numerous additions, at the time when public attention was directed to the Gold Coast during the Ashanti War of 1873-74. Even those who make them do not appear to know their own minds. Winwood Reade in one of his books² says: "They quarrelled, and Maclean grew tired of her: he had a passion for intrigue, which almost amounted to disease . . . in fact he spent every night at orgies in the town;" yet in another book³ the same writer says: "A disgraceful and groundless charge was made against Governor Maclean." How he would propose to reconcile such contradictory statements, or what evidence he could possibly have gathered more than a quarter of a century after the event to induce such a change of opinion, it is difficult to imagine.

Ridiculous though these rumours were, they were eagerly believed, and Maclean's reputation in England soon became so evil that nothing was considered too bad to be attributed to him nor too improbable to be unhesitatingly believed. There can be no doubt that L. E. L.

¹ Again contrary to Mrs. Bailey's statement.

² *The Ashantee Campaign* (1874), p. 64.

³ *Savage Africa* (1863), p. 39.

1837-1848 was an exceedingly popular authoress and held a high position in the affections of the public, who, now that they had lost their idol, were readily stirred by these false recitals of her wrongs to seek a means of avenging her by bringing her husband into disgrace. His every act was carefully scrutinized with the one idea of finding fault with it ; but he himself knew nothing of what was going on while he was on the Coast and had no opportunity of contradicting these aspersions on his character. In fact, he was quite unaware of their existence until they had been current for some months.

It was not long before these people found the opportunity they sought. One of Maclean's earliest acts on first assuming the government of the country had been to discourage and by all possible means put down the practice of offering human sacrifices, a custom that was by no means confined to Ashanti, but was universal along the coast also. By his continual efforts he had almost succeeded in putting a stop to it in the case of the Fantis, though isolated instances still occurred from time to time in which it became known that sacrifices had been made with more or less secrecy.

Soon after the death of Mrs. Maclean, the mother of Kujo Chibu died. This was the Denkera King, who had recently removed from his own country and been allowed to settle at Jukwa near Cape Coast, where he and his people enjoyed the same protection and privileges as the other coast tribes. He now sent a message to the Governor informing him of the death of his relative and assuring him that his wishes would be respected and no human sacrifices made. This of course was very satisfactory, and Maclean sent a present to the King to encourage him to keep his promise, warning him at the same time that, should he fail to do so, he would assuredly be punished ; and, knowing very well the kind of saturnalia the people always held at these big funeral customs, and thinking it possible that in their excitement sacrifices might even yet be made, he sent a soldier back with the King's messenger, with instructions to stay in Jukwa until the custom was over

and watch their proceedings. Although Kujo Chibu 1837-1848 repeated his promises of obedience, the Governor's fears CHAP. XXIV were justified ; for the King, yielding either to his own conscience or to the superstitious fears and entreaties of his people, caused secret sacrifices to be made, which were reported to the Governor in spite of all his precautions. Nor is it in the least surprising that he should have done so ; for it must be remembered that, according to his religious beliefs, had he failed to provide these victims, he would have been offering a gross insult to his own mother and the first woman in his kingdom, and have been sending her into the next world very ill provided for.

The belief held by all the Akan peoples is that every man has a dual personality, the actual corporeal man and a tenanting and to some extent protecting spirit known as a "kra." When the man dies, an intangible shadowy man or "sraman," in all respects similar to the man himself during life, is evolved, and the kra is liberated and becomes a "sisa" or kind of wandering spirit. This idea of the kra closely corresponds to the European conception of a soul, and the sraman to that intangible form, a belief in which still persists among many, commonly called a ghost. Among the Akan peoples however, it is the sisa that is believed to remain on earth and have the power of annoying the living in various ways, while the sraman goes to the spirit world (Sramanedzi), where it continues its existence in the same social position as that held by the individual during life. It is this belief that has given rise to the custom of offering human sacrifices at funerals and on certain other occasions, the idea being to liberate the spiritual forms (asraman) of the victims and thus enable them to accompany and wait upon that of the deceased. Hence, at the funeral of a Chief or other great person who has been accustomed to be attended by a number of slaves during life, a proportionately large number of victims is slain. Similarly, the slaughter of prisoners that always follows a victory does not arise from wanton cruelty, for all these men would be of some value as slaves, but is intended as a thank-offering to the gods, to

1887-1848 whom it is believed prisoners of war are specially acceptable as having fought on the side of their own opposing gods. Others again are killed to wait on the chiefs who have fallen. This custom, therefore, owes its origin to feelings of love and respect for the dead and veneration for the gods, and not to any inherent cruelty of disposition. Human sacrifices are, in fact, prompted by the purest motives.

Kujo Chibu was at once brought to Cape Coast and heavily fined for what he had done, and a similar punishment was inflicted on one of the Fanti Chiefs who was proved to have provided one of the victims.

Mr. Jackson was strongly opposed to the Governor's decision in this case, and, according to him, the sacrifices were not made secretly but quite openly, though even so they constituted a distinct breach of the promise Kujo Chibu had voluntarily made. In reference to this matter, he wrote : " I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that the acts for which the King of Denkera is accused were not done in secret, but at noon-day in the presence of thousands of Denkeras and Teufels and strangers from all the surrounding country. . . . They know not that they are committing a crime ; their money is taken from them, and they are irritated at the circumstance, but they believe the object sought is their gold, for the attainment of which the other is a mere excuse. Milder measures should, in the first instance, be resorted to. You are dealing with a nation, not an individual. They should be reasoned with, which, aided by the assistance of their friends in endeavouring to convince them of their error, would in time succeed with these as it has done with others."¹

There can be no two opinions about the general wisdom of these remarks. In the introduction of any reforms the "milder measures" should always be tried first ; but if they fail, a time must come sooner or later when stronger action must be taken. The Government had for a long time set its face against human sacrifices, and the question

¹ Sarbah, *Fanti National Constitution*, p. 184.

as to how soon severer measures are called for in such 1887-1848 cases is one upon which there will always be room for an CHAP. XXIV individual difference of opinion. The real point of the whole difficulty, as has already been shown, lay in the fact that this custom was not practised from caprice or any trivial motive, but was intimately connected with the very root of the national religion.

These matters were now reported by the enemies of Maclean to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and it was represented that these and other similar measures were acts of oppression, and that the Governor had no right whatever to punish Kujo Chibu as he had done. They asserted that the position the English held in the country did not warrant such interference with the customs of the people, and in this they were in a great measure correct; for the country had never been conquered by the British, nor ceded to them, facts from which it was now argued that the people could in no way be amenable to English law.

The Secretary of State seems to have had no idea of the circumstances of the English in the country, nor how they maintained their position there, and adopted the view that Kujo Chibu must either be a British subject, in which case he should have been punished by death as a murderer, or that he was an entirely independent chief, in which case the Governor had no authority whatever to fine him. "This view was, however, quite a mistaken one. The King of Denkera was neither a British subject nor independent. He was one of several chiefs who had, in return for British protection, surrendered a portion of their independence and submitted to British control. This control had for years been exercised for the suppression of inhuman customs, and Mr. Maclean was only following out a policy that had been continuous since 1817."¹ The most that could have been said was that the English had no power, either by their legal rights in the country or by the conditions on which they held the forts from the Crown, to interfere with the customs of the people,

¹ Ellis, *History of the Gold Coast*, p. 204.

1837-1848 and had indeed been specially enjoined by the latter not CHAP. XXIV to do so except by persuasive means. The position, however, was not so much one for the consideration of strictly legal rights as of policy. It was essential that the Governor's authority should be recognized as paramount, and it would no longer have been so had such disobedience been overlooked. No one understood this better than Maclean. In a letter to the Secretary of State, dated 13th April 1841, he wrote: "Were the Government not to exercise control over the adjoining districts, or were it to refuse to exercise judicial authority over them, the labour of many years would be overthrown in one month and consequences would ensue too horrible to be contemplated. The Forts would become isolated . . . trade and communication with the Ashantee and the Interior would cease . . . oppression, rapine, murder and human sacrifices would take the place of that peace, good order and security of person and property which we have with so much labour and pains established throughout the country."¹ But though the Secretary of State thus defined his views on the subject, he did not go so far as actually to disapprove of the Governor's action; but he warned him to be extremely careful how he attempted to put down or interfere with any native customs, and gave him distinctly to understand that he would have to accept all responsibility for any such measures.

These agitators in England, who probably knew little or nothing about the Gold Coast and were ready to make any allegations that suited their purpose, upon however slight a foundation, and who seem, moreover, to have been actuated by feelings of spite against Maclean personally rather than by any motives of philanthropy towards the natives, now brought a further accusation against the local government and charged it with encouraging slavery. Thus, the very people who had made such an outcry against the Governor because he had tried to abolish the horrible practice of offering human sacrifices, now blamed him for not having interfered with the equally

¹ Maclean's letter-book at Christiansborg Castle.

old-established and infinitely less objectionable custom of 1837-1848 keeping domestic slaves ; for this was the only form of CHAP. xxiv slavery that still existed on the Gold Coast, the old slave trade having been completely suppressed along the whole line of coast over which British jurisdiction was exercised. It was, moreover, an institution with which the Crown Government that had preceded the present administration had never made any attempt to interfere, but had, on the contrary, openly abetted and recognized it by frequently employing the slaves of private persons and paying their owners for their services.

Complaint was also made that a Spanish slaver, the *Dos Amigos*, and other vessels employed in the traffic, had been allowed to purchase stores on the Gold Coast. They, however, had no slaves on board at the time and only obtained ordinary stores and not slave-trading equipment, so that Maclean had felt it difficult, if not impossible, to take any action in the matter. He could neither have proved that the vendor was aware of the buyer's occupation, nor that the goods purchased were in fact intended for use in the slave trade. His own letters, written about 1840, long before any enquiry was thought of, are sufficient proof of his good faith and the care he habitually exercised to guard against rendering any assistance to slave traders.

In a letter to the Committee, dated Cape Coast Castle, 17 June 1839, he wrote : " It is perfectly true, and I have stated the fact at least fifty times in my official correspondence, that slave vessels (that is, vessels destined to convey cargoes of slaves from the leeward coast) do frequently anchor both here and at Accra. But has Her Majesty's Government ever invested the authorities here with power to interfere with such vessels ? We are neither at war with Spain, Portugal, nor Brazil : by what authority, upon what pretext, then, could I prevent vessels belonging to those countries from anchoring at any of our ports ? These vessels, though fitted up for the slave trade, do not come here to purchase or ship slaves, but to purchase goods to enable them to carry on the slave trade to leeward.

1837-1848 But you are well aware that I possess no power to prevent this, so long as the masters of those vessels comply with our port regulations ; and that if I did presume to interfere with them, a memorial to the Secretary of State would (justly) ensure my being heavily censured, if not dismissed.

" But I repel, with indignation, the insinuation (if such has been made) that these slave-dealers receive any aid or encouragement whatever from the authorities here.

" I, on the contrary, assert that we have discouraged the slave trade by every means in our power ; a triumphant proof of which is exhibited in the total abolition of that traffic throughout the whole line of our coast, 150 miles in extent ; a consummation which neither Sir Charles Macarthy, nor his immediate successors, were able to effect, when they possessed twenty times our means, and fifty times our physical power.

" If Her Majesty's Government disapprove of slave vessels being allowed to trade with this colony, let the order be given ; and I shall take care that it shall be obeyed.

" With a small armed vessel at my command, I would undertake to prevent slave traders resorting to any part of the Gold Coast."¹

Judge Stephen pointed out in reply that Maclean had " an undoubted right to seize all such vessels, and to send the masters and crews to Sierra Leone for trial," and the authority for such action would be the " British statute, to which, within the British dominions, all persons . . . are bound to yield obedience."² He omitted to say, however, how this was to be done in the absence of any armed vessel and with only the small force that Maclean had.

Maclean's position was also supported by Lord John Russell's letter, dated Downing Street, 14 July 1841, in which he wrote : " The laws of Great Britain are, of course, binding only within the British dominions . . .

¹ *Report on the West Coast of Africa* (1842), part ii, p. 127.

² *Ibid.*, p. 128.

but I do not understand that a British subject would incur any penalty which would be enforced against him in British courts of justice, by holding men in slavery within the limits of any country, by the law of which slavery is permitted. . . . Her Majesty's dominion on that coast (Gold Coast) is . . . of very narrow local range . . . it extends only to the forts themselves . . . beyond the very walls of the forts there is no sovereignty, properly speaking, vested in the British Crown. . . . Whether the residents within Her Majesty's dominions on the Gold Coast are Europeans, mulattoes or natives, the rule of law that no man can be holden in slavery there, is peremptory and inflexible, and must be rigidly enforced. With regard to persons living in the vicinity, but not within the British dominions, the same rule does not apply. If the laws or usages of those countries tolerate slavery, we have no right to set aside those laws or usages, except by persuasion, negotiation and other peaceful means."¹

Domestic slavery was a well-established custom and had probably existed on the Gold Coast for as long as it had been inhabited, and still exists. It formed so integral a part of the social life of the people, whose whole system of society was based upon it, that any sudden attempt to interfere with it would have been bound to fail and would have caused such serious disturbances and have evoked such strenuous resistance and determined opposition that the ability of the English to maintain their position on the Coast must have been seriously endangered. No one understood this better than Maclean, who also appreciated the vast difference that existed between slavery as it is ordinarily understood in European countries, where the slave is a mere drudge and chattel, and domestic slavery as it exists on the Gold Coast, where the slave is almost invariably well treated and regarded rather as a member of the family than as a servant and not infrequently succeeds in accumulating a considerable amount of personal property, and may, in certain circumstances, even

¹ *Report of Select Committee on West Coast of Africa (1842)*, part ii, p. 139.

1887-1843 inherit that of his master. Other considerations had
CHAP. XXIV also induced the Government to tolerate this internal
slave trade. A large number of these domestic slaves
were of course born in servitude on the coast, but nearly
all fresh importations, and most of the class originally,
came from Ashanti and were persons who had either been
paid in tribute by subsidiary provinces or captured in war.
In Ashanti, such men, when not immediately required
for sacrifice, were kept as slaves and lived in constant
danger of being chosen for sacrifice on some other occasion.
By allowing the coast tribes to purchase and hold them
therefore, their position was very materially improved;
for they no longer ran this grave risk of being offered as
victims to the gods and their good treatment as slaves
was also fairly assured; added to which was the further
important consideration that these slaves and their issue
greatly increased the population of the British pro-
tected area and provided a large number of men whose
services would be available in the event of further trouble
with Ashanti. Maclean, therefore, had very wisely re-
frained from any open interference with this institution
and had merely endeavoured by every possible means to
better the condition of the slaves themselves and ensure
their good treatment, thus paving the way for the intro-
duction of greater reforms at some future time, should
they be found necessary. In this he succeeded; and so
soon as it became known that cruelty to slaves would not
be tolerated, it quickly ceased. Maclean himself wrote
to the Committee on this subject: "I am certain that no
wise and prudent man, no true philanthropist, would
hastily and rashly endeavour to force upon a people a
state of society for which they are as yet wholly unpre-
pared, and which would inevitably plunge them into a
worse condition of barbarism than that from which they
are now so happily emerging."¹

The people who propagated these reports, however,
made it appear that the Gold Coast was a British Colony, in
which the Governor tolerated and even encouraged slavery.

¹ *Report on West Coast of Africa (1842)*, part ii, p. 149.

As a matter of fact, neither of these statements was correct : the Gold Coast was not a British Colony, and the Governor encouraged no form of slavery and only tolerated the comparatively harmless domestic form from sheer necessity and motives of good policy. The mere fact that they were incorrect, however, did not prevent a very widespread belief in them. It is difficult to conceive anything more inconsistent or ridiculous than the conduct of these agitators against Maclean, and the only point that can be urged in extenuation of their folly is that public feeling in England then ran very high on the subject of slavery, so that it was only necessary to make use of the word in order to arouse the greatest indignation, quite regardless of the question whether there was any true foundation for the assertion that slavery in the ordinary sense existed or not. They might with just as much reason have accused Maclean of encouraging the people to fight and exterminate each other because company fights occasionally occurred.

The inhabitants of every town on the Gold Coast are divided into companies ; and it was, and indeed still is, not an uncommon thing for one or more of these companies, between whom a certain amount of jealousy and ill-feeling nearly always exists, to insult each other and fight. Besides the company flag proper, which they all have, each one usually possesses a number of other flags, the designs on which are emblematic of and commemorate some event in its history, which, while redounding to its own credit and glory, is often most distasteful to other rival companies by referring to some past defeat or the origin of some long-standing feud. These subsidiary flags are made and exhibited from time to time and almost invariably cause trouble, either by the implied insult or by actually infringing the design of one of another company's flags. The members of rival companies, too, have a taste for composing and singing annoying and insulting songs about each other, and when they are sung publicly, or the objectionable flags paraded through the streets, it frequently happens that the insulted company will take

1837-1848 up the challenge and a more or less serious riot ensues. **CHAP. XXIV** This result is all the more certain if such actions take place in the rival company's quarter of the town. The severity of these conflicts varies considerably. They may take the form of little more than a disorderly crowd, or assume the magnitude of a big armed riot or even a pitched battle on chosen ground. An instance of the latter occurred in 1841 at Kormantin, where two companies who had long been jealous of each other's strength took the field after due preparation and began to fight a regular battle, which would probably have ended in the decimation or extinction of one or other of them had not Mr. Cruikshank hurried over from Anamabo and intervened before much damage had been done. Yet, although he stopped the battle thus early, twenty-two men had already been killed when he reached the scene.

The final result of this continued agitation against Maclean was the appointment of a Commissioner, Doctor R. R. Madden, who was sent out by the Home Government to enquire into and report on the state of the British Settlements on the West Coast. Some idea of the effect of the oft-repeated calumnies against Maclean, and the spirit in which a certain section at least of the public regarded Dr. Madden's mission, may be gained from the tone of some verses that were addressed to him at the time of his departure.

"God speed the herald on his way,
To whom the task is given
To check oppression's iron sway,
That mocks at earth and Heaven !
The word he bears from Britain's Isle
Shall Nature's rights restore,
And Freedom's long-forgotten smile
Revisit Afric's shore !
Strike off those fetters from her hand !
Break off those withering gyves !
Then see how native mind expands,
How the crush'd heart revives !
The blind shall see, the dumb shall sing,
The slave forget his woe ;"
Etc., etc.

Considering the facts, it would be difficult to imagine 1837-1848 anything more absurdly hysterical and misleading than CHAP. xxiv these lines.

Dr. Madden only stayed a very short time on the Coast, and the brevity of his visit,¹ combined with the fact that he was in very bad health at the time, made it quite impossible for him to form any accurate opinion on the matters he was to enquire into or realize the true relationship in which the Government stood to the people. It was sufficient, however, to enable him to obtain some little superficial knowledge ; and because he found that a form of slavery existed that was both recognized and tolerated by the Governor, and that the administration of justice was effected by a compromise between British and Fanti law, his report was most unfavourable to the local Government.

On his return to England, a Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to report to Parliament on the state of the West African Settlements. After very lengthy proceedings, this committee eventually agreed upon a report which entirely exonerated the local Government and did justice to Maclean and his administration.

" We fully admit the merits of that Administration, whether we look to the officer employed, Captain Maclean, or to the Committee under whom he has acted, which, with a miserable pittance of between £3,500 and £4,000 a year, has exercised, from the four ill-provided forts of Dixcove, Cape Coast, Anamaboe and British Accra, manned by a few ill-paid black soldiers, a very wholesome influence over a coast not much less than 150 miles in extent, and to a considerable distance inland ; preventing within that range external Slave Trade, maintaining Peace and Security, and exercising a useful, though irregular, Jurisdiction among the neighbouring tribes, and much mitigating and in some cases extinguishing some of the most

¹ He devoted one day only to his " enquiry " at Cape Coast. *Vide* Maclean's letter to the African Committee dated Cape Coast Castle, 17th of January 1842. He arrived at Cape Coast on the 19th of February 1841, while Maclean was at Accra, and left on the 26th of March, having been continuously sick for all except the first and last few days.

1837-1848 atrocious practices which had prevailed among them
CHAP. XXIV unchecked before.

" We would give full weight to the doubts which Captain Maclean entertained as to his authority, until specifically so instructed, to prevent vessels, suspected of being intended for the Slave Trade, but not having slaves on board, from trafficking in lawful goods within his jurisdiction ;¹ and we do not infer from that circumstance, that the Government of these Forts had any partiality for an abominable Traffic, which, on the contrary, they have done so much to check ; but we think it desirable, for the sake of enlarging the sphere of usefulness of these Settlements, and of giving greater confidence in the character and impartiality of their Government, that it should be rendered completely independent of all connection with Commerce, by a direct emanation of authority from the Crown, and that it should be placed, with increased resources, in direct and immediate communication with the general Government of the Empire. . . .

" . . . The Judicial Authority at present existing in the Forts is not altogether in a satisfactory condition ; it resides in the Governor and Council, who act as Magistrates, and whose instructions limit them to the administration of British law, and that, as far as the natives are concerned, strictly and exclusively within the Forts themselves ; but practically, and necessarily, and usefully, these directions having been disregarded, a kind of irregular jurisdiction has grown up, extending itself far beyond the limits of the Forts by the voluntary submission of the Natives themselves, whether Chiefs or Traders, to British Equity ; and its decisions, owing to the moral influence, partly of our acknowledged power, and partly of the respect which has been inspired by the fairness with which it has been exercised by Captain Maclean and the

¹ The Act by which such interference could alone be justified was never sent to or published in Cape Coast, because in 1833 "the Government were ignorant of the existence of slavery in any of the British settlements on the western coast of Africa." (Vide Lord John Russell's letter ; *Report of Select Committee on West Africa* (1842), part ii, p. 140.)

Magistrates at the other Forts, have generally, we might almost say, uniformly, been carried into effect without CHAP. XXIV the interposition of force."¹

In addition to recommending that the Crown should resume the control of the Gold Coast,² the Committee advised the reoccupation of some of the abandoned forts, such as those at Beyin (Apollonia Fort) and Winneba, not with any view to an extension of the territory under British influence, but in order to obtain better control over the Chiefs. They also advised the appointment of an independent judicial officer, who should not be restricted in his administration by the technicalities of British law, and made various other recommendations for the increase of the military forces on the Coast, the employment whenever possible of acclimatized Europeans or educated Africans, the provision of better facilities for educating the people, and the gradual discouragement of domestic slavery.

Accordingly, in 1843, the government of the Gold Coast was once more undertaken by the Crown and the Settlements were replaced under the control of the Governor of Sierra Leone. Winneba Fort was reoccupied, but no other forts were either rebuilt or garrisoned, and a large number of native clerks were employed. A company of the West India Regiment was sent from Sierra Leone to garrison the forts, and the general condition of the soldiers was materially improved.³ Under these new arrangements, Commander Hill, R.N., was appointed Governor and Captain Maclean Judicial Assessor.⁴

¹ *Report of Select Committee* (1842), part i, pp. iv, v.

² In June 1840 a suggestion had been made that an agent of the Crown should live at Cape Coast to watch and report upon the Merchant Government.

³ In 1845 instructions were received for "the enlistment of the Militia or Armed Men into the 1st West India Regiment." This was done on the 1st of February, but only seven of the whole number that volunteered passed for enlistment. Many of the others, thus disappointed, soon became mutinously inclined and a number of them were discharged.

⁴ This officer derived his powers from the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843.

1837-1848 No stronger proof of the justice of Maclean's government nor of his extraordinary abilities as an administrator could possibly be found than that afforded by the fact that he had governed this country for not less than fourteen years and had only once had to resort to arms ; and in spite of his having assumed control at a most unfortunate and difficult time, when the Ashantis were still smarting under their first serious defeat and were believed to be likely to make an attempt to retrieve their fortunes, and when the tribes on the coast itself were at war with one another and openly defying all authority, yet he had succeeded in restoring and preserving peace and good order, and establishing general security and prosperity throughout the whole country, to an extent to which they had never existed before. All this he had done without losing the respect and love of the people ; and although there must have been an enormous amount of prejudice against him personally at the time of the Commission of Enquiry, yet he emerged from this ordeal, not only exonerated, but even praised to a great extent for what he had done. In 1828 the Government had abandoned the Gold Coast as an undesirable and useless Possession, and it was solely due to Maclean's wise administration that British influence had been so extended and strengthened and the country as a whole brought into so satisfactory a condition, that the Crown now found it worth while to revert to its former policy and resume control.

Thus the long and eminent services of Captain Maclean at last received some official recognition. His duties now were to sit with the Chiefs in all cases in which Africans alone were concerned and to try such cases with them in accordance with the Fanti Customary Law in so far as this was applicable and not at variance with the general principles of British justice. The Secretary of State, in his despatch defining the jurisdiction of the Assessor, laid down that his duties were to "consist in combining with an impartial investigation of the cases brought before him, a mitigation of the severity of the sentences which, in such cases, would be awarded by

native judges, in the event of conviction," and the 1887-1848 Assessor was to be specially cautioned of "the necessity CHAP. XXIV for a lenient exercise of the discretion entrusted to him."¹ This mode of administering justice was identical with that originated and for so many years carried out by Maclean, and it thus came about that the very methods which he had inaugurated, but which had been so much cavilled at, were now sanctioned and legalized by an Act of Parliament and continued under Crown rule.

The Crown, moreover, adopted Maclean's policy in dealing with the problem of domestic slavery; for no active interference with the system was made, but the Judicial Assessor continued to use his influence to ensure good treatment to the slaves and discourage by every means in his power those defects and abuses that at times occurred. The old difficulty that had always been felt still existed, namely, that the British had no legal claim to territory or jurisdiction beyond the actual forts, and although some argued that the boundary extended to the limit of the range of the guns, this was too vague a definition to be of any practical benefit. The principle laid down by Lord John Russell, therefore, still held good, that "if the laws or usages of those countries tolerate slavery, we have no right to set aside those laws or usages except by persuasion, negotiation, and other peaceful means."

In 1843 a carriage road, built by Henry Barnes of Anamabo from that town to Akrofu, a distance of ten miles, was completed. It had been begun three years earlier and was intended to facilitate the transport of timber to the coast for shipment, Barnes having been the first to engage in this trade in 1830.

¹ Parliamentary Paper, *Report of Select Committee on West Africa*, 1865, p. 438.

CHAPTER XXV

DISTURBANCES ON THE COAST

1844 TO 1849

1844-1849 COMMANDER HILL had not long been Governor when he
CHAP. XXV determined to make some agreement with the Fanti
Chiefs whereby they might be brought under better control and their relations with the Government be more clearly defined. To this end a treaty was drawn up and explained to them, to which they readily agreed, and it was signed at Cape Coast on the 6th of March 1844. This treaty is usually referred to as the Bond of 1844 and reads as follows :

" BOND, 6TH MARCH 1844

" Whereas power and jurisdiction have been exercised for and on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, within divers countries and places adjacent to Her Majesty's forts and settlements on the Gold Coast ; we, chiefs of countries and places so referred to, adjacent to the said forts and settlements, do hereby acknowledge that power and jurisdiction, and declare that the first objects of law are the protection of individuals and of property.

" 2. Human sacrifices, and other barbarous customs, such as panyaring, are abominations, and contrary to law.

" 3. Murders, robberies, and other crimes and offences, will be tried and enquired of before the Queen's judicial officers and the chiefs of the districts, moulding the customs of the country to the general principles of British law.

" Done at Cape Coast Castle before his Excellency the

Lieutenant Governor, on this 6th day of March, in the 1844-1840
year of our Lord 1844.

CHAP. XXV

" Their marks :

- " X CUDJOE CHIBBOE, King of Denkira.
- " X QUASHIE OTTOO, Chief of Abrah.
- " X CHIBBOE COOMAH, Chief of Assin.
- " X GEBRE, Second Chief of Assin.
- " X QUASHIE ANKAH, Chief of Donadie.
- " X Awoossie, Chief of Domonassie.
- " (Signed) QUASHIE ANKAH.

" Their marks :

- " X AMONOO, Chief of Anamabo.
- " X JOE AGGERY, Chief of Cape Coast.

" Witness my seal on the 6th day of March 1844, and the
7th year of Her Majesty's reign.

" (Signed) H. W. HILL, Lieutenant Governor (L.S.).

" Witnesses, and done in the presence of :

- " (Signed) GEORGE MACLEAN, J.P. and Assessor (S.).
- " F. POGSON, Lieut., 1st W. I. Regiment (S.)
Commanding H. M. Troops.
- " S. BANNERMAN, Adjutant of Militia (S.)."¹

No innovations were introduced by this treaty ; it conferred no new territorial rights ; but it legalized and defined that jurisdiction in purely criminal matters which had been continuously exercised over the towns around the British forts ever since the commencement of the century and which Maclean had gradually extended to the whole Protectorate. But although nothing new was gained, it was none the less a very necessary step ; for as time went on, it became more and more necessary to have documentary evidence of every agreement or arrangement made with the Chiefs and people, many of whom, in the coast towns especially, were now being educated and could no longer be regarded and treated as simple savages as had been the case in the past.

Soon after Governor Hill's arrival, about December

¹ The signatures of the Chiefs of Dixcove were added on the 21st of August, and those of the Chiefs of Lower Wassaw on the 2nd of December.

1844-1849 1844, a party of Ashantis was returning through Assin with trade goods from the coast, when a woman carrying a few gallons of rum, who was a little in advance of the others, was suddenly attacked by an Assin, who knocked her down and then, throwing her into the bush, left her for dead and carried the rum back to his village. The other Ashantis, on reaching the village and failing to find the woman there as they had expected, went back to search for her. They found her lying in the bush, but, though still breathing, she was quite unable to speak and died soon afterwards. Near the body they found a piece of cloth which had been dropped by the murderer. Taking this with them, they returned to the village, where they showed it to several people, saying they had found it lying on the road and were afraid they might be suspected of having stolen it if it were found in their possession. A man soon claimed it as the property of his brother, who was then sent for but denied that it was his. It was proved, however, to belong to him, and he was at last forced to acknowledge it ; whereupon the leader of the Ashanti party explained the circumstances in which it had been found and accused him of the murder. He was at once seized and taken before the Chief of the village, who sent him to Chief Chibu of Assin, who, however, said the case was far too serious for him to deal with and sent the man under escort to the Governor at Cape Coast.

On their arrival in Kumasi, the Ashantis of course reported what had happened to the King. The news was speedily confirmed and feeling ran high against the Assins, whose independence since 1831 had always been a sore point with the Ashantis. Their resentment was soon turned against the Governor also ; for he had omitted to comply with the customary rule of etiquette by sending to inform the King of his assumption of government, and now, as time went on and nothing was heard from him about this murder, they regarded his silence as more than a slight and an actual infraction of the treaty of 1831. They knew that the criminal was in his custody, and expected him to notify the King officially of the murder of

one of his subjects within the protected territory and 1844-1849 then punish the offender in accordance with the terms CHAP. XXV of the treaty. He did neither ; and after waiting a reasonable time, the King called a meeting of all his Chiefs to consider what should be done.

There was in Kumasi at this time a Wesleyan missionary, George Chapman, who had come up with Mr. Freeman in August 1843 and been living in the town ever since. He was on very friendly terms with the King and Chiefs, and, being about to return to Cape Coast, was asked to be present at this meeting in order that he might hear all that passed and be able to state the King's views to the Governor. The Chiefs, after hearing the statement of the leader of the trading party and learning that the King had received no message from the Governor, were greatly excited. Two of them stood up and asked permission to take the great oath that they would at once lead their men against the Assins and exterminate them ; but they were over-ruled by Kwaku Dua who said that, since Mr. Chapman had consented to act for them, they must first wait and see what the result of his negotiations might be ; but he promised that if redress was not forthcoming, he himself would lead his army against the Assins and go through and through their country until no living thing was left in it.

On reaching the frontier at Fomana, all the Ashantis with Mr. Chapman were turned back by the Chief, who had orders from Kumasi to close the road and allow no one to leave the kingdom until the dispute had been settled. Orders had also been sent to the Ashantis then trading on the coast to buy up all the guns and ammunition they could find and return at once to the capital. Parties of men heavily laden with these warlike stores were met all along the road, and when Cape Coast was reached the traders were found in a state of great alarm and fearing an immediate invasion. The discovery had just been made that every store had been depleted of powder, while even in the Castle there was only enough to fire a few rounds of cannon and no more was expected

1844-1849 for at least three months. Worse management cannot be imagined, and if the Ashantis had advanced they must have had everything their own way.

The Governor alone ridiculed the idea of an Ashanti invasion and professed to believe that it would be easy to defeat any army the King could send with 3,000 or 4,000 Fantis and Assins. Mr. Chapman's statements, however, soon dispelled this absurd idea, so that when three Chiefs arrived a little later with the King's message they found him prepared to treat the matter seriously. The murderer was sent up to the place where the crime had been committed and there executed in the presence of the King's messengers, who then returned to Kumasi and reported that the terms of the treaty had been kept and the murder avenged. Thus, what at one time threatened to involve the country in another war was satisfactorily and easily settled by compliance with the perfectly just demands of the Ashantis and removing their fears that the English were about to disregard yet another treaty.

Towards the end of 1845 Commander Hill resigned his appointment and was succeeded in the following year by Commander Winniett, R.N., Mr. James Lilly¹ having acted during the interval.

In 1846 a company fight occurred at Elmina, which assumed such a serious aspect that it was only by firing the Castle guns that it could be stopped and thirty people were killed ; and on the 6th of September in the same year a serious riot broke out at Accra between the people of James Town² and those of the Dutch town, during which the greater part of the latter was burned and several lives were lost on either side.

Early in 1847 Governor Winniett visited Abomi, and on the 5th of April concluded a treaty³ of friendship and commerce with Gizu the King of Dahomi. A year later, in 1848, as a result of a motion by Lord Fermoy in the

¹ Colonial Surgeon and Acting Secretary to the Governor.

² British Accra.

³ For full text see *Report of Committee of House of Commons* (1865), Appendix 3, p. 419.

House of Commons to endeavour to stop the barbarous 1844-1849 practices so common on the West Coast, Mr. Cruikshank CHAP. XXV was sent on a mission to Gizu to try to induce him to abandon the slave trade and abolish human sacrifices ; but he met with no success, the King pointing out that such innovations would endanger his throne and the very existence of his kingdom by removing the principal and almost sole source of his revenue¹ without providing any means of replacing it.

Although the export slave trade had been entirely suppressed along the whole of the British coast line, it still continued in the eastern districts in spite of the efforts of the Danish Government to abolish it. In 1839 Governor Giede heard of the doings of a Portuguese slave trader named Don José Mora, who had established himself near the mouth of the River Volta, and led a force of sixty men against him. Mora was secured and his goods and slaves confiscated, but was subsequently released on undertaking never again to carry on the slave trade within the jurisdiction of the Danish Government. Three years later, however, in 1842, he was found to be carrying on his old business at Wei and Governor Wilkens, with a force of about 150 men, sailed down in an American ship and landed there by night. Mora escaped by jumping through a window, but his goods and such slaves as he had collected were seized and taken to Christiansborg, where the latter were given their freedom and employed as Government labourers.

In 1844 the Danish sergeant in charge of Fort Prinzenstein at Kitta heard that this same Mora, who had now been joined by two other slave traders, was still carrying on his business at Wei and prepared to arrest him. But before any attack could be made, the slave dealers got news of his intentions and moved. Soon afterwards, however, Mora openly defied the Danes by marching past the fort with a gang of slaves and was stopped. The slaves were brought into the fort, but he

¹ About 8,000 slaves were exported annually from Dahomi, the transit and export duties bringing the King a revenue of 300,000 dollars.

1844-1849 himself was again allowed to go. He and his fellow **CHAP. XXV** traders now bribed the Awunas to assist them, and they forced their way into the fort, which was in a very bad state of repair, and compelled the sergeant to surrender the slaves he had taken. Some men, under an officer, were therefore sent from Christiansborg to repair the fort preparatory to taking steps to punish the people for this act ; but while this was being done, a quarrel broke out between the garrison and the Awunas, who came up in great force and blockaded it.

Mr. Schmidt had now succeeded Mr. Wilkens as Governor, and so soon as he heard of this outbreak, set out in person for Kitta with about 120 men and entered the fort without opposition. The Chiefs were sent for and asked to explain their conduct. They asked for time in which to prepare their answer and returned to the town promising to bring their reply the next day ; but instead of doing so, they collected their men and laid siege to the fort. The town was bombarded and laid in ruins, but the garrison were soon reduced to great straits and were on the verge of starvation, when the French warship *Abeille* put in and relieved them just in time. The Governor then returned to Christiansborg and great preparations were made to crush the Awunas. A large force was collected, and a man-of-war, the *Ornen*, sent out to assist ; but the Awunas, disheartened by the last struggle and the damage then done to their town and property, were in no mood for further hostilities and sued for peace. This was granted on payment of a fine, and the slave traders then removed to Popo.

On the 22nd of May 1847 Maclean died of dysentery at Cape Coast after thirteen days' illness, and such was the universal respect that he had inspired by his long and just administration, both as Governor and Judicial Assessor, that for fourteen days after his death every store was closed and all business in the town suspended, while the people held a great funeral custom in his honour and the discharges of musketry were almost continuous. Nor was this feeling confined to the inhabitants of Cape Coast,

but it extended equally throughout the whole Protectorate 1844-1849 and even penetrated beyond its borders into Ashanti. CHAP. XXV The Ashantis had long regarded Maclean as their friend and protector ; for he had never refused to listen to any just complaint nor failed to give them satisfaction, and their traders had always been able to travel through the Protectorate to the coast without fear of molestation or robbery and with a degree of general security that they had never known before. The King, indeed, had considered his friendship of such paramount importance that he had been in the habit of making regular sacrifices in order to ensure its continuance. For weeks and months after his death parties continued to arrive from the out-lying districts, and every Chief considered it his duty to take up a position in front of the Castle gate and fire several volleys as a mark of respect for the memory of the late Governor before proceeding to attend to his business. Maclean was buried in the courtyard of the Castle, where a large stone slab bearing the initials "G. M." may still be seen marking his resting-place alongside that of L. E. L. Mr. J. C. Fitzpatrick succeeded him as Judicial Assessor.

The mere forfeiture of his gold by Maclean had had no effect on the conduct of Kwaku Akka ; but Governor Hill had been unable to take any further proceedings against him because the senior naval officer on the station refused to co-operate with him. Akka, therefore, was still in open revolt when Commander Winniett arrived at Cape Coast. He made several attempts to open communication with him in the hope of inducing him to listen to reason and moderate his conduct ; but in vain. Akka imprisoned his messengers and openly defied his authority. But these acts were as nothing compared to the outrages he committed soon afterwards, which quickly brought matters to a crisis and forced the Governor to take decisive action against him. Besides offering a reward of two ounces of gold for every head brought to him and murdering a party of Wassaw traders who had come down, Akka went still farther and kidnapped a number of the people of Axim, who were, of course, Dutch subjects, and also

1844-1849 waylaid and murdered the French Commandant of Assini.
CHAP. XXV Finally, he sent a message threatening to attack Cape Coast Castle, raze it to the ground, and dine off the Governor's liver. The Governor, therefore, determined to raise a sufficient force and march against him. It was known that Akka had about 2,000 well-armed men, whereas the only troops on the Gold Coast were the single company of the 1st West India Regiment that had been sent from Sierra Leone and about thirty armed police. It was necessary, therefore, to call upon the Chiefs for assistance, and they responded to the appeal so well that the only difficulty the Governor found was in limiting his force to reasonable numbers and refusing the services of those who were not required without giving offence. An expeditionary force of between 4,000 and 5,000 men was thus quickly raised and left Cape Coast on the 24th of March 1848.

It is over a hundred miles along the beach from Cape Coast to Axim ; but the whole of the troops¹ had reached there by the 3rd of April and entered the enemy's country three days later. The Apollonians disputed the passage of the Ankobra River on that day, the 6th, but were driven back ; and a similar attempt to check the English advance at the Abmussa River the day after was equally unsuccessful. Having been decisively defeated on two occasions, the enemy quickly realized that further resistance was useless and sought to make terms. Akka had fled and hidden himself in the bush—the advancing troops firing on his body-guard as he left Ateabu ; but his many cruelties and consistently oppressive rule had not tended to win the love of his subjects nor increased their anxiety to run any serious risks on his behalf, and, still further stimulated by the offer of a reward of 100 ounces of gold, they now seized and surrendered him as the price of peace. An old captain, named Bahini, who had been instrumental in his capture, was elected by the people to succeed him,

¹ Two divisions of Fanti Allies under Messrs. Brodie Cruikshank and Francis Swanzy, and a company of the 1st West India Regiment under Lieutenant Bingham.

and became responsible to the Government for the good 1844-1849 order of the country. It is, of course, just possible that CHAP. XXV it was not until now that the Apollonians became parties to the tripartite treaty of 1831, but in that case Governor Winniett's signature would probably have appeared, so that the date previously given¹ is the one most likely to be correct. On the 18th of April the troops returned with their prisoner to Cape Coast, where he was tried by the Governor and Fanti Chiefs on the 19th of December and condemned to death; but the sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life, and he died in Cape Coast Castle on the 28th of December 1851.²

It seems extraordinary, but it is none the less a fact, that the Secretary of State blamed Governor Winniett for having undertaken this expedition and even threatened to make him pay its whole cost. It was only after its successful conclusion that a reluctant approval was at last extorted. It is difficult to understand in what possible way the Governor could have been expected to avoid acting as he did, or how he could even have been justified in delaying matters for the three months then necessary to communicate with the Secretary of State and receive a reply; nor is it easy to guess to what limits the evil might have extended had he done so. Governor Winniett rightly wrote in his despatch on the subject that "to allow a day to pass without . . . crushing rebellion and establishing good order . . . would be to temporize with a case pregnant with incalculable mischief to the well-being of the British Settlements here."³ It was not only the Wassaws and other tribes, but the Dutch and French also, who naturally and rightly looked to the English Governor for redress, and their opinion of his government could be better imagined than described had he been content to remain inactive in the face of all that Akka had done. Other Chiefs also might have been tempted to revolt had

¹ *Vide* p. 421.

² He lost his reason in prison, and was a helpless idiot for some time before his death.

³ Winniett's letter book at Christiansborg Castle.

1844-1849 they seen Akka successfully defying the Government,
 CHAP. XXV whereas the ease and promptitude with which the necessary force had been raised and the rebellion crushed could not fail to have a very beneficial effect on them.¹

In 1848 an attempt was made, in accordance with special instructions that had been sent out by the Secretary of State, to induce natives of the Gold Coast to go as free emigrants to the West Indies. It was hoped that they would obtain an extensive practical knowledge of tropical agriculture, which would prove useful when they returned after a few years. Nothing came of the scheme however, for neither the Chiefs nor the people themselves were in favour of it. The Chiefs, because they failed to appreciate or foresee its possible advantages, and estimated their own power and importance by the number of men they had under their command or as domestic slaves in their retinues, and the people, because they already had plenty of land in their own country, which produced all they required, and were averse to leaving it for any problematical benefits to be obtained in a strange one.

Governor Winniett had received special instructions to put down human sacrifices by every possible means, and, affairs on the coast now being quiet, he left Cape Coast with Mr. Freeman and an escort of one company of the 1st West India Regiment and the band, under Captain Powell, on the 28th of September 1848 for Kumasi, where he hoped to be able to come to some agreement with the King of Ashanti for their abolition. In this he met with no success ; but Kwaku Dua seized the opportunity of the Governor's presence in his capital to try to regain his authority over the Assins and asked that they might now be returned to him. The Governor promised to consult the wishes of the people themselves and be guided by their decision, and accordingly, on his return to Cape Coast, sent for the Assin Chiefs and told them of the

¹ It appears that the Apollonians were made to bear the cost of the expedition, for there is an entry in one of the old letter-books at Christiansborg Castle that the Apollonia Chiefs " on the 16th of May 1848 had made themselves responsible to the Crown for the sum of £1,170 4s. 5*½*d."

King's request. But they preferred to remain under British protection, and the King was soon afterwards notified by Acting Governor Fitzpatrick that they had elected to remain as they were and must, therefore, be considered entirely independent of Ashanti. This visit to Kumasi, the first ever undertaken by a Governor, was not a very politic measure ; for it was claimed by the Ashantis that the Governor, by coming to see their King, had admitted his own inferiority. The coast tribes, too, regarded the matter in much the same light ; for on the Gold Coast, and especially in Ashanti, where court etiquette is always most strictly observed, it is ever the inferior who visits his superior. All things considered, therefore, this visit probably did more harm than good.

1844-1849
CHAP. XXV

When the Basel Mission first began work on the Gold Coast they confined themselves to Christiansborg ; but a little later, one of their missionaries, Ries, visited Kumasi but met with no success. The Society then began to work among the tribes in the Volta River district in the hope of ultimately being able to penetrate to Ashanti by this route, and in 1864 Klauss crossed the river and founded a station on the top of a hill at Anum.

The effects of the establishment of a school at Cape Coast and of mission stations both there and elsewhere now began to manifest themselves. While it would be unjust to blame the missionaries for all the results that were directly or indirectly the outcome of their settlement in the country, it cannot be denied that the first comers at any rate seem to have been actuated by a very large amount of indiscreet zeal and but little foresight ; and though it must be remembered that they had very many difficulties to contend with, they did undoubtedly, though quite unintentionally, bring about some distinctly unfortunate results. These men were strangers to the country, knew nothing of its people, and allowed their anxiety to gain converts to lead them into error. Instead of taking the trouble to study the beliefs the people already held and then trying to eliminate the defects from their creed and engraft something better in their place,

1844-1849 they rashly and erroneously concluded that because they CHAP. XXV made use of certain inanimate objects in connection with their worship, they must be idolaters and the whole system essentially corrupt ; a conclusion that a little careful study and enquiry would have given them good reason to modify. In their efforts to gain converts, therefore, they tried to expunge every trace of these natural beliefs before propounding a faith which, to an African, cannot be easy to understand, and thus left the majority of their subjects floundering in a sea of doubt and mystification from which they frequently tried to save themselves by grasping once more at their own beliefs, while many of those who adopted Christianity had a most perverted idea of what it really was.

It was at this time, too, when education was first introduced to any large extent, that the "Coast scholar" appeared. This term is usually regarded, and commonly used, as one of contempt or derision ; but if it is applied indiscriminately in this sense a great injustice is done. On the Gold Coast, as in other parts of the world, the amount of knowledge acquired by different individuals varies within the widest possible limits, from the man who can merely read or write, or perhaps scrawl his own name in the most laborious and imperfect manner, to men who have acquired a thorough mastery of the English language and read widely. Such men have educated and trained their minds to such a degree that their opinions, especially when given on subjects concerning their own people and customs, must always carry weight and be entitled to the greatest respect. These men are thoroughly well educated, and their services in various capacities are invaluable and indispensable. But they are exceptional. It is to the youth who, either from a disinclination for honest work, or from a mistaken idea that by acquiring a smattering of the rudiments of education and aping the European in dress and manners, believes that in some mysterious way he will add to his dignity and better his position, that the term "scholar" is correctly applied in its local and restricted sense. He it is who, having learned sufficient at

school to enable him to make some show of education and 1844-1849 impose in various ways on the entirely illiterate, lacks CHAP. XXV sufficient energy or means to complete his education and leaves. His scanty store of knowledge is not enough to gain him employment as a clerk or qualify him for any of the other positions open to the more energetic and ambitious; yet he feels that he must get some return for the money and time he has spent, and being too proud to do any manual labour, is soon driven by necessity to prey upon the wholly illiterate, who seem to regard him with a kind of superstitious awe as a person possessed of wonderful and mysterious powers. Such education as he has acquired, moreover, too often merely enlarges the scope of any criminal instincts he may possess by enabling him to perpetrate various fraudulent offences impossible to the more ignorant. At best, such men do an immense amount of harm to other quite innocent persons, by indulging in all kinds of extravagances and involving their families in debt, and by giving an erroneous impression of the effects of education on the African.

When the missions were first started, the pay given by the missionaries to those whom they were compelled to employ as interpreters and teachers, and to the numerous carpenters, masons and labourers who were required to erect the necessary buildings, fully equalled, even if it did not exceed, the wages they could obtain elsewhere. Employment at the missions, therefore, became so popular that great numbers of people were induced to join them, the majority of whom came there primarily for what they could get. They then heard the teachings of the missionaries which, to them, were so novel and strange that it is not surprising that they were the cause of a great deal of misconception and induced the people to believe that by adopting this new faith they would derive many important temporal benefits. Time, of course, undeceived them, and so it came about that the numbers of so-called converts quickly fell off and the attendants at the missions consisted almost solely of the persons in their employ. But although the vast majority thus fell away, there were

1844-1849 a very few who adopted Christianity in all sincerity and **CHAP. XXV** their numbers slowly increased ; a fact which seems to have been largely due to the more politic and temperate conduct of Mr. Freeman.

The pagan inhabitants of the Gold Coast are remarkable for their easy-going tolerance as regards their own religion and that of others. This is mainly attributable to the fact that most of the Gold Coast deities are local or individual ones, whose sphere of influence and power is limited ; so that while a few are revered by a whole district, others are only worshipped by single communities, families or individuals as tutelary gods. It would be considered a foolish act of supererogation for anyone to waste his time by worshipping the local gods of another district who were too far away either to help or molest him, though, should he travel thither and thus come within their sphere of influence, he would probably think it good policy to propitiate them with some small offering. These early Christians, however, became imbued with a fanatical zeal in the cause of their new faith and a contempt for their former beliefs that led them into extremes, and the missionaries seem to have made no attempt to curb them. In the end these people went to such lengths that they quite overstepped the bounds of all reason and ordinary tolerance, and so exasperated the pagan community that serious trouble arose and nearly involved the whole country in a religious war.

Mission stations had been opened at several places away from the Society's headquarters at Cape Coast, and amongst them was a small school at Asafa, where there were about ten or fifteen converts. This village was near Mankesim, where the great fetish Brafo dwelt, and which might, therefore, be regarded as the religious headquarters of all Fanti.¹ This fetish was consulted by persons from far and near and its priests drove a very lucrative business,

¹ Brafo is said to have been appointed by the god Bobowisi of Winneba Hill, who is a general deity, to act as his deputy in minor matters. He was brought to Mankesim from Ashanti, where he had been pointed out by the local priests. (Ellis.)

so that it cannot have been at all pleasant for them to see 1844-1849 their god repudiated in the immediate neighbourhood of CHAP. XXV his shrine. But although this doubtless gave rise to a certain amount of ill-feeling, they took no active steps to interfere with the Christians. The latter, on the other hand, in 1849, moved from their own to another small village, still nearer to the sacred hollow in the forest in which the god was believed to dwell. Here they began to abuse and ridicule Brafo's worshippers, and even went so far as to clear the bush in the immediate neighbourhood of the sacred grove and make their farms there.

This was more than the priests were prepared to stand. The credit of the deity and their own easy means of making a livelihood were endangered, and they therefore called upon the Chiefs and people to defend the honour of their god. They, however, did not consider it necessary for them to take any action, for they were convinced that Brafo would speedily avenge himself without human aid, and it was not until they had been disappointed in this belief and had seen unusually good crops growing on the Christians' farms, even after one of them had shot an antelope¹ in the sacred grove itself, that they felt it incumbent upon them to do something. A council was therefore held, at which it was agreed that the Chiefs should combine to defend the honour of the fetish. Adu, the King of Mankesim, who lived on the spot, was appointed its immediate guardian, but he received the moral support of all the other Chiefs, who promised to share with him the responsibility of any action he might find it necessary to take.

Soon after this arrangement had been made, one of the fetish priests, a member of one of the less important grades, joined the Christians, and he with two others entered the sacred grove and cut several poles there for building purposes. The priests, so soon as they heard of what had been done, went to Adu and called upon him to punish these men, and he, having collected his people, went by night to the village in which the Christians were

¹ Sacred to Brafo.

1846-1849 then living and, reaching it at daybreak, burned it and
CHAP. XXV carried ten of the Christians prisoners to Mankesim.

These men had been going out of their way to look for trouble, but now that they had succeeded in finding it they were of course the first to complain, and the matter was reported to the Governor, who had known nothing of what was going on. He at once sent a soldier to Mankesim summoning Adu to Cape Coast to explain his conduct, while the Judicial Assessor, realizing that the Chief would hardly have ventured to such lengths unless he had received great provocation and taken a particularly serious view of the matter, tried to save further trouble by sending privately to Amonu the King of Anamabo and asking him to use what influence he had with Adu to prevail upon him to comply with the Governor's summons and not make matters worse by a refusal. The fetish priests, in the meantime, were endeavouring to persuade Adu to drown the renegade; but he refused, and on the arrival of the Governor's messenger, fixed a day on which he promised to come to Cape Coast and bring his prisoners with him, at the same time guaranteeing their personal safety and explaining that he could not come at once as he required time to collect his people. A second messenger was then sent to order him to come to the Castle immediately, who, on his arrival at Mankesim, found Adu on the point of starting and accompanied by all the Fanti Chiefs who had promised him their support and a great number of followers. On reaching Anamabo, the Chiefs wrote to Mr. Bannerman, who was then Commandant of the fort, pointing out the difficulty they would find in maintaining so many of their people in Cape Coast and begging that the Judicial Assessor would come to Anamabo and settle the case there, promising at the same time to abide by whatever decision he might give. This request was granted, and the Assessor, on his arrival at Anamabo, found the whole of the Fanti Chiefs collected there with about 3,000 of their people.

The facts were quite clear and were not disputed by either party. It was admitted that the Christians had gone out of their way to insult the fetish and been guilty of

conduct calculated to provoke its worshippers, and that 1844-1849 Adu had thereupon seized them and burned their village. CHAP. XXV The Court ordered Adu to pay the Christians £56 as compensation for the loss of their property, and an additional sum of £40 to the Government as a fine for his offence, while the Christians on the other hand, were to pay £20 to the Fanti Chiefs as compensation for the insult offered them through their fetish.

The Chiefs now obtained permission to retire and consult together, and, on their return to the Court, acknowledged the justice of the sentence with the exception of the order for payment of compensation to the Christians for the loss of their property. To this they strongly objected, urging that the losses they had suffered were an altogether inadequate punishment for the offences they had committed and that they would be compromising the dignity of their god if they consented to pay this sum. They further requested that, in deference to the already outraged feelings of the deity, the Christians should be ordered to abandon the farms and village they were occupying. The Assessor replied that his judgment had been based on the principles of equity, without any regard to the religious aspect of the case or the respective merits of Christianity and fetishism, and he could not therefore alter it ; but he was ready to mediate between the parties with a view to the prevention of future quarrels, and to advise the Christians to sell their present farms if the Chiefs would buy them. The Chiefs soon saw that it was vain for them to hope to change this decision, though they were far from being convinced by the Assessor's arguments, and merely said : " If our master prefers these ten Christians to the whole of the Fanti nation, we cannot help it ; we are sorry, but we submit." It is always hard for the African to believe that might does not necessarily mean right. Anfu Otu the King of Abra, and Amonu the King of Anamabo stood sureties for Adu and agreed to be responsible for the payment of the money.

The case had been heard in the hall of Anamabo Fort, which could only accommodate about 200 of the principal

1844-1849 men, and the remainder of the people had been waiting outside the gate to hear the result of the trial. So soon as the Chiefs left the fort and the decision was made known, many of these people seized their arms, which they had previously hidden in the houses in the town, and Adu was quickly surrounded by at least 1,000 armed men, who raised him up on their heads and carried him through the streets, defiantly proclaiming him the protector of their god and bearing a few kegs of powder before him as an intimation that he was prepared to fight. This demonstration had been arranged by some of the Chiefs, unknown to the Abras and Anamabos, and the hearing at the latter's town had been specially requested with the object of avoiding the presence of any troops and in the hope of awing the Assessor by these means into giving a decision in accordance with their wishes.

The Assessor, fearing they might perhaps proceed to extremes, and hearing occasional shouts recommending the massacre of the Christians, came out and ordered Adu to come down from his palanquin. He obeyed ; but was immediately hurried away by his people, who thought the Assessor was about to make him a prisoner, while the Anamabos, fearing some harm might befall the Assessor, seized their arms and ranged themselves by his side ; whereupon the others, seeing they had not all the force on their side, at once scattered and fled up the roads towards their villages. Amonu now began to feel anxious about the payment of the various sums for which he and Otu had made themselves responsible and followed Adu in the hope of being able to persuade him to return. He overtook him at Great Kormantin, where Adu turned upon him and reviled him as a traitor to his god and the compact they had all made when they met in council at Mankesim, adding that he had only agreed to come to Anamabo to have the case heard because he had been convinced that the Fantis were so firmly leagued together on this point that the Assessor would never dare to give judgment against him. Since he had done so, however, and Amonu and Otu had been foolish enough to encourage and abet

him by standing sureties for the various payments, he, 1844-1849
Adu, intended to allow them to pay.

CHAP. XXV

For four months Adu maintained an attitude of armed defiance, collecting large quantities of powder and lead, and cutting war paths through the bush, deaf alike to the remonstrances of the Governor and the persuasions of those Chiefs who sided with the authorities. Many of the Chiefs openly supported Adu and camped near the fetish grove, where they kept a constant guard lest any attempt should be made to destroy it or arrest their champion. Otu and Amonu, though willing to redeem their promise and pay the fine, were not called upon to do so ; for it was felt that such a termination of the affair would be most unsatisfactory, and the Governor preferred to let matters wait until time and the inconvenience caused by the unsettled state of the country should bring the revolted Chiefs to reason. It would, moreover, have been extremely risky to attempt to use force, for it would have been necessary to call on some of the Chiefs for assistance and it was impossible to know on whom to rely. The nature of the quarrel caused it to be universally regarded as a religious question, and few, if any, of the people would have dared to take up arms against Brafo.

Eventually, the interruption to trade and the generally disturbed state of the country caused such universal discontent that the Chiefs who had at first supported Adu were inclined to be less enthusiastic in his cause, and the Governor considered the time had come when an effort might be made to settle the quarrel. He accordingly sent for the King and Chiefs of Cape Coast, and, after telling them that he was about to lead an expedition against Adu, called upon them for assistance. At this, as had been expected, they demurred ; pointing out that, although they were willing enough to fight for the Government on any ordinary occasion, yet they regarded this as a very different matter and dared not take up arms against the Brafo fetish. They, therefore, begged the Governor to defer his plans for another week to give them time to send a final deputation to Adu. This suggestion was readily

1844-1849 agreed to, but a great show of military preparations was made by continually exercising the troops and serving out ammunition. Adu's long resistance had been solely due to the fetish priests, whom he had consulted on each occasion when messengers had reached him, but as they now saw that it would be useless for them to try to hold out any longer, they informed him that the fetish said he might go without fear. Adu accordingly came to Cape Coast attended by most of the Fanti Chiefs and a large retinue. The greatest excitement prevailed in the town and every precaution was taken to guard against any repetition of the disorderly scenes that had taken place at Anamabo. Fort William, which commands the Castle and town, was garrisoned by an officer and a party of gunners ; the whole of the Castle garrison was kept under arms ; all sentries were doubled ; a request that the case might be heard outside the Castle was refused ; and the Castle gate was placed in charge of an officer's guard, who had orders only to open the small wicket and to admit none but the principal men.

Over six hundred of the chief men in the country assembled in the Castle Hall, and after the Linguist of the Cape Coast deputation had related what its members had done, Adu was brought forward and, throwing his handkerchief down at the Governor's feet in token of submission, acknowledged his error and begged for mercy, pleading that he had not acted in his own interests but rather in the cause of the whole Fanti race and in defence of his faith. He further said that he thought the Judicial Assessor was prejudiced against him and asked that his case might be reheard. This was done ; and the Governor, magistrates, and principal Chiefs, having retired without the Assessor to consider their judgment, confirmed the decision that had been given at Anamabo. Adu was then required to deposit fifty ounces of gold in the Castle as security for his good behaviour for two years, but was not otherwise punished for his disobedience. The fine and compensation to the Christians were then paid and this long-drawn-out dispute was finally set at rest.

While these events had been happening, a fetish man named Kofi Kuma, who had quarrelled with another priest about a woman, privately disclosed the whole fraudulent business of the priests to the Judicial Assessor and furnished him with the proofs of a plot against several of the leading converts to Christianity, namely George Blankson of Anamabo ; Hayfron the fort interpreter ; and William Parker and Stanhope, who were office-bearers at the Wesleyan Chapel. A secret meeting had been held at dead of night on the shore of the lagoon near Anamabo, at which it had been decided to murder these men and subscriptions had been collected for the hire of a fetish man to poison them and thus remove the chief danger threatening their own religion and means of livelihood. The Chiefs were, therefore, summoned to a second meeting, at which this plot and the practices of the fetish priests were fully exposed by the Judicial Assessor. The priests found guilty of conspiracy to poison were publicly flogged in the market place at Cape Coast and subsequently imprisoned for five years in the Castle, while their female confederates¹ received sentences of two years' imprisonment each. But though this exposure seems to have caused a tremendous sensation at the time and the people temporarily lost faith in their beliefs, this effect was by no means permanent, and a year or two later the worship of Brafo began to revive and was soon in as flourishing a condition as ever.

¹ Nineteen persons in all were found guilty.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE POLL TAX

1850 TO 1859

1850-1859 IN 1850, by Letters Patent dated the 24th of January,
CHAP. XXVI the Gold Coast was separated from Sierra Leone and
constituted a separate government, with Executive and
Legislative Councils for the management of its affairs.

During 1849 the Danish Government had expressed their willingness to dispose of their Possessions¹ on the Gold Coast, and negotiations had been opened which resulted in the purchase of all their forts and rights in the country by the English for the sum of £10,000. Unfortunately the records were not included and were removed to Denmark. It was hoped that the departure of the Danes would facilitate the introduction and collection of Customs duties on imports² and that the sum thus raised would more than suffice to meet the extra expenditure which the maintenance of these forts would entail. It was also found that the anxiety of the Danish Government to dispose of these Possessions was so great, that if England refused the offer it would be made to others Powers. They had, in fact, already been offered to Mr. Forster, of the firm of Forster and Smith, then trading on the Gold Coast, on condition that he would hoist the Danish flag and keep the forts and other buildings in repair, and there was every probability that the French would be given the next opportunity of acquiring them. It was felt, therefore,

¹ It was costing them £4,000 per annum to maintain them.

² The Danes had already refused to co-operate in levying a duty on imported spirits.

that it might possibly lead to a renewal of the slave trade, 1850-1859 or at least to increased difficulties in its prevention, if CHAP. XXVI these forts passed into the hands of any person or nation less sincerely anxious than the English and Danes were to abolish it. Their acquisition was, moreover, desired, because, although the relations of the English and Danes with one another had on the whole been very friendly, doubts had arisen within recent years as to the extent of their respective jurisdictions, and a dispute in reference to the districts of Akim and Akwapin had been in existence ever since 1838. In fact, this question was constantly cropping up, but had never been definitely settled.

All the arrangements for the transfer of the forts having been completed, Governor Winniett left Cape Coast on the 26th of February 1850 with Mr. Freeman, who acted as his secretary, and Dr. Dolce, and went to Accra to take them over ; but owing to the illness of the Danish Governor Mr. Carstensen, it was not until the 6th of March that the actual ceremony took place. On that day the various officers, including Mr. Schamarez the Dutch Commandant of Fort Crève Cœur, left Accra at nine o'clock in the morning and marched in procession to Christiansborg. As they entered the Castle a royal salute was fired by the Danish garrison, the Danish flag was hauled down, and the Union Jack hoisted in its place and saluted by Fort Crève Cœur and James Fort. In the courtyard they were met by Governor Carstensen, the officers of the Danish garrison and the principal inhabitants of the town, and the keys of the fortress were formally handed over.¹ The Chiefs were then admitted and the transfer was explained to them, to which, though naturally sorry to see the Danes go after having lived under their flag for so many years, they raised no objection. Mr. Bannerman was left at Christiansborg as Civil Commandant, with Lieutenant Stokes and a small detachment of troops to

¹ Governor Winniett wrote " to meet a wish generally expressed here in this country," asking that Christiansborg Castle should be renamed "Grey Castle" or "Castle Grey," after Earl Grey, who was then Secretary of State for the Colonies.

1850-1859 garrison the Castle, and the next morning the Governor ^{CHAP. XXVI} started on a tour of inspection through the other places belonging to Denmark. He was accompanied by Captain Schiioning, who had been appointed by Governor Carstensen to hand them over.

Teshi Fort, which was in bad repair, was taken over the same day, and Ningo Fort, which was little more than a ruin, the day after. On the 12th, Kitta was reached and the British flag hoisted on Fort Prinzenstein.¹ The town itself was still in ruins, never having been rebuilt since the bombardment in 1847, and the people were now living in another town about two and a half miles away. They came in to see the Governor, however, and received permission to return and rebuild their old town under the fort provided they showed proper respect to the British flag. On the 15th Adda Fort, which was also in urgent need of repair, was taken over, and from there the journey was continued through Krobo and Akwapim to Akropong and other towns, the party returning to Accra on the 21st. None of the Chiefs or people at any of the places visited had raised any objections to the transfer, which was thus quietly effected without any trouble.²

The property thus acquired included Christiansborg Castle and a Martello Tower³ and burial-ground a few hundred yards to the west of it, two houses at Fredericksborg, about a mile inland, and a large tank in the town. There were also the four forts, Prinzenstein, Friedensborg, Konigstein and Augustaborg at Kitta, Ningo, Adda, and Teshi respectively; Fredericksgaor, the plantation in the Akwapim Mountains; and Fredericksnople and Frederickstadt, the abandoned plantations near Akropong and Dodowa.

All former attempts having proved abortive, the acquisition of the Danish Settlements was deemed a favour-

¹ Five brass guns from this fort were subsequently removed to Cape Coast Castle.

² After the transfer, the Governor moved to Christiansborg Castle, which then became Government House.

³ Governor Carstensen wrote some of his letters from "Fort Prvestein," Accra, which may have been this tower, or the Castle renamed.

able opportunity for the imposition of customs duties. 1850-1859
 But though the Danes had gone, the Dutch still remained, CHAP. XXVI
 and, by their refusal to co-operate,¹ rendered the collection of a revenue by this means quite hopeless ; for their Settlements were so scattered along the Coast and so intermixed with those of the English, that it would have been impossible to prevent wholesale smuggling.

Soon after the transfer, it became known that a man had been roasted alive at Ningo for witchcraft and several other charges of breaches of the peace were made against the Chiefs and people. The Chief and Headmen were, therefore, arrested, tried at Christiansborg, and imprisoned in Cape Coast Castle. Soon afterwards a similar case occurred at Adda, but when the Chief, Odumfu, and his councillors were summoned to appear at Christiansborg and explain their conduct, they refused to obey and imprisoned the messengers. The Governor, therefore, led a force of 100 men of the 1st West India Regiment under Captain Craig against the Addas, who then sued for peace and surrendered the five principal offenders, who were imprisoned in Cape Coast Castle. The Addas also undertook to pay a fine of 1,600 dollars to defray the cost of the expedition.

The undertaking given by the Chiefs of Apollonia to Mr. Cruikshank on the 16th of May 1848, that they would pay 326 ounces 4 ackies of gold to defray the cost of the expedition against Akka, had never been fulfilled. By the end of January 1849 only 34 ounces 5 ackies had been paid, and an offer was then made to compound the balance by payment of £750, but rejected. The Judicial Assessor, Mr. Fitzpatrick, was therefore sent to Apollonia with orders to obtain payment, but was insulted and threatened by Bahini. After being constantly put off, Mr. Fitzpatrick finally arrested Bahini, and a most riotous scene took place in the yard of the house where the meeting was being held. Blazing fire-brands were thrown on

¹ Sir W. Winniett wrote that Governor Van der Eb was himself an extensive trader, having two vessels of his own, and often being absent from Elmina on trading expeditions.

1850-1859 the roof of Mr. Fitzpatrick's house, and the six militiamen **CHAP. XXVI** he had with him were nearly all seriously injured, while he himself received a severe blow in the eye with some weapon. In the end, he was compelled to release his prisoner, and then demanded the return of the British flag. Another Chief, Amaki, however, who had throughout been doing his utmost to preserve order, implored him not to take the flag from them, and a few days later Bahini and the other ringleaders of the riot surrendered themselves and were taken to Cape Coast and tried. Bahini was sentenced to two years' imprisonment, another man to six months, and the remaining three received forty-eight lashes each in front of the Castle.

In 1850 an attempt was made to grow cotton on the Gold Coast and an American was sent out to supervise the plantations: 25,000 cotton bushes were planted near Cape Coast, but the difficulty of obtaining labour soon caused the business to be abandoned. A few years earlier, large quantities of coffee had been grown, but this had had to be given up for the same reason. The plantations had been worked principally by pawns, and after this system was discouraged it was found impracticable to work them any longer to advantage.

Governor Winniett died¹ on the Coast on the 4th of December 1850 and, after Mr. James Bannerman had acted as Governor for twelve months, Major S. J. Hill² was appointed in October 1851. During his administration an important measure was passed which went farther than anything else had yet done to define the true relations in which the Government and people stood to each other. The failure of Customs duties³ had made the Home Government anxious to devise some other means of raising a permanent revenue for the support of the Settlements, and Lord Grey, had, moreover, laid down that the people

¹ Of dysentery.

² Afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel and Governor of Sierra Leone.

³ The Governor reported that, owing to this failure, there were no funds available to pay the salaries of the Commandants of Anamabo, Winneba, Kitta and Dixcove and the Collector of Customs, some of whom were said to be "in real want."

should be expected to contribute something in return **1850-1859** for the protection afforded them. A general meeting of **CHAP. XXVI** the Chiefs was, therefore, held at Cape Coast on the 19th of April 1852, to consult with the Governor and other officers how this object might best be attained. This meeting first of all resolved itself into a Legislative Assembly with power to enact laws, and then passed several resolutions which were embodied in a document which was signed by the Chiefs and approved and confirmed by the Governor. This enactment became known as the Poll Tax Ordinance and was formally adopted by the Legislature as a legal ordinance of the Settlements. Its chief provisions were as follows :

“ 1. That this meeting, composed of his Excellency the Governor, his council, and the chiefs and head men of the countries upon the Gold Coast, under British protection, constitutes itself into a legislative assembly with full powers to enact such laws as it shall deem fit, for the better government of those countries.

“ 2. That this assembly be recognised by Her Majesty's Government as legally constituted, that it be called the Legislative Assembly of native chiefs upon the Gold Coast, that it be presided over by his Excellency the Governor, who shall have the power to assemble, prorogue, and adjourn it at pleasure ; and that its enactment, sanctioned and approved of by the Governor, shall immediately become the law of the country, subject to the approval of Her Majesty the Queen, and be held binding upon the whole of the population being under the protection of the British Government.

“ 3. That this Legislative Assembly being thus duly constituted, having taken into consideration the advantages which the chiefs and people derive from the protection afforded them by Her Majesty's Government, consider it reasonable and necessary that the natives generally should contribute to the support of the Government by submitting from time to time to pay such taxes as may be determined upon by the majority of the chiefs assembled in council, with his Excellency the Governor.

1850-1859 " 4. That it appears to the chiefs at present assembled
 CHAP. XXVI in council, that the most productive, the least burthen-
 some, and the most equitable tax which in the present
 state of the country can be levied, would be a poll-tax
 upon the gross amount of the population enjoying the pro-
 tection of the British Government.

" 5. That entertaining the views here expressed, the
 chiefs and head men do, for themselves and their people,
 voluntarily agree to pay annually to the Government the
 sum of 1s. sterling per head, for every man, woman, and
 child residing in the districts under British protection.

" 6. That the collection of the tax be confided to officers
 appointed by his Excellency the Governor, assisted by the
 chiefs, who, in consideration of annual stipends to be paid
 to them by the Government, agree to give, in their several
 districts, their cordial assistance and the full weight of their
 authority in support of this measure, and to aid the tax-
 gatherers in taking a census of the population, and in col-
 lecting the tax.

" 11. That the revenue derived from this tax, after
 payment of the stipends of the chiefs and other expenses
 attending its collection, be devoted to the public good
 in the education of the people, in the general improvement
 and extension of the judicial system, in affording greater
 facilities of internal communication, increased medical
 aid, and in such other measures of improvement and
 utility as the state of the social progress may render
 necessary, and that the chiefs be informed of the mode of
 its application, and entitled to offer such suggestions on
 this point as they may consider necessary."¹

Other provisions referred to the details of collection
 and authorized the Governor to collect the tax for the
 current year.² A meeting of the Kings of Accra, Chris-
 tiansborg, Akim, Akwapim and Krepi and other Chiefs
 of the eastern districts was held at Christiansborg soon

¹ Parliamentary Paper, *Report of Committee*, 1865, p. 420.

² The Governor proposed Brodie Cruikshank as Chief Collector to
 supervise at a salary of £600 per annum.

afterwards, at which the Governor and Mr. Bannerman 1850-1859 explained this Ordinance and its provisions were agreed to. CHAP. XXVI

This Ordinance or Agreement was of very great importance; for it established the right of the people to the protection of the Government, a right that was not clearly defined by any of the treaties then in force and concerning the existence or extent of which great doubts had existed. The convention of an assembly of Chiefs with power to enact laws in conjunction with the Governor and Council was also a great innovation and practically amounted to a parliament of the representatives of the people. What might have resulted from a continuance of this arrangement must always remain an open question, for they were never again assembled. The position of the people was now defined by the Treaty of 1831, the Bond of 1844, and this Poll Tax Ordinance, and there was no longer any room to doubt that, in return for their concessions in the modification of their laws and customs and their agreement to contribute towards the expenses incurred by the Government on their behalf, they were absolutely entitled to protection and the Government was bound to afford it and guarantee their independence of Ashanti.

There is no doubt that the Governor, in forming this Assembly of Native Chiefs, had more in view than the passage of this single measure. On the 22nd of August 1850, James Bannerman and Brodie Cruikshank had addressed a long letter to Governor Winniett, in which they said that, "It is in the nature of social improvement and Civil Government to advance by slow degrees, and so gradual have been the encroachments upon the authority of the Chiefs, but at the same time so decided the elevation of the lower classes, that partly by force, partly by reason, and partly by corruption, an extraordinary modification amounting almost to a subversion, of the rights of the former have been silently and acquiescently effected." They explained that there had been less murmuring under the administration of the Committee of Merchants, because the process had not then gone so far, and a portion of the

1850-1859 Parliamentary grant had been appropriated to giving
CHAP. XXVI presents to the Chiefs whenever they had been sent to or
for, and they had also been treated with more show of
respect for their station. "Thus while his reason acknowled-
ledged the justice, his self-esteem was flattered by the
condescension of the Government. At present, however,
there is no fund appropriated for purposes of this nature,
and the Government is only now known to the Chiefs as
the instrument of their correction, and the abridger of
their privileges." They added that it would be "per-
factly impossible to govern the immense population of
the Gold Coast without the instrumentality of the Chiefs" and
recommended "a legally constituted deliberative
assembly, to be called 'the Assembly of Native Chiefs,'
to be appointed to meet at Cape Coast Castle twice every
year for the purpose of framing, with the assistance of the
Judicial Assessor and other Magistrates, such laws as shall
when sanctioned and confirmed by the Governor become
generally binding upon the Natives of the Country."¹
The members of this Assembly were to receive a small
annual stipend from the Government. Governor Hill
doubtless had this letter before him and was, to a great
extent, acting on the advice contained in it; for he him-
self, in his despatch to the Secretary of State on the subject
of the Poll Tax Ordinance, dated the 23rd of April 1852,
wrote: "The Natives having agreed to the payment of
this small Tax, I was puzzled as to the manner in which
I could frame any law making it binding on the Chiefs
and People to fulfil their promise, as possessing no ter-
ritorial jurisdiction and the Natives not being British
Subjects, it was out of my power to frame any Ordinance
affecting them. Under these circumstances and with a
view to future legislation I considered it advisable to form
the Native Chiefs into a Legislative Assembly placing
myself at their head." He added that the "scholar"
class, consisting of "certain educated Natives with no
real pretensions to any power were in the practice of
assuming an authority with the people that did not belong

¹ Letter-book at Christiansborg Castle.

to their position, by such means exercising an undue influence with the Chiefs and Headmen, and generally opposing in an underhand manner the efforts of the Governor."¹ He said that he well knew they had done all they could to oppose the Poll Tax Ordinance, and that this opposition had been successfully overcome by placing the chiefs in their proper position and bringing them into direct communication with the Executive.

Now that there seemed to be a reasonable prospect of raising a revenue in the country, it was decided to dispense with the services of Imperial troops and enroll a local corps, to be called the Gold Coast Corps, to garrison the forts.² It had been found that the men of the 1st West India Regiment, who had been doing this duty since 1843, did not stand the climate well, and it was thought that by enlisting natives of the country it might be possible to provide a more efficient force. This corps was to consist of 300 men trained as artillerymen. They were armed with an Enfield carbine and sword-bayonet, wore a Zouave uniform similar to that of the West India Regiment, and were paid 7d. a day. The officers³ were given command of a company after three years' service and their majority at the end of six, or a captain could retire on a pension of £150 a year.

The only natives of the Gold Coast who were likely to enlist in this corps were runaway slaves or pawns, and Major Hill had received orders not to return any of these men to their masters. Hitherto these instructions had not caused any trouble, for slaves would not run away unless they could obtain employment, and if suddenly emancipated could only steal or starve. Cruikshank, whose work was published at this time, says that nearly

¹ Letter-book at Christiansborg Castle.

² Headquarters and half the Regiment were stationed at Cape Coast, and the remainder at Accra, Anamabo, and Dixcove.

³ Major Hill was appointed Major during his Governorship; three lieutenants of Colonial Regiments were appointed captains, three others lieutenants, and three N.C.O.'s ensigns. The establishment was subsequently increased by three captains, three lieutenants, one adjutant, three European sergeant-majors, and six drummers.

1850-1859 all the crimes on the Gold Coast were committed by runaways. *xxvi* way slaves who lived by theft and plunder and always gave the same excuse for their conduct, namely, that they had no one to look after and support them. No one appreciated their position better than the slaves themselves; and when Dr. Madden, during his visit to the Coast, told a number of these men at Accra that they were free, they immediately asked him to provide for their subsistence, saying that if the Government freed them and did not intend to support them, they would certainly starve and would much prefer to remain as they were.

By a diplomatic fiction, it was supposed that no slavery of any kind could by any possibility exist within the limits of British jurisdiction, and, consequently, that any slave or pawn became immediately free by virtue of entering one of the forts and standing on purely British soil. This was of course an extreme view, which, whether theoretically correct or not, was most unsuited to the circumstances and needs of the case and bound to cause difficulties. Major Hill, however, decided to enlist these men in the new corps and thereby nearly brought about a serious outbreak; for it no sooner became generally known among the slaves and pawns that this employment was open to them, than numbers of them came to the Castle, and the Governor, acting up to the strict letter of his instructions, refused to hand them back to their masters and enlisted them as soldiers. These men, or at least the majority of them, were not Fantis or members of any coast tribe, but Wangaras, Gonjas, Grunshis, Dagombas and others who had been captured or taken as tribute and sold by the Ashantis. They were collectively known on the coast as Donkos.

The wealth of many of the Chiefs and principal men consisted almost entirely in slaves, and it can readily be understood that they regarded this sudden detention of their property, which was against all precedent and all Government, as nothing less than pure robbery. A great outcry was raised and for a time affairs looked very threatening and a serious outbreak was imminent. The Chiefs

were determined not to submit to such high-handed 1850-1859 interference with their property, and were moreover CHAP. XXVI. fully prepared to use force in the defence of their rights. The Governor was thus driven to adopt a middle course, and it was arranged that the Chiefs would supply as many men as were wanted, but that they must be paid for by the Governor handing a portion of their pay to their former masters each month until eight pounds, which was the usual price of redemption, had been paid. The difficulty having been got over by this means—which amounted to an official recognition of and connivance at slavery—the Gold Coast Corps was quickly raised and the company of the 1st West India Regiment, which had been reduced by deaths to but fifty rank and file, returned to Sierra Leone early in 1853. It can be seen, however, from the amount of determined resistance that these actions evoked, even from persons who were not directly affected by them but were only defending a principle, how utterly impossible it would have been ever to have attempted to abolish domestic slavery. Nothing short of the most overwhelming force would ever have compelled the people to relinquish so ancient a custom and one that was so closely interwoven with their social system.

About the middle of 1852 trouble arose in Assin, where the Chief, Kujo Chibu,¹ began to intrigue with Ashanti. The Assins, who had revolted against Ashanti during the last war and fought with the Fanti allies at the battle of Dodowa, had had their independence declared by the treaty of 1831 and most of them were living a little to the south of the Pra, where they enjoyed the same protection as the other tribes who lived nearer the coast. There had, it is true, been earlier rumours of secret dealings between the Assin Chiefs and the King of Ashanti, who had more than once shown his anxiety to have these people returned to him, and as early as 1835 the Fanti Chiefs had become alarmed and expressed grave doubts as to the propriety of trusting Chibu too far. He and the other Assin Chiefs

¹ Not to be confused with the loyal King of Denkera, who had now been dead for two or three years.

1850-1859 had then been placed under the immediate supervision
CHAP. XXVI of Anfu Otu the King of Abra, who was made responsible
for their conduct, and this control had been maintained
until 1843, when the Assins, having behaved well, had been
released from further surveillance.

Kujo Chibu, who was dissatisfied with the way in which
he had been treated on several occasions and conceived,
rightly or wrongly, that the Government was ignoring
the power and dignity of the Chiefs too much, now took
advantage of the King's anxiety to regain his authority
over his people to obtain from him a bribe of 400 ounces
of gold by promising to assist him in compelling them to
return to their former allegiance, for the Assins them-
selves were too much alive to the advantages and freedom
they now enjoyed to have any intention of willingly
renewing their submission to the arbitrary rule of Ashanti.
These proceedings reached the ears of the Governor, and
a soldier was sent to summon Kujo Chibu to Cape Coast to
give an account of his conduct. This messenger was
detained by the Chief, and a small detachment under an
officer then made a forced march by night and, reaching
his village at daybreak, arrested Chibu and brought him
to Cape Coast.

The Fanti Chiefs were assembled to sit with the Governor
and Judicial Assessor to try him. He was charged with
three distinct offences : first, sending a man as a prisoner
to the King of Ashanti well knowing that he would be
sacrificed ; second, receiving a bribe from the King and
endeavouring to persuade his Captains to accept part of
it in order to bring them under Ashanti rule ; and third,
setting the authority of the Governor at defiance by
detaining the soldier and telling him that he intended to
throw off his allegiance and return to Ashanti, and that
he did not care for anything the Governor could do. Chibu
was found guilty on every count and sentenced to be de-
posed and imprisoned in the Castle for life, while Kobina
Gabiri, another Chief, who was also convicted of disloyalty
to the Government, but in a lesser degree, was punished
by the imposition of a small fine.

A few weeks later, the allied Chiefs petitioned the 1850-1859 Governor for Chibu's release and restoration to his stool. CHAP. XXVI While fully admitting his guilt and the justice of his punishment, they considered that he now realized the enormity of his offence and was anxious to have an opportunity of redeeming his character, and they believed that if this was given him he would cause no further trouble. As a guarantee of his good conduct they proposed that the nephews of every Chief and Headman in Assin, who were the rightful heirs to the several stools, should be delivered to the Governor as hostages, so that the matter might be kept constantly before the minds of the Chiefs and people and it would be impossible for any repetition of these offences to occur. They also undertook to make a good road, such as the Governor should approve, from Cape Coast to the River Pra, and that those Assins who were still living on its northern bank should cross and settle within the Protectorate. To these terms the Governor agreed, and Chibu was released in October 1852 and, with all his Chiefs and Captains, renewed his allegiance to the Government.

Chibu, however, on his restoration to his stool, found himself in an awkward predicament ; for by accepting a bribe from the King of Ashanti he had by native custom bound himself to serve him, and he well knew that his failure to do so would not be overlooked. At the same time he had sworn allegiance to the Government, given hostages for his good behaviour, and still had vivid recollections of his recent narrow escape from lifelong imprisonment. He tried to reconcile these two opposite positions by openly preserving an appearance of fidelity to the Government, and at the same time continuing his secret intrigues with Kumasi while he cast about him for some scheme whereby he might carry out his obligations to the King without incurring the vengeance of the Government and Fanti allies. The King of Ashanti, meanwhile, knew that his anxiety to regain his power over the Assins had betrayed him into these underhand dealings, and that he could not, therefore, appeal to the Governor for

1850-1859 redress, but must either continue as he had begun or be
CHAP. XXVI content to lose the 400 ounces of gold that he had paid.

In accordance with his idea, Kujo Chibu now proposed to the King that he should send a party of Ashantis to Dunkwa for the ostensible purpose of making custom for Chibu the late King of Denkera, who had at one time been his subject, and that this party, on its way back through Assin, should assist him to escape to Ashanti and compel his people to accompany him. In this way he hoped to satisfy the King and at the same time delude the Governor with the belief that he was being forced to Kumasi against his will. This scheme was approved by the King, who therefore wrote to the Governor on the 26th of March 1853, informing him that he was sending a party down with his brother Atjiempon to make custom for the late King of Denkera, and asking him to send a soldier to be present during the ceremonies at Jukwa to preserve order. This letter was sent by Atjiempon's party, which numbered about 300 armed men; but they no sooner reached Yankumasi Assin than the people began to suspect treachery, while Chibu, fearing discovery, and in order to keep up the fiction of his fidelity to the Government, pretended to be alarmed and fled to Dunkwa, where he placed himself under the protection of the Chief of Dominasi. His alarm, however, may not have been entirely feigned. It was possibly genuine enough and inspired by his doubts as to what kind of reception he might meet with in Kumasi and whether the King would really be prepared to overlook his failure to carry out his part of the first agreement. The Ashantis advanced a day's march beyond the River Pra to Fesu, where they were stopped by the Chief, who, suspecting the real purpose of their visit, said he could not allow so large an armed party to pass through his district and at once communicated with the Governor.

Atjiempon now tried to obtain permission to proceed to Cape Coast and there personally obtain the Governor's permission; but before anything had been agreed to, Ensign Brownell and a detachment of forty men who had

been sent up by the Governor arrived in Assin. Atjiempon 1850-1859 then delivered the King's letter to him to be forwarded CHAP. XXVI to the Governor and stated the avowed object of his journey. Major Hill replied that the Fantis, having heard of the arrival of this Ashanti force in the Protectorate, were in such an excited state that he feared there might be a collision between the parties if the custom was proceeded with, and that he must, therefore, ask Atjiempon to withdraw. Chibu was sent down by the Fanti Chiefs to Cape Coast for safe custody, and Gabiri was then arrested and confronted with Atjiempon, who, at sight of him, lost all control of himself and disclosed the whole plot, accusing Chibu and Gabiri of having conspired together to swindle the King out of 400 ounces of gold. The wretched Gabiri had not a word to say in reply, and he, too, was therefore sent under escort to Cape Coast.

Atjiempon still made various excuses for postponing his return to Kumasi and was daily being joined by reinforcements, while the Fantis were so enraged by his presence that they seized all the Ashanti traders who happened to be in their villages and soon held about 400 of them prisoners. War seemed inevitable ; but Major Hill sent Ensign Hill with forty-six men to reinforce Mr. Brownell and protect the Ashanti captives, but strict orders were given that in no circumstances was a shot to be fired except in self-defence.

Ensign Brownell, having been assured by Atjiempon that the force encamped behind him had come with no hostile intent, but was merely sent to cover his own retreat, decided to visit the camp and settle the matter on the spot. On his arrival, he was surprised to find an army of fully 6,000 men, but was well received and arrangements were made for a palaver to take place on the following day. It was then agreed that the Ashantis then in the hands of the Fantis should be handed over ; that the invading force would then retire across the Pra, and that any dispute between the Governor and the King should be settled afterwards. Mr. Brownell rather rashly undertook to remain in the Ashanti camp until the first half

1850-1859 of this agreement had been complied with, and about 400 CHAP. XXVI Ashantis were at once collected and escorted within their lines ; but Atjiempon still made excuses, maintaining that he could not leave until their property had also been restored.

Atjiempon's escort was still receiving daily reinforcements, and it was known that a second army under one of the King's sons had arrived and was encamped a short distance in rear of it. Major Hill, therefore, sent another letter to Mr. Brownell conveying an ultimatum to the Ashantis, and informing them that all their people's property would be collected and restored as soon as possible, but that the invading force must retire and the British troops be permitted to leave their camp within twenty-four hours or he should consider war declared. Preparations were at once made to compel obedience to these orders should they be disregarded. In response to a letter from the Governor, Commander Hasseltine arrived in Cape Coast roads with H.M.Ss. *Britomart* and *Alecto* and an army of over 10,000 Fanti allies was sent to Dunkwa under the command of Captain M'Court, who took one officer and 100 men of the Gold Coast Corps, two field pieces and four rocket-tubes with him. Troops were also requisitioned from Sierra Leone and the Gambia and 1,000 men of the West India Regiment asked for, while orders were given to Captain M'Court, that in the event of his being attacked he was to retire steadily on Cape Coast so as to draw the enemy within range of the forts and avoid all risk of being himself surrounded and cut off in the bush.

The Fantis had learned the advantage of combination at Dodowa and, instead of flocking to the forts for protection as they had formerly done on the first rumour of an Ashanti invasion, now answered the call to arms and took the field readily enough, so that the allied force encamped at Dunkwa was quickly swelled to over 24,000 men. These preparations undoubtedly had a good effect and went far towards convincing the Ashantis that the coast tribes would not be the easy prey they used to find

them. The forces, however, never came into collision. 1850-1859 On the night of the 6th of April, a messenger arrived in the Ashanti camp bringing orders from the King for Atjiempon's return. This messenger protested that the King had no quarrel with the Government and said he would like Mr. Brownell to wait and see his men recross the Pra so that he might be able to report their departure to the Governor.

On the 9th the Ashantis broke up their camps, and recrossed the Pra on the following days. The threatened war was thus averted without a single shot having been fired, and an Ashanti army for the first time in history had assembled and retired without giving battle; but even though no engagement had taken place and war had never actually been declared, the interruption to trade was estimated to have involved the Cape Coast traders in losses of between £30,000 and £40,000, and twelve small villages in Assin and a number of farms had been destroyed.

It was afterwards ascertained from the reports of Mr. Laing, the Wesleyan missionary then living in Kumasi, that although the roads to the coast were carefully closed after Atjiempon's force had left the capital, yet the King gave out that they had only gone to make custom for Kujo Chibu and that the second force was despatched because he had heard that Atjiempon had been stopped. Atjiempon left Kumasi on the afternoon of Tuesday the 15th of March and would have slept that night in one of the villages just outside the capital—probably Kasi—where he would have remained on the Wednesday also as this was a fetish day. It was, therefore, Thursday the 17th before he resumed his journey, and it would have been impossible for him to have reached and crossed the Pra, advanced another day's journey, been stopped, and then sent back a messenger to Kumasi by the time the reinforcements were despatched on the 21st. This argument has been advanced as conclusive proof of the King's real intentions; but it must be remembered that the Ashantis are not entirely dependent upon messengers for their

1850-1859 information but can communicate with each other by CHAP. XXVI drumming and other rapid means, and if the news of Atjiempon's reception in Assin was sent in this way it would have reached the capital in a remarkably short time—a few hours at the outside—so that these facts are not in themselves sufficient to prove that the King's intentions were so purely hostile from the outset that he sent a second force to the support of the first before he heard from the latter. The point, however, is of no great importance, for there is no room to doubt the King's main object, and the fact that he had allowed himself to be beguiled by Chibu was no excuse for his conduct.

On the 16th of April Kujo Chibu and Kobina Gabiri were tried by the allied Chiefs, assisted by the Judicial Assessor, in the camp at Dunkwa, and having been found guilty of treason, were condemned to death. They were beheaded on the 18th in the presence of 10,000 of the allies, and Boaben and Kwow Abadu were then elected to the vacant stools.

This is the first occasion on which a King of Ashanti ever contravened the terms of a treaty. Kwaku Dua himself was known to be a peaceable man, a fact to which the satisfactory termination of the affair was probably due; but although the King is the nominal head, his power is not absolute, but is controlled to a great extent by his Council, and it was no uncommon thing for some of the Chiefs when excited to take rash oaths as to what they would do, which they afterwards felt bound to redeem. In this way a peaceable King might easily be overruled in his Council and forced into a war for which he had no personal inclination. Whether this is what happened in the present case is doubtful, but it seems more likely that the King, having allowed his anxiety to regain his dominion over the Assins to betray him into listening to the wiles of Kujo Chibu, then found that he had gone too far to retract. Whatever Kwaku Dua's personal inclination may have been, there is no doubt that the Ashanti Chiefs as a whole were bent on war. Sergeant Hay of the Gold Coast Corps, who had been sent to Kumasi

with a message by Mr. Brownell, reported on his return 1850-1859
" that the King is the only man in Kumasi who does not ~~CHAP. XXVI~~
avow his wish to go to war with the English, all the other
Chiefs and Captains are most anxious to commence
hostilities."

It was generally felt throughout the Protectorate that only a temporary respite had been gained, and at the end of October 1853 Mr. Blankson, a native trader of Anamabo who knew many of the Ashanti Chiefs, was sent to the King to induce him to send delegates to Mansu to renew the old treaty or make a fresh one. He returned to Cape Coast on the 2nd of January 1854 with a letter from the King acknowledging himself to be still bound by the Treaty of 1831, and in which among other things he wrote that he was "refusing to sign the new treaty, as I have good reasons in so doing; because I consider that I have not violated any of the rules in the old treaty since it was drawn up at Cape Coast Castle, until the occurrence of the recent excitement, caused by the evil conduct of the Assins, in which case I thought that I was justified in sending a body of people to escort them to Ashanti country, at their own wish and request, without letting Governor Hill know of it. . . . I consider myself blameless in the affairs throughout, from the beginning of Governor Winniett's conduct and others, and have not infringed the old treaty, which require a new to be made or renewed, as you requested. In the meantime I still confirm the old treaty, and will act upon it, and in future also I shall never do anything without letting your Excellency know of it, as you had proposed, in reference to any injury that may be done to myself, or any of my subjects, the demanding of a debt or debts, or any other minor cases. . . . I can assure your Excellency also, that if I have violated the rules in the treaty which deserve a fine, and you asking me to lodge gold in the Castle, I shall not show any reluctance in doing so, knowing that it shall be sent to me again at the expiration of the period of time fixed. . . . Above all I beg your Excellency to represent the statement of the case to the British Government in England,

1850-1859 that they might not think that I have done wrong in CHAP. XXVI these matters, and refusing to sign the new treaty, as I have already given you my reasons of the same."

In this letter the King, with a diplomacy by no means peculiar to Africa, altogether ignored his offence in having listened to the overtures of Kujo Chibu and laid stress on his own grievances in the case. He, however, plainly avowed what his real object had been in sending Atjiempon to Assin, and it was evident, not only from his letter, but also from Mr. Blankson's account of what had passed in Kumasi, that he had declined to admit the necessity for a new treaty because he clearly saw that any such admission would necessarily imply that he had broken the former one, and he feared this might be made the ground of a claim for compensation. He also referred to the cases of a soldier at Accra and a niece of Amonu the King of Anamabo, who had cursed him some time previously, an offence for which Ashanti law prescribed the punishment of death, but which the Judicial Assessor had persuaded him to overlook. He evidently regarded these infractions of the treaty by persons under British protection as a fair set-off against his own offence. The King also asked that a British Resident might be stationed in Kumasi, and as there was no European officer who could be spared, an educated African, George Musgrave, was sent up.

In 1853 the first Supreme Court Ordinance was passed. It provided for the administration of justice in causes both civil and criminal and established courts under a Chief Justice. This Ordinance confined the jurisdiction "within Her Majesty's Forts and Settlements on the Gold Coast," but in 1856 this jurisdiction was extended by an Order in Council to the "Protected Territories" in all cases in which Her Majesty "might exercise (powers and jurisdiction) without the co-operation of any native chief or authority." The same order empowered the Governor to make regulations by Ordinance "with respect to the exercise of the above-mentioned powers and jurisdiction, provided that equitable regard be paid to local customs."

The offices of Chief Justice and Judicial Assessor were **1850-1859** held by one and the same person, and his jurisdiction, **CHAP. XXVI** therefore, was practically extended to all cases.

The first payment of the poll tax had been made without demur ; but though it had been estimated that it should raise a revenue of £20,000 a year, £7,567 6s. 1d., the amount collected in 1853, was the highest sum that was ever actually produced, and the payments fell off very rapidly until they finally ceased in 1861, when only £1,552 3s. 4½d. was obtained. The total amount collected during the years from 1853 to 1861, both inclusive, was £30,286 10s. 8d. Great complaints had been made, even as early as 1854, of the manner in which the tax was collected ; but the real cause of its failure was malversation ; for a portion of the money was improperly used for the payment of salaries instead of being wholly devoted to local improvements for the benefit of the people, as had been arranged. No census had been taken, and the collection of all this money was entrusted principally to local agents employed for the purpose. These men worked quite independently of the Chiefs, because it had been feared that if the collection of the tax were left to them, they might use it as a means of oppression and extortion. It does not seem to have occurred to anyone however, that such practices were quite as likely to arise, and in fact did arise, in the case of these paid collectors ; and it is probable that even if the Chiefs had acted in the same way, the people would have taken it better from their natural heads than from men who had no political status or authority and against whom they had no constitutional remedy if they abused the powers given them. It was doubtless a choice of evils, but the greater of the two was the one chosen. The collection of any such tax in such a country would at best be a most difficult task, and could only be attempted with any hope of success through the heads of the people. This tax really received its death blow when Sir Benjamin Pine, who was Governor in 1857, established municipal corporations ; for they also collected taxes in the different districts and the two demands clashed. They in turn

1850-1859 lapsed under the next Governor and were extinct by
CHAP. XXVI 1860.

Early in 1854 the payment of the poll tax was for the first time openly resisted. In the first week in January, Mr. Cruikshank, who was acting as Governor during the temporary absence of Major Hill, visited Christiansborg and informed the Chiefs that it was time for the tax to be collected again. They asked for the usual permission to retire and consult together, and promised to bring their answer in the course of the next few days ; but when Mr. Bannerman sent for them after Cruikshank had returned to Cape Coast, they, having decided not to pay the tax, flatly refused to enter the Castle, and, as he declined to come out to them, returned to the town. On the 14th of January over 3,000 armed men assembled near the Castle, and in spite of the persuasions and arguments of the traders, publicly confirmed the resolution they had already passed.

Mr. Cruikshank then returned to Christiansborg and the garrison was reinforced with the intention of compelling the people to submit ; but before anything more was done, Major Hill arrived, and with the help of messengers from the Kings of Akim and Akwapim, who had been sent to reason with the rioters, peace was finally restored at a meeting held at Labadi on the 6th of March and a small fine was then exacted from the people for the disturbances they had made.

Some months later, however, more serious riots took place. On the afternoon of Sunday the 27th of August, Captain Bird, while walking from Christiansborg Castle towards Accra, met some men rolling a puncheon of rum on which no duty had been paid and promptly seized it. This was no sooner reported in the town than the people turned out and attempted to rescue the rum from the soldiers who were removing it to the Castle, and, after a fierce struggle, in which stones were freely thrown and many blows struck, succeeded in recapturing it and driving the soldiers into the Castle. Lieutenant Brownell had recently arrived in Christiansborg to collect the poll tax,

and the garrison having been reinforced on the 4th of September by an officer and fifty men drafted from Cape Coast, he most unwisely tried to start the collection of the tax while the people were still excited by this dispute. A few traders paid ; but the people were determined to resist, and, having posted guards to intercept any collectors returning to the Castle, fined the traders a puncheon of rum for their weakness. The people seem to have been under the impression that the abolition of the tax had been agreed to when peace was made after the last riots ; but though the exact terms of this peace are not known, it does not appear that this was the case. On the 31st of August the mob tried to cut off all supplies and held up the people who were taking provisions to the Castle; This caused a second stone fight, in which one of the mob was killed.

The whole of the eastern district was now in open rebellion, and matters had gone so far that it was decided to take extreme measures and bombard the town. H.M.S. *Scourge*, Commander John Adams, anchored off Christiansborg at five o'clock on the evening of the 11th of September, and the 13th was fixed for the bombardment. But though the intentions of the Government leaked out and were perfectly well known in the town, the people apparently felt confident that peace would somehow be made, and very few of them went away or troubled to remove their property.

On the 12th, Lieutenant Hunt Grubbe landed with two seamen and helped the garrison to improve their defences and prepare for the bombardment, and on the morning of the 13th the *Scourge* weighed anchor and sailed towards Labadi. This had the immediate effect of drawing off the people of Teshi and Labadi to the defence of their own towns, and at seven o'clock that morning the ship began to bombard Labadi, while the guns of the Castle simultaneously opened fire on Christiansborg. The women and children were at once hurried into the bush for safety, while the men seized their arms and prepared to attack the Castle. There were several stone houses

1850-1859 within about thirty yards of the walls, and here the hunters
CHAP. XXVI and all the best shots entrenched themselves and kept up so brisk and accurate a fire that the garrison were quite unable to work their guns and by noon the batteries were silenced. The *Scourge* was now bombarding Teshi, but the garrison could not signal to her for help, because the flag-staff halyards had been cut by a shot from one of the besiegers. This damage, however, was repaired at considerable risk, and the *Scourge* returned in the evening and, after shelling the houses in which the enemy had concealed themselves, bombarded the whole town. During that night the defences of the Castle were improved so as to afford better protection to the gunners, and on the 14th and 15th the bombardment was continued, while the *Scourge* sailed for Cape Coast, returning on the 17th with another officer and fifty more men of the Gold Coast Corps and fresh supplies for the garrison. Having once more bombarded Christiansborg, she sailed on the 19th and burnt Teshi.

The people had now deserted the town and retired to the bush. The whole place was soon plundered by the soldiers and the houses near the Castle were pulled down; yet, though the town had been reduced to ruins and the people had lost all their property, the casualties were very few. The Christiansborg people lost only five men and two women, while six men had been killed at Labadi and a few more wounded at each of the places attacked. The Castle garrison however, out of a total strength of 131, lost seven killed and had twenty-three more wounded, including Captain Bird and Lieutenant Hunt Grubbe.

Governor Hill arrived on the 27th of October with more warships and reinforcements from Sierra Leone, intending to land some marines and attack the people in the bush. But through the intercessions of King Taki, this project was abandoned, and after the heirs to the several stools had been delivered to the Governor as hostages, peace was concluded. The people, however, did not return to Christiansborg nor attempt to rebuild their houses until

some time later, when Mr. Freeman, the Wesleyan missionary, was Civil Commandant. 1850-1850
CHAP. XXVI

In 1855 Accra narrowly escaped a similar fate due to a like cause, and a Commissioner was sent in 1856 to enquire into and report upon the local state of affairs. He found that although the Accras were loyal enough in a general sense, yet they positively refused to pay the poll tax, and in 1857 a mob of the townspeople plundered the French factory in James Town.¹

In 1857 the designation of the Gold Coast Corps was changed to "The Gold Coast Artillery Corps," and the colours of the uniform and facings were changed. A late Lieutenant of the Osmanli Horse Artillery was attached to the regiment for one year as Instructor of Artillery, and was then succeeded by a regimental Lieutenant as Instructor of Musketry.

In 1858 Ologo Patu, the Chief of South Western Krobo, led a rebellion against the Government. This also owed its origin partly to the strong objection the people of the eastern districts had to paying the poll tax, and partly to a quarrel with Odonkor Azu, the Chief of Eastern Krobo, whom Patu attacked. The Gold Coast Corps, under Major Bird who was Acting Governor, was moved to Accra, and contingents having been raised in Accra, Eastern Krobo, Akwapim and Akwamu, the whole force was concentrated at Prampram early in September. On the 11th an advance was made, and on the 13th the army encamped near the Krobo Mountain, but the Akwapim contingent deserted the same night. On the 18th Captain Brownell led a small detachment and attempted to occupy a height overlooking Ologo Patu's town ; but the enemy drove him back and then attacked the British camp, but were repulsed with great difficulty after an engagement lasting two hours.

Reinforcements were now sent for, and by the 19th of October a large force had been collected and a fresh advance was made. Nearly 15,000 men were now concentrated at Saddle Hill, about a mile and a half to the south of the

¹ Now Messrs. Swanzy's James Town Factory.

1850-1859 Krobo Mountain, and in the face of this overwhelming force Ologo Patu surrendered. **CHAP. XXVI** He and some of the other Chiefs were imprisoned as security for the payment of a fine of £10,000, which was imposed on the people, but barely half of this sum had been paid when they succeeded in making their escape, owing to the inexcusable carelessness of the officer in charge of them.

In 1859 a serious riot took place between the Bentil and Intin Companies at Cape Coast. The Captains were prosecuted, and the Court ordered that every Company in the town should, within one month, send into the Castle all the flags they wished to use in future, when the Governor would substitute others for such as were objected to, and the colours and patterns of every approved flag would be registered in the Secretary's office, after which the use of any other would be severely punished. In the light of subsequent events, however, it would appear either that this order was never enforced, or that the registration of all lawful flags at this early date was soon forgotten.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE FIFTH ASHANTI WAR

1860 TO 1864

IN 1862 the Gold Coast, always subject to slight earth- 1860-1864 quakes, was visited by one of exceptional severity. CHAP. Seventeen distinct shocks were felt during a period of six weeks, which culminated in one of special violence on the 10th of June, by which all the forts and buildings along the coast were more or less wrecked. At Accra, where the greatest amount of damage was done, Christiansborg Castle and the other forts were almost entirely destroyed, being rendered no longer habitable, and the prisoners confined there had to be removed lest the shattered walls should fall upon and crush them. Another notable earthquake had occurred in 1858.

On the 3rd of October in the same year, a number of men of the Gold Coast Corps, whose lack of discipline had gained them an unenviable notoriety, broke into open mutiny and attempted to murder several of their officers, who are said to have gambled with the men's pay instead of putting it to its proper use.¹ The attempt fortunately proved unsuccessful and the mutineers fled to Napoleon. Two days later H.M.S. *Wye* called at Cape Coast, and on the 7th H.M.Ss. *Brisk* and *Mullet* landed fifty more suspected men, who had been sent up by Major de Ruvignes from Accra. The Europeans, fifteen in number, occupied the Castle, while the sergeant-major was sent out to treat with the mutineers, who had now entrenched themselves in their position at Napoleon; but they refused all the terms

¹ Ellis, *West African Islands*, p. 178.

1860-1864 offered them. The public, however, showed them no sympathy, and in fact cordially hated them, so that by **CHAP. XXVII** the 9th they were compelled by want of provisions to lay down their arms and were then sent for trial by General Court Martial to Sierra Leone. One of the ringleaders was shot,¹ and another, a private, sentenced to death and sent back to Cape Coast, where he was executed on the 13th of November. Two more were sent to penal servitude for life, and forty-eight received various sentences of imprisonment. Twenty-one marines under Lieutenant Ogle of the Royal Marine Artillery were then drafted into the Castle as a safeguard against any further outbreaks, and order was restored.

Since the last threatened invasion by the Ashantis, although the eastern districts had been in a disturbed state owing to the resistance offered by the people to the payment of the poll tax, the remainder of the Protectorate had been unusually quiet. The various Chiefs were on good terms one with another, their relations with Ashanti were perfectly friendly, and the whole country was in a very prosperous condition. Trade had never been more flourishing : numbers of Ashantis arrived on the coast daily, bringing gold, ivory and other produce, which they exchanged for European goods ; and now that the rebellion in the east had been put down by the Krobo war, the outlook was exceptionally brilliant, and everyone was confidently looking forward to a time of general peace and prosperity. These hopes, however, were soon dashed to the ground by the occurrence of a fresh dispute with Ashanti, and the country was soon afterwards involved in another war, which, as an example of blundering incompetence and hesitancy, and a sequence of unfortunate mistakes, is unique in the history of the Gold Coast.

The trouble originated as follows : Kwesi Janin,² a Captain and subject of the King of Ashanti, was alleged to have found certain " rock gold "³ which, by Ashanti law,

¹ The bugler who sounded the " assembly " at Cape Coast. He was shot at Tower Hill Barracks on the 10th of November.

² Djanin or Gainie.

³ Nuggets.

should have been surrendered to the King, instead of 1860-1864 which he had retained it for his own use. Some of the King's messengers happened to pass through his village soon afterwards, and his wife had given information against him, swearing the King's oath that the charges she made were true. Janin at once confirmed the oath, thereby appealing for the matter to be heard before the King's tribunal, and the messengers accordingly ordered the parties to accompany them to Kumasi to have the case settled. Janin, however, possibly because he was conscious of guilt, now began to make various excuses for delaying his departure, putting the messengers off first for eight days, then for ten, and last of all for fifteen ; after which, as he still refused to proceed to Kumasi, the King's men felt convinced of his guilt, and returned to the capital and reported what had happened to the King. Further messengers were then sent to bring the parties before the Court ; but Janin had anticipated this and fled into the Protectorate before they could reach his village, taking several of his people with him. About the same time, too, a slave boy who was returning to Kumasi with his master escaped and fled to Assin, whence he was sent down by the Chief to the Governor.

Early in December 1862, messengers from the King arrived at the Castle to make a formal demand for the return of these fugitives. Amongst them was the bearer of the Golden Axe,¹ showing that the matter was regarded as one of more than ordinary importance. An enquiry was held in the Castle Hall, at which the slave boy complained that he had been ill-treated by his master, and that having sworn the King's oath that he would not return to Ashanti, he would certainly forfeit his head if he were sent back. Janin also protested that he was innocent of the charge preferred against him, and asserted that it had been made solely because he was a rich man, and that the King

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¹ This emblematic axe was thought much of by the Ashantis : it was said to have been used as a weapon by one of their earliest Kings before the introduction of firearms, and was kept with and carried in procession before the Golden Stool.

1860-1864 had invented this excuse to ruin him and confiscate his
CHAP. property.

XXVII Governor Pine was fully alive to the difficulties of the position, and in his despatch to the Secretary of State on the 10th of December 1862, wrote: "The refuge afforded to runaway slaves and pawns under the British flag has, during my long experience, proved the source of the greatest irritation and annoyance to native Kings and Chiefs, and the wound the most difficult for Her Majesty's representative to heal. . . . Gladly would I try an experiment and send back these subjects to Ashantee, for if confidence were once created between this Government and Ashantee, the greatest obstacle in the way of amicable relations between us would be removed; and if against the old man there were the slightest shadow of a *prima-facie* case of criminality, my course would be clear; but as it is, I dare not deliver him up, much less the runaway boy. Their blood would be upon my head; and yet I feel that I am estranging, if not exasperating, the most powerful King on this Coast, and upon whom, according to his ideas, I am committing a gross injustice." Consequently, although the messengers offered to swear the King's oath that if Janin were returned he would receive a fair trial and even if found guilty would not be injured, nor the slave boy's life forfeited, the Governor told them that he could not consent to deliver them unless he was furnished with definite evidence of their guilt, and the men then returned to Kumasi.

Many people expected that war would be the immediate result of this refusal; but the King, following the customary policy of Ashanti, would not resort to hostilities until he had convinced himself that he could not gain his ends by diplomacy. On the 17th of February the messengers returned and were received in the Castle Hall on the following day. A letter was also sent by the King to the Dutch Governor at Elmina complaining of the treatment shown him by the English, but his offer to send one of his officers to Kumasi to mediate in the dispute was refused. At the meeting in the Castle, the chief

Ashanti envoy, Amankwa Akuma, delivered the King's 1800-1804 message and a letter, and the treaties and documents dealing with the relations between the Government and Ashanti were laid on the table and frequently referred to during the discussion. The history of the case was briefly told by Amankwa Akuma to show that Janin was charged with having broken the laws of his country, and his extradition for trial was then demanded on the ground that a treaty or agreement existed between the Government and Ashanti that criminals should be mutually given up. The King wrote : " I think you to be my good friend, and always I believe you that I can get back any of my slaves who run away to you ; but in poor George Maclean's time I made agreement with him in certificate, the one in Cape Coast Castle, and another in my hand therein stated, that any Fantee person run up to me to deliver him and to bring him to Cape Coast. And if any slave of mine also run away to Cape Coast, you are to deliver him back also to me, as all the Governors that take charge of Cape Coast Castle did not move from this agreement, but always filled the rules of the said poor George Maclean, except your time has destroyed the agreement. . . . But one of my slaves, named Quarquah, who was witness to the said agreement, and who was the bearer of the certificate for me, is absent in the town, and I have sent messenger after him ; but when he comes I will let him come with the book, that you may see your guiltiness."

The King, therefore, was either inventing a purely fictitious story of an agreement to suit his present purpose, or he genuinely believed that such an agreement existed and had several times been acted upon in the past. It is hardly likely that the former could be the true explanation ; for the King would scarcely have based his claim on grounds that he knew or even suspected to be false, for he would have known that the copy of the treaty preserved at Cape Coast would at once be referred to and the deception exposed. It is far more probable, therefore, that these demands were made in perfect good faith. The allusions to Governor Maclean and Quarquah make it quite clear

1860-1864 that the treaty referred to was the Tripartite Treaty of 1831,
CHAP. in which the mark of "Quagua" appears on behalf of the
XXVII King. It is true that there is no article dealing with the mutual surrender of criminals in this treaty; but this is the document in which the vague allusion is made to "the terms and conditions of peace already agreed to" as defining the manner in which all future disputes were to be settled. It must be remembered, too, that the King could not read the treaty for himself, and would be dependent upon what he was told by "Quagua" and his other representatives, and if any further verbal or written agreement had been made at that time, they would probably have included its terms in their general account of the whole transaction, and thus have led the King to believe, and very probably themselves have believed, that such agreement was part of the actual treaty itself.

Apart from all this, there is in fact evidence that some such agreement or understanding really did exist. Cruikshank, who wrote only ten years before these events took place, says: "Another difficulty which our Gold Coast Government has to contend against is the disposal of runaway slaves from Ashantee. It was stipulated in our treaties with the King that his fugitive subjects should be redelivered to him in the same way that Fantees flying into his dominions were to be restored to the Governor. This arrangement was necessary to prevent malefactors escaping punishment. But in many cases the runaway Ashantee seeks a refuge from the fate which is likely to overtake him at the murderous customs which are often taking place at Coomassie, and a natural repugnance is, of course, felt about surrendering him. . . . Under these circumstances, the Governor is obliged to mediate as he best can, and refuses to deliver up the runaway, except upon condition of sufficient security being given that his life will be spared. . . . The security for their safety is simply 'the King's great oath,' taken on his behalf by his messengers. There is no instance known of this oath given under such circumstances being

violated."¹ Cruikshank had spent eighteen years in the country, had been Judicial Assessor, and had also acted as Governor, and had such an intimate knowledge of Gold Coast affairs, especially during the period of Maclean's administration, that it is ridiculous to suppose that he would have made such a statement as this unless some such agreement actually existed; nor is it likely that Maclean, who was so anxious and did so much to restore law and order and to ensure justice to all, would have omitted to make some such arrangement as this to prevent the escape of criminals. In fact, Maclean himself wrote in a letter dated the 16th of December 1837 to the Committee of Merchants in London: "I have seldom known any but criminals to seek the protection of the British flag, and even these I have very rarely delivered; having almost always made it matter of personal favour with the King that he should allow them to be redeemed for a sum of money. In no case whatever have I ever delivered up a fugitive without receiving undoubted security for his personal safety; I almost always, indeed, stipulate for the personal appearance before me of the party at stated periods. Moreover, no person is given up merely because he is the subject of a foreign Chief; it must be shown he has been guilty of some crime, or that there exists against him some just claim."² Maclean, therefore, had given up criminals and others after their personal safety had been guaranteed, and the procedure described by Cruikshank is so exactly in accordance with the statements made by the King in his letter that there can be no doubt that this claim was genuinely made, and if not made under any actual agreement was at any rate according to established precedent. Colonel Nagtglas, too, who served for many years under the Dutch Government, and was Governor of their Possessions in 1869 and 1870, wrote in a letter dated February 1874: "There is an agreement in existence between the local British Government and the King of Ashanti, either oral or in writing, that on

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XXVII¹ Cruikshank, vol. ii, p. 236-7.² *Report of Committee* (1842), part ii, p. 144.

1860-1864 both sides runaway prisoners for crime should be
CHAP. delivered."

xxvii Since writing the above, a despatch written by Governor Winniett to the Secretary of State on the 4th of June 1850 has been found in one of the old letter-books at Christiansborg Castle, which settles this question beyond all doubt. He wrote: "I believe your Lordship is perfectly aware that since the close of the war with Ashantee an understanding has existed between the British Local Government and the King to the effect that all runaways from Kumassie are to be delivered back to the King upon application made by him to the Officer administering the Government." He went on to explain that this arrangement had at times given rise to serious doubts in his mind, but that considerations for the peace of the country had been sufficient to overcome his reluctance to adhere to it. In one case he had resisted such a demand in reference to a slave woman who had been ill-treated and run away, but the King had threatened to close the paths and cut off all communication with the coast, and he had been compelled to give in.

Taking these independent statements in conjunction with the King's letter, it is evident that the claim now made by Kwaku Dua was one that he was perfectly entitled to make, and was in fact made in accordance with an agreement or compact of some kind that actually existed and had been repeatedly acted upon for many years. Nor can it be denied that the crime of which Kwesi Janin was accused was a serious one according to the laws of Ashanti. It is one of those specially mentioned by Bowdich. Ashanti was at this time an entirely independent kingdom and only bound to the British Government by treaty obligations; and although Mr. Pine was undoubtedly actuated in what he did solely by feelings of humanity, it is very questionable how far he was justified in the circumstances in refusing to comply with the King's request after his duly authorized messengers had offered to follow the usual precedent and take the King's oath that the lives of the refugees would be spared. So

far as the slave boy was concerned, there could be no reason for refusing to give him back after the messengers had sworn that he would not be injured, except that he was a slave. But he was a slave in a country over which the Government had no control, and this, above all others, was a case in which Lord John Russell's ruling ¹ applied. The futile attempts that had been made to bring European views on slavery into line with those of the African and to make them fit in with African conditions had, in fact, already cost the English their good name for absolute and impartial justice on the Coast itself. There is, moreover, plenty of evidence to prove that these oaths were considered binding and were invariably respected. Cruikshank mentions a case in which some fugitives who were about to be handed over to the King's messengers after they had taken the usual oath requested that they might be required to "kiss the white man's book" also, which they, knowing the King's oath would not be violated, readily consented to do. The King, however, on hearing that he had been bound not only by his own but also by the white man's oath was so alarmed lest some accidental harm might befall the men, that he sent them back, preferring to lose them altogether rather than incur the risk of an unknown danger.

In replying to the King's letter, Mr. Pine wrote: "I am willing to give up criminals, although there is no such agreement, but I do not consider Quasie Gainie a criminal until you prove him so." The question was doubtless a difficult one. Mr. Pine would naturally have found it hard to hand over a man who had claimed his protection, even though he might be the subject of an independent State and have no right to it, and yet on the other hand this agreement undoubtedly existed and had been made with the sole object of dealing with cases of this kind. On the whole, it seems probable that the Governor was mainly influenced by the fact that the offence with which Janin was charged, though a serious one in the eyes of the Ashantis and a breach of one of

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¹ *Vide* p. 442.

1860-1864 their oldest laws, was not a crime known to English law ; **CHAP. XXVII** and this fact seems to have altogether blinded him to the view that Ashanti was an independent State over whose laws the English had no control whatever. The real question, then, would be whether this agreement provided for the extradition of all criminals, irrespective of the nature of their offences, or only for the surrender of those charged with certain classes of crime. There is the strongest evidence that there was some such understanding ; and if this was so and only certain crimes, of which this was not one, were covered, it would surely have been admitted and the right of refusal in this case pointed out. If there was no extradition treaty the Governor could not be asked to give up fugitives except in accordance with the precedent that had undoubtedly been set ; if there was, he could not refuse.¹

The Governor's decision, however, was fully approved by the Secretary of State, who, in a despatch dated the 4th of March 1863, laid down that " no law should authorize such delivery to the authorities of a country in which justice is not fairly administered, except in the case of heinous crimes clearly proved," though this direction was qualified by the statement that if it were necessary for the Chiefs to hand over fugitives for their own safety, such action should be carried out by the Chiefs themselves, but no British authority should be involved in their surrender except in cases where clear justice required it. Whether or not the present was a case in which clear justice required the surrender of Janin is a point upon which there is room for a diversity of opinion ; but this extraordinary qualification of the general principle laid down shows that the Secretary of State felt no more sure of his ground than the Governor did. At any rate, seeing that the Chiefs were under British protection and amenable to Government control, it is difficult to understand how they could have adopted the course here recommended and have handed over fugitives without the consent of the English being at least implied. The Secretary of State, however,

¹ He had a perfect right, however, to demand proofs.

knew nothing of the King's second message or of the alleged **1860-1864** agreement and actual precedent in such cases, and asked **CHAP.** " to be informed what is the actual practice with reference **xxvii** to persons taking refuge in the protected territories."

Ellis, in his account of what happened at the meeting with the Ashanti envoy, says that " many of the merchants, with Commodore Wilmot, strongly supported the claim of the King, but the headmen of Cape Coast, who it was said had been bribed by Djanin, and others of the merchants, were against it. The Governor also was of opinion that the fugitives should not be surrendered, so, as a matter of course, the official members of the Council voted with him, and it was finally decided by a considerable majority to reject the King's demand."¹ The Governor, in his despatch of the 10th of March 1863, however, says, " it was the unanimous opinion of all present that my compliance with the King's request . . . was impossible." In his evidence before the House of Commons Committee in 1865, when asked why he had not sent Janin away, he admitted that Governor Hill had established a precedent for such a course, and said : " I suggested it till I was tired, I begged them to let me send him away. The Palaver Hall contained a hundred and fifty natives deeply interested in it, and they protested, when threatened, to send him back by force (to Ashanti). I told him that it was his duty to obey his lawful King, I pointed out that he would not injure him, but simply judge him and do him justice." A little later he says, " The general sentiment of the meeting was the greatest horror at my even hesitating to protect the man."

In the face of these conflicting statements it is very difficult to decide what really did happen. Ellis evidently took his account from a letter written by Dr. Horton to Earl Granville, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated Cape Coast Castle, 12th November 1869, in which the following passage occurs : " The case of the King of Ashantee was set forth in a speech by his war-axe bearer, which was remarkable for its fluency, rhetorical power

¹ Ellis, *History of the Gold Coast*, p. 226.

1860-1864 and argumentative clearness. There was a division amongst the members. Many of the merchants, with Commodore Wilmot, strongly urged the claim of the King of Ashantee, and recommended that Gamin should be delivered up ; whilst the Chiefs of Cape Coast, who had been bribed by Gamin and some of the merchants, were of a contrary opinion. Commodore Wilmot endeavoured to influence them, by showing them how prosperous the country then was and the evils of war, and clearly pointed out that, if they went to war with Ashantee, it would take fifty years to bring the country back to its then condition ; but, *quot homines tot sententiae*, the voice of the multitude prevailed, and Gamin was quietly allowed to remain in the Protectorate."¹ Dr. Horton was almost certainly present at the various meetings, and was writing from his own knowledge of what took place ; but this letter, which is a summary of events written some years later, does not go into the details of the several palavers. This is evident ; because Commodore Wilmot did not arrive on the Coast until the 29th of March, and cannot therefore have been present at this first meeting. The Governor really seems to have been very doubtful what to do, and to have hesitated and changed his mind more than once, finally giving way to the clamour of the people.

On the arrival of Amankwa Akuma in Kumasi with the Governor's second message of refusal, a meeting of the Council was held, at which it was unanimously decided that such an insult and disregard of obligations could only be avenged by war. It is not known whether Kwaku Dua himself was inclined to hostilities or not. He was certainly the most pacific ruler who ever sat on the Ashanti Stool, but in any case he was bound to be overruled by his Chiefs. But although war was then and there decided upon, its actual commencement had to be postponed for a time, in order to enable the King to replenish his stock of powder and other necessaries. It was indeed commonly reported on the coast, when parties of Ashantis first began to cross the Pra, that the King himself knew nothing of

¹ Horton, *Letters on the Gold Coast*, pp. 54, 55.

their movements, but that they were led by Chiefs who had taken the King's oath that they would make war. **1800-1804**
 Others said that Kwaku Dua had been forced by his Chiefs to give a reluctant consent to the invasion, which was probably nearer the truth, for his throne would have been endangered had he persisted in a refusal, and neglect to enforce the surrender of Janin would have established a dangerous precedent and have led to the escape of other criminals. The greatest uncertainty, however, prevailed everywhere, and no one really knew what was happening or what might be expected next.

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The Governor's difficulties at this time were very great and by no means confined to the prospect of hostilities with Ashanti and the King's failure to reply to his last letter. Much ill-feeling existed between the Dutch and English Accras, and the Governor arrived there only just in time to prevent an open rupture. The men of the Gold Coast Corps, too, were in a state of open mutiny, due partly to the scarcity of officers, but principally to the discontent caused by their being paid only sevenpence ¹ a day without rations, while the men of the West India Regiment, who were serving on the Coast and performed similar duties, received a shilling a day and rations. The people of the Protectorate, too, were in a most excited state, and knowing very well that war was imminent and that the Ashantis were busily engaged in purchasing arms and ammunition at Elmina and conveying them to Kumasi, seized all the Ashantis they found passing through their country and put them "in log."² Amongst them was "Quarquah," who was on his way to Cape Coast to give his version of what had occurred when the treaty was signed in 1831, and though the Governor gave orders for the immediate release of all these prisoners on the ground that war had not yet been declared, it does not appear that he ever reached Cape Coast. The Fantis can hardly be blamed for taking what they felt were wise precautions; but these seizures of Ashantis by the protected tribes while the two countries were nominally at peace, for

¹ ? Eightpence.

² *Vide* p. 338.

1860-1864 which no compensation was made on their release, gave **CHAP. XXVII** the King a further excuse for war. In addition to all these troubles, the Governor was left without any European civilian to assist him, and had to rely upon such help as the naval and military officers could give him, while they themselves were preparing to take the field and were already fully occupied with their own duties.

Nearly all the troops were at this time stationed in Accra, Prampram, Pong and other places in the eastern district, where they had been sent to enforce payment of the fine imposed on the Krobos for their recent rebellion. The Governor therefore visited Accra, collected every available man and returned with them to Cape Coast on board the *Adventure* early in April. She had left Lagos with an officer and a hundred men of the 2nd West India Regiment, who had just been relieved and were returning to the West Indies ; but in view of the threatening state of affairs, they, too, were disembarked and detained at Cape Coast to reinforce the garrison.

Rumours were now current of the presence of marauding bands of Ashantis in the northern districts, and four heads were sent to Cape Coast, Anamabo, Winneba and Accra which had been taken by the allies from Ashantis whom they had caught pillaging their farms. Supplies of arms and ammunition were then issued to the allied Chiefs for their protection, but they were strictly enjoined to commit no hostile act except in case of absolute necessity. No actual declaration of war had yet been made, and it was therefore decided, at a meeting held in the Castle on the 30th of March, to send a messenger to the King to ask what his intentions really were and whether these incursions of his people had been made with his approval. Prince Ansa, having volunteered his services, was sent up on this mission. A fortnight later it was arranged that Major Cochrane should at once take the field and form an entrenched camp some thirty miles from the coast in order to be in a better position to observe the enemy's movements, to give confidence to the allies, and provide a nucleus around which their forces might rally. He left Cape Coast

for this purpose on the 17th of April and reached Mankesim 1860-1864 two days later.

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The regular forces on the Coast did not exceed four hundred men, all of whom were urgently needed by Major Cochrane. Guns and men were therefore landed from the warships for the protection of Cape Coast : 128 officers and men from the *Rattlesnake* occupied the Castle, Fort William and Barnes' house on Prospect Hill, and raised an entrenched redoubt named Fort Frederick on Connor's Hill, while thirteen men were landed from the *Ranger* to garrison Fort Victoria. Provisions for six weeks were landed and stored in the Castle and Anamabo and Dixcove Forts, the gates and buildings were repaired, and four additional guns sent to Dixcove. Two large camps were formed by the allies ; the Gomoas and Agunas occupying Essikuma, while the Denkeras, Abras, Assins, and the detachments from Cape Coast and Anamabo established themselves at Mansu. Messrs. G. Blankson, Hughes, W. E. Davidson, W. Finlason, S. C. Brew and Robert Hutchison all raised small contingents from their own families and retainers and joined the army in the field.

In the meantime the Ashantis had completed their preparations, and their army crossed the Pra and invaded the Protectorate in three divisions. The first, numbering about 2,000 men, entered Wassaw with orders to hold the Denkeras and Wassaws in check, but to avoid any general engagement if possible ; the second, 8,000 strong and having similar orders, advanced from Prasu and followed the main road through the very centre of the Protectorate ; while the main body, under Awusu Kokor, a relative of the King, crossed the river a little later and entered Akim. This force advanced rapidly through Western Akim without meeting with any opposition until it reached Essikuma, where it suddenly fell on the allied camp and, after a stubborn resistance lasting six hours, in which many fell on either side, the allies were completely routed.

Hearing that Anamabo was threatened, Major Cochrane marched the whole of his force there at the end of April ; but after waiting three days without seeing any sign of

1860-1864 the threatened attack, returned once more to his camp at Mankesim. On the 7th of May he moved through Denkera to Bobikuma, where a number of the allies had collected after the battle of Essikuma. The Ashantis were still encamped at the latter place, which lay about fourteen miles to the north-west of Bobikuma. Anything more disgraceful and incompetent than the subsequent conduct of Major Cochrane can hardly be imagined. "On the 10th of May the Ashantis advanced to within a quarter of a mile of the camp of the allies, and a slight skirmish took place between them and the native scouts, in which several of the latter were killed. A general engagement was now confidently expected for the next day, and there was a reasonable prospect of victory, as the native contingent at Bobikuma numbered nearly 20,000 men ; but to the astonishment and indignation of the entire force, both regular and native, Major Cochrane issued orders for the whole of the former and the greater portion of the latter to retire to the village of Adijuma ; and this retrograde movement was carried out on the day following, while the gallant commander himself proceeded to the sea-coast town of Mumford. On the 12th of May the remnant of the native contingent left at Bobikuma was attacked in force by the Ashantis at two o'clock in the afternoon, and by five o'clock the allied natives were completely routed, losing very heavily. The town of Bobikuma was destroyed, and had Awusu Kokkor pushed on to Adijuma the disorganised force there waiting, without orders and without a commander, would no doubt have been swept away before him. Fortunately, however, he did not follow up his success, but after destroying upwards of thirty towns and villages in the neighbourhood, retired unmolested on the 24th of May to Akim Swaidru, a town on the southern frontier of Ashanti-Akim, and close to the River Birrim, the eastern tributary of the Prah."¹

The small portion of the allied force who were thus deserted at Bobikuma and left at the mercy of the enemy

¹ Ellis, *History of the Gold Coast*, pp. 228-9.

lost 141 killed ; yet they succeeded in holding their own 1860-1864 and kept the whole of the main Ashanti army at bay for CHAP. three hours, so that there is every probability, that the xxvii display of a little more courage on the part of Major Cochrane would have enabled the much larger force he had with him fully to hold its own, and, if unable to gain a decisive victory unaided, at least to gain sufficient time for the arrival of the army encamped at Mansu to support it. The Fantis at this time were ready enough to fight and only required to be led ; but the way in which they were deserted and left to their fate by the officer to whom they had looked for guidance and support completely destroyed their confidence and naturally caused them to lose heart.

On the 21st of May a messenger arrived from Captain Williams, who was in charge of a small force at Ajumako. He had been recommended by Major Cochrane to follow his own example and retreat, but had declared his intention of remaining at his post until recalled by the Governor. This messenger was a Fanti prisoner who had been released from the Ashanti camp and was the bearer of a flag of truce and two pieces of cane, one considerably longer than the other. He said that the Ashanti general had sent him to ask the Governor to choose one of these canes. He had no quarrel with the English nor with the Fantis, and did not wish to make war on them, but had merely been sent to recover the fugitives. If, therefore, the Governor was prepared to surrender them, he must choose the shorter cane and the war would be at an end, but if he declined to give them up and chose the longer cane it would be continued indefinitely. The surrender of a third person was also demanded—namely, Ajiman the King of Western Akim, whose head the Ashanti general said he was determined to have because he had insulted the King. This was the Chief under whose protection the fugitives had first placed themselves, and it was stated by Colonel Conran in his evidence before the House of Commons Committee in 1865, that the King had sent messengers to Ajiman to demand their surrender, but that it was reported that

1860-1864 he had "sent an insulting message back by the messengers to the King of Ashanti, and it is said cut off one of their heads, besides ill-treating the others." If, then, it were true that Ajiman had been guilty of this outrage against his messengers, it is not surprising that the King should have demanded his head. The Governor, however, seems to have known nothing of this at the time, and, wishing to receive some confirmation of the accuracy of this message, asked Prince Ansa to visit the Ashanti camp and inform the general that he would hold no parley with anyone but a duly accredited Ashanti, who must come to the British camp with a flag of truce ; but that if the message had been correctly delivered, the Ashanti army must immediately leave the Protectorate and full compensation be paid for all the damage it had done.

Realizing that Major Cochrane was unlikely to be of any great use to him in the field, Mr. Pine himself, escorted by a small body of volunteers under Captain Finlason, proceeded to the camp at Ajumako, where he arrived on the 27th of May and found about 8,000 men under arms. The Kings and Chiefs bitterly complained of the way in which Major Cochrane had deserted and betrayed Akini the Chief of Bobikuma, but readily agreed to supply the necessary transport if another advance were made by the Governor or Captain Williams. On the 5th of June Major Cochrane, apparently shamed into doing something by the Governor's activity, arrived in camp from Mumford but brought only twenty men with him, so that a further delay was caused while the remainder of his force was sent for, and there was no possibility of commencing the advance for some time. In this way all hope of making a successful attack on the enemy or cutting off his retreat was destroyed. The rains were now coming on, and previous costly experience had taught the Ashantis that campaigning during the wet season only entailed disease and disaster to their troops. Awusu therefore, so soon as he had received the Governor's message and confirmed his own, decided to retire. Before anything more could be done, news was brought to the allied camp that the

Ashantis had already recrossed the Pra and were on their way back to Kumasi, taking a number of Fanti prisoners and jawbones with them.

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" Thus disgracefully terminated the campaign of 1863. Through mismanagement, to use no harsher term, the Ashantis had been allowed to attack the allies in detail and win two battles, and to remain for over eighty days in one of the most fertile districts of the Protectorate, burning, ravaging and slaying. The disappointment and shock to Governor Pine were so great that he was taken seriously ill in the camp at Denkari, near Adjumako, where he had gone to inspire and encourage the natives, and he was brought down to Cape Coast almost lifeless."¹ Major Cochrane returned to Cape Coast on the 25th of June, the regulars reoccupied the forts, and the allies were dispersed during the rainy season. During their stay in the Protectorate the Ashantis had burned over thirty towns and villages and destroyed an enormous number of farms, besides killing several hundreds of the people. The laying waste of so much fertile country and the absence of the people from their farms in other parts led to much distress and want : foodstuffs were at famine rates, and the price of corn rose from 2s. 6d. to 13s. 6d. a bushel.

The people, suffering from famine and loss of property, and smarting under an undeserved defeat, now renewed their complaints against Major Cochrane, and, by petitions and indignation meetings, constantly clamoured for his removal. Commodore Wilmot wrote to the Admiral on the 14th of August that he had to " report the entire failure of the expeditionary force under Major Cochrane, in doing anything towards either meeting the Ashantis in the field or assisting the allied Kings and Chiefs to do so. The entire military force was placed at the disposal of the commanding officer for this purpose, and it was on this account alone that I offered to garrison the Castle and defend the neighbourhood. The season has been a most wonderful one, with scarcely any rain and very cool.

¹ Ellis, *History of the Gold Coast*, p. 230.

1800-1864 Every advantage has been given to the commanding officer for field operations as far as the weather was concerned, and the Kings and Chiefs under our Protectorate were ready for advancing. I am sorry to say, however, that all these advantages have been thrown away, but, far worse, the 'prestige' of our support has been lost, and the British power brought into contempt. It will be for the Government to enquire into the cause of this inaction, and I feel very deeply the humiliation we have suffered in consequence." Much ill-feeling existed against the Dutch also for having permitted the Elminas to send regular supplies of arms and powder to the Ashantis while they were actually occupying portions of the protected country, and it was clear that the Dutch Governor, Colonel Elias, had been in regular communication with Awusu Kokor, for one of his letters addressed "To the Captain-General of the Ashantee army at war against the British" had been intercepted. It was not opened, but the mere fact that such a correspondence was going on was sufficiently significant.

Although he had been so hampered by all these numerous difficulties, so that the campaign had ended disastrously to the English and without a single success or effort on their part as a redeeming feature, yet Governor Pine understood more clearly than anyone else seems to have done what were the real needs of the case, and was firmly convinced that the time had come when a decisive blow must be struck at the power of Ashanti if any hope of permanent peace and prosperity on the Gold Coast was to be entertained. There were only two courses open : one was to continue to recognize Ashanti as an independent power and treat it as such, the difficulties attending which would have been very great owing to past misunderstandings, and would have steadily increased as time went on and the power of the English grew and extended ; the other was to conquer it, and by a firm and just rule gradually eliminate what was objectionable and foster and encourage what was good in it. There was no practicable middle course.

Mr. Pine stated his views very clearly in a despatch dated 12th of May 1863, in which he wrote : " It is with the deepest regret that I find myself involved, in spite of all my precautions, in a serious, and I fear, lingering war ; but such being the case I will not conceal from your Grace the earnest desire that I entertain that a final blow shall be struck at Ashantee power, and the question set at rest for ever as to whether an arbitrary, cruel and sanguinary Monarch shall be for ever permitted to insult the British flag and outrage the laws of civilization. This desirable object can be attained only by the possession of such a force as I fear the Governor of these Settlements can never hope to command, unless your Grace should be pleased to urge upon Her Majesty's Government the policy, the economy, and even the mercy of transporting to these shores an army of such strength as would, combined with the allied native forces, enable us to march to Coomassie and there plant the British flag. To a stranger the course I point out may appear a visionary one, but I am convinced that, even with all the disadvantages of climate, the expedition would not be so dangerous, so fatal, or accompanied with such loss of life as have attended expeditions in other and apparently more genial climes ; and with 2,000 disciplined soldiers, followed by upwards of 50,000 native forces, who require only to be led and inspired with confidence by the presence of organized troops, I would undertake (driving the hordes of Ashantees before me) to march to Coomassie. As the case now stands, the most I can hope is to drive the Ashantees from the Protectorate without the chance of administering that chastisement or demanding that retribution which is so justly due to its inhabitants, and remain in constant dread of subsequent incursions of a powerful enemy. Although I am not sanguine, the allies now in arms, amounting to upwards of 50,000 men, declare that with the smallest additional military force they would attempt to reach Coomassie if permitted ; and I only hope that the assistance I have demanded from Sierra Leone and the Gambia, as I advised your Grace by the last mail, may arrive and be in such

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1860-1864 force as to embolden me to sanction such an enterprise,
 CHAP. for I feel that any other measure must necessarily be
 XXVII incomplete."

These proposals were severely criticized by the *Times* as follows: "What good can come out of that? If we capture Kumasi, a couple of English regiments will be needed to hold it. If we destroy it, we destroy at once the commercial value of Cape Coast. It would likewise be the grossest political blunder to undermine the power and authority of the King of Ashanti. . . . Instead of harbouring culprits against his Crown, instead of disregarding the treaties between himself and us, instead of trying to sap the foundations of his throne, we should strive to cultivate acquaintance with him by the tranquil arts of peace."¹ These arguments were absolutely sound. If it had been possible to establish a friendly understanding or alliance with Ashanti and treat it as a friendly power, that would have been the best course; but the objection was that the difficulties attending such an arrangement between two nations so far removed from each other in the scale of civilization would have been enormous and most difficult to avoid.

The correctness of the main opinion expressed by Mr. Pine, however, was fully vindicated by the events that followed ten years later; but the Home Government declined to sanction any such expedition, and the Duke of Newcastle replied: "I am not insensible of the encouragement which the unfortunate inaction of the troops and native allies under Major Cochrane's command may afford to fresh aggressions by the Ashantees; but the proposal of a regular invasion to be made upon that nation, and of a march upon their capital, is too serious to admit of my encouraging it. I will merely say at present that I should feel very averse to its adoption, except in case of overruling necessity, and also after the report of some more competent military commander than anyone from whom there has yet been an opportunity of obtaining an opinion at the Gold Coast."

¹ Quoted in Casely Hayford's *Gold Coast Native Institutions*, p. 264.

Some troops were sent out, however, and Major Cochrane was superseded by Lieutenant-Colonel Conran, who arrived at Cape Coast on the 13th of August on board H.M.S. *Megaera* with 495 men of the 4th West India Regiment, who brought up the total strength of the regular troops on the Gold Coast to about 700 men. These men relieved the naval brigade by which the Castle and forts had been garrisoned, and further reinforcements were promised. On the 21st of the same month Colonel Conran disbanded the Gold Coast Corps,¹ which, apart from having mutinied, had given a great deal of trouble for some time past and was considered quite useless and unreliable.

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On the 19th of August a messenger arrived from Kumasi, bringing a letter from the King, and 200 Dutch subjects who had been in the capital during the invasion and were now returning to Elmina. They were probably men who had been engaged in the supply of arms and ammunition. The King acknowledged the receipt of the Governor's letter written in June, but said that he could give no reply to it until he had met his Chiefs in Council and completed the funeral custom for those who had fallen in the war, and again promised that "Quarquah" should come down and explain the alleged treaty for the return of refugees. The Governor's reply was a refusal to hold any further communication with him until he had received a specific answer to his former letter and compensation had been paid for the damage done by the Ashanti army. It was thought that this letter had been sent merely to gain time and that the Dutch subjects were sent down to curry favour with their Government and ensure a further supply of powder and arms. Everyone expected that the Ashantis would renew their attack on the Protectorate so soon as the rains were over, and in order to oppose their advance and

¹ All volunteered to serve during the Ashanti invasion. During the twelve years' existence of the Corps, 20 officers out of 57 had died, the commissions of 6 Ensigns had been cancelled, 4 others resigned or were superseded within a few weeks of being gazetted, 6 out of 11 Sergeant-Majors died with an average African service of nine months and 2 more were invalidated with an average African service of five months (Major J. J. Crooks).

1860-1864 at the same time restore the confidence of the allies in
CHAP. British protection, it was decided to form a camp on the
xxvii River Pra, which could be used as a base for the collection
of stores preparatory to an advance into the enemy's
territory should this be found practicable and necessary.
It was also known that small bands of the enemy were still
lingering in the Protectorate near the Pra, and on the 9th
of October messengers arrived from the King of Denkera
bringing a fresh Ashanti jawbone and reporting the oc-
currence of a slight skirmish between his people and one
of these parties. One of the objects of this advanced
camp, therefore, was to free the Protectorate of these
predatory bands and show the King that the English
were still prepared to fight and resist his encroachments.
An Ashanti Captain, too, who had been sent to Atta the
Chief of Akim during the last invasion to ask him to return
to his former allegiance, was now released. This man
had been sent down by Atta to Accra, and before his de-
livery at Cape Coast had been on a cruise of some months'
duration on Commodore Wilmot's ship, and it was hoped
that his account of all that he had seen and of the prepa-
rations that were being made might induce the King to
make some such concessions as might lead to the conclusion
of peace.

A camp and supply depot were first formed at Mansu
on the 2nd of January 1864 and garrisoned by 100 men
under Captain Mackay, who cleared the bush and fortified
the position. They were followed on the 25th by the
men of the 2nd and 4th battalions of the West India
Regiment under Captain Knapp, who arrived at Mansu
on the 31st, and Colonel Conran and his staff reached the
camp the day after. Messengers had been sent to the
various Chiefs asking them to cut roads for the passage of
the troops and transport of stores, and this work had been
done so promptly and so well that a twelve-pounder gun
was taken up to the Pra on its wheels without once being
taken to pieces. By the 8th of February the whole of
the troops from Cape Coast were encamped near the river
at Prasu, where they commenced the construction of a

strong stockade. The men stationed at Accra were then moved to Akim Swedru, where the Ashantis had had their headquarters the year before.

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A rather half-hearted conditional permission was now granted by the Home Government for Mr. Pine to put the plans he had suggested into effect and carry the war into the enemy's country ; but it was very distinctly laid down that this course could only be sanctioned if it could be shown to be a defensive and not an offensive measure, "safer, less costly in blood and money, and more likely to be decisive in its results than waiting for an attack which is being prepared, and which no peaceful measure can ward off without loss of that dignity and position which are essential to our security." In a despatch dated the 21st of December 1863 the Secretary of State expressed the hope that it might be found possible to inflict punishment on the Ashantis without entering their country, severe enough to remove the bad impressions caused by the impunity with which they had been allowed to ravage the Protectorate during the preceding year and to deter them from making any further aggressions ; but he added that "should no opportunity be found of striking such a blow without entering the Ashantee territory, you are not to regard yourself as absolutely prohibited from doing so under any circumstances, and from advancing, as far as the utmost consideration for the safety of the troops would permit, for the purpose of obtaining reparation and securing the peace of the Protectorate."

There seemed some prospect, therefore, that it might even yet be possible to carry out the only measure from which any real and permanent benefit could reasonably be expected. In past years' a stricter regard for the obligations imposed by treaties, and a wiser and more just diplomacy, might possibly have led to some satisfactory arrangements ; but now that the Gold Coast was directly under Crown Government a more decisive line of action was certainly called for. The Ashantis, too, naturally, regarded all the events of past history as the acts of the English generally, and would have been quite unable to

1860-1864 appreciate any difference that might have been held to exist between the responsibility of the Crown and that of the representatives of trading corporations. Moreover, the views they now held, and which it must be admitted were to a great extent justified by past events, were by no means conducive to any great faith in British promises nor likely to favour the success of any negotiations.

It was known from an Ashanti deserter who had taken refuge with the King of Denkera early in March, that although the preparations at the Pra were perfectly well known in Kumasi, the Ashantis did not for a moment believe that the troops would ever dare to cross the river, and that a second invasion had been planned and would be carried out during the next dry season regardless of these defensive arrangements. The invasion of Ashanti, however, was too great an undertaking, and the provisional permission that had at last been accorded was encumbered by too many conditions and restrictions to justify any advance being made with the troops yet available, and it was therefore necessary to await the arrival of the promised reinforcements before anything more could be done. They were expected daily; but week after week went by without their arrival, and though the troops encamped on the Pra were at first kept in good health and spirits by the novelty of their surroundings and their constant employment in clearing the bush, erecting stockades for the fortification of the camp and building a bridge, yet, when the rains set in early in March and the men, camped on low swampy ground, were more or less confined to their tents and huts, the climate and exposure, combined with their enforced idleness, soon began to tell; fever and dysentery broke out, and by the end of the month twenty-five per cent of the men were in hospital.

All the necessary preparations for the advance had now been completed at Prasu. Meat for seventy days and biscuit for forty-two for 1,200 men had been collected there, besides 200 rounds of ball cartridges for each man and two 12-pounder howitzers and ten rocket-tubes with ammunition in proportion. The delay was caused solely

by the non-arrival of the promised troops, and, as the 1860-1864 medical reports from the camp grew more and more alarming, it was decided to withdraw three companies to Cape Coast, leaving two to garrison the camp at Prasu and one at Akim Swedru. These movements had no sooner been carried out than the *Tamar* arrived on the 9th of April bringing the long-expected reinforcements to the number of 674 officers and men of the West India Regiment, principally of the 1st and 4th battalions. Mr. Pine's health had in the meantime broken down under the continued strain and anxiety, compelling him to go for a cruise in the *Rattlesnake*, and the rains having fairly set in, it was necessary to suspend all field operations until they were over. The Governor and civil officers had moved into the town when the military establishment was increased, but many of these new troops had to be quartered in hired houses also, as the accommodation in the Castle was still insufficient.

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It was now decided that these newly arrived troops should relieve those who had been garrisoning the camps in the bush ; but this change was attended with the most disastrous results. The object, of course, was to replace the men who had suffered so severely from disease by others who were in the best possible condition ; but although this seemed reasonable enough at first sight, it was in reality anything but a wise measure. Although the West Indians are descended from West African stock, they have to a great extent lost their immunity, and when they first arrive in the country are affected by the climate nearly as much as Europeans. Their immunity, however, is very quickly reacquired, and the men who had been stationed in the bush for several months and escaped were now practically reacclimatized, and in fact represented the survival of the fittest. They were infinitely better able to perform the necessary duty of guarding the stores at Prasu than these new arrivals, who were still in their most susceptible condition. The two companies of the 1st West India Regiment who relieved the detachment at the Pra towards the end of April soon demonstrated

1860-1864 the truth of this fact, for before they had been a month in the bush, four officers out of seven and 102 men out of **XXVII** 214 were on the sick-list. There was no proper hospital accommodation in the camp, the whole place was more or less under water, for days together the men were unable to dry their clothes or properly cook their food, and there was next to nothing for them to do and no news or excitement to stimulate them. In these circumstances it was not surprising that the number of sick rapidly increased. It was therefore decided to reduce the strength of the detachment to 100 men only and the remainder left for Cape Coast on the 6th of June.

" In the meantime the Home Government, alarmed at the great loss of officers and men, somewhat hastily decided that all operations against Ashanti should cease, and that the troops should be withdrawn. This intelligence reached the Gold Coast in the middle of June, and was received with the greatest consternation. It was hard upon Governor Pine, whose theory as to the practicability of invading Ashanti was now generally held to have been proved to be incorrect, and whom many people did not hesitate to charge with the responsibility of the loss of life which had taken place ; it was hard upon the troops, who after months of weary waiting saw the reward of patience close at hand, only to be deprived of it ; and it was particularly hard upon the protected tribes, who saw themselves about to be once more abandoned to their foes. In truth, the failure of the expedition was due to the vacillation of the Home Government, and that alone. First it would not sanction an advance into Ashanti territory, and then it accorded a conditional sanction. Troops were sent over in dribs and drabs, so that the first arrivals had to wait, doing nothing, for those who were still to come. Then, having by its lack of decision made an expedition before the commencement of the rains impossible, it impatiently put an end to the operations, because sickness prevailed during the rains. There was no reason why the original scheme should not have been adhered to. As the rains ceased, the troops would have

recovered in health and spirit ; the hardest part of the work, 1860-1864 the collection of supplies and munitions of war at Prasu, CHAP. was already done ; at the commencement of the dry season xxvii an immediate advance to Kumasi could have been made, and had it been made all the miseries suffered by the inhabitants of the Gold Coast during the invasion of 1873 would in all human probability have been spared." ¹

The stores that had been carried up to the Pra at such trouble and expense now had to be disposed of, for it was out of the question to bring them back to the coast, and Colonel Conran was told to use his discretion as to what should be given to the allies and what should be destroyed to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. Much of the ammunition was considered useless to the allies and was thrown into the river, and the guns were spiked and buried secretly ; but the people were bitterly disappointed and thought it a pity that anything should be thrown away, while they keenly felt the disgrace that the Ashantis should see how completely these great preparations had failed. It was when he heard of these proceedings that Kwaku Dua remarked " the white men bring many cannon to the bush, but the bush is stronger than the cannon." Never did any enterprise end in such utter failure. The Ashantis were more than ever convinced that the English were only formidable so long as they had the shelter of their forts, and it says much for the peaceable disposition and influence of the King that the whole Gold Coast was not overrun by his armies in the following year. The troops left Prasu on their return march to the coast on the 12th of July, and embarked for the West Indies and Sierra Leone on the 29th, leaving only the 4th West India Regiment to garrison the forts.

Thus ended the greatest failure in the history of the British occupation of the Gold Coast. Well may Lord Wolseley have written that any "attempt to relate the history of our early relations with Ashantee . . . would certainly neither redound to the credit of our arms nor to

¹ Ellis, *History of the Gold Coast*, pp. 234-5.

1860-1864 the intelligence of our home Ministers.”¹ The prestige CHAP. which had attached to the English name from the battle **xxvii** of Dodowa until the death of Maclean was now gone, and the question once more came to be debated whether Great Britain should maintain or abandon her connection with the Gold Coast. Commodore Wilmot’s predictions were fulfilled : this war had, in a short time, reduced the country from the most satisfactory and prosperous condition it had ever been in to the opposite extreme. Disappointment, misery and mutual recriminations now replaced the happiness and goodwill of former years, and trade was at an absolute standstill. Many of the merchants became bankrupt, and those who contrived to weather the storm at all only did so with the greatest difficulty, and their resources were crippled for many years.

¹ Wolseley, vol. ii, p. 257.

CHAPTER XXVIII

EFFECTS OF THE WAR

1865 TO 1867

THE recent campaign had caused such a scandal, and 1865-1867 involved such a loss of prestige and so much expense and sickness amongst the troops employed, that the Home Government once more began seriously to consider whether it was worth while to remain any longer on the Gold Coast, and a Special Commissioner, Colonel Ord, R.E., was sent out to obtain information about the management and prospects of the Settlements there and in other parts of West Africa. It was pointed out to him in his instructions that the settlement of these places by Europeans in the ordinary sense of the term had never been contemplated ; but that the Government had only intended to encourage the legitimate commerce of British merchants, to protect trade by the occupation of a number of detached posts, and at the same time to put a check on the Slave Trade, human sacrifices and other barbarous practices that had been customary among the people. Colonel Ord was to report to what extent these objects had been attained by the local Government and what moral influence was exercised by it over the people : he was also to try to devise some plan, either by limiting the present expenditure or by introducing some system of taxation of the people, whereby the Settlements might be made self-supporting without their efficiency being impaired.

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Colonel Ord landed at Cape Coast early in 1865 and interviewed the Chiefs on the 25th of February. On his return to England in March, he reported that so far as the

1865-1867 suppression of the Slave Trade and the protection and encouragement of lawful commerce were concerned, the local Government had satisfactorily attained the objects for which it had been kept up, and that a great deal had also been done towards the final abolition of human sacrifices, torture for witchcraft and other barbarous practices, which, though not yet unknown on the Gold Coast, were nevertheless of comparative and increasing rarity. The establishment of British Courts had also done much to mitigate the evils of domestic slavery and check any tendency towards undue oppression and severe punishment by providing a means of appeal. It was admitted that the occupation of the country was costly both in lives and money, and that the wars in which the Government had so frequently been involved were mainly responsible for this expense, not only directly, but also indirectly by the interruption and damage they caused to trade. While admitting, however, that "differences or collisions with the natives have occurred which greater forethought or judgment might perhaps in some instances have prevented," stress was laid on the fact that "whenever settlements are brought into contact with warlike and lawless savages, such complications as have occurred on the West Coast are by no means infrequent, and are generally productive of financial and other difficulties."

The unsatisfactory condition of the Gold Coast and other West African Settlements was justly attributed to the absence of any definite and permanent policy in their administration and the relations of their Governments with the people. Colonel Ord therefore proposed that they should all be placed under one central authority and controlled by a Governor-in-Chief, who should be stationed at Sierra Leone. The main objection to this arrangement, which had caused the separation in 1842—namely, the absence of any certain and speedy means of intercommunication between the different Settlements—had now ceased to exist. The presence of the Dutch and their continued unwillingness to come to any agreement for the imposition of Customs duties, combined with the failure of the poll

tax, rendered any increase of revenue by these means out of the question ; but with free communication by steamer established between the various Settlements, it was thought that it would be safe to reduce the number of troops stationed on the Gold Coast itself and thus curtail expense.

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A Select Committee of the House of Commons was now appointed to consider this report and advise Parliament on the course to be adopted. Some urged that the Gold Coast should be abandoned altogether ; others that it should be retained but more wisely managed. The Committee heard a great deal of evidence, and the question of the amount of protection to which the people were entitled received special attention. It was acknowledged that the mere idea of the existence of a Protectorate without a certain degree of protection was a manifest absurdity ; and it was admitted that the Government, by fining and imprisoning the people, and in some cases the Chiefs also, had treated them as British subjects. The question to be decided, therefore, was not so much whether the people were entitled to protection or not, as the amount of such protection that need be given them. What the Government really wanted was to arrive at some definite understanding on this point, in order that it might judge to what extent it was likely to be implicated, pecuniarily or otherwise, in the event of future aggressions by the Ashantis.

This protection, though really originated when the English opened fire on the Ashantis at Anamabo in 1806, had practically been established during Maclean's governorship, and it was clear that a man of his ability and judgment, but with his limited means both as regards money and troops, would never have undertaken to guarantee to the people under his care an absolute immunity from the interference of enemies who had already conquered them. His idea had been to use the influence that his Government gained from the use of the term "British Protection" to assist the people in emancipating themselves from their former bondage, and to convince the Ashantis that any measures for reasserting their dominion

1865-1867 over the protected tribes were not to be undertaken lightly.

CHAP. XXVIII It would have been quite impossible for him to guarantee the safety of the people, and this they understood as well as he did ; all he ever undertook to do, and all that they ever expected him to do, was to assist them when occasion arose so far as lay in his power. This was the condition of affairs until 1852, when the Poll Tax Ordinance was passed. The provisions of this measure certainly gave the people a stronger claim on the Government than they had ever had before ; and had the payments then agreed to been regularly made, it might fairly have been contended that they were entitled to a greater degree of protection than had formerly been contemplated. These payments, however, had not been maintained, and the people, having broken their part of the contract, could no longer claim any of those benefits that they might otherwise have derived from it. It is quite clear, however, that they never had expected anything like complete protection, nor supposed that the Government would fight their battles for them. All that they required was that when they were attacked they might be assisted by the provision of arms and ammunition, and that the Government would send its troops to form a nucleus around which their own forces might rally, and provide officers to lead them. The Fantis, in early times, had been anything but celebrated for their courage in war ; but in recent years, and in fact ever since 1826, they had done much to retrieve their character, and had always been ready to take the field when occasion arose and do their share of the fighting.

The fact that the Government was contemplating the abandonment of the country soon became known on the Gold Coast, where it caused the greatest alarm. No one knew better than did the people themselves the value to them of the protection they enjoyed—of whatever degree it might be—and they fully realized that if the English once withdrew, it would not be long before the Ashantis again invaded their country and established their dominion over the whole Gold Coast. Had the English gone, it is

doubtful whether the Dutch would have remained, and even had they done so, their presence would have made no difference to the plans of the Ashantis. At best, a period of fearful confusion and bloodshed must have ensued, and whether the Ashantis were ultimately successful or not—about which, however, there can be little room for doubt—there would have been an immediate renewal of the Slave Trade, which the people still regarded as the legitimate and natural business of the country, and to which they would surely have returned so soon as the restrictions imposed by the Government were removed. Petitions signed by hundreds of Chiefs and others were forwarded to the Governor, in which it was said : “ We wish the continuance of the English protection ; and it is impossible for us now to express in terms sufficiently strong our desire that the English Government should continue with us and not leave us. To leave us now would be like the parent forsaking his offspring before being able to care for itself.”

The Committee finally arrived at the following decisions : first, that it was impossible for the British Government to withdraw, wholly or immediately, from its Settlements and engagements on the Gold Coast ; second, that all further extension of territory or assumption of Government or new treaties granting protection to the tribes would be inexpedient, but that the policy of the local Government should rather be to encourage the people to exercise those qualities which might, in course of time, render it possible for the management of their affairs to be left more and more in their hands and eventually enable the Government to withdraw. This policy of non-extension, however, was not to be considered “ an absolute prohibition of measures which, in peculiar cases, may be necessary for the more efficient and economical administration ” of the Settlements already occupied. The third recommendation was that all the West African Settlements should be united under one central government at Sierra Leone with local Administrators in each. As a result of this, the Gold Coast once more became a dependency of

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1865-1867 **Sierra Leone**, the Governor-in-Chief visiting it once a year
CHAP. and the Administrator communicating with the Colonial
xxviii Office only through him.

These recommendations entirely reversed the policy that had grown up in recent years. They were, in reality, quite impracticable, and in the end caused much local trouble. "Committees of the House of Commons cannot stop the working of natural causes. Neither peoples nor individuals ever stand still. They either go forward or they go back ; and if a white race, not decaying in itself, keeps a hold among and is brought into daily contact with natives, it must, by a law of being which overrides all Parliamentary dicta, neither stand still nor go back, but extend its influence and widen its empire. When the Committee prefaced their report with the admission that the British Settlements and engagements in West Africa could not at once or wholly be abandoned, they practically gave up their case ; for, impossible as was immediate or total abandonment, it was perhaps less impossible than for the English to remain in Africa without still going forward. Their recommendations, therefore were for the most part still-born."¹ This summarises the whole question of the rise of British jurisdiction on the Gold Coast. Coming in the first place as traders pure and simple, the English had built their forts and factories, but had never acquired any territorial rights in the country, either by conquest or otherwise, beyond the actual sites on which these forts stood, and even these had originally been granted by the Chiefs and the English had paid ground-rent for them until events brought the deeds or "notes" into their hands. Strictly speaking, their jurisdiction ceased at the gates of the forts ; but by a process of gradual and almost imperceptible extension, by "usage and sufferance," their authority had come to be very generally recognized far beyond these strictly legal limits, and this extension of power was the natural and unavoidable outcome of their continued presence in the country and of the long contact of a stronger and more virile race with a

¹ Lucas, p. 130.

less enlightened people. The finding of this Committee, in fact, seems to have been based on a very imperfect understanding of the true position of the English in the country, and showed great want of foresight. One of the Commissioners, indeed, publicly admitted some years afterwards that "he and his colleagues had taken a most erroneous view of the state of affairs on the Gold Coast."¹

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During this enquiry, several witnesses, including Sir Benjamin Pine, a former Governor and brother of the Richard Pine who was then in office, had given evidence that the administration of justice was not so well carried out as it had been in the time of Maclean, and they attributed this fact to changes that had gradually grown up in the character of the office of Judicial Assessor. The original intention had been that he should sit with the Chiefs and assist them to administer the law; but in recent years he had ignored them altogether and no longer allowed them to sit with him, but used to give his own judgment in all cases. The only difference, therefore, that now existed between the practice of his Court and that of the Chief Justice was that in the former African laws and customs were taken into consideration, while in the latter decisions were given according to the strict letter of the English law only. The Chief Justice's Court was now regulated by a new Supreme Court Ordinance which was passed in November 1866.

On the Gold Coast, the unfortunate conduct of the recent campaign, combined with the report of the Committee of Enquiry, had a very bad effect and led to much trouble. Judging by the recent exhibition that had been given them, the people quickly came to the conclusion that the British were quite unable to conduct military operations in the bush, and that the protection upon which they had been relying was a broken reed. This belief was soon strengthened by an official announcement that in the event of any future invasion they must rely entirely upon their own efforts to repel it and expect no assistance from the Government unless the safety of the forts was

¹ Mockler-Ferryman, p. 78.

1865-1867 directly endangered. British prestige was never at a lower ebb, and several of the Chiefs, who maintained that they had only given up a portion of their authority and submitted to British control in return for the compensating protection afforded them against their enemies, began to show symptoms of revolt, but were promptly called to order. Many partly educated men obtained copies of the minutes of the proceedings of the House of Commons Committee, and, either because their education was insufficient to enable them to grasp the true meaning of what they read, or because they wilfully picked out those passages that seemed best adapted to suit their own ends and deliberately suppressed the context, thereby obscuring and distorting their sense, gave their less enlightened countrymen a very erroneous view of the case.

The special point upon which these men fixed, and which they made the text of all their agitations, was the Committee's recommendation that the people should gradually be trained in the management of their own affairs, so that the Government might ultimately be able to withdraw if the necessity arose. This recommendation had been made to hold out some hope to those who had urged the immediate abandonment of the country, and its true spirit and meaning were sufficiently clear from the evidence upon which it was based. Sir Benjamin Pine had said "that we cannot govern that country, and if we cannot help the Chiefs to govern it we should be better away," and he went on to explain that this fact was largely due to the unhealthiness of the climate and the consequent difficulty in maintaining a sufficiently large establishment to admit of the appointment of magistrates all over the Coast. It was necessary, therefore, that the people should, to a great extent, be ruled through their Chiefs, and his advice was that they should be "gradually accustomed to manage their own affairs . . . by giving them municipal institutions, by making them drain their towns and take care of their local affairs . . . so that within a given time, it might be half a century and it might be a century, we should be free to a great extent, and they might then

manage their own affairs," but such management even 1865-1867 then was to be by "the people directly subject to our Government." Nothing could have been clearer than this ; and the plainly stated finding of the Committee that it was impossible for the Government to withdraw, which had been arrived at only after a careful consideration of all the circumstances and claims of the people, was in itself sufficient to negative the construction that was now put upon this passage. The "scholars," however, entirely ignored these important explanations of the late Governor's meaning and made it appear that the Home Government had actually recommended, if not ordered, the almost immediate withdrawal of all British control, and that the local Government was, therefore, acting in a defiant and unjustifiable manner in endeavouring to maintain its authority.

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The mass of the Chiefs and people, dependent as they were upon the small educated community for their information, and seeing their statements apparently supported by the recent announcement that they must not expect any further protection, can hardly be blamed for the spirit of unrest that they showed. This, however, was soon quieted, and the majority of the Chiefs behaved extremely well in what certainly were very trying circumstances. John Aggri the King of Cape Coast, however, became surrounded by a number of more or less educated and designing men, who probably hoped to benefit themselves by any changes that they might succeed in bringing about, and lending too ready an ear to the bad advice they gave him, caused the Government a great deal of trouble and ended by procuring his own downfall. Aggri himself was a protege of the Wesleyan Mission, and always alluded to himself as "the Christian King of Cape Coast"; but he was quite illiterate and could only speak a few words of English, so that the numerous extraordinary letters that were written in his name must have emanated principally from these advisers, some at least of whom were undoubtedly clever men, possessing an extensive knowledge of the English language, which they might have

1865-1867 put to a better purpose than the deception of their natural
CHAP. ruler and their less accomplished fellow countrymen.
xxviii Aggri, in short, seems to have been a mere cat's-paw.

In January 1856 the people of Cape Coast had deposed their King Kofi Amissa, who had succeeded Joe Aggri (Brupu) but was not of the blood royal, and until the 21st of January 1865 they had not appointed a successor ; but finding themselves prejudiced when meeting the people of other districts by the fact that they had no Head Chief of their own, they had then elected this John Aggri (Essien), who was a member of the original royal family. His enstoolment was formally recognized by Governor Pine in February, and trouble arose almost immediately afterwards from the action of one of his magistrates, Martin, who imprisoned one George Blankson Wood for an alleged contempt of his Court, a charge that appears to have had some foundation in fact. Wood, however, claimed to be a British subject, having been born within a few yards of the Castle, and after some very intemperate correspondence, in which he denied all right of appeal from his own to the British Court, Aggri at length declined to treat with the Governor any longer. A careful examination of this correspondence shows that Aggri's advisers had a pretty clear perception of the subtle and gradual means by which British jurisdiction had been extended by Governor Maclean and his successors ; but they did not choose their words any too carefully in referring to them, and while there was a certain foundation of truth beneath all that they said, they persistently attributed every action of the Government to the worst possible motives, and, while grossly exaggerating and emphasizing the defects of the system, were careful to avoid any acknowledgment of or reference to the undoubted benefits that they had derived from it. To give them their due, Aggri and his friends were patriots, but woefully indiscreet and misguided ones, who either could not or would not state their case fairly nor carry out those negotiations that might have led to a satisfactory settlement of the dispute without resorting to veiled threats and offensive insolence.

How far Aggri was aware of the true import of all that was written in his name is an open question. At the commencement of the correspondence he rather reluctantly withdrew one letter when its impudent tone was pointed out to him, but his subsequent communications certainly showed no improvement in this respect, so that he does not seem to have lost faith in his advisers and secretaries.

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The really important points were that Aggri denied the existence of any right of appeal from his Court and claimed jurisdiction over land within a few yards of the Castle walls. This right of appeal, however, had long been established. Governor White, when answering questions put to him by the Select Committee of 1816, said that a native had a right of appeal from the judgment of a native judge to the Governor,¹ and that in such a case sentence would be passed "conformably to African law, when such law is compatible with strict justice."² The right of the Government to lands in the immediate neighbourhood of the forts, and therefore presumably its jurisdiction over them, stood on a similar footing: it was a matter of long-established precedent. For the past half-century the Government had been in the habit of granting land, for which application was made on special forms, within gun-shot or a radius of five miles of the Castle. The long existence of this custom, without any protest having been raised, certainly implied a tacit admission by the people that such land belonged to the Government, even though a rigid investigation of its claims might limit such rights to the actual site of the fortress itself. Moreover, there is clear evidence that this right of the Government to land in Cape Coast was generally admitted; for, at a meeting held at Government House on the 10th of May 1865, at which this question was discussed, the Chiefs of Cape Coast, five in number, Aggri himself being absent, said "that they the Chiefs and people knew that the lands in Cape Coast belong to the Queen;

¹ Parliamentary Paper, *Report of Committee on African Forts* (1816), p. 171, Question and Answer, 26.

² *Ibid.*, Question and Answer, 27.

1865-1867 that they themselves are under the Queen, and are protected by her ; that wherever the Governor resides in **CHAP.** **xxviii** Cape Coast they considered as the Castle. That knowing these things, the people think it unnecessary for the Governor to make such a request—viz. that they should sign a document giving land to the Queen, when the Queen had for a series of years given and granted the said lands without any question on their part.”¹ In the end, Wood took action against Martin in the British Court and obtained judgment for £19 16s., which Aggri paid under protest.

Aggri next sent messengers to all the neighbouring Chiefs, urging them to join him in opposition to the Government ; but they would have nothing to do with him, and when, on the 10th of April, 1865, just prior to his departure for England to give evidence before the House of Commons Committee, the Governor summoned all the Chiefs to a meeting under tents at Cape Coast and enquired whether they wished to side with Aggri and sever their connection with the British Government or not, the question was met with an unanimous denial. The only Chiefs living within a reasonable distance who failed to attend this meeting and record their wishes were Aggri and the other Cape Coast Chiefs. Aggri, however, sent Martin as his special envoy to England, where he gave evidence before the House of Commons Committee, and in explaining the Chief’s grievances, had the audacity to try to represent him as the exponent of all the other Kings and Chiefs on the Gold Coast, though they, as has been seen, had declined to recognize him and even considered it presumptuous on his part to have sent for them ; moreover, their refusal to contribute anything towards the heavy expenses incurred by Martin’s mission involved Aggri in still further difficulties. Another complaint that was made by Martin was that the growing custom of employing advocates had so increased the attendant expenses that the British Courts were no longer accessible to the people ; yet, though he represented these advocates as a positive curse to the

¹ Parliamentary Paper, *King Aggery*, p. 45.

country, Aggri soon afterwards employed their leader **1865-1867** as his private secretary and chief adviser.

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While the relations between the Government and Aggri were thus strained, an unfortunate affair took place at Cape Coast, of which he and his party gladly availed themselves as an additional pretext for abusing the Government. At this time, owing to lack of proper accommodation elsewhere, one company of the 4th West India Regiment was quartered in a hired house in Low Town, and on the night of the 4th of September 1865 a serious riot broke out between the soldiers and the townspeople. The annual Yam Custom or Black Christmas had been kept that day, and most of the fishermen and others who lived in that quarter of the town were much excited by the quantity of drink they had consumed during its celebration. The orgies attending this custom, indeed, were only too often the cause of serious disturbances all over the Coast, and it was at these times especially that the disgraceful fights between rival companies occurred. Thus, only the year before, in 1864, such fights had taken place at Sekondi and Komenda, in the former of which fourteen men had lost their lives, while at Komenda Numbers 1 and 5 Companies had fought on the 30th of October, and fourteen or eighteen men had been killed and nearly a hundred more wounded. The next year, just before this riot at Cape Coast, a similar outbreak at Mumford had resulted in the death of four men and the wounding of not fewer than sixty others ; and these casualties would have been very much heavier still had not Mr. Bentil interfered and succeeded in putting an early stop to the conflict.

This riot at Cape Coast was largely due to the jealousy that existed between the townspeople and the soldiers. The latter, having none of their own countrywomen with them, had roused the anger of many of the Fantis by the liberties they took with their wives, slaves and pawns, many of whom had attached themselves to the soldiers, who, with their pay and rations, were able to provide for them better than their own husbands and owners. Soon

1865-1867 after six o'clock in the evening, just as it was getting dark, some soldiers who were passing through Low Town were suddenly attacked with sticks and stones by the Fantis, whose estimate of their wrongs had been greatly magnified by drink, and several small parties of soldiers soon became involved in the fray. One of them, Private Beckles, had his arm broken, and the soldiers, who were greatly outnumbered, ran to the barracks and reported what had happened to the Adjutant ; but though Major Ivey immediately went out with a small party of troops, everything was then found quiet. Soon after his return, however, at about seven o'clock, Private Broffit was brought in on a stretcher : he was insensible, and at the time was believed to be dead, while another man, Private Wheeler, was missing, and was never found nor his fate ascertained with certainty. The greatest excitement now prevailed. The troops were, of course, furious at the loss of their comrades ; the Bentil Company turned out and began beating their drums, and, as many of the soldiers were known to be still in the town, a party was marched out to protect and recall them. The Administrator, Colonel Conran, accompanied these men ; but other disturbances occurred between the people and isolated parties of soldiers who were still in the town, in which a Fanti named John Saniez was killed and fifty-eight men and five women wounded, most of them but slightly. Several more soldiers were also wounded.

At the inquest on Saniez, a verdict of wilful murder was returned against Private King, who had been seen amongst a party of soldiers who were assaulting him. He was tried, found guilty and sentenced to death. However, some fault was found with the judge's charge to the jury ; part of the evidence was considered unsatisfactory ; the jury were alleged to have been drunk when they returned to Court to deliver their verdict, and the scene in Court to have been most disgraceful. The death sentence was, therefore, commuted to one of imprisonment for life, and on the whole of the facts and minutes of the trial being laid before the Secretary of State, he gave it as his opinion

that nothing had been disclosed to show that the crime 1865-1867 amounted to anything more than manslaughter, and CHAP. recommended a further reduction of the sentence to one of xxviii two years' imprisonment.

After this outbreak, those of the soldiers who had hitherto been quartered in the town were at once withdrawn into the Castle, Low Town was put out of bounds, and the whole regiment confined to barracks for an indefinite period. In March 1866, the 4th West India Regiment was relieved by the 3rd battalion and transferred to Sierra Leone, and the feud between the military and the civilian population to a great extent died out.

Bad as this riot was, it was as nothing compared with the far more serious disturbances and pitched battles that so often occurred between the people themselves, but of which they took very little notice even when they resulted in the loss of many lives. It had, moreover, been commenced by the Fantis. Aggri's party, however, ignored these company fights altogether and made the most of this unfortunate event, charging the soldiers with having "issued forth at night with some of their officers and treated the town as if they had taken it by assault in time of war . . . slaughtering the Queen's subjects,¹ taking away property, beating peaceful citizens, dragging human beings about like dead cattle, and creating such terror and confusion as will never be forgotten."²

During this time, more than one attempt had been made to conclude a peace with Ashanti, but without success. The Ashantis, having secured at least a moral victory, naturally expected to dictate their own terms. Towards the end of 1865, however, the Government again enlisted the services of George Blankson of Anamabo, and as a result of his negotiations duly accredited messengers arrived from Kumasi with sixty-five retainers to arrange the terms of peace. Nothing definite was settled ; but Colonel Conran availed himself of the fact that these men

¹ Here, when it suited him, he could definitely claim that his people were British subjects.

² Parliamentary Paper, *King Aggery*, p. 40.

1865-1867 had been sent down to issue a proclamation on the 16th of **CHAP. XXVIII** January 1866 setting forth that the King of Ashanti had sued for peace and that peace was accordingly declared and proclaimed. By no African nor any other custom is it usual for the victors to sue for peace, and this ridiculous announcement was as futile and contemptible as the conduct of the campaign that preceded it had been. The King, of course, was most indignant when he heard of the false construction that had been put upon his action and lost no time in making it known that, so far from his having sued for peace, he had merely sent messengers down in response to the Governor's overtures and now declined to enter into any further negotiations until his original demand for the surrender of Janin had been acceded to.

The excitement caused by the riot at Cape Coast had barely cooled when the people made preparations for a pitched battle amongst themselves, which, had it not been prevented by the timely interference of the Governor and the troops, must have resulted in far greater bloodshed and loss of life than had attended the former disturbance. A dispute arose between two companies, numbering together about 2,000 men, over some insult that had been offered by one to the other at a funeral custom, and on the 17th of January 1866 one company marched out fully armed and with flags flying to the battle-ground at the head of the lagoon, where they waited for their rivals to come and take up the challenge. This they at once prepared to do, and were actually marching through the town for this purpose when the Governor, hearing what was going on, ran to Gothic House, and, turning out the hospital guard, compelled the men to proceed by a more circuitous route. He thus gained time to call out the troops and took them at the double to the lagoon. Here they split into three divisions, one of which halted at its eastern end, while the other two doubled along either shore. In this way a collision between the opposing forces was prevented and several Captains of the Anafu Company were captured as they tried to escape by wading across the lagoon. Aggri

and his Chiefs had also turned out, and did their best to quell the disturbance, but they had clearly lost all control over the people and could have effected nothing without the assistance of the troops.

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One of the most important and influential Chiefs in the Protectorate, Ortabil King of Gomoa, was now ill-advised enough to listen to the persuasions and misrepresentations of Aggri's secret messengers and attempted to defy the Government. He first of all overran the country of a neighbouring Chief named Hamma with an army of 5,000 men, doing much damage to property and killing three men. Hamma fled to Cape Coast for protection, a warrant was issued for the arrest of the murderers, and two constables who were sent to execute it met the Chief and his people at Anamabo on the 22nd of March. Ortabil was then on his way to Cape Coast to settle the dispute between himself and Hamma and flatly refused to permit the arrest of the men. Later in the day he arrived at Amanfu on the outskirts of Cape Coast, accompanied by an armed force of 500 men, and a party of nine police was again sent out to demand the surrender of the accused ; but after being rather roughly handled by some of Ortabil's men, they were compelled to return without the prisoners. Ortabil swore by M'Carthy and several other oaths that he would never give them up and that any attempt to seize them would cause bloodshed, adding that he had come to Cape Coast of his own free will and that the Governor had not men enough to bring him.

By the time the police had reported these proceedings, Ortabil and Aggri were seated in council together under a tree at Papratem in the centre of the town, surrounded by all their people. The Governor therefore went out with twelve constables and about a hundred men of the 3rd West India Regiment, and, having halted them at a distance of about two hundred yards from the spot where the Chiefs were sitting, advanced unattended and demanded Ortabil as his prisoner. This decisive action seems to have overawed the Chief and convinced him that he had gone too far, for he promptly surrendered and the people ran away

1865-1867 in all directions. He was marched to the Castle, where he **CHAP.** remained a prisoner in one of the officer's quarters until **xxviii** the 26th, when, having acknowledged his fault and craved pardon, he was released on payment of a fine of twenty-five ounces of gold and depositing a further twenty-five ounces as security for his good behaviour for the next two years.

Soon after the publication of Colonel Conran's peace proclamation, a war broke out in the eastern district, which owed its origin to the intrigues of a native slave-trader named Geraldo de Lema. This man had been one of the domestic slaves of a Brazilian named Cesar Cerquira Lema, who had carried on an extensive slave-dealing business at Voji, a village some three miles to the east of Kitta, where he had kept a large establishment. Geraldo de Lema, whose real name was Geraldo de Vasconcellos, had been liberated and acted as his agent for the purchase of slaves at Adda. Lema had died in December 1862, leaving a large fortune, all of which had been acquired in the Slave Trade ; but though the greater part of this was in Lisbon and Bahia, he had a considerable amount of money in doubloons and other property in Voji and still more in Adda. All this Geraldo seized, and, taking his old master's name and wife, continued the business on his own account.

In 1865, Geraldo, while still at Adda, grossly ill-treated one of the principal Chiefs of the town, and the people thereupon drove him away, plundered his property and confiscated all his slaves. He then went to Voji, where he persuaded the Awunas to adopt his quarrel. They provided him with an army of between 3,000 and 4,000 men, which he led against the Addas ; but on reaching the banks of the River Volta opposite the town in April 1865, he found his passage barred by the boats of H.M.Ss. *Dart* and *Lee*, under Captain F. W. Richards. He therefore turned northward and, following the course of the river reached Pong, which he sacked and burned ; thereby not only dislocating the whole of the trade of the eastern district, but stopping the navigation of the river also.

The Accra traders began to complain of the damage

that was being done to their business, and the Governor 1865-1867 opened negotiations with the Awunas for the surrender of CHAP. Geraldo, but without success ; and the Accras, who were xxviii closely allied to the Addas, were then allowed to go to their assistance. A force of about 9,000 men was quickly raised in Accra, Christiansborg and the surrounding villages and supplied with 1,200 muskets and about fifty kegs of ball cartridge by the Government. Some of the Accra traders, Messrs. Irvine and Clayton and the two Bannermans, also raised a volunteer force of 200 men, and this nucleus of the army, under the command of Lieutenant Herbert¹ of the 4th West India Regiment, left Accra on the 18th of February 1866 and marched up country to Kanar, a village on the banks of the Volta some fifteen miles above Adda and about two hours' march from Mlefí, opposite which the Awunas were then encamped. By the 17th of March the allies had nearly all come in, and the army then moved to Mlefí, whence the enemy's camp near Adidomi was plainly visible, and the greater part of it was destroyed by the fire of the guns and rockets. The next day Captain Humphrey and Lieutenant Stewart arrived with a detachment of the 4th West India Regiment, and the former took over the command. On the 19th a strong party of Accras was sent across the river to capture the enemy's canoes, which could be seen moored under the opposite bank. Their passage was covered by the fire of the guns, which soon drove the Awunas into the bush, so that the losses of the Accras were very slight. Instead, however, of securing the canoes and returning at once, as they had been ordered, the Accras followed the retiring enemy and were drawn into an ambuscade and routed. In their hurried retreat across the river they lost over sixty men, including the King of Adda.

Two days later, on the 21st, Taki the King of Dutch Accra, and Kwow Dadi the King of Akwapim, reached Mlefí with a second army of 7,000 men. With these reinforcements the river was crossed, and Captain Humphrey, finding the enemy's camp at Adidomi deserted, ordered a

¹ Civil Commandant of the eastern district.

1865-1867 pursuit. Taki, however, refused to obey, and as he was universally recognized as the paramount Chief of the eastern district, the people all sided with him and the project had to be abandoned. Captain Humphrey, however, begged the Chiefs to remain on the ground that had been deserted by the enemy, so as to guard the passage of the river until the remainder of the army could be ferried across. Dawuna, the Chief of Christiansborg, who had been sent to Copenhagen and educated by the Danes some forty years before and is said to have been a very sensible old man, alone consented, saying he was a British subject and would not be dictated to by a King who lived under the Dutch and had brought Dutch flags into camp. He sent his men across the river and was about to follow them, but was eventually overruled by the others, and Captain Humphrey, seeing the uselessness of trying to help the people so long as they defied his authority, withdrew his detachment to Adda.

The command thus devolved once more upon Lieutenant Herbert, who called a meeting of all the Chiefs, at which he explained the impossibility of his remaining with them unless they were willing to obey his orders, and eventually prevailed upon them to listen to reason. The remainder of the allied army was then ferried across the river, and on the 3rd of April the whole force started in pursuit of the enemy. Having crossed the Toji River on the 4th, the army, which now numbered about 15,000 men, remained encamped in the palm forest until the 12th, when it again advanced, but with so little precaution and in such bad order that it was soon afterwards attacked in a narrow defile surrounded by thick bush by about 8,000 Awunas, who appeared without the least warning in front and on both flanks simultaneously. The carriers with the baggage and supplies, nearly all of whom were women, had, with the greatest carelessness, been placed at the head of the column with a quite insufficient escort, and their sudden and precipitate flight through the armed men who were following naturally threw everything into confusion. The ammunition, howitzer and rockets were nowhere to be

found, and even had they been available, the panic- 1865-1867 stricken carriers were so mixed up with the fighting men CHAP. that not a shot could have been fired at the enemy. The ^{xxviii} baggage was abandoned and numbers of the allies were shot down at close quarters ; but the Awunas were so badly off for ammunition that they were firing small stones instead of bullets, or the slaughter might have been even greater than it was. The utter rout of the whole force was only averted by the King of Akwapim, who led about 4,000 of his men through the bush and suddenly fell on the Awunas in the rear, thus giving the Accras time to rally. A hardly contested battle then ensued, during which a gun which had at last been brought up by the allies was captured and recaptured no fewer than six times ; but after two hours' desperate fighting the Awunas were put to flight and pursued with terrible slaughter for several miles. Geraldo de Lema himself was severely wounded during the action, and the losses of the allies amounted to 65 killed and 320 wounded, of whom 150 subsequently died. The allies now refused to advance any farther. They were worn out by their exertions and thought the decisive victory that they had just gained was sufficient ; and although Lieutenant Herbert first ordered and then begged them to follow up their success by marching against the Awuna towns, they retired to the Volta, recrossed it on the 14th, and at once dispersed to their villages.

The Government was quite as slow as were the Accras to take advantage of this victory, and made no attempt to come to any settlement or demand compensation from the Awunas for many months. It was not until the following October that Colonel Conran visited Jel'a Koffi and offered them terms : these were the surrender of Geraldo de Lema and the payment of an indemnity of 2,000 dollars to the Accras. Had these demands been made immediately after their severe defeat, it is more than probable that the Awunas would have been only too glad to have acceded to them ; but while the Government had been allowing the months to slip by without taking any action, Osai Kwaku Dua had made good use of the time, and, so soon as he

1865-1867 heard of their defeat, had sent messengers to the Awunas and Akwamus, who were also being threatened by the Accras, offering them the assistance of Ashanti. This offer had been eagerly accepted by both tribes, who had sent hostages and presents to the King, so that the Awunas were now in a position to refuse the demands made upon them and said they could not surrender de Lema, as he was a stranger in their country, nor would they pay any indemnity, because they said they themselves had suffered the heaviest losses in the war. Nothing more was done at the time, but an Ashanti army was sent against the Krepis who were allies of the Accras, as a temporary measure, and its general was given instructions to enter the Protectorate so soon as a favourable opportunity presented itself.

Meanwhile Aggri, though warned at the time of Orabil's arrest that any further misconduct on his part would lead to his deportation to Sierra Leone, and although he had now been deserted by many of his earlier supporters, continued in his former defiant line of conduct, imprisoning people and keeping them "in log" in dungeons beneath his house, denying the Government any right of interference, refusing to stand up in the presence of the Governor-in-Chief, and declining to meet the local Administrator. He now wrote directly to the Governor-in-Chief at Sierra Leone, informing him that he intended to raise a military force from amongst his people, and forwarded a petition in which he objected to and abused every act of the local Government.

Kwow Amonu, the King of Anamabo, also tried to imitate Aggri's methods and began to imprison and flog people merely on the advice of the fetish priests and with no pretence of a proper trial. A fine was imposed on him by the magistrate at Anamabo, but he refused to pay it. A visit by the Governor, however, quickly brought him to order; for though he hid himself, the arrest of some of his Chiefs compelled them to produce him, and he was then fined and cautioned.

In December 1866 Aggri reached the end of his tether. On the 6th of that month he addressed a letter to Colonel

Conran which contained nothing but abuse and thinly veiled threats of insurrection. He protested against "the perpetual annoyances and insults that you persistently and perseveringly continue to practise on me in my capacity as legally constituted King," and continued, "I presume your object is to endeavour all in your power to incite me and my people to enact more of those fearful things that took place in Jamaica. . . . However much you may wish to have me and my people under martial law, you will never have that pleasure. . . . I shall appeal for the last time, and then if some tangible satisfaction is not accorded to me and those whose interests I am bound to protect, it will be time enough for me to adopt those measures which will ensure to me and my people something unlike the slavery that you are endeavouring to place us in. I am fully aware that all your vengeance on me owes its origin to the fact that I exposed you for those fearful acts that took place on the 4th September 1865, when my people were butchered by your soldiers, some by your own personal superintendence. . . . I shall not omit to bring before the British Government at the Downing Street your personal attack upon King Ortabil. . . . It is impossible for me to endure your tyranny, annoyances and abuses any longer, nor will I be subject to the disunion that you are daily endeavouring to create amongst my Chiefs and others. . . . Four prisoners were discharged from my town prison. . . . For the last time I desire to call your attention to this last gross outrage, and should it occur again the responsibility rests at your door."¹

This seditious letter, which was unsigned, was delivered on the morning of the 7th of December, and the Governor, wishing to receive some confirmation of its contents before resorting to extreme measures, wrote to Aggri asking him to come and see him, and, when he failed to do so, sent Lieutenant Hamilton to his house soon after three o'clock in the afternoon with a letter enquiring why he had not come. Aggri was extremely insolent, saying he could send no answers to letters, that he was King, and

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¹ Parliamentary Paper, *King Aggery*, pp. 72-3.

1865-1867 that he did not know who Colonel Conran might be. He
CHAP. admitted, however, that he had sent the letter, and finally
XXVIII promised to be at Government House by four o'clock, a
promise that was never fulfilled. The next morning his
arrest was quietly effected, and he was at once put on
board the mail steamer *Calabar* and sent to Sierra Leone. His
chief adviser, Hughes, fled to Elmina, and Martin and
his party also ran away when they found the people were
preparing to call them to account for having caused so
much trouble by their false reports. Two days later a
proclamation was issued declaring Aggri to be no longer
King and abolishing his Courts and prison, and the Governor
then called a meeting of the Chiefs and people, at which
he explained to them what had happened, and order was
once more restored.

Aggri was not only an ignorant and arrogant, but also
a very foolish man. He suffered for his weakness in being
too easily led by those whose education should have enabled
them to give him sound advice instead of continually mis-
leading him and teaching him to entertain such false
ideas. Even after his arrival in Sierra Leone he continued
to act in a very absurd manner, but was allowed to remain
at large on condition that he did not leave Freetown and
showed himself to the police when required. The final
decision of his case was left to the Secretary of State, who,
in confirming his deposition and exile, wrote : "The
anomalous position of the British Government on the Gold
Coast affords no general principles for the decision of such
questions as the present. I can only look to the history of
the place. . . . In return for protection we expect deference
to our authority. . . . It would be inconsistent with the
proper precautions to be observed at Cape Coast, and with
that resistance which it is our duty to offer to the renewal,
under the very walls of our forts, of the cruel punishments
and exactions of native Chieftains, to allow Aggrey to
resume his former position."¹ Aggri therefore remained
at Sierra Leone and was granted a pension of £100 a year
by the Government until April 1869, when, the memory of

¹ Parliamentary Paper, *King Aggrey*, pp. 101-2.

these events being less vivid, he was permitted to return **1865-1867** to Cape Coast, though not of course as King.

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On the 6th of April 1867 Major Blackall, the Governor-in-Chief, visited Accra on a tour of inspection and afterwards sailed down to Jella Koffi with the avowed object of concluding a peace with the Awunas. They were then engaged with their Ashanti allies in pillaging the towns and villages in Krobo, and had again succeeded in entirely stopping the navigation of the Volta and closing the roads into Krepri. The only Awunas whom the Governor now saw were the Chief of the small village of Strongbi and one John Tay, a native trader of Jella Koffi, who came on board his vessel and, after some discussion, agreed to sign a treaty of peace on behalf of their countrymen. These men were absolutely unauthorized to treat for peace, and were quite insignificant persons, so that this treaty when completed was not worth the paper it was written on and was only fit to be classed with Colonel Conran's absurd proclamation of peace with Ashanti. It was immediately repudiated by the Awunas so soon as they heard of the transaction.

On the 27th of April 1867 Osai Kwaku Dua, who was then planning another invasion to avenge the non-surrender of Janin, died in Kumasi, and in the absence of any brother or nephew, was succeeded by his great-nephew Kofi Karikari. Kofi Karikari was the eldest son of Efua Kobri, who was the eldest daughter of Efua Sapong, the sister of Osai Kwaku Dua.¹ Kwaku Dua had quarrelled with Efua Sapong and sent her a silken cord, advising her to hang herself, which she did. In addition to Efua Kobri, she left two other daughters and a son, Opoku. The latter was soon afterwards accused of aspiring to the stool, and was put to death in the manner customary with princes of the blood by having his neck broken with an elephant's tusk.

The actual enthronement of the new king, however, was delayed by disturbances in Kumasi which nearly involved Ashanti in a civil war. On the death of a king of Ashanti the princes of the blood were allowed by custom to take

¹ *Vide* vol. ii, p. 269, and genealogical table, Appendix D.

1867-1868 expenditure of some £8,000 to £12,000 from Government funds. The salaries paid to the Dutch officials were very small, and they were allowed to supplement them by private trading ; but as they used the forts as warehouses and had no rent to pay, and imported their goods duty free, unofficial traders were quite unable to compete with them and any import duties that might have been received by the Government must consequently have been so small as to be scarcely worth taking into account. It was indeed only at times when the English and Ashantis were at war that any considerable trade was done at Elmina ; for the Ashantis then purchased all their supplies from the Dutch, a fact that clearly made it to their interest to foment any quarrels that might arise and caused them to be regarded with continual suspicion by the English, who doubted their sincerity and would have been only too glad to see them leave the Coast.

The chief reason that had induced the Dutch to remain on the Gold Coast at all was that they were in the habit of purchasing slaves from the King of Ashanti and sending them to serve as soldiers in Java and their other East Indian Possessions. They had, for years past, kept an agent in Kumasi whose duty it was to collect and purchase any slaves of whom the King wished to dispose and send them to Elmina, where they were asked if they were willing to serve as soldiers and then shipped to the East Indies ; but although this form was gone through and the men enlisted ostensibly as free agents, they knew well enough that they had been bought as slaves and it is alleged that they did not understand a word of the language, so that the whole proceeding was an absolute farce. They were presumably not Ashantis at all, but members of northern tribes who had been captured in the numerous small wars and punitive expeditions in which the Ashantis engaged, or paid as tribute by one or other of its northern Dependencies. The English, indeed, freely accused the Dutch of indirectly fostering the Slave Trade by these means. Now that the export Slave Trade had been abolished, the price of slaves had fallen, and these men were obtained at the small cost

of forty dollars each, the purchase money being credited to the King, so it was said, in diminution of a debt that he owed to the Dutch Government and which they would otherwise have found it very difficult, if not impossible, to collect. By remaining at Elmina, therefore, the Dutch not only collected regular instalments of a sum that must otherwise have been written off as a bad debt, but also kept open an economical and never-failing source of supply of recruits for service in their East Indian Dependencies. Some of these men were brought back to Elmina and pensioned when they became too old for further service, and gradually formed a settlement on the slopes of a hill in the town, which is still known as Java Hill. These men, whether Mahomedans or pagans when they went out, were Mahomedans when they returned ; and it was their presence in Elmina that first led to the immigration of other Moslems from the interior and the formation of a Hausa colony.

Some such arrangement for recruiting the Dutch East India forces had certainly been in existence since 1836, and possibly for an even longer period. In a despatch to the Committee in London, dated London, 27th September 1836, Governor Maclean referred to the Dutch Government having "adopted measures for recruiting their East India military force from among the natives of the Gold Coast. . . . To provide a sufficient and constant supply of recruits for the military forces of Java from among the natives of the Gold Coast (who out of their own country are the best black troops in the world) has, I have reason to know, been long a favourable object with the Dutch Government."¹

All negotiations for an equalization of duties having failed, an effort had been made as far back as 1860 to arrange an exchange of territory, and the Dutch had then agreed to accept all the Settlements of the English that lay to the west of the Sweet River in exchange for their own to the east of it, so that each Government might have an uninterrupted stretch of coast and be able to make any

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¹ Sarbah.

1867-1868 Customs regulations it desired along its own seaboard without risk of interference from the other. It was found, however, that some of the people living under British protection in rear of the western half of the coast objected to being transferred to the Dutch, and the project had therefore been abandoned. This very important fact now seems to have been forgotten, or, if it was remembered at all, the anxiety of the Government to raise a revenue in the country was allowed to outweigh all considerations of justice to the people who lived under its protection.

On the 5th of March 1867 a treaty¹ was signed in London and ratified on the 5th of July making the very exchange that had been rejected seven years earlier. The English ceded to Holland the whole of their Possessions to the west of the Sweet River—that is, Apollonia, Dixcove, Sekondi and Komenda, together with their Protectorate over Denkera and Wassaw, and received in exchange the Dutch Settlements at Mori, Kormantin, Apam and Dutch Accra, which lay to the east of it.

This exchange of territory, though presumably and professedly made with a desire to improve the condition of the country and consequently to benefit its people, caused endless trouble, and was, in fact, a monumental piece of folly and injustice that the slightest regard for the interests and prejudices of the people or for the probable result of such a change would have prevented. The reasons that had led to the rejection of this very scheme in 1860 were fully as strong in 1867; and it would have required no great penetration, but merely the exercise of a little ordinary common sense, to have convinced anyone who had the slightest knowledge of the country that the people would be as much opposed to it now as they had been then. It was only necessary to consider for a moment what this exchange of territory actually involved. The cession of the forts themselves was a comparatively trivial matter; but the transfer of the Protectorate over the various tribes who were now to be handed over to another nation as if they were the slaves and actual property of the Govern-

¹ For full text, see Horton, *Letters on the Gold Coast*, p. iv.

ment was a very different affair. The treaty even went so far as to refer to and describe this Protectorate as "rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction," words that give a very false idea of the relations that actually existed. To all the affected tribes this change meant that they must transfer their allegiance to another Government for which, at least, they had no special preference ; to many of them it meant that they must henceforth live in unity and be at peace with their hereditary enemies on the coast and with the Ashantis ; but to the Denkeras and Wassaws it meant even more than this, for it placed them at the mercy of the Ashantis, against whom they had been in arms as British allies during the last war, and with whom no peace had yet been concluded. They knew full well that it would be vain to expect the Dutch to protect them from the vengeance that would surely follow ; for even if they had been willing to oppose the schemes of the Ashantis, which is unlikely, they were far too weak to be able to afford any efficient protection or to guarantee freedom from invasion or extortion to any but those who lived in the immediate neighbourhood of their forts. The change, therefore, involved the practical surrender of these tribes to Ashanti, which, in the absence of their voluntary submission, would speedily be enforced ; it also necessitated the friendship of the Komendas with the Elminas, of the Sekondis with the Shamas, of the Apollonians with the people of Axim, and of those of Dixcove with the Butris ; between all of whom there existed old-standing quarrels and hereditary feuds. The selection of the Sweet River as the frontier between the English and Dutch portions of the Coast, too, though geographically convenient, was politically unwise ; it is, however, by no means the only instance of the fixation of an arbitrary boundary, without the least regard for the extent of the jurisdiction of the Chiefs, that has caused more or less trouble. Several villages, such as Efutu and Mampon, which belonged to Cape Coast, were thus placed under the Dutch ; and since it was from these villages and the extensive farms and plantations around them that the Cape Coast people obtained the greater part of their food sup-

1867-1868 plies, their surrender to the Dutch, who charged a tax on certain produce, placed their unfortunate owners in the extraordinary position of having to choose between voluntarily abandoning these valuable dependencies, and paying a tax on their food to one European nation while they themselves were living under the protection of and owed allegiance to another.

Such radical changes in the national sympathies of so many different peoples and such a complete reversal of the politics of nearly every tribe on the coast were more than could reasonably be expected ; yet, in spite of these very valid objections, and with an utter disregard for the wishes of the people, plainly expressed in 1860, and for the justice of their case, the Government calmly proceeded to carry out this change without so much as consulting those whose interests it so vitally affected, let alone attempting to gain their consent to it ; and when the news first reached their ears and they petitioned against it, praying the British Government not to desert them, their claims to consideration were completely ignored. The Authorities seem to have imagined that because the people lived over the graves of their ancestors, for whom they entertained a degree of respect amounting almost to veneration, they could be relied upon not to leave their individual districts, and that that was all that need be thought of. Considering the way in which the whole business was conducted, and that its effect must be to expose the Fantis, Denkeras and Wassaws to an early attack by the Ashantis, the Government certainly had no grounds for surprise or complaint when these changes evoked the most determined resistance and caused a general rebellion which kept the country in a state of civil war for years.

The treaty came into force on the 1st of January 1868, but it was not until December 1867, a few days before the actual transfer took place, that the first and only reference was made to the people. Mr. Ussher, who had recently succeeded Colonel Conran as Administrator of the Gold Coast, then issued a proclamation stating that this exchange of territory had been arranged and was about to

be carried out, and sent a circular letter to those Chiefs 1867-1868 whom it affected, informing them that the protection that CHAP. XXIX had hitherto been given to them by the English would be abandoned, and that they must henceforth look to the Dutch, to whom they were to be handed over.

Major Blackall, the Governor-in-Chief, arrived from Sierra Leone to effect the transfer and was met at Accra by Colonel Boers, the Dutch Governor. At four o'clock on the afternoon of the 4th of January 1868 the Dutch flag on Fort Crève Cœur was lowered and the Union Jack hoisted in its place and saluted by the guns of the other forts and the warships in the roads. This fort was afterwards repaired and renamed Ussher Fort. Apam, Kormantin and Mori were in like manner handed over to Major Blackall, who, finding the people raised no objections, arrived at the very premature conclusion that the transfer of the windward forts to the Dutch could be effected with equal ease. He therefore returned to Sierra Leone, leaving Mr. Ussher to hand them over. The two cases, however, were entirely different : the Dutch subjects on the eastern seaboard had always been on friendly terms with the English, the change did not materially affect their interests, and they were perfectly willing to transfer their allegiance. On the western coast, on the other hand, the English subjects were all opposed to the change and determined to resist it as far as possible, though it fell to the warlike Komendas actually to commence the open rebellion and prolonged period of distraction which ended in compelling the Dutch to sell their Possessions and leave the Gold Coast for ever.

Komenda was the first place to be visited, and here it was that the first sign of the coming storm appeared. At this time the Komendas were still in an unsettled state, owing to the continued disagreement between the various companies ever since the great fight in 1864. The first rumours of the projected change were absolutely discredited; but they were soon confirmed, and in the face of this greater danger a mass meeting was held at which all minor disputes and quarrels were amicably settled and peace was made between the rival parties in the town. The subject

1867-1868 of the transfer then monopolized the attention of the **CHAP. XXXIX** people, and the receipt of a message warning them to prepare for the visit of the two Governors soon convinced them that there was no time to be lost in deciding what line they would take. Meetings were held at which it was unanimously agreed that the Dutch flag should be refused at any cost, and Kwaku Inkruma, the Chief of the town, swore to reject it. On the arrival of the Governors, Mr. Ussher explained to the Chief and his Councillors what had taken place, and Colonel Boers then proceeded to assure them of the good intentions of his Government towards them, promising them various improvements and expressing the hope that they would serve the Dutch as loyally as they had the English. Kwaku Inkruma was then called upon for his answer, and having first retired with his Councillors to talk the matter over, returned and said that as he and his people had been under the English from time immemorial, had fought with them in their wars and always owed them allegiance, he could not now adopt a policy so opposed to that of his ancestors and must therefore decline the offer of the Dutch flag. Whether or not this answer was wholly unexpected is doubtful ; but the Governors decided to temporize and proceed to the other windward forts first, hoping that when these had been transferred the Komendas would not venture to offer resistance alone, and that time would put matters straight. They therefore left for Sekondi, promising to return a fortnight later to receive the Chief's final answer.

Although the Denkeras and Wassaws flatly refused to acknowledge Dutch authority, preferring if the English withdrew their protection to incur the risk of an Ashanti invasion unaided, the other tribes on the coast-line were differently placed. They objected to the change as strongly as did the Komendas, but were for the most part compelled to submit. There were, of course, both English and Dutch forts at Komenda ; but the former had not been occupied for many years, and the latter had been no more than a dismantled ruin since 1782, so that the people were able to offer an open resistance, all possibility of which was denied

to the inhabitants of Dixcove and Sekondi, whose towns 1807-1868 lay under the guns of still occupied forts. In Apollonia, CHAP. XXXIX too, Ateabu was too near the Dutch fort at Axim for any armed resistance to be advisable ; but the Beyins, following the example of the Komendas, refused to accept the flag, and when their town was afterwards bombarded by a Dutch man-of-war, merely retired to their bush villages, where they were out of reach, and showed their continued loyalty to the English by applying to the Administrator for arms and ammunition with which to carry on the war. This request, of course, had to be refused, and they then applied to the Fanti Chiefs, who sent them powder and lead and several ounces of gold-dust.

Some of the educated community in Komenda now availed themselves of the time allowed by the Governors for the preparation of Kwaku Inkruma's final answer to point out to him that any further attempt to resist the transfer would only result in his own downfall and the destruction and ruin of the town ; and although he was at first very unwilling to listen to their advice, their persuasions at length outweighed his scruples and induced him to change his mind and decide to accept the Dutch flag. The people, however, were as much opposed to it as ever, and when Kwaku Inkruma informed them of his revised decision they reviled him as a traitor and thenceforth excluded him from all their councils and plans for the war that they now realized was inevitable. In their subsequent doings they were led by their Tufuhin, Kwamin Emil. Many of the women, and all the children, old men and movable property were sent to the bush villages, while the companies armed themselves and prepared for whatever might befall.

On the 30th of January the Dutch man-of-war *Metalen Kruis* was sighted, bringing the two Governors back to Komenda, and the five companies retired to their stations outside the town, leaving only a few scouts near the beach to keep them informed of what passed. The Governors and their Staffs landed and went to one of the largest houses in the town, where they were joined by the Chief and his

1867-1868 party ; but with the exception of a few onlookers who were
CHAP. XXIX there to watch the proceedings on behalf of the five companies, no one else was present. Mr. Ussher reminded the Chief of the reason of their visit and impressed upon him that the transfer of the other Settlements having already been completed, no amount of resistance on his part could avail him anything, but would, on the contrary, only involve him in serious trouble. Kwaku Inkruma replied that he had now reconsidered his former decision and was ready to receive the Dutch flag, which was then handed to him and formally accepted.

The party then set out for the fort to hoist the flag. Nothing was to be seen of the fighting men, who were still concealed in the bush just outside the town ; but the street was filled with crowds of excited women, who paraded up and down, shouting abuse at the Chief, and it was only with difficulty that a passage was forced through them to the fort and the flag hoisted. News of this crisis had in the meantime been carried to the five companies, who quickly formed themselves into three divisions, one of which advanced along the beach from the western side of the town, while the second came up through its streets, and the third through the bush immediately in rear of it. They were now seen bearing down upon the party at the fort, fully armed and in hostile formation. Their aspect was so threatening that the Governors had no doubt that discretion would be the better part of valour ; the hated flag was at once hauled down, and the party ran for their boat and put off to the ship just before the Komendas charged down upon the spot. Had the flag been left flying and the Governors remained where they were, it is more than likely that the whole party would have been cut to pieces. The people then turned to vent their fury on the Chief and his few adherents, who were loudly abused and would probably have been very roughly handled, if not killed, had they not fled for refuge to Dutch Komenda.

At daybreak the next morning a strong party of seamen was landed, and, going to the fort, again hoisted the flag ; but the Komendas had not relaxed their watch and were

quickly on the scene. Neither party, however, seemed 1867-1868 ready to fire the first shot, and after some time had been CHAP. XXIX spent in mutual recrimination and a few attempts by individuals to reach the halyards had failed, the companies retired and left the Dutch in possession. The sailors then set fire to the town, and, taking the Chief and his Councillors with them for safety, put off to their ship, which then bombarded the town and returned to Elmina a few days later.

In the meantime, the other tribes, encouraged by the prompt and determined action of the Komendas, and exasperated by the bombardment of their town, met at Mankesim, where a great Council of Chiefs was held, at which it was unanimously agreed that, as all their protests had been disregarded and matters had proceeded to such extremities, the time had come for them to combine and resist by force of arms the occupation by the Dutch of any of those towns that had hitherto been included in the British Protectorate. This combination was joined by the Chiefs of Assin, Wassaw, Denkera, Gomoa, Winneba, Mankesim and Abra, and became known as the Fanti Confederation : it also included the Anamabos, but the people of Cape Coast, living as they did under the Castle guns, were compelled to remain openly neutral, though secretly in sympathy with it. The Confederation had no sooner been formed than an Elmina jawbone was received from the Komendas as a formal intimation that they were at war, and news reached the camp a few days later of an attack which the Elminas had made on an outlying village, where they had killed several former British subjects and captured others, whom they paraded in triumph through the streets of their town. The immediate investment of Elmina was therefore decided upon. The Abras marched to Efutu that same day, where they were quickly joined by the Denkeras, and the combined force then moved to Simio. The other Chiefs who had joined the Confederation followed with their people in rapid succession, and the Elminas soon found themselves reduced to great straits for food.

The Dutch now had their hands too full at Elmina to

1867-1868 be able to make any further move against the Komendas, **CHAP. XXIX** who were thus left to their own devices and took to piracy and kidnapping. Owing to the famine in Elmina, large supplies of provisions had to be fetched from the windward ports, and the Komendas made a practice of lying in wait for the returning canoes, which they chased and captured. In these sea fights large numbers of people were sometimes engaged ; but the Komendas were almost invariably successful, and many of them amassed considerable wealth by these means, some of which is said to remain in different families in the town to the present day. Any money or valuables taken were kept, the women were sold, and the men decapitated.

The English, who were as much alarmed as were the Dutch by the widespread rebellion their action had evoked, though it inconvenienced them less, were at their wits' end to find some means of restoring order. Every effort was made to prevent the sale of arms and ammunition, and those who had not yet joined the Fanti Confederation were warned against taking any part in the movement ; while those Chiefs who, though already in arms, were still under British protection, were called upon to explain what they meant by making war upon a friendly Power. Their answer was simple enough. They pointed out that the Komendas and others who had been handed over to the Dutch against their will were not the slaves of the Government, but had rather been its allies ; that the Government had even paid a yearly rent for the ground on which their fort at Komenda stood for so long as it was occupied, and that they could not therefore understand by what process of reasoning the present action of the Government could be justified, nor did they intend to desert their friends at such a time just because the English chose to do so.

The Elminas were now so closely blockaded that they could do but little ; and although the Ashantis, who would not otherwise have failed to make the most of such an excellent opportunity to reinvoke the Protectorate, were prevented from doing so at present by the latent disaffection in Kumasi, Kofi Karikari sent to Colonel Boers

offering him a small army to assist him temporarily. This 1867-1868 he was obliged to decline, though, had he dared, he would CHAP. XXXIX probably have been only too glad to avail himself of the services of such a reinforcement.

On the 4th of April the Elminas made a sortie against Abina, a small village close to the town which belonged to Cape Coast, killing four of the inhabitants and taking several others prisoners. This outrage was more than the people of Cape Coast could reasonably be expected to stand, and they promptly marched to Abina under their Chiefs Kwaku Atta and Kofi Amoa, drove out the Elminas and joined in the investment of their town. The confederate forces now numbered between 20,000 and 30,000 men : the Komendas, Wassaws and Denkeras, with the Tufels and Anamabos, were encamped on the western side ; the Cape Coast detachment, with the Moris and Kormantins, on the east towards Abina : and the Fantis from Abra, Ajumako and Mankesim lay near Frampon in the centre. The Administrator, annoyed by his failure to preserve the neutrality of Cape Coast, declared Kwaku Atta and Kofi Amoa to be outlaws, confiscated their property and caused their houses to be razed to the ground.

Early in May the Administrator sent Mr. Freeman to the camp behind Elmina to try to induce the Chiefs to raise the blockade ; but they paid no heed to his warnings and persuasions, and, instead of retiring, busied themselves with preparations for a final assault on the town, which was to be made on the 27th. The Komendas and others were to commence the attack on the right, and the Cape Coast people and those with them on the left were then to open fire so as to divide the attention of the Elminas and Dutch troops while the central division from Frampon forced its way into the town. Had their intentions remained secret, this plan might very likely have proved successful ; but, fortunately for the Elminas, a traitor in the allied camp gave them warning, so that they were able to anticipate events, and took the enemy completely by surprise by themselves making an attack on the Cape Coast detachment early on the morning of the 26th. Though

1867-1868 quite unexpected, their onslaught was met in the most **CHAP. XXIX** determined manner by the allies on the left, who held them in check until they received reinforcements from the centre, and then, after a battle lasting about five hours, drove the Elminas and the Dutch troops who were supporting them back into the town with considerable loss. The outskirts of the town and the Dutch camps fell into the hands of the allies and were burned ; but though several attempts were made to fire the town itself, it was saved by the guns of Fort Conraadsburg, which soon compelled the Fantis to retire. During all this time, the Komendas and others on the left had known nothing of what was going on, and the Abras and some others in the centre, either from jealousy or because they had at last been won over by the persuasions of Mr. Freeman, who was still in their camp, had taken no part in the fighting, so that, considering the amount of success that had been gained by the small portion of the confederate force that was engaged, there can be little doubt that a combined attack such as had been contemplated would have resulted in the destruction of the greater part of the town. This failure of their plans, together with the inactivity of the King of Abra, who was regarded with great suspicion, and the efforts of Mr. Freeman to bring the war to an end and effect a reconciliation, now induced the people to raise the blockade on the understanding that their quarrel would be finally adjusted by the Administrator. The Abras were the first to leave, marching some ten miles that same afternoon ; others left before evening, and on the following day the remainder of the investing force broke up and retired.

The final settlement of the differences between the Fanti Confederation and the Elminas having been left in the hands of Mr. Ussher, a meeting was soon afterwards arranged and held at Elmina, at which the English and allied tribes were represented by Mr. Simpson the Collector of Customs,¹ Mr. Freeman, and Mr. Dawson the Secretary of the Fanti Confederation. The following

¹ Under the Administrators there was no Colonial Secretary, his duties being performed by the Collector of Customs.

terms of peace were then drawn up and agreed to by the 1867-1868
Elminas :

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1. That hostilities between the two parties should immediately cease.
2. That the Elmina-Ashanti alliance should be suspended for six months.
3. That the Elminas should be allowed free intercourse with, and an undisputed right of way through, the countries of all the tribes belonging to the Fanti Confederation.

It was hoped that the trouble would be brought to an end by this agreement ; but the Fanti Confederation at once rejected the terms and very reasonably required that the alliance between the Elminas and Ashantis should be broken off altogether, and not merely held in abeyance for a few months and then renewed to involve them in a fearful vengeance for recent events by bringing down an Ashanti army to the support of the Elminas. This, however, was more than the Elminas would consent to. Apart from the facts that they regarded themselves as near relatives of the Ashantis, that their town was, in fact, deemed an integral part of the Ashanti kingdom, and that any such repudiation of an alliance that had existed from the earliest times would certainly involve them in trouble with that people ; they were even now, and had been during the whole war, in communication with Kumasi. They well understood, therefore, that it was only the existence of internal troubles of a temporary nature that had led to their being unprovided with assistance and that the exercise of a little more patience on their part would soon put that right, and consequently, though they had been ready enough to promise a limited suspension of the alliance if that would afford their enemies any satisfaction, they were by no means prepared to abandon it altogether, nor, in fact, to do anything that might cause them personal inconvenience. They therefore flatly refused to consider the suggestion of the Fanti Confederation, and the negotiations fell through. The blockade of Elmina, however, was not renewed, though the allies kept such a close watch on it from the surrounding villages that the people were unable to go far

1867-1868 from the town and were nearly as closely confined as they had been during the organized investment. Their sufferings at this time were very great : their farms had all been plundered and destroyed, and they were now entirely dependent on such produce as could be grown in the immediate neighbourhood of the town and on the fish and other supplies brought in by the few canoes that still ventured to sea and succeeded in escaping the vigilance of the Komendas. When driven by famine to make foraging sorties on the surrounding villages, which were but irregularly guarded, skirmishes took place with varying results. The Elminas, however, took care to attack only those places that were for the time unprotected, and usually went in sufficient numbers to ensure success : they would then return loaded with provisions and parade the heads of those whom they had killed through the streets of their town.

This state of affairs continued unchanged for the next six months until Sir Arthur Kennedy, who had succeeded Major Blackall as Governor-in-Chief, arrived at Cape Coast on board H.M.S. *Lee* on the 27th of October. This was his first tour of inspection, and he was confident of being able to put an end to such an unsatisfactory condition of things and restore order throughout the country. With this object in view, another meeting was arranged to take place at Elmina, at which he might be present with the Dutch Governor to talk matters over with the Chiefs of the town. This meeting was held in the Castle early in November, and the Governor then explained to the Elmina Chiefs that their political position and that of Ashanti were not what they had formerly been, and that they must therefore be prepared to regard current events from a rather different standpoint from that to which they had hitherto been accustomed. He pointed out that the recent exchange of territory had brought many former Dutch subjects under the English, under whose protection they were perfectly content, while those tribes who had been transferred to the Dutch were bitterly opposed to the Ashantis and would never be willing to join the Elminas in their alliance with

them, nor could they be relied upon if they were compelled to do so. He showed them, therefore, that by continuing their allegiance to Ashanti they would not only have to keep up their payments of tribute to Kumasi, but would stand alone, the objects of the hatred and suspicion of every other tribe on the Coast, against whose vengeance they could not hope to prevail unaided ; while the introduction of an Ashanti army for their support would only lead to a continuance of strife and of the miseries necessarily attendant on war from which they were even then suffering. If they renounced their allegiance, on the other hand, the Ashantis might indeed seek to punish them and compel their submission, but in that event they would receive the support of the whole of the tribes in the two Protectorates, who, as an united body fighting for a common cause, would be able to resist any such encroachments, as a portion of them had already done at Dodowa. He therefore advised them to enter into an alliance with the Denkeras, Wassaws, Fantis and other tribes composing the Fanti Confederation, and when they retired as usual to consult in private before giving their answer, it seemed that the Governor's arguments had prevailed and their acceptance of his proposal was considered certain. This evident inclination on their part, however, had not escaped the notice of Colonel Boers and the Dutch officers, who were far from ready to cut off their connection with Ashanti ; for what little trade they still had would then be diverted elsewhere and the supply of recruits for the East Indies, from which they were believed to derive some personal profit, would be stopped. A Dutch officer was therefore sent out to join the Chiefs in their consultation and instructed to use every possible argument to counteract the impression that had been made by Sir Arthur Kennedy's speech. This plan succeeded ; and when the Chiefs returned to the Palaver Hall they declared that they had decided to continue their allegiance to Ashanti and that their decision was final.

The reply of the Elmina Chiefs had been so decided that there was nothing more for Sir Arthur Kennedy to do ;

1867-1868
CHAP. XXXIX

1867-1868 but he had felt so confident that he had attained his object
CHAP. XXIX and succeeded in bringing a difficult negotiation to a satisfactory ending, that he was greatly disappointed by his failure. On his return to Cape Coast, therefore, he informed the Chiefs of the Fanti Confederation that they were now at liberty to take any action they wished against the Dutch tribes, and it thus became lawful for anyone to do that for which Kwaku Atta and Kofi Amoa had been outlawed and ruined only seven months before.

On the 30th of December a small detachment of Dutch soldiers from Elmina made an attack on Eguafio. They were driven back however, the sergeant in charge was killed, and seven prisoners and three breech-loading rifles were taken, besides five women who had accompanied them as carriers.¹

While the central and western districts of the Gold Coast had been convulsed by the Dutch-Komenda and Fanti-Elmina wars, Geraldo de Lema had not been idle ; but, ever since the repudiation of Governor Blackall's treaty by the Awuna Chiefs, had kept the eastern districts in such a disturbed state that the continual small skirmishes and constant pillaging of villages and plundering of farms had almost depopulated some parts of the country and put an entire stop to all trade. Sir Arthur Kennedy, therefore, went to Accra and, on the 10th of November, in conjunction with Captain Glover, R.N., the Administrator of Lagos, tried to restore order by offering a reward of £200 for the surrender of de Lema, and, when this failed to produce the desired result, caused his house at Voji to be bombarded and destroyed by Captain Jones of H.M.S. *Pert*. It was then decided to attempt the passage of the Volta bar in the Colonial steamer *Eyo*. This dangerous bar had never before been crossed by any steamship, although at least one sailing vessel had entered the river many years before ; for in Norris' map of "Dahomy and its Environs," published on the 1st of March 1793, a note appears that "the tremendous breakers at the mouth of the R. Volta have prevented Vessels from entering till

¹ Horton.

very lately, when an American brig made good her passage 1867-1868 and found 10 or 12 feet water on the Bar."¹ With great CHAP. XXXIX difficulty and no little danger the feat was accomplished in safety, and the sudden appearance of the steamer in the river, whence they had always thought themselves immune from any possibility of attack, so alarmed the Awunas that they promptly came to terms, and a treaty was concluded on the 13th of November and signed by the contracting parties on board the *Eyo*. Besides providing for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the freedom of trade on the Volta, this treaty² appointed the Governor-in-Chief final referee in all future matters of dispute.

¹ *Vide* Norris' map in Dalzel's *History of Dahomey*.

² For full text *vide* Parliamentary Paper, *Correspondence Respecting the Ashanti Invasion*, part ii, p. 64.

CHAPTER XXX

THE ASHANTI INVASION OF KREPI AND THE DUTCH-KOMENDA WAR

1869

1869 It has already been shown that it was only the occurrence
CHAP. XXX of internal dissensions in Kumasi after the death of the late King that had prevented the Ashantis from seizing the favourable opportunity presented by the confusion following the exchange of territory for a renewed invasion of the Protectorate. Towards the end of 1868, however, the local tension had become somewhat relaxed, and although the old general Asamoa Kwanta still remained in retirement, the King decided that it would now be safe to make a further effort to avenge the refusal of the British Government to surrender Janin, and began to collect arms and ammunition for another war. Many of these were obtained from beyond the Gold Coast, and Amatifu, the King of Kinjabo, ordered 1,000 muskets on behalf of the Ashantis from one of Messrs. F. and A. Swanzy's representatives, who was in his country at this time.¹

This new invasion was to be carried out by the combined movements of three distinct forces. One of these, numbering 30,000 men under Adu Boffo, was at once sent across the River Volta with orders to acquire territory beyond the eastern frontier of the Protectorate, where it was not expected that the presence of an Ashanti army would attract the serious attention of the Government. This army was then to await the completion of the King's other plans before advancing any farther. A second division was to make an attack on the western side; while the

¹ Reade, *African Sketch Book*, vol. ii, p. 35.

King himself intended to cross the Pra with his main army 1869 so soon as all was ready. In order to introduce the nucleus CHAP. XXX of this western force into the Protectorate without arousing suspicion, and to enable its leader to support, encourage and organize the Elminas, whom the Ashantis had hitherto been unable to assist, but who were now expected to furnish the greater part of this western army, several hundred armed Ashantis were despatched to Elmina under the command of the King's uncle Atjiempom. This step was taken quite openly and was explained by the assertion that the men had been sent to accompany Ando, an Elmina Chief who had been sent to represent the town at the funeral custom of the late King, and to return the compliment of his visit.

Although Adu Boffo adhered strictly to his orders and never invaded the Protectorate, his presence just beyond the frontier naturally caused some unrest in the eastern districts, and the general peace and tranquillity that had been expected to follow the conclusion of the treaty with the Awunas by Sir Arthur Kennedy and the disappearance of Geraldo de Lema were never realized. The Awunas had been in alliance with the Ashantis and Akwamus, who, not being parties to the treaty, continued to carry out their plan of campaign against the Krepis in spite of the defection of their former ally. They met with an amount of determined resistance that was far beyond anything that they had expected, and although the Krepis were defeated again and again with the most fearful slaughter, and hundreds of them were taken prisoners, their Chief, Dompri,¹ a man of quite exceptional courage, only retired to rally his men and make another stand as gallant as those that had preceded it. In this way the war dragged on for months ; but the Ashantis, though constantly winning battles, were as far from the actual subjugation of the country as ever.

In the meantime, the Krepis had appealed again and again to the Accras, Akims, Akwapims and Krobos for assistance, thereby causing such a degree of excitement

¹ *Vide* note at end of chapter.

1869 amongst these tribes that there seemed every probability that some of them would soon become involved in the struggle. This was a contingency that the Government was anxious to avoid at any cost. The war was at present being carried on beyond the limits of the Protectorate, and the Authorities had no wish to see it brought nearer home nor to find themselves directly embroiled in it. Mr. Simpson, the Acting Administrator, therefore determined to find out what was the real state of affairs. Leaving Cape Coast in February 1869, he landed at Accra on the 15th, and, after learning all he could from the local Chiefs and traders, went up country to investigate matters on the spot. He reached Odumasi on the 5th of March, and soon found that the reports that had reached him had not been exaggerated. He therefore decided to try to weaken the invading force by detaching the Akwamus from their alliance with Ashanti so as to give the hard-pressed Krepis some indirect assistance. With this object in view he sent for the Chief of Akwamu, and, when he refused to obey the summons, went to see him in person. This bold proceeding met with initial success ; for the Akwamus, overcome by his arguments and persuasions, at once signed a treaty by which they renounced their alliance with Ashanti.

News of this proceeding quickly reached the ears of Adu Boffo, who immediately hurried to the spot and found no difficulty in inducing the fickle Akwamus to reconsider their decision, which they promptly reversed, and, repudiating the treaty they had just made with Mr. Simpson, calmly informed him that he was their prisoner. Mr. Simpson's position was anything but pleasant ; his hut was actually set on fire the same night, and for a time he was in great danger ; for although many of the Akwamus were anxious to send him to Kumasi as a peace-offering to Kofi Karikari after their recent disaffection and a token of their continued loyalty to him, the majority clamoured for his immediate execution, which would undoubtedly have been carried out but for the intervention of Adu Boffo. Mr. Simpson had come to the Akwamus' camp of his own accord as the representative of the British Govern-

ment and as a proposer of peace, and not to make war. 1869
 It was therefore contrary to the Ashantis' code of honour CHAP. XXX
 to allow any real harm to befall him, and it was also
 contrary to their present policy to do anything that might
 precipitate trouble with the Gold Coast Government before
 their preparations for the contemplated invasion had been
 completed. Adu Boffo therefore refused to permit the
 Akwamus either to execute or detain their prisoner, and
 as he was supported by a large army and they had no
 wish to call down the wrath of Kofi Karikari upon them-
 selves, they had no alternative but to submit, and the
 Administrator was released after having been kept a state
 prisoner for five days.

At this time, the Basel Mission station at Anum was
 occupied by two missionaries—Frederick Augustus Ram-
 seyer,¹ who had his wife and infant son with him, and
 Johannes Kühne.² The fighting, which had been continued
 almost without intermission since the release of Mr. Simp-
 son, daily drew nearer Anum, and on the 9th of June the
 missionaries were warned that a battle was imminent, that
 the town was about to be deserted, and that the time had
 come when they must decide whether or not they would
 make their escape while the way was still open. The
 Chief was ready to give them carriers, but they rather
 obstinately refused to take his advice. The next day,
 however, they thought better of it and decided to retire
 to Ho, where there was another mission station ; but it
 was now too late, and when they applied to the Chief for
 hammockmen, they found he was marching out to oppose
 the enemy's advance and wanted every available man.
 The missionaries were thus left alone on their hill over-
 looking the empty town ; but those at Ho, Messrs. Müller
 and Hornberger, had been wiser and retired in good time.

On the morning of the 12th, a party of Ashantis came
 up to the house and, requesting the missionaries to accom-

¹ A Swiss who had come to the Gold Coast in 1864 and arrived in
 Anum on the 29th of December 1868.

² A Silesian who arrived on the Coast in 1866 and in Anum in April
 1869.

Ramseyer was an ordained missionary, Kühne a merchant.

1869 pany them, marched them away to be brought before Adu
CHAP. XXX Boffo. He was taken on the 25th of the same month, and
M. Bonnat, the French factor of the mission, who had
foolishly remained there in fancied security after the others
had fled, was taken prisoner. According to Mr. Kuhne's
statement to Winwood Reade, he had stayed behind to
sell powder and arms to the Ashantis ; they, however,
took them for nothing and him also. The station was
plundered and burned, and the bell, which crashed down
from the blazing ruins of the chapel, was afterwards carried
to Kumasi as one of the principal trophies of the campaign.

The sufferings of the captives from Anum during their
march with their Ashanti escort were very great. They
were placed in the charge of one Ageana, a drunken and
brutal slave of Adu Boffo, who, with his son Kobina,
discovered a never-failing source of amusement in bullying
and terrifying his unfortunate prisoners. They were
pitilessly hurried along, insufficiently shod, often over
rough ground and under a blazing sun, past burning villages
and the headless corpses of the slain, with little to drink
and less to eat, and compelled to keep up with their
captors on marches of about thirty miles a day, while
during the whole time they were a prey to constant fears
of execution. Although these fears proved to be ground-
less, they were none the less alarming at the time, and
anxiety for the child, who daily grew weaker for want of
his proper food, added mental anguish to their bodily
sufferings.

The treatment of these unhappy people has repeatedly
been cited as conclusive proof of the worst possible
instincts of cruelty and brutality in the Ashanti character.
This seems most unfair ; but the reason for it is not far
to seek. It is mainly because these occurrences are of
comparatively recent date and are fairly well known to
residents on the Gold Coast and in Europe, whereas other
cases, having happened at a more remote period, or
having been less advertised, are either forgotten or un-
heard of by the majority of those who hold these opinions.
There can be no doubt, too, that a general spirit of hostility

towards Ashanti and an extraordinary unwillingness to believe anything good of its inhabitants have grown up and are especially common amongst those who know least of them, so that it is customary to condemn them in every instance without further consideration or enquiry. Yet the treatment meted out by the Winnebas to Mr. Meredith in 1812, when, though taken in time of peace, he was forced to walk barefooted through blazing grass and otherwise tortured, and by the Komendas to the Dutch sailors whom they captured at about this time, and who were forced to drink urine, frequently flogged, and generally ill-treated, was infinitely more brutal, and a study of the earlier history of the country shows that the treatment of one European nation by another was fully as bad. In these cases the tortures inflicted on the victims were intended as such, and were, moreover, sufficiently severe to cause death: those suffered by the missionaries, on the other hand, were for the most part not intentional. The few intentional cruelties that they were called upon to bear were due to the fact that they had the misfortune to be placed in the charge of a man who was a natural bully and whose conduct disgusted his fellow Ashantis almost as much as it did his wretched captives. Ageana was one of those congenital blackguards who may occasionally be found amongst any people, whether barbarous or civilized, and but for him their sufferings would assuredly have been much less severe. They were always well treated by the King, who was much annoyed at their having been put in irons, but were occasionally insulted by the populace in Kumasi on occasions of public festivals, when for days together the people are in a most excited state and all more or less intoxicated. When they complained to the King, however, he gave them full permission to strike any Ashanti who insulted them. He supplied them with 4½ dollars (£1 os. 3d.) each for subsistence every Adai (every forty days) and allowed them to walk freely about the town.

Apart from the wilful taunts and insults of Ageana and his son and those of the Akwamus—for which the Ashantis cannot be blamed—the chief troubles of the prisoners

1869 were of a nature that an Ashanti, or any other African, CHAP. XXX would be unable to appreciate. Inured from his youth up to a life of almost Spartan simplicity and endurance; accustomed to cover long distances barefooted and at a rapid pace—often with a heavy load on his head; used to the heat of the tropical sun and to drink but little on the march, seldom eating much until evening, and often taking his first meal then; able to sleep almost anywhere and to digest the coarsest food; it would never occur to an Ashanti that his prisoners suffered any more from fatigue and thirst or insufficient protection for their feet than he himself did, and he might find it hard to realize such a thing were it explained to him.

From an Ashanti point of view the missionaries were treated extremely well, and they themselves mention numerous acts of kindness that they received, but which it is very unlikely would have been shown to any African. Of their escort even, with the exception of Ageana and his son, they say "as time wore on they became our best friends, and treated us with as much consideration as was possible in our forlorn condition."¹ One of them was ready to carry the child, but it would not leave its father's arms, and after a time even Ageana carried a gourd of water from which they might drink on the road. A rough shelter was built whenever they halted to shield them from the sun and crowd, and though at first they were ironed at night as a precaution against escape, they were provided with a hut in which to sleep and given a woollen quilt and some other things that had been taken from the mission station. So long as they were still in the enemy's country, food was naturally scarce, for the whole district had been ravaged by war for months past; but after crossing the Volta² on the 27th of June and entering Ashanti, there was usually a sufficient and often an abundant supply. The King, too, sent out presents from Kumasi, but they were usually appropriated by Ageana. On the whole, therefore, although the missionaries are entitled to every sympathy, it seems hardly just to hold

¹ Ramseyer and Kühne, p. 29.

² At Awurahai.

up their captors to the unbounded execration that is 1869 commonly their lot, or to advance the conduct of an individual ruffian like Ageana as typical of Ashantis generally. CHAP. XXX.

With frequent halts of several days each, the party passed Abetifi and reached Totorasi on the 31st of July. Here the child, who had only been kept alive by a diet of eggs, succumbed to his privations on the 7th of August. The King had been told of his illness and had tried to obtain a milch cow in Kumasi, but without success; a ram and other presents, however, were sent out to the prisoners. From Totorasi they were taken through Jabin to Abankoro, a small village close to Kumasi, where they remained for about six months. There they were joined on the 27th of August by the party bringing M. Bonnat.

In the west, the war between the Komendas and the Dutch still dragged on. After the demolition of their town, the people had retired to their bush villages, making their headquarters at Kwesikrum, whence they regularly sent out parties of scouts, whose duty it was to watch the beach and give timely warning of any movements of the enemy. One of these parties soon discovered that the Dutch Komendas were plundering a barn in the deserted town, and they were attacked and driven off. They and the Ampenis and people of the other coast villages then fled to Elmina and left the Komendas free to make their plans and preparations and carry them out quite unobserved.

The Dutch now sent troops along the beach to subdue the rebels; but they effected nothing, for the Komenda scouts were on the look out, and had called up the companies long before the town was reached. After a battle lasting little more than an hour, the Komendas again retired to their bush villages, while the troops took possession of a large house that still stood in the town. This they garrisoned, but did not take the precaution of clearing the surrounding bush, so that the enemy's sharp-shooters continually harassed them, creeping up close to the house and firing a volley and falling back again before their presence was even suspected. It did not take the Dutch

1869 long to realize that this was a very one-sided kind of
CHAP. XXX warfare, and they therefore determined to undertake an expedition to the bush, attack the Komendas in their villages, and thus put an end to the struggle.

During the evening before the day fixed for this attack, several shells were fired in the direction of Kwesikrum to drive out the Komendas, which, however, did them no harm, and next morning the Dutch force marched inland. This was a movement for which the Komendas were quite unprepared, never dreaming that the Dutch would venture to attack them in the bush, and they would have been taken completely by surprise had not the troops been seen by a party of scouts who were on their way down to discover the cause of the firing on the previous evening. They immediately hurried back to their camp and raised the alarm ; but although their headquarters were at Kwesikrum, numbers of their men were stationed at Abransa and other villages, which lay some distance away. Messengers hurried off to summon these men, while the small force available on the spot turned out to hold the Dutch at bay until the reinforcements could come up. The sound of firing set these outlying companies on the road long before the messengers reached them ; but after a hardly contested fight, the Komendas ran short of ammunition and were compelled to retire, leaving the Dutch soldiers in possession of the village. Having burned the place, the troops returned to the beach, boarded their vessel and returned at once to Elmina.¹

During these times many slight skirmishes took place between the Komendas and the Dutch troops without much damage being done on either side. On one occasion, after the Komendas had retreated to the bush, the Dutch broke up and burned every canoe that they could find, in the hope of putting a stop to the piratical excursions of the enemy ; but fresh canoes were promptly obtained from Kafodidi, Abrobi and other villages, and matters then went on very much as before. Moreover, the Komendas,

¹ There is some uncertainty about the date of this battle, but it is said to have been fought on the 10th of January 1869.

encouraged by their continual successes at sea, soon grew 1869 bolder, and small parties would often come down before CHAP. XXX dawn and conceal themselves in the bush on the outskirts of Elmina itself, where they would lie in wait for and kidnap the women when they came out for water in the early morning. In this way the Elminas lost a large number of people before it dawned upon them that the Komendas were responsible for their disappearance, for they found it hard to believe that they could be bold enough to venture so near the town and forts. So late as the 27th of September 1870 the Dutch Governor wrote complaining that the Komendas were still attacking the fishing canoes; and that two boys had been kidnapped on the outskirts of Elmina only a few days before.

The Elminas blamed Colonel Boers for many of their misfortunes, and more especially for having rendered them insufficient assistance and protection during the blockade of their town by the Fanti Confederation. They therefore sent a deputation, consisting of one Dutch officer and George Emnsang a native trader, to Holland to petition for his removal, and he was superseded early in May 1869 by Colonel Nagtglas, an officer who had spent many years in the Dutch service on the Gold Coast both as a military officer and as Governor. He had retired on his pension, but now returned as a Royal Commissioner and Governor with unusually extensive powers.

The new Governor was naturally most anxious to bring the war with the Komendas to an end, and soon after his arrival sent the Dutch warship *Amstel* to land troops there and make yet another attempt to crush the rebellion. She anchored off Komenda in the evening, and during the night threw a number of shells over the deserted town in order to drive away any of the people who might be lurking in the bush and preparing to oppose the landing of the troops. They, however, were all away in their villages and knew nothing about the arrival of the ship; but the sound of firing brought them down at daybreak to see what was the matter, and the Dutch thus defeated their own object. Seeing the man-of-war lying in the roads, the Komendas

1869 kept under cover and lay down behind a ridge of sand high up on the beach to see what would happen next. **CHAP. XXX** The firing had ceased before they arrived ; but they had not been waiting long when they saw a boat leave the ship and approach the shore, taking soundings as she came. She had been sent to try to discover the entrance to the lagoon or river which was marked on an old chart as opening into the sea, as it was thought this would afford the safest landing-place for the troops. As she neared the beach, she was lost to sight for a few moments between the rollers, and a man of the Wombil Company, named Kwesi Kum, in his eagerness to see what had become of her, stood up. He was seen by the boat's crew and immediately shot dead. This acted on his comrades like an electric shock, and, abandoning all further attempts at concealment, they rose as one man and charged down on to the beach.

This sudden appearance of large numbers of an enemy whom they had fondly believed to be miles away in the bush, so startled the sailors that they lost control of their boat and she immediately capsized in the surf. Her crew consisted of two officers and nine men, who now found themselves struggling in the broken water and struck out for the shore. Only five of the seamen, however, succeeded in reaching the beach, the others being either drowned or shot down by the Komendas as they struggled through the surf. One of the survivors, who resisted capture, was killed by a blow on the head with the butt end of a musket, but the others were all secured by the waiting Komendas and hurried off into the bush. The ship was powerless to help them and weighed anchor and returned to Elmina to report the disaster. These prisoners were treated with the utmost brutality,¹ and one of them died under the ill-usage of his captors.

The Komendas now reported this success to the heads of the Fanti Confederation, who sent messengers ordering that the prisoners should be well treated but on no account be given up until a sufficient ransom had been paid.

¹ *Vide* p. 581.

Colonel Nagtglas sent to the Acting Administrator, Mr. 1869 Simpson, telling him what had happened and begging CHAP. XXX him to use his influence with the people to secure the speedy release of the Dutchmen. Mr. James Davies, the Acting Collector of Customs, was sent from Cape Coast to the Komenda camp at Kwesikrum on this mission, but, as no ransom was offered, he failed to secure the release of the prisoners. Mr. George Blankson of Anamabo, who was a member of the Legislative Council, was then sent as the representative of the Government, accompanied by John Hammond and George Blankson junior, representing the Fanti Confederation. After a great deal of haggling over the price, it was eventually agreed that the prisoners should be released on payment of 300 ounces of gold-dust by the Dutch Government. Two of them were then handed over, while the remaining survivor was retained as security for the payment of the ransom. Colonel Nagtglas, accompanied by his aide-de-camp Captain Le Jeune, then came over to Cape Coast. He was met at the Sweet River—the Anglo-Dutch boundary—by an escort of the 1st West India Regiment, and remained in Cape Coast for five days, paying the ransom and receiving the third prisoner on the 15th of July. He was then escorted on board the Dutch warship *Amstel* amid the hostile demonstrations of the Cape Coast mob, with whom a Dutch Governor was anything but a popular person in these troubrous times.

Every success scored by the Komendas was hailed with delight by the people of the other towns that had been transferred, all of whom were regarded with great suspicion by the Dutch as being connected with the Fanti Confederation. The loyal Dutch subjects living in those towns that had originally been their Settlements were also bitterly hostile to all Fantis, and this latent enmity was soon fanned into flame by the people of Dixcove, who made no secret of their antipathy to Dutch rule and their joy at the successes of the Komendas, though, living as they did under the guns of a Dutch fort, they could not indulge in any open demonstrations. The Bushua people,

1869 too, instigated by one Appia Esilfi of Elmina, demanded
CHAP. XXX all the Fantis in Dixcove for execution, and actually seized
four Cape Coast men who had been living for several years
in a village near Butri. The Chiefs, however, refused to
comply with these demands, but though they rescued
those who had already been taken from execution, Esilfi
sold them all as slaves. Soon after this, on the 6th of
June 1869, the Elminas living in Bushua caught a pawn
belonging to a Cape Coast trader at Dixcove, and an-
nounced their intention of putting him to death in revenge
for what the Komendas had done. He was rescued by
Captain P. W. Alvarez, the Dutch Commandant of Butri,
who, so it is alleged, told the Bushua people that if they
had really killed the man he should have considered their
action fully justified and have taken no notice of it, but
that, as the execution had not yet been carried out, he must
protect him. On his return to the fort, he summoned all
the Chiefs and people of Dixcove, and forbade them to leave
the town unless they wore a small Dutch flag in token of
their loyalty, or he would not be responsible for their lives.

From all accounts it is fairly evident that the Dutch
at this time had been rendered desperate by their continued
troubles with their new subjects, and were ready to adopt
any means, however ruthless, to compel them to submit
to their authority. The passive resistance of the Dixcove
people had made them especially obnoxious to the Dutch,
who, seeing that they had them at their mercy, determined
to make an example of them and inflict upon them a
portion of that punishment which they so ardently but
vainly desired to administer to the Komendas. Captain
Alvarez, therefore, supplied the Butris—between whom and
the people of Dixcove there was a long-standing feud—
with ammunition, and arranged with them that they should
make an attack on the town, while he, in order to cripple
the Dixcove people as much as possible, went round with
a party of soldiers on Saturday the 12th of June and ordered
all traders and others to hand over their stock of powder
and lead for removal to the fort. In due course they
arrived at the house of a wealthy native trader named

Kobina Mensa, who held a large stock of powder ; but rumours of the projected attack on the town were already afloat and he flatly refused to give up his sole means of defence. After some argument, it was agreed that Mensa's magazine should be sealed, and Captain Alvarez went to the fort to fetch the seal and wax ; but on his return he again insisted that the powder must be taken to the fort, alleging that some of it had been removed in his absence. Mensa, however, remained obdurate, and though the soldiers took away three cases of guns, they had to leave the powder, and subsequent attempts to secure it or to make Mensa a prisoner also failed.

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The next day, Sunday the 13th of June, Dixcove was surrounded by the Butris and other Ahantas,¹ and at eight o'clock on the Monday morning they attacked the town : the Dutch at the same time opened fire on it from the fort, and the greater part of it was soon in flames. The Dixcove people turned out to repel their enemies, and, though the latter were assisted by a number of Dutch soldiers armed with Snider rifles, more than held their own. The battle lasted all day and ended in a decisive victory for the Dixcove men, who returned to the town between five and six o'clock the same evening. Their success availed them nothing, however, for they had no sooner re-entered the town than a heavy gun and rifle fire was opened on them from the fort, which soon compelled them to fly to the bush, leaving their houses to be pillaged and burned by the Dutch soldiers, the Elminas who were with them in the fort, and the very Ahantas whom they had so severely beaten during the day. Nothing was spared. Messrs. Swanzy's store was broken open and property to the value of nearly £8,000 stolen, the safe being removed and broken open under the very walls of the fort.

There can be no doubt that this attack was made at the instigation of Captain Alvarez, and it is almost equally certain that it was connived at and approved by the Authorities at Elmina. Much of the Ahantas' ammunition had been sent to them directly from Elmina, no compensa-

¹ Under Baidu Bonsu V (Kwow Ason).

1869 CHAP. XXX tion for the losses they had sustained could ever be obtained by Messrs. Swanzy and others, nor was Captain Alvarez suspended from duty. Mr. W. E. Sam, Messrs. Swanzy's agent at Dixcove, who made every effort to prevent bloodshed, had written to Mr. Cleaver, the firm's agent at Cape Coast, informing him of the probability of an attack on the town; but when this letter was referred to Colonel Nagtglas he assured him that there was not the slightest ground for alarm, and, when Mr. Ussher subsequently lodged a formal complaint, the Dutch Governor could only account for the issue of ammunition to all the Ahantas, except the Dixcove people, by saying that he was afraid the Wassaws were about to attack the town. There was not the slightest ground for any such belief, and, even if there had been, the Dixcove people themselves should presumably have been the first persons to be armed.

The terrible barbarities perpetrated by Atjiempon during his march along the coast and his subsequent stay in Elmina, combined with the apathy of the Dutch, under whose forts many of them took place, show better than anything else how complete was the absence of all law and order as a result of this long-continued warfare. Atjiempon was a man in whom all the worst traits of the Ashanti character were emphasized with scarcely any traces of its redeeming features; a man with little or no self-control, but a certain amount of low cunning, he had bestialized himself by frequent debauches, the effects of which were plainly recorded on his face, and gave himself up to unlicensed cruelties; he was, in fact, a tyrannical bully, who, apart from his pride of race, had few instincts above those of a brute. He, like Ageana, was altogether exceptional, and can no more be taken as a type of the Ashanti race than Jonathan Wild or Judge Jeffries could be put forward as typical Englishmen.

When he left Kumasi at the end of 1868, the roads between Ashanti and the Coast were all closed by the Fanti Confederation, and he had therefore been forced to travel by a very circuitous route. Having passed through Awoin, he was detained for four months in Kinjabo, and when at

last allowed to proceed as a result of an interchange of 1869 messages with Kumasi, went on to Assini, whence he made his way through Apollonia to Axim, where he arrived at the end of October 1869. CHAP. XXX

Atjiempion announced that he had taken an oath before leaving Kumasi that he would put to death every Englishman and Fanti with whom he chanced to meet, and it must certainly be admitted that he did his best to carry this out. He had not been in Axim more than a few days when he seized an unfortunate Fanti who was living in the town, dragged him to the market-place, and there, within three hundred yards of the walls of the Dutch fort, first cut out his tongue and then beheaded him. This cold-blooded and brutal murder was committed quite openly and in broad daylight, yet it failed to evoke the least remonstrance from the Dutch Commandant. As a matter of fact, the Dutch very seldom concerned themselves with such matters, or made any attempt to control the more objectionable customs of the people even at their headquarters. When the official messenger from Kumasi had arrived in Elmina to announce the death of Osai Kwaku Dua, he had been publicly sacrificed according to custom, and the Dutch had done nothing. A few days after the commission of this murder, on the 14th of November, Mr. Cleaver, Messrs. Swanzy's agent, landed at Axim with Captain Dale of the brig *Alligator* to transact some business, and Atjiempion promptly seized them both and prepared to put them to death also. This, however, was rather more than even a Dutch Commandant could close his eyes to, and, thoroughly alarmed at the prospect of the complications that would arise if he allowed two Englishmen to be murdered practically in his presence, he at last bestirred himself, and with some difficulty prevailed upon Atjiempion to release them.

The news of these acts was the signal for a general exodus of all the Fantis living in the coast towns under Dutch rule, who fled precipitately to Denkera or Wassaw and the towns on the English seaboard. Atjiempion's opportunities, therefore, were few; but some Fantis re-

1869 maimed here and there, and these he rigorously sought out. **CHAP. XXX** On reaching Sekondi, where the Dutch Sekondis had already beheaded an Accra man after first cutting out his tongue, he found that six Fantis who had been living there had sought the protection of the Dutch flag, and were even then in the fort. Nothing daunted, however, Atjiempon demanded the surrender of these men by the Commandant, and actually received them. Two of them were put to death in front of the fort, but the Dutch warship *Amstel* arrived the next morning, Atjiempon was sent for, and the other four were taken from him and sent to the Governor at Elmina.

From Sekondi Atjiempon passed along the beach by Shama and Komenda, where he narrowly escaped being attacked by this warlike people, who, being still in their bush villages on account of the war with the Dutch, did not see his party until it was too late to intercept it. Six Fantis living in Adjuapenin, when they heard of this monster's near approach, tried to escape in canoes to Cape Coast ; but one of these was captured by two canoes from Elmina and its three occupants were brought back to Atjiempon, who beheaded one man, beat a woman to death, and would have murdered the remaining man also had he not succeeded in slipping his hand from under the staple by which he was secured " in log " and making good his escape into the bush.

On the following day Atjiempon entered Elmina with the head of his latest victim carried in triumph before him, and was accorded a perfect ovation. Here, again, Fantis who had thought they would be safe under the Castle guns were beaten to death. " At Elmina itself—where stand strong fortifications, bristling with five-muzzle and breech-loading heavy cannons ; where Dutch marines and Batavian regulars, with their improved rifles, in vast numbers, occupy every stronghold of the town ; where two men-of-war at her roadstead ride at anchor with their broadsides commanding every portion of the town—even here Atjiempon's atrocious acts, and the voice of the dead and dying, cry loudly for vengeance against the civilized

Government of Holland."¹ Proof of the utter demoralization of Dutch authority was complete. 1869

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Complaints of the conduct of Atjiempon were made to the British Administrator, Mr. Ussher, and forwarded by him to Colonel Nagtglas with a demand for his punishment. The Dutch Governor, however, only showed his displeasure by refusing to grant him an audience for a few days, after which he was allowed to live in Elmina in perfect freedom, committing still further outrages from time to time.

Perhaps Colonel Nagtglas should not be too severely blamed for his inaction. He was doubtless afraid of getting himself into trouble with his own Government, whose policy it was, and always had been, to remain on terms of friendship with Ashanti. The whole of Elmina was with Atjiempon, who was looked upon by the people as a hero and their saviour from their enemies the Fantis. His arrest would almost certainly have provoked armed resistance, and the Governor's only means of inflicting punishment would then have been to bombard the town from the Castle and forts; but in considering the advisability of such a step he was not likely to forget that his predecessor, Colonel Boers, had been removed from office for failing to afford the Elminas sufficient protection, and he would naturally have hesitated before resorting to such an extreme measure as the destruction of their town, while his long experience of the country ensured his appreciation of the necessity of being able and ready to enforce compliance with any order that he gave.

NOTE.—Dompri was not really a Krepis Chief. He was an Akim and a stranger in the Krepis country. He had been in the Asachari district when he was first attacked by the Ashantis, who drove him towards Peki. He was then joined by the Krepis, who collected at Awudomi, and being a brave man and a good general, was asked to lead them, and became their Commander-in-Chief.

¹ Horton, *Letters on the Gold Coast*, p. 124.

CHAPTER XXXI

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DUTCH AND ASHANTIS

1870 TO 1872

1870-1872 THE capture of Europeans by Adu Boffo's army and their **CHAP. XXXI** removal to Kumasi caused the British Authorities on the Gold Coast much anxiety, and so perplexed them that for some time they were quite unable to decide how to act. The Governor has been blamed because he did not immediately secure their release by the payment of an exorbitant ransom ; but the position was a peculiar one, and when all the circumstances of the case are considered it is at once apparent that the Government was in no way bound to interfere.

In the first place, none of the prisoners, though Europeans, were British subjects ; nor had they been living within the Protectorate when they were captured, but at a place quite outside the sphere of British influence. M. Bonnat, moreover, had actually been preparing to supply the Ashantis with powder and arms with which to continue his war against the Krepis, with whom he himself was living on friendly terms. Nor was Ashanti in any way amenable to the British Government. It was an entirely independent Power, and although the war in which these prisoners had been taken was doubtless only a preliminary step to the renewed invasion of the Protectorate, no actual attack had yet been made upon any British tribe, and the Government was not directly involved in the struggle. Of the tribes that were implicated, the Akwamus were the only people to whom they had any right to dictate, and they had thrown off their allegiance and joined the Ashantis. Had

the prisoners been in their possession, the Government **1870-1872** would have been justified in adopting the strongest measures **CHAP. XXXI** to compel their release ; but they were subservient to the Ashantis, and had neither captured the prisoners nor had they now got them in their possession nor within their control. The Governor therefore regarded the matter as one in which he could not interfere officially, but decided to use his influence unofficially and indirectly to secure the release of the captives at the first opportunity. It was a very difficult question, and it is doubtful if he could have done much more with the limited means at his disposal. To have made demands that he was unable to enforce would have been worse than useless, and to have tamely submitted to extortionate demands for a ransom would only have brought his authority into contempt, while he certainly could not have paid any such sum from Government funds without special authority from the Secretary of State. Any such payment, moreover, would have established a most undesirable precedent, and have supplied a direct incentive to the Ashantis to make further similar captures whenever the opportunity arose.

In the meantime, Adu Boffo had got into serious difficulties. In October the gallant Dompri had inflicted a severe defeat on the Ashantis, whose losses had amounted to about fifty per cent of their entire force, and had also succeeded in intercepting more than one convoy of ammunition from Kumasi. The Accras, Krobos, Akwapiems and Akims, stimulated by the repeated appeals of the missionaries in Odumasi and of the Krepis, were preparing to go to the assistance of the latter, and the enemy's position was already so precarious and threatening that both Adu Boffo and the King of Akwamu became seriously alarmed, and, believing this sudden activity to be due to fears for the safety of the Europeans, decided to send hostages for them. These hostages, amongst whom was Adu Boffo's son Kwamin Opoku, were given to the King of Krobo in November, who soon afterwards handed them over to the Governor at Cape Coast.

Alarming accounts of Adu Boffo's defeat and danger

1870-1872 had in the meantime reached Kumasi, and the King sent **CHAP. XXXI** to recall him ; but before he received the summons, the delivery of hostages had already induced the eastern tribes to withdraw their forces, for they believed it was only a preliminary step to the release of the missionaries which would speedily follow. Adu Boffo's position was therefore much improved, and he was able to remain in Krepi and regain much of his lost ground. The King's alarm for the safety of his army had also induced him to send to the Governor offering to exchange prisoners, and the Ashantis who were detained in the Protectorate had been collected and sent to Prasu with Major Brownell under the impression that the Europeans would be given up. Many delays occurred however, and Major Brownell, who was kept at Prasu for seven and a half months, suffered the greatest inconvenience from want of provisions and the absolute impossibility of obtaining any meat at all. This was due to the action of the Assin Chiefs, who were opposed to the surrender of these Ashanti prisoners and wished to keep the roads closed so that they might retain all the trade in their own hands and reap heavy profits as middlemen. The delay enabled the King to get news of Adu Boffo's later successes, and when the exchange at length took place on the 2nd of March 1871, the only prisoners obtained were Fantis, amongst whom was Prince Ansa, who had been detained in Kumasi since the 17th of September 1867. The excuse given for not releasing the missionaries was that the King could not give them up until their captor, Adu Boffo, had returned and made his report ; but the true reason probably was that they were far too important a diplomatic card to be readily parted with so long as affairs were in their present unsettled state.

The exchange of territory with the Dutch in 1868 had not been followed by any of those benefits that they had expected for themselves, while the English had been so involved in their subsequent quarrels with the people that they, too, had derived little or no advantage from the change. The whole country had been in a state of confusion ever since the transfer took place. The Dutch had never been

able to quell the rebellion of the Komendas, the Cape Coast 1870-1872 people and their allies were still at war with the Elminas, CHAP. XXXI and there was civil war in Apollonia. The Beyins, who from the very first had refused to acknowledge the authority of the Dutch and had been driven from their town by the bombardment in 1867, had appealed to and been joined by the Wassaws, and their combined forces were now making war on the Ateabus, who had accepted the flag. At the commencement of the disturbance, the Dutch Commandant of Apollonia Fort had removed his garrison and all the stores, left the keys with the Chief of Ateabu, and retired to Axim. By the beginning of 1870, these dissensions and the consequent ruin of their small trade, the continued anxiety, and the losses and famine caused by the blockade of Elmina, more than outweighed the small advantages that had hitherto induced the Dutch to remain on the Coast, and at last made them willing to consider those proposals of the English for the purchase of their Possessions that they had formerly rejected. Moreover, although the position of the English was nothing like so bad as that of the Dutch, it was nevertheless sufficiently threatening to make them more than ever anxious to acquire the Protectorate over the whole Coast, so that they might be able to combine all the tribes to resist the encroachments of Ashanti. It is true that no invasion of the Protectorate had yet been made in any force ; but Adu Bofo's army was still in Krepi just beyond the eastern frontier, and Atjiempon's force was actually in Elmina and certainly boded no good, while beyond the western frontier a third force of some 5,000 men was only awaiting the permission of the French at Assini to cross the boundary and join Atjiempon. This Ashanti activity in the immediate neighbourhood of, and on all sides of the Protectorate, combined with the facts that the King was holding several Europeans captives in his capital, and that no peace had ever been made since the invasion of 1863, could not fail to increase the anxiety of the English Government and make them more than ever desirous of securing the removal of the Dutch, who were known to be on friendly

1870-1872 terms with Ashanti, and at whose headquarters the only **CHAP. XXXI** Ashanti force that had as yet entered the Gold Coast itself was even then stationed.

Atjiempon still continued to commit various outrages from time to time, and on one occasion sent a strong party of Elminas across the boundary into British territory, where they destroyed a small village and advanced to within three and a half miles of Cape Coast before retiring. To prevent any more raids of this kind, the people of Cape Coast and Mori had then formed a camp near the Sweet River.

Early in 1870, an incident occurred which plainly shows the lengths to which Atjiempon was prepared to go, and the readiness with which the King and people of Elmina fell in with his wishes. On the 12th of March, Mr. W. C. Finlason, a white Jamaican living in Cape Coast, went over to Elmina to see Mr. George E. Emin sang, one of the members of the Dutch Legislative Council. He arrived at about four o'clock in the afternoon, and was accompanied on shore by Captain Webber of the brig *Albert*, by which he had come. At a little before eight o'clock that evening, while they were sitting with Mr. Emin sang in his house, a number of Elminas burst into the room and demanded to know what Mr. Finlason was doing in their town, ordering him to appear at once before the King. Mr. Emin sang dismissed them, saying they were about to go for a walk and would call on the King if possible. Soon after this, the three went out and, after paying some calls, reached Mrs. Bartels' house, where they were again interrupted by the Elminas, who demanded to know why they had failed to appear before the King. After some discussion they went away, but returned half an hour later headed by the King himself, with whom was Atjiempon.

The King, Kobina Edjan, accused Mr. Finlason of having written against the Elminas in the *African Times*, of being the Secretary of the Fanti Confederation, and of having come to Elmina as a spy; all of which he denied. Crowds of Elminas collected outside the house, while the King continued to abuse Mr. Finlason, and at midnight

Atjiempon's "death-drum" was beaten, his executioner 1870-1872 entered the room armed with knife and club, and Mr. Finlason was on the point of being put to death, when a bugle suddenly sounded, a Dutch officer sprang into the room sword in hand, and, calling to Mr. Finlason, took him outside, where a guard of 150 Dutch soldiers was waiting with fixed bayonets to escort him to the Castle. This interruption had been so sudden and unexpected, and their prisoner had disappeared so quickly, that the King and Atjiempon had barely realized what was happening until it was all over, and were far too astonished to be able to offer any resistance. At ten o'clock the next morning, Mr. Finlason was escorted to the quay by Captain Alvarez and a party of 200 soldiers and put on board the *Albert*, whence he was removed to the Dutch warship *Kroopman* on the 16th and taken back to Cape Coast.

All these circumstances combined to make the speedy acquisition of the Dutch Settlements desirable ; but anxious though the Dutch now were to get out of the country before their losses became even greater, the Home Government was determined not to take over their Possessions until it was assured that there would be no opposition from the people, and had no intention of becoming involved in any such troubles as the Dutch had had ever since 1868. The local officials, however, were far less cautious ; and although it was almost certain that the proposed transfer would be the signal for fresh and even more serious outbreaks, they seem to have been so imbued with the idea that their position would be improved by the change, and so convinced of the advantages they would obtain from the control of an uninterrupted line of coast, that they thought they could regard the risk as purely nominal. They took very little trouble to forecast the probable result, but did everything they could to forward the negotiations, apparently leaving Ashanti out of their calculations altogether and only thinking of the war party in Elmina. Sir Arthur Kennedy and Mr. Ussher were both suspicious, but readily allowed their better judgment to be overruled. The acquisition of the Dutch Settlements had, of

1870-1872 course, been the ambition of the English for many years, **CHAP. XXXI** and now that the opportunity had at last arisen, it would naturally have been hard for them to have had to reject it ; yet they had sufficient warning of what the result was likely to be, and accepted assurances that they would never have believed in other circumstances, just because they happened to coincide with their own wishes. It was natural, but most unfortunate.

The negotiations commenced in November 1869 and continued until early in 1872.¹ The chief difficulties were the suspicion of an Ashanti claim to Elmina and the presence of Atjiempon and his followers in the town, which to some extent supported it. The relations between Ashanti and Elmina at this time were of the most vital importance in estimating the probable effect of the transfer, and could quite easily have been ascertained. There was, in fact, an undoubted alliance between them, and, according to native custom, Elmina was regarded as an integral part of the Ashanti kingdom.

As in the case of all the earlier forts, the ground on which Elmina Castle stood had been leased from the Chiefs, and a "Note" issued for the monthly instalments of the ground-rent. This Note had been given in the first place to the Chiefs of Elmina, but had been captured by the Komendas and from them passed into the hands of the King of Denkera, from whom it was taken by Osai Tutu of Ashanti in the war of 1699 or 1700. Ever since then the Dutch had paid the rent to the Kings of Ashanti. During the blockade of Elmina in 1809, its inhabitants had sent a message to the King of Ashanti informing him of their plight, and an army had been despatched to their assistance in 1811. In 1817 the English Governor had definitely recognized the Ashanti King's authority over Elmina by instructing the officer in charge of the British mission to Kumasi to complain of "the ill-treatment the people of Cape Coast have experienced from those of Elmina," which he suggested was due to "their presuming on their

¹ *Vide* Parliamentary Paper, *Cession of the Dutch Settlements*, February 1872.

connection with the Ashantis," and Mr. James was ordered 1870-1872 to ask the King to "exert his influence and prevent what CHAP. XXXIV is at present to be apprehended, and what the Elminas are endeavouring to provoke—a war between the two people."¹ The third article of the treaty of 1817 states that "the King of Ashantee guarantees the security of the people of Cape Coast from the hostilities threatened by the people of Elmina."² Again, while the English were at war with Ashanti in 1824, the Elminas seized many Fantis and killed or robbed and enslaved them, a fact that was still well known in 1868.³ During the negotiations for peace after the battle of Dodowa, too, the King of Ashanti gave more than one proof that he considered Elmina a part of his kingdom. On the 12th of April 1828 he wrote that he had heard "that Fantees are already marched for Elmina, to put me in great trouble with all my people, I thought, when the peace was concluded would for all my subjects."⁴ In every war between the English and Ashantis it had been well known that the Elminas were in close alliance with the latter, and during the blockade of their town in 1868 by the Fanti Confederation they had claimed the assistance of the King, and the despatch of an army to their relief had only been prevented by the Dutch Governor. On the death of Osai Kwaku Dua, Kofi Karikari had sent an official messenger to notify the Elminas of the event, a compliment paid only to allies and tributaries, and an Elmina Chief, Ando, had been sent to represent the town at the funeral custom in Kumasi : and finally, the Elmina Chiefs had told Sir Arthur Kennedy himself, as recently as October 1868, that they absolutely refused to ally themselves with the Fantis, but had decided to continue to "pay tribute" to Ashanti, whose friendship they infinitely preferred. The presence of Atjiempon with armed Ashantis in the town had its own significance also.

In the face of such an array of indisputable historical

¹ Bowdich, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*, p. 127.

³ *Vide Memorial of the Kings and Chiefs*, Horton, *Letters on the Gold Coast*, p. 96.

⁴ Ricketts, p. 154.

1870-1872 facts, it is difficult to understand how Colonel Nagtglas **CHAP. XXXI** could have denied the existence of this Ashanti claim, or how Sir Arthur Kennedy could have been induced to accept his explanations. It only shows how eager everyone concerned was for the projected change, how grossly ignorant they must have been of the history of the country, and how little trouble can have been taken to learn the actual facts. Colonel Nagtglas wrote, not only alleging that the Elminas would give no trouble, but even denying the existence of any "treaty or official engagement between Elmina and Ashanti."¹ Taken absolutely literally, this may have been true ; there was no written treaty, unless the Note for the rent could be so described. He was forced to admit, however, that the Dutch paid twenty ounces of gold annually to the King of Ashanti, but tried to explain away this very significant fact by saying that the pay-note taken from the Denkeras had been issued by the Dutch West India Company to "the Chief of Denkirah . . . to encourage the trade for slaves, gold-dust and ivory. . . . The King of Ashantee has no recognized claim upon the Territory or people of Elmina."² Yet the English had issued such Notes themselves, and had paid the King of Ashanti on them in an exactly similar way, and had on more than one occasion had trouble enough over some of them to have impressed the fact permanently on their minds. There was small excuse, therefore, for the ready credence they now gave to this ingenious explanation. Mr. Ussher alone seems to have had some inkling of the true state of affairs. On the 16th of December 1870 he wrote a "Private and Confidential" letter to the Governor-in-Chief, in which he said : "I do not wish to impute any unfair dealing to the Government of the King of Holland upon this Coast, but I think it is of the highest importance that such a point as the one I mention should not be lost sight of, as an unsatisfactory settlement might again involve us in a troublesome and protracted war with Ashantee ; such as was the case when Governor John Hope Smith

¹ Parliamentary Paper, *Cession of Dutch Settlements*, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*

refused, some fifty years ago, to continue the yearly tribute 1870-1872 paid by the British forts to the Ashantee King by right of CHAP. XXXI his conquest of Fantee."¹

In November 1870 the probability of the transfer was made known to Kofi Karikari, who lost no time in showing that he, at any rate, considered Elmina a part of his kingdom. In a letter dated the 24th of November 1870 he wrote to Mr. Ussher: "I beg to bring before your Excellency's kind consideration regarding the Elmina, if it is included in the change. The fort of that place have from time immemorial paid annual tribute to my ancestors to the present time by right of arms, when we conquered Intim Gackidi, King of Denkera. Intim Gackidi having purchased goods to the amount of nine thousand pounds (£9,000) from the Dutch, the Dutch demanded of my father, Osai Tutu I, for the payment, who (Osai Tutu) paid it full the nine thousand pounds (£9,000), and the Dutch delivered the Elmina to him as his own, and from that time tribute has been paid to us to this present time."² Kofi Karikari thus made it perfectly clear that he at least considered that he had a definite claim to Elmina, and that that claim was a long standing one. In the course of nearly two centuries of oral tradition it is not surprising that the exact details should have become distorted, but the allusions to Intim Dakari of Denkera and Osai Tutu show clearly enough to what the King was referring, and it is of course quite possible that some such monetary transaction may also have taken place, though it is ridiculous to suppose that either Osai Tutu or anyone else would have paid £9,000 for an annual bounty of £20, unless there was some other advantage attached to it. This letter was referred to Colonel Nagtglas, who professed to be "extremely surprised" at its contents, and reiterated his assertion that the money was not paid as tribute or ground rent, but merely as a subsidy to encourage trade and maintain friendly relations. He also referred Mr. Ussher to Cruikshank's work, saying that it "gives the best idea

¹ *Cession of Dutch Settlements*, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

1870-1872 of the mutual relations between the King of Ashantee and
CHAP. XXXI the Governments and nations on the seaboard."¹

This appeal to Cruikshank seems singularly unfortunate and at once raises the suspicion that Colonel Nagtglas cannot have read this author very carefully, while the English Authorities seem to have been content to take his word on the subject without making any attempt to refer to the book and check his assertions. Cruikshank's statements bearing on this point are very plain. He shows what these "pay-notes" really were by saying "a ground-rent, paid to the Chiefs and Headmen of the several towns where forts were built, seems to have been the general nature of European tenure on the Gold Coast. With this payment was coupled the necessity of giving monthly pay-notes."² Referring to the conquest of Denkera by Osai Tutu, he says: "Other advantages attached to this conquest. The Dutch Government paid the King of Denkera a monthly Note for Elmina Castle, which became the perquisite of the victor, and to this day the Kings of Ashantee enjoy the same."³ In another place he writes: "It has been mentioned that the Europeans paid to the native Chiefs a ground-rent for the forts, as well as monthly Notes to several of the Chiefs. These payments were evidently regarded by the natives as an acknowledgment of their sovereignty of the country, and that our establishments were held on sufferance, not by conquest or purchase. When the King of Ashantee conquered Denkera, the pay-note which the King of Denkera held from the Dutch for Elmina Castle was transferred to the conqueror. In like manner the Notes for Accra fell into his hands on the conquest of Akim. These were to him additional confirmation of his right of sovereignty over the countries which he had conquered, written proofs, in fact, to which he and his successors might always appeal in the event of cavil or dispute."⁴

These statements are so plain and place the holders of these Notes so clearly in the position of landlords and

¹ *Cession of Dutch Settlements*, p. 13.

² Cruikshank, vol. i, p. 28. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 51. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

owners of the soil, showing also the interpretation that 1870-1872 was put upon them by the people, that it is quite evident CHAP. XXXIV that Mr. Ussher cannot have looked the subject up, for he only wrote to Sir Arthur Kennedy that he considered the Dutch Governor's explanation was "not satisfactory." Later the King again wrote on the same subject, and showed that he only valued the payment made as "tribute" and not for its actual amount: "From the ancient up to this time Elmina Castle is mine, and living with them as friends, and they also paid yearly tribute to me, but as having understood that it going in exchange to be under your Excellency's protection I do not understand."¹

The only argument that could possibly have been advanced to dispute the existence of this Ashanti right to Elmina would have been the contention that when, in 1831, the Ashantis abandoned their authority over Denkera, they also renounced their claims to every other advantage gained by its conquest, including this Note. It might have been a nice point, but it could never have been sustained; for such an inference could not justly have been drawn from the treaty unless the Note was specifically mentioned. The question, doubtless, did not arise at the time, as it was of no interest or importance to the English so long as the Dutch held Elmina. The payment had, moreover, been continued by the Dutch down to the present time, even though the lapse of so many years may possibly have rendered them genuinely ignorant of its true nature.²

Meanwhile, in the hope of accustoming the people to the new state of affairs before the actual cession took place, they were told of the arrangements that were being made, and Mr. Ussher issued a proclamation on the 28th of November 1870 calling upon the British protected tribes to cease their warfare and quarrels with the Dutch peoples and prepare to live in peace and friendship with them and with each other. In December, too, Mr. C. Bartels was sent to Elmina to see how the people there were disposed to receive the English flag, and to try to arrange a meeting

¹ *Cession of Dutch Settlements*, p. 22.

² *Vide*, p. 391.

1870-1872 between them and the Administrator either in Cape Coast CHAP. XXXI or at the Sweet River. He met the Kings, Chiefs and principal townspeople of Elmina, Shama and Sekondi in the Castle on the 19th. Colonel Nagtglas and some other Dutch officers were also present. The King of Elmina made it abundantly clear that although he was ready enough to cease from further hostilities and was indeed sincerely anxious for peace, he was equally determined never to come under the English flag and thus live on common terms with his hated enemies the Fantis. He maintained that he had already conquered them four times under the English flag, and said that he could never consent to put himself under a defeated flag. He and his people had, moreover, suffered so much as a result of the previous exchange of territory that he was very averse to any further proceedings of a similar nature.

During the whole of this time Atjiempon was still in Elmina, though the English had frequently asked for his removal and indeed made it a necessary preliminary condition of the purchase of the Dutch Settlements. Colonel Nagtglas, therefore, had tried to obtain his recall by writing to the King, and in order to give some proof of his sincerity and allay the suspicions of the English, arrested him on the 14th of April 1871 and imprisoned him in the Castle. A month later, however, he was released on swearing that he would return to Kumasi within thirty days, but failing to fulfil this promise, was re-imprisoned. Many Ashanti traders visited the coast during this cessation of open hostilities ; but as it was found that many of them were purchasing munitions of war which would assuredly have caused them to be molested by the British tribes on their return journey, thus still further complicating matters, a proclamation forbidding the sale of any such goods was issued on the 17th of October.

While these negotiations were going on, Adu Boffo was still in Krepi, and, having met with some successes, had once more stopped the navigation of the Volta. He had left a small garrison of Ashantis and Akwamus on Duffo Island, about fifty miles up the river, who acted in concert

with Geraldo de Lema and attacked any canoes that tried 1870-1872 to pass. The Accras determined to drive these men out, CHAP. XXXI and Mr. Ussher left Cape Coast on the 25th of April 1870 in one of the Lagos Colonial steamers, with a few Lagos Hausas and thirteen men of the 1st West India Regiment to assist them. He was joined by the Administrator of Lagos, Captain Glover, and the party ascended the river in the small steamer *Echo*, which had been equipped with a gun, rockets and a mortar. The steamer anchored about ten miles below the island, while the native army camped along the river-bank. On the day fixed for the assault, the Accras were sent along the eastern bank, near which the island lay, while the steamer moved slowly up to its western side. Rockets were fired into the enemy's village, which was soon in flames, and numbers of the enemy were then seen retreating up stream in hundreds of canoes ; but though they were fired upon from the steamer, the majority of them made good their escape and hid themselves in the thick cover along the banks of the river. Two days later, the Accras landed on the island under cover of the fire of the steamer's gun and mortar, and, advancing in three long lines, beat it from end to end. Many of the enemy were killed and hundreds of bodies floated down the river ; many more were taken prisoners, their leader blew himself up according to Ashanti custom when he saw the day was lost, and the remainder escaped either in canoes or by swimming.

Exaggerated reports of this defeat soon reached Kumasi and induced the King to offer to exchange the missionaries for the hostages held by the Government. Accordingly, Major Brownell was once more sent up to Prasu in charge of them. The force that had been driven out of Duffo Island, however, was but a small detachment of Adu Boffo's army, and he and his main body were quite unaffected by the battle, and very soon afterwards defeated the Krepis in a decisive engagement, in which the gallant Dompri was amongst the slain. Some, however, allege that Dompri was in reality shot by the Accras, who were jealous of the favours that had been shown him by English

1870-1872 Governors.¹ The news of this success once more turned CHAP. XXXI the scale, and Kofi Karikari again refused to exchange the prisoners until Adu Bofo had returned to give his account of the campaign and their capture.

In the west, Amatifu the King of Kinjabo had been joined by one of the Sefwi Chiefs, and their combined force had attacked the Apollonians, but had been defeated and driven off.

The Convention for the cession of the Dutch Settlements had been signed by the plenipotentiaries at the Hague on the 25th of February 1871, and its ratification was only being delayed on account of the doubts about Elmina, which was still under suspicion of being feudatory to Ashanti. The Dutch were most anxious for the arrangements to be completed, and, in May, sent Henry Plange, a native clerk in their service, to Kumasi to obtain from the King a withdrawal of his claim and to threaten him with a discontinuance of his subsidy if he refused to make it. Plange arrived in Kumasi at the end of June, at the same time as the British Administrator's messenger Crawford. Ashanti and British (native) messengers were constantly passing backwards and forwards at this time, not only on account of the negotiations for the release of the missionaries, but also because the King had a complaint against Kobina Fua the King of Western Akim, and was threatening to make war on him.

Plange found the missionaries in the capital when he arrived. They had been removed from Abankoro in February 1870 to one of the Kumasi villages, and thence in the following December to the city itself. They lived in the buildings of the Wesleyan Mission that had been established by Mr. Freeman, with a native catechist named Watts whom he had left in charge and who had been detained by the King for the past seven years. On the 2nd of September Mrs. Ramseyer gave birth to a daughter, an event that caused great satisfaction to the Ashantis, who regard the birth of a female child to an enemy in Ashanti territory as a good omen, whereas the

¹ *Vide* note at end of chapter.

birth of a male is considered unlucky. On the 4th, Adu 1870-1872 Boffo entered the capital with the remnant of his army ; CHAP. XXXI but his losses had been so terrible that many of the customary ceremonies were omitted and there were but few trophies, the principal one being the chapel bell from Ho, which was carried before the general.

Plange left Kumasi on the 2nd of September, having completely failed in his mission to the King ; nevertheless, on his arrival in Elmina, he produced the following remarkable document :

“ CERTIFICATE OF APOLOGY

“ 1. These are to certify that the letter addressed to his Excellency H. T. Ussher, the Administrator of Her Britannic Majesty's Settlements on the Gold Coast, dated Coomassie, 24th November 1870 by me, Coffie Calcalli, King of Ashantee, reside at Coomassie kingdom, was totally misrepresented in the part of parties entrusted with the writing and the dictating.

“ 2. I therefore do solemnly declare, in the presence of your Excellency's Ambassador, Mr. H. Plange, profession writer of the Government's office at St. George d'Elmina, and my Chiefs, that I only meant board wages or salary, and not tribute by right of arms from the Dutch Government.

“ 3. On account of circumstances relative to my ancestor, Osai Tutoe the 1st, having conquered Intim Gackadi, the then King of Denkerra, a friend or kind of commission agent of some transactions for His Netherland Majesty's Government on the Gold Coast, the said Intim Gackadi's liabilities with the Dutch Government on the Gold Coast, to the amount of £9,000, my said ancestor was caused to make it good by the said Dutch Government, and in virtue of which the Custom pay-note of the said Intim Gackadi was transferred to my said ancestor, who enjoyed it in times immemorial, and became heritable to his heirs the Kings of Ashantee, who now hold the said Custom pay-note in possession to this present moment.

“ 4. The said £9,000 was paid to ensure friendship and

610 NEGOTIATIONS WITH DUTCH AND ASHANTIS

1870-1872 good-will, or feeling, towards the Dutch Government on
CHAP. XXXI the Gold Coast Settlement in Elmina Fort, Castle or fort.

" 5. Tradition tells us that Ashantee and Elmina are relations ; offspring of one mother ; they are brethren ; also they are not to have hostilities against each other by oath of allegiance.

" 6. In conclusion, I must acknowledge that the aforementioned letter, dated Coomassie, 24th November 1870, about my communication to his Excellency H. T. Ussher, concerning Elmina Fort, is a vague, formal or nominal expression, the sentiments of which I therefore must now write that the whole is a mistake.

" Signed in the presence of the Ambassador and the Chiefs,

Coomassie. 19th August 1871.

his

(Signed) COFFIE X CALCALLI

mark

King of Ashantee

Reside at Coomassie Kingdom.

Chiefs

his

(Signed) INSUAS X Pokoo

mark

his

BOOACHIE X TURTSIN

mark

his

YOAR X NYCHWIE

mark

(Signed) H. PLANGE, Ambassador."

This extraordinary document was delivered to Lieutenant-Colonel Y. H. Fergusson, who had relieved Colonel Nagtglas as Acting Governor of Elmina, on the 15th of November, and a copy of it was immediately forwarded to Mr. Salmon, who was now administering the Government at Cape Coast. It was, of course, the very thing that was wanted had it been genuine ; but unfortunately there are good grounds for believing that it

was a forgery, and its ready acceptance by the English 1870-1872 after their previous doubts and suspicions was a mistake CHAP. XXXI: that was attended by important and far-reaching results. The most that can possibly be said for it is that it may possibly have been a most distorted and grossly exaggerated version of the King's oft-repeated statement that he had never conquered the Elminas, but that they were his relatives and allies. This statement now seems to have been twisted into a disavowal of any claim to Elmina Castle, which was an entirely different matter ; and it is impossible to believe that the King, if he ever put his mark to this document at all, had any suspicion of the true import of its contents. It is far more likely, however, that the whole thing was produced by Plange himself. It is true that the King and Chiefs of Elmina, as well as Prince Ansa and the two Ashanti messengers Abirifa and Kotiko, who brought the letter from Elmina, all acknowledged it ; but none of them can have had any real knowledge of it, as they had not been in Kumasi when it was alleged to have been written. There are, on the other hand, several reasons which, apart from the extreme improbability of the King's having made any such admissions, justify doubts of its genuineness.

The missionaries were in Kumasi during the whole period of Plange's stay ; but they had never seen or heard of this document, and were certain that he had completely failed in his mission and obtained no concession whatever from the King. Plange did not leave Kumasi until the 4th of September, whereas this paper, which should have completed his business there, purported to have been signed on the 19th of August, so that it would have been more than ever remarkable if the missionaries had known nothing of its existence. Moreover, it was the King's invariable practice to send for them to read and interpret every letter before he put his mark to it, and it would have been very strange if he had omitted to do so in this instance, when signing what would have been by far the most important document of them all. The whole thing was in the handwriting of Plange, who had doubtless been

1870-1872 impressed with the importance and absolute necessity of
 CHAP. XXXI obtaining some retraction of this kind and was unwilling
 to return to Elmina and admit that he had failed.

There is no reason to suppose that the Dutch officials suspected any deception : in fact, there is presumptive proof to the contrary ; for Colonel Fergusson at once wrote to the King, acknowledging the receipt of this document, quoting the principal heads of its contents and informing him of the release of Atjiempon, with a request for his immediate recall.¹ This letter, moreover, was really sent ; for it arrived in Kumasi in the middle of December and was taken to the missionaries to be read, and the mere fact that such a letter was written shows at once that the Dutch Governor at any rate was not conniving at a fraud. What reply, if any, the King made is not known ; but two letters were received from him by the British Administrator, one dated the same day as the "Certificate of Apology" and the other a little later, both of which contained passages that were scarcely consistent with this alleged renunciation of all claim to Elmina and should have raised doubts of its genuineness and have led to further enquiries being made. In the first of these letters the King wrote : "I wish you can see and settle all the Elmina Question, as I cannot have access for my people to go there, and the Fantees are molesting them a great deal, which is not good. The Elminas are my friends and relations. . . ."² In the second he wrote : "There is also another important question which I wish to bring before your Excellency's notice—that is, the Elminas—which may it please your Excellency to take into serious consideration and cause to settle up all the differences and hostilities between the Fantees and the said Elminas. . . . In the meantime I wish to go further to remind your Excellency concerning the property of some people of Elmina, captured and plundered by the Assins or Fantees, said to be thereabout seventy-three (73) persons, and three hundred ounces

¹ *Vide* letter dated St. George d'Elmina, 28th of November 1871, *Cession of Dutch Settlements*, p. 35.

² *Vide* letter dated Kumasi, 19th of August 1871 ; *ibid.*, p. 29.

(300 ozs.) of gold, valued in property, plundered, causing 1870-1872 their recovery and delivery up to me, in order to restore CHAP. XXXI back to their respective owners at Elmina, for they look upon me to recover for them. . . .¹ Events, however, happened so quickly after this that no enquiries were ever made, and Mr. Salmon reported that the Certificate of Apology "finally set at rest the question of the King's absurd claims."

At about this time, a great change took place in the disposition of the Elminas. They realized that when the Dutch went they would be surrounded by enemies on every side, and that it would be quite impossible for them to preserve their independence for long. The majority of them, therefore, were now ready to accept British protection, and Kobina Edjan and his smaller party alone continued to oppose the transfer. A stormy meeting was held on 24th of February 1872 and the following day, at which the majority of those present decided to depose the King. They went through a form of carrying out this resolution on the 3rd of April, and his destoolment was then confirmed by Governor Fergusson; but several of the companies who lived in the part of the town on the Castle side of the River Benya had taken no part in these proceedings and remained loyal to him.

The Dutch now removed Atjiempon to Assini, whence it was expected that he would make his way back to Ashanti by the Kinjabo road by which he had come. His departure, with the alleged renunciation of the King's claim to Elmina, removed the last of the difficulties that had caused so much delay, and finally left the way clear for the transfer of the Dutch Possessions to England.

NOTE.—The Krepis, who should presumably know the truth,¹ give the following account of Dompri's death. They say that after having led them throughout the war, he came to them at last and said that he wished to return to his own country in Akim. He set out with his people, numbering about a hundred in all; but news of his departure with this small escort reached the enemy, who ambushed him at Ajupi, near Bato, allowed him and his party to pass, and then shot him in the back and killed nearly all his escort also. The people actually concerned were not the Ashantis, but their allies the Akwamus.

¹ *Vide* letter dated Kumasi, 1st of September 1871, *Cession of the Dutch Settlements*, p. 27.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE FANTI CONFEDERATION

1871 TO 1872

1871-1872 IN 1871 an attempt was made by a few men to evolve
CHAP. XXXII from the old Fanti Confederation an organized scheme for
the improvement of the condition of the people and the introduction of self-government ; but the Authorities, finding it difficult to foresee where this movement might end, became alarmed and took strong measures for its immediate suppression.

This Confederation, though only now assuming definite shape, had been in existence for several years and really owed its origin to the disgraceful fiasco of 1863, when the incompetence of the military commander and the small amount of attention paid by the Home Government to the excellent advice of Governor Pine had combined to destroy all faith in the ability of the English to defend those tribes who had been relying upon them for protection. These events, coupled with the official intimation that followed them that the people must rely on their own unaided efforts to repel any future invasions, unless the safety of the forts themselves was imperilled, soon convinced the Fantis that something must be done, and that since no tribe was strong enough to stand alone against Ashanti, they must put their own quarrels on one side and combine their forces. This was the real origin of the movement ; but the ill-advised proceedings of Agri and the unsettled state of the country immediately after the war had prevented anything more being done at the time. The transfer of 1868, by which certain towns and districts formerly under

the English were, without any consideration for the wishes 1871-1872 of the people concerned, unceremoniously handed over CHAP. to the Dutch and their inhabitants indirectly threatened XXXII with annihilation by the Ashantis, at once convinced the Fantis that what had until then been perhaps little more than a suspicion of impending danger, was a serious reality calling for immediate action. Then followed the meeting of the Kings and Chiefs at Mankesim, and the first formation of the Fanti Confederation as a definite body. Its objects, in this its earliest form, had been, first, to advance the interests of the whole Fanti nation, and second, to combine for offence and defence in time of war. Their efforts to attain these objects and to resist the attempts of the Dutch to assert their authority over those who had unwillingly been transferred to them have already been detailed. The Confederation at this time was in an embryonic state, with no definite code of laws for its regulation, and was, moreover, torn by internal quarrels and dissensions. Anfu Otu, the King of Abra, was the acknowledged leader of the Fanti nation, but Edu, the King of Mankesim, in whose town the Confederation had first come into being, had tried to constitute himself its official head and considerable ill-feeling between the two had resulted.

The Accras had taken no part in this movement ; but the losses they had sustained during the troubles in Awuna soon convinced them that they, too, must adopt some measure for properly organizing their resources. The Accra Chiefs were rich neither in money nor men, and when any expedition had to be undertaken, it was upon the slaves and subscriptions of the traders and educated community that they mainly relied. During the Krepi war, the Administrator, Mr. Simpson, had asked the Chiefs to supply 2,000 men to go to the assistance of Dompri ; but though they had readily undertaken to collect this force and had been given a hundred pounds to aid them in their preparations, they had never been able to fulfil their promise, and at a meeting held on the 12th of August 1869 had plainly admitted that they were powerless to

1871-1872 do anything without the assistance and co-operation of the educated community. This had resulted in the formation **CHAP. XXXII** of an association of the latter on the 13th of August, under a president and managing committee of six, which was known as the Accra Native Confederation, without whose advice and consent it was agreed that the Chiefs should not act either in peace or for war.

When the Fanti Confederation was first formed at Mankesim, its principal aim had been to obstruct the action of the Government by offering armed resistance to the transfer of British Possessions to the Dutch. Naturally, therefore, it had aroused the opposition of the Administrator, Mr. Ussher, who had no wish to see the whole country convulsed by civil war, nor to find himself involved in the troubles of the Dutch. Whatever his private opinion of the rights of the case may have been therefore, he was bound to discountenance the proceedings of the Confederation absolutely, and on the 18th of July 1868 he had written to the Chiefs then assembled at Mankesim : "Your conduct has been such that I can no longer have any relation with you. . . . As you voluntarily throw off your allegiance, you must not be surprised that I accept your act, and treat you, until you come to your senses, as apart from Great Britain. . . . In case of war with the Ashantees, as you will have provoked it, you will bear the brunt thereof without help from Government."¹ Mr. Ussher was, of course, bound to see that the transfer was made peaceably if possible, and had no other course open to him ; but later, when the blockade of Elmina had been raised and the Confederation was no longer engaged in open hostilities against the Government, it was definitely recognized by Mr. Simpson, who had relieved Mr. Ussher while the latter went on leave. He had sought its assistance to secure the release of the Dutch sailors who were being held by the Komendas, and had also visited its officers at Mankesim. The convention for the release of these prisoners had been ratified by Colonel Nagtglas, Mr. Simpson, and Mr. R. J. Ghartey the President of the Con-

¹ Horton, *Letters on the Gold Coast*, p. 31.

federation. Subsequently, its principal officers visited Mr. 1871-1872 Simpson at Cape Coast, at his invitation, to discuss the ~~CHAP.~~ form of constitution best suited to it, and these deliberations ~~xxxii~~ had been continued by Mr. Ussher on his return. Later, the introduction of self-government became the paramount object of the Confederation, a circumstance that materially altered the views of the local authorities regarding it.

On the 16th of October 1871 some of the Kings and Chiefs and a number of educated natives met again at Mankesim, and, after many deliberations, drew up a Constitution, which was completed on the 24th of November. This Constitution¹ consisted of forty-seven articles, many of which were sub-divided into several sections. Some of the principal articles were as follows :

Article 8. That it be the object of the Confederation :

Section 1. To promote friendly intercourse between all the Kings and Chiefs of Fanti, and to unite them for offensive and defensive purposes against their common enemy.

Section 2. To direct the labours of the Confederation towards the improvement of the country at large.

Section 3. To make good and substantial roads throughout all the interior districts included in the Confederation.

Section 4. To erect school-houses and establish schools for the education of all children within the Confederation, and to obtain the service of efficient schoolmasters.

Section 5. To promote agricultural and industrial pursuits, and to endeavour to introduce such new plants as may hereafter become sources of profitable commerce to the country.

Section 6. To develop and facilitate the working of the mineral and other resources of the country.

Article 12. That this Representative Assembly shall have the power of preparing laws, ordinances, bills, etc., of using proper means for effectually carrying out the

¹ For the full text of this document, *vide* Parliamentary Paper, *Fanti Confederation*, pp. 3 *et seq.*, Sarbah, *Fanti National Constitution*, pp. 199 *et seq.*, or Casely Hayford, *Gold Coast Native Institutions*, pp. 327 *et seq.*

1871-1878 resolutions, etc., of the Government,¹ of examining any
 CHAP. questions laid before it by the ministry, and by any of
 XXXII the Kings and Chiefs, and, in fact, of exercising all the
 functions of a legislative body.

Articles 21 to 25 dealt with education.

Article 26. That main roads be made, connecting various provinces or districts with one another and with the sea coast . . . etc.

Article 37. That in each province or district provincial courts be established, to be presided over by the provincial assessors.

Article 43. That the officers of the Confederation shall render assistance as directed by the executive in carrying out the wishes of the British Government.

Article 44. That it be competent to the Representative Assembly, for the purpose of carrying on the administration of the Government, to pass laws, etc., for the levying of such taxes as it may seem necessary.

It will be seen that the avowed objects of the Confederation were excellent, though great doubts must exist about its power to accomplish them. The intention of its promoters seems to have been to establish a form of self-government secondary and subservient to British authority; and this Constitution, with other documents bearing on the subject, was handed to the Administrator, Mr. Salmon, on the 30th of November with a letter requesting him to forward them to the Governor-in-Chief for the "information" of the Secretary of State. It was afterwards alleged by those concerned that the Constitution had been forwarded for "approval," but nothing of the kind was stated in the covering letters, and Mr. Salmon of course refused to forward them officially, while Sir Arthur Kennedy described the movement as "too absurd and impracticable to be seriously considered."² Assuming, however, that there never was any intention of acting on this Constitution until after the approval and sanction

¹ It is not clear whether the British Government or their own is intended.

² *Fanti Confederation*, p. 1.

of the Government had been obtained, it was obviously 1871-1872 out of the question that any such sanction could have been given to it as it stood ; for, excellent though it undoubtedly was in some respects, it was quite impossible in others, and even included districts, such as Komenda, which at this time were nominally Dutch Possessions. Its working, moreover, would have been utterly impracticable unless the whole country was united in the matter, which was not the case, and the imposition of taxes on produce, which was proposed, would probably have caused its almost immediate extinction. The whole Constitution seems to have been framed by a few educated and semi-educated men, primarily no doubt for the good of their country, but secondarily for the benefit of themselves ; and it was alleged that many of the Chiefs whose marks were appended to the documents had no knowledge of their contents and had not even been present at the meetings.

Mr. Salmon, who seems to have regarded the whole of these proceedings as a personal insult and to have entirely lost his temper, promptly came to the conclusion that he was face to face with a dangerous conspiracy and took immediate steps to nip it in the bud. According to some of the correspondence,¹ he certainly seems to have acted hastily and none too wisely, and certain incidents do not particularly redound to his credit. A stormy scene followed the presentation of the documents, and at about half-past ten the same night the officers of the Confederation who had brought them, W. E. Davidson, J. F. Amissah, and J. H. Brew, were arrested on a charge of treason and confined in the gaol at Gothic House. Warrants for the arrest of the others were issued the next morning and some of them were executed ; but a few days later all the accused were liberated on entering into recognizances in £3,000 that they would not leave Cape Coast.

All these events were duly reported to the Secretary of State, who, however, took a far less serious view of the case and promptly ordered the release of the accused from bail and the stay of all proceedings against them. In

¹ *Vide Parliamentary Paper, Fanti Confederation.*

1871-1872 his despatch dated the 16th of January 1872 he wrote :
 CHAP. " As the information before me does not lead me to attach
 XXXII so much importance to this movement, I cannot but
 regret that persons claiming to hold office under the
 Confederation should have been arrested, although they
 were subsequently, and apparently after a short interval,
 released on bail ; and if on the receipt of this despatch
 the proceedings which the Administrator contemplated
 in the Judicial Assessor's Court should not have taken
 place, you will instruct him to stay any proceedings and
 to free the parties from bail. . . . There is hardly room for
 question that some of the Articles in the Constitution of
 the Confederation were practically inconsistent with the
 jurisdiction of the British Government in the protected
 territory. I think the Administrator might have confined
 himself to issuing a proclamation warning British subjects
 from taking office under the Confederation, and stating
 that those who did so would be held responsible for their
 acts. He would have been quite right also in declining to
 recognize in any way the ' Constitution ' until the Articles
 had been approved by Her Majesty's Government."¹

A proclamation¹ was issued on the 12th of February
 1872 ; but the Secretary of State disapproved of the in-
 troduction of the words " deeming the so-called Constitu-
 tion to be subversive of those relations which have for a
 long time past subsisted between Great Britain and this
 country, and certainly leading to a discontinuance thereof."
 Mr. Ussher, again, on his return to the Coast, issued another
 proclamation on the 9th of March threatening " any
 person committing overt acts on the part of the Confederation "
 with prosecution ; but this also was disapproved of.

On the arrival of Mr. Pope Hennessy, the new Governor-
 in-Chief, a deputation waited upon him to express their
 views with reference to the Confederation, and subsequently
 presented a memorial² on the subject, in which they ex-
 plained their scheme and contended that, at this time at
 any rate, the Confederation was not intended to supersede

¹ *Fanti Confederation*, p. 13.

² Full text, *ibid.*, p. 40.

* *Fanti Confederation*, pp. 51 *et seq.*

the Government, but rather to act under it and open up 1871-1872 and improve the conditions existing in the interior, where CHAP. but little had yet been done by the English. The following ~~xxxii~~ passage occurred : " In the first place, for the Fanti Confederation to be of real practical use in the amelioration, development and civilization of the country, it must have the recognition, countenance and support and hearty co-operation of Her Majesty's Government and its friendly aid and advice. We do not for one single moment pretend to be able to carry on a Government in the interior without such recognition and assistance."¹ The annual revenue required by the Confederation was estimated at £20,000, one half of which it was suggested should be provided by the Government, while the other was to be raised by means of Court fees, fines, etc., and, in order to compensate the Chiefs for the loss of these funds, stipends were to be allowed them " in consideration of their . . . giving up their right of settling palavers or disputes of any kind. . . . The Confederation would establish courts of justice in each district, and dispense justice far more impartially, expeditiously, and at less cost than the present native Courts."² The promoters of this scheme, therefore, proposed totally to abolish those powers that were inherent in their natural rulers, any attempt to regulate or modify which has invariably been the signal for an outcry of the most bitter complaint from the very same class of people. The necessity for permitting the Confederation to levy taxes was insisted upon, and the only alternative suggested was that the Government should " take over the whole country, and govern it as vigorously and on the same system and principles as it does her other Colonies."³

Mr. Pope Hennessy, while approving a great deal of the scheme, recommended the adoption of the latter alternative and the re-establishment of Municipal Councils in the principal towns—but without the power of local taxation to which the failure of Sir Benjamin Pine's plan had been due ; but other events of importance supervened,

¹ *Fanti Confederation*, p. 53.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

1871-1872 and it was not until later that anything more was done.
CHAP. XXXII The Fanti Confederation, however, thenceforth ceased to exist.

The rise and fall of this movement was attended by the greatest ill-feeling and friction between its promoters and the local Government. This was mainly due to the intemperate conduct of Mr. Salmon, and to the fact that, whatever may or may not have been their real intention, its promoters never made it clear until it was too late that they thought the sanction and co-operation of the Government were in the least degree necessary. Their earlier proceedings certainly gave colour to the belief—which was probably correct—that they had promulgated their Constitution and begun to act upon it before submitting it even for the “information” of the Authorities. The Confederation, too, was probably connected in the Administrator’s mind with the memory of those troublous times that had first called it into existence, and this may have done much to influence him against it.

So far as its promoters were concerned, this later development of the old Fanti Confederation owed its origin to the same causes that had prompted Aggri and his advisers to cause trouble a few years earlier. They placed upon the second recommendation of the House of Commons Committee of 1865 a construction that it had never been intended to convey; and this recommendation, as has been shown,¹ had moreover been practically nullified by the first admission of those who made it. No attempt had ever been made by the local Government to follow the policy mapped out by this Committee; but, with the single exception that the Gold Coast had been placed and remained under Sierra Leone, every one of its recommendations had been disregarded. The Committee had discountenanced any further extension of territory and all new treaties; yet part of the Dutch Possessions had already been taken over and negotiations were almost completed for the purchase of the remainder, and new treaties had been made with the Awunas. Only once had

¹ *Vide* pp. 536 and 537.

the Home Government made any attempt to check this **1871-1872** tendency to ignore the recommendations of the Committee. It had been admitted that the Government had no territorial rights beyond the walls of its own forts ; and when Colonel Conran, in October 1865, issued a proclamation defining the limits of British territory as extending to a distance of a cannon-shot or five miles from each fort, the Secretary of State had promptly ordered him to recall it, and, in a subsequent despatch dated the 22nd of December 1865, told him to " avoid any expression which bore the appearance of extended jurisdiction over territory at the Gold Coast."¹ This order, however, was never obeyed, and it was admitted that the Authorities had for years exercised the right of disposing of land around the forts without any protest from the people ; indeed, the Government would have been powerless had its jurisdiction been rigidly confined within its strictly legal limits, and the British could not have maintained their authority on the Coast at all, but would have been forced either to retire or to revert to their original position of mere store-keepers. That the Home Government admitted this in later years is quite clear from the wording of the Convention for the exchange of territory with the Dutch in 1868. The first Article reads, " The boundary between the possessions of Her Britannic Majesty and those of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands will be a line drawn true north from the centre of the mouth of the Sweet River as far as the present boundary of the Ashantee kingdom. . . ."² and the Government thus definitely assumed " possessions " east of the Sweet River from the sea coast to the River Pra.

The passage by which the promoters of the Fanti Confederation chiefly justified their proceedings was that recommending that " the object of our policy should be to encourage in the natives the exercise of those qualities which may render it possible for us more and more to transfer to them the administration . . . with a view to our ultimate withdrawal." But, since the English were about

¹ Horton, *Letters on the Gold Coast*, p. 155.

² *Ibid.*, p. iv.

1871-1872 to buy out the Dutch, it was abundantly evident that their CHAP. policy had changed, and that they no longer had any intention of leaving the Gold Coast. It was therefore absurd XXXII to expect them to take any steps to facilitate a withdrawal that they no longer contemplated. The local Government, moreover, had never evinced any willingness to grant the people any such concessions ; nor was it really possible that they could have done so to any great extent. The two Authorities must inevitably have clashed, and it had never been intended even by the Committee of 1865 that the people should do more, for many years at any rate, than learn to regulate their own towns. Certainly no such ambitious scheme as that now put forward had ever been thought of.

But although the local Authorities had throughout been absolutely opposed to the introduction of even such minor forms of self-government as this, presumably regarding them as dangerous beginnings the extent of whose growth they were unable to foresee, the Secretaries of State seem to have been quite ready to countenance them. In 1869 Lord Granville wrote recommending "that the natives should, as much as possible, be brought to know the intricacies of the civil government of the Coast, with the ultimate view of placing them in responsible governmental position."¹ This, of course, was written at a time when the policy laid down by the Committee was still being followed. In 1872 Lord Kimberley wrote : "Her Majesty's Government have no wish to discourage any legitimate efforts on the part of the Fantee Kings and Chiefs to establish for themselves an improved form of government, which indeed it is much to be desired that they should succeed in doing ; but it is necessary that all parties concerned should understand that as long as they live under the protection of Great Britain the protecting Government must be consulted as to any new institutions which may be proposed."²

The people, therefore, were not so much to be blamed for what they did in formulating this scheme, as for the

¹ Horton, *Letters on the Gold Coast*, p. 28.

² *Fanti Confederation*, p. 14.

way in which they did it, and for having acted upon it 1871-1872 before taking steps to obtain the approval of the Govern- CHAP. ment, and, apparently, without at first intending to take **xxxii** such steps at all. They may perhaps be excused for having failed to deduce the change in the Government's policy from subsequent events, and it was only natural for them to adhere to a resolution of a Committee of the House of Commons which they had before them in black and white, and which, moreover, coincided so accurately with their own desires.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE TRANSFER OF THE DUTCH SETTLEMENTS

1872

1872 THE treaty¹ for the cession of the Dutch Settlements to CHAP. England was ratified at the Hague on the 17th of February XXXIII 1872. Besides the actual transfer of the forts, it provided that no natives who now came under British protection should be blamed or punished on account of any quarrels they might have entered into while they were still under the Dutch, and that any of the former Dutch subjects might, within a period of six years, be free to move to any other Dutch Possession or foreign country.² Special reference was also made to the "Africans freed from military service in the Netherland Transatlantic possessions,"³ and an additional stipulation was subsequently added that if at any time the British should permit the recruitment of free labourers on the Gold Coast and their exportation to other British Colonies, the same privilege should be allowed to the Dutch. The price to be paid was the value of the stores in the forts—nothing being charged for the buildings themselves—which was to be assessed by a commission of Dutch and English officers: it was subsequently fixed at £3,790 1s. 6*½*d.

On the 2nd of April, Mr. Pope Hennessy, the Governor-in-Chief, arrived at Cape Coast from Sierra Leone on board the Colonial steamer *Sherbro* to carry out the transfer, and the following extracts from the instructions given him clearly show what were the intentions of the Home Govern-

¹ For full text *vide Cession of Dutch Settlements*, p. 43.
² Article II. ³ Article IV.

ment at this time, and that they, at least, still had some 1872 suspicion about Elmina.

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" Her Majesty's Government, in concluding this treaty, have done so in reliance on the power of the Dutch Government to transfer the forts to the British Authorities peaceably, and without giving rise to any acts on the part of the native tribes under Dutch protection, on the occasion of the transfer which might lead to open hostility, as unhappily occurred in 1868. . . . Her Majesty's Government have no intention of assuming a British Protectorate over those native tribes without their consent. . . . I wish to call your particular attention to the Elminas. . . . You will endeavour to ascertain, in conjunction with the Governor of Elmina, whether the departure of the Dutch, and the occupation of the forts by the British, are likely to cause any movement on the part of the Elminas which might lead to open violence. They should be distinctly told that they will not be required to place themselves under British protection against their will, and a similar communication should be made to all the tribes over whom the British Protectorate, which was relinquished in 1868, formerly extended.

" The objects which Her Majesty's Government have throughout had in view in negotiating this treaty are not the acquisition of territory or the extension of British power, but the maintenance of tranquillity and the promotion of peaceful commerce on the Coast ; and nothing could be further from their wish than that a treaty made with these objects should be carried into effect by violent measures. At the same time, they trust that by judicious and cautious management the excitement which may possibly arise upon an event of so much importance as the retirement of the Dutch from the Coast may not lead to any serious difficulties ; and I need not say that they would greatly regret that arrangements which they believe are calculated to be of much benefit to the whole population, by putting an end to old feuds and difficulties, inseparable from the division of authority which has hitherto prevailed on the Coast, should be frustrated by the jealousies of the native tribes.

1872 " But you will on no account employ force to compel
 CHAP. the natives to acquiesce in the transfer of the forts ; and
 XXXIII if you find that the attempt to assume possession of the
 forts on the part of the British Authorities would probably
 be followed by resistance on the part of the surrounding
 native tribes, you will not accept the transfer of the forts,
 but will report the circumstances to Her Majesty's Govern-
 ment, and await further instructions." ¹

On the 4th of April, Mr. Pope Hennessy went over to Elmina and had a long conference with the principal inhabitants and the representatives of the nine companies. The Chiefs of Shama and other places were also present, and when the Governor promised that certain regulations that were in force in Cape Coast with reference to the keeping of pigs in the town and other matters would not be extended to Elmina, the people expressed themselves as quite satisfied, and it was arranged that the actual transfer should be carried out on the following Saturday, the 6th of April.

On the day appointed for the ceremony, the Governor-in-Chief arrived off Elmina on board the *Sherbro*, accompanied by the Administrator of the Gold Coast, Mr. Ussher, on board the Colonial steamer *Nellie* and escorted by H.M.Ss. *Rattlesnake* and *Seagull*. The *Rattlesnake* saluted the Dutch flag with twenty-one guns, ceremonial visits were exchanged with the officers commanding the Dutch warships lying in the roads, and at eleven o'clock the Governor-in-Chief, the Administrator, and Commodore Commerell, V.C., C.B., landed at the steps opposite the water-gate of the Castle, where a guard of honour had been drawn up to receive them. Here they were met by Governor Fergusson and his Staff, with the principal inhabitants of the town. A procession was quickly formed, and, entering the Castle by the main gate, proceeded at once to the Council Chamber, where the Kings and Chiefs of Elmina, Shama, Sekondi and other places included in the transfer were assembled. Governor Hennessy produced the Convention, and the Captains of the nine

¹ *Transfer of Dutch Possessions, etc.* (1873), part i, p. 7.

companies of Elmina were then asked in turn by Governor 1872 Fergusson whether they had any objections to the transfer. CHAP. The same proceeding was gone through with the representatives of each of the other towns. The Chiefs wished to retire and consult together, according to their usual practice ; but Governor Fergusson refused to allow it, saying that he had already delivered Elmina to the British, and that they must therefore accept the flag. They then gave their consent, shaking hands with the two Governors and drinking the healths of the King of the Netherlands and the Queen of England. The proclamations of the two Governors were then read by their respective Colonial Secretaries, and the gold and ivory baton of Admiral de Ruyter, which was held by the Dutch Governors as the symbol of sovereignty over their portion of the Coast, was then handed to Mr. Pope Hennessy. This baton, however, was afterwards returned to the Netherlands Government. Leaving the Council Chamber, the party proceeded to the flag-staff, where the Dutch flag was still flying. An English flag of the same size was then hoisted alongside it by one of the Dutch officers under a salute of a hundred and one guns from H.M.S. *Rattlesnake*. This was done in order to avoid the unpleasantness of actually hauling down the Dutch flag, both being taken in at "retreat" that evening and the English flag alone hoisted the next morning. On the conclusion of the ceremony, Governor Fergusson was escorted to the landing-place by Mr. Pope Hennessy and his Staff, and embarked on board H.N.M.S. *Citadel of Antwerp* under a salute of seventeen guns from the *Rattlesnake*.

A hundred men of the Hausa Police had been brought from Lagos to garrison Cape Coast Castle, and the men of the 2nd West India Regiment whom they had relieved were now landed to occupy Elmina. Sufficient men were then embarked on H.M.S. *Seagull* to garrison the other forts, and Commander Stubbs was sent to take over those to windward. Axim was transferred on the 8th, Dixcove on the 9th, and Sekondi on the 10th without any sign of opposition from the people. Axim was garrisoned by

1872 twenty-five men of the 2nd West India Regiment under
CHAP. Captain Sheppard, Dixcove by twenty-one men under
xxxiv Lieutenant Wilkin, and Sekondi by twenty-one men under
Lieutenant Hopkins. The Dutch troops who had occupied
them were embarked on H.N.M.S. *Loo*. No troops were
stationed at Shama or Butri, for these forts had long been
unoccupied, but the flag was hoisted on them early in the
following August. Those Dutch officials who had com-
pleted five years' service on the Gold Coast received pen-
sions, while those with less service, but who were still fit
for duty, were given appointments in Java and Surinam
as vacancies occurred ; but the Dutch Colonial Office
made no provision for them in the meantime, and many
of them are said to have fared very badly.

Thus the Dutch finally left the Gold Coast, where they
had occupied Settlements continuously for 274 years. The
Castle of St. George and Fort Conraadsburg at Elmina,
Fort St. Anthony at Axim and Metal Cross Fort at Dixcove,
were all in excellent order ; Fort St. Sebastian at Shama,
Fort Orange at Sekondi, and Fort Batenstein at Butri
only needed a few repairs—chiefly to the roofs ; but all
the other forts that had formerly existed along the wind-
ward coast, such as Groot Fredericksburg and Fort Doro-
thea, were mere ruins, and Komenda Fort was still in the
condition to which the bombardment of 1868 had reduced
it, while the Dutch Fort Vredenburg had been unin-
habitable for nearly a century. Elmina was by far the
strongest place ; for in addition to the Castle, which the
Dutch had greatly extended and improved during their
occupation, and Fort Conraadsburg which they had built
to defend it, there were all the other smaller forts or re-
doubts that had been erected from time to time to assist
in defending the town from the attacks of the Fantis. On
the summit of a steep hill overlooking the salt plain to the
north of Fort Conraadsburg was a pentagonal stone fort—
Fort Scomarus ; and a smaller circular stone fort, known
as Fort Java, stood on the hill of that name ; while on
some rising ground about half a mile to the east of the town
towards Cape Coast stood Fort Nagglas, another square

redoubt surrounded by a moat. On the western side, on 1872
the neck of the peninsula on which the Castle stood, was CHAP.
Fort de Veer, a square redoubt built of stone ; and between XXXIII
this and Fort Scomarus, on a patch of rising ground to the
left front of Fort Conraadsburg, stood yet another circular
fort, Fort Batenstein. These smaller forts mounted two
or three six-pounder guns each, and, with the exception of
Fort Nagtglas, were in fairly good condition, requiring
only a few trifling repairs to put them in a satisfactory
state of defence.

Elmina had been in the possession of the English for
but three weeks when a most disgraceful riot occurred
in the town. Commodore de Haes, His Netherland
Majesty's Commissioner, had arrived on board his flagship
the *Admiral de Wassenaer* on the 7th of April, and on the
26th landed at seven o'clock in the morning. He was met
by Mr. G. E. Emin sang, an Elmina and ex-member of the
Dutch Legislative Council who had been left as Civil
Commandant by Mr. Pope Hennessy, and by Lieutenant
Joost of the Dutch army. They went at once to Emin
sang's house, where the Commodore had arranged to meet
the Chiefs and settle the distribution of a sum of 20,000
guilders that the Netherlands Government had promised
them as compensation for the losses they had suffered
during the war with the Fanti Confederation. All the
Chiefs attended this meeting with the exceptions of the
King Kobina Edjan and the Captains of Numbers 6, 7 and
8 Companies. Having handed in their statements of
losses, the Chiefs left at half-past nine, and Emin sang and
Joost started to accompany the Commodore back to the
landing-stage. They had nearly reached the bridge when
they were met by a large crowd consisting of part of
Number 1 Company and Numbers 6, 7 and 8 Companies,
all armed with guns and carrying their flags and drums.
This crowd quickly surrounded the Commodore's party,
and there, within 150 yards of the Castle, several shots were
fired, Lieutenant Joost was pulled back by someone who
seized his coat, knocked down by a blow with the butt end
of a musket and shot as he lay on the ground. Emin sang

1872 escaped into Molenaar's house near by, while the Com-
 CHAP. modore and his aide-de-camp, who had also been knocked
 XXXIII down in the scuffle, fled to the Castle. Lieutenant Joost,
 who had been mortally wounded in the thigh, was
 carried in about ten minutes after they had reached safety
 and died on the following afternoon. Some further rioting
 took place in the town, which resulted in the death of at
 least one man, and when the Commodore wished to re-
 embark soon after ten o'clock, a strong escort was necessary
 to accompany him to his boat.

Mr. Ussher hurried over from Cape Coast immediately on hearing of this disturbance, arriving in Elmina at four o'clock the next morning. Emin sang, who was still shut up in Molenaar's house, was relieved of his office by Lieutenant Gerrard, who also replaced Captain Turton as Officer Commanding the Elmina garrison. Governor Hennessy, who arrived from Lagos on the 2nd of May, tried to lay all the blame for this unfortunate affair on Captain Turton, maintaining that he ought to have led his men into the town and quelled the riot; but apart from the fact that he had no right to take any such action unless and until he was called upon to aid the Civil Power, his whole garrison only amounted to four sergeants, a drummer, and fifty-six rank and file, and it would have been the height of madness to have left the Castle practically undefended while he marched a few men against a large and excited armed mob. The Secretary of State, therefore, refused to admit that Captain Turton's conduct was open to censure, expressing the opinion that he had taken a correct view of his position, and that there might have been serious risk in sending so small a body of troops into the town.¹

Accounts differ as to the true cause of this riot. It was at first attributed to Mr. Pope Hennessy's impolitic action in appointing Emin sang Civil Commandant of Elmina. It was well known throughout the whole Coast that none but the most insignificant stations were ever administered by natives, and such an appointment could

¹ Captain Turton was reinstated at Elmina early in February 1873.

scarcely fail to give umbrage to the Elminas and cause 1872 them to think that they, whose town had hitherto CHAP. been the headquarters of the Dutch Government, were henceforth to be held of little account. It was therefore believed that this demonstration had been directed against Emin sang alone, and that Joost had been accidentally killed ; but although the Governor's action was most unwise and only one of several things that he did in defiance of the opinions of those who had had much greater local experience, but whose advice he totally disregarded, it was only a contributory and very minor cause of the present disturbance. When once the riot had begun and Emin sang appeared on the scene, this feeling against him led to his being roughly handled by the excited mob and made him afraid to leave his place of refuge in Molenaar's house for many days ; but the real initial cause of the trouble was the action of those who had deposed the King without the consent of some of the companies who still supported him. These companies had held a meeting that morning, after which they had armed themselves and turned out with the intention of forcing the Captains of the other companies to state the reasons that had induced them to act so unconstitutionally, and compelling them to listen to what they themselves had to say on the subject. It was while they were passing into the town for this purpose that they met the Commodore's party, and, having grievances against Joost and Emin sang, and being already excited, were carried away by their feelings and committed acts of violence that had formed no part of their original programme.

The animosity of some of the people against Lieutenant Joost was due to a misunderstanding. The Dutch, when they withdrew from the Coast, had promised a gratuity to all those who had been in their service, and Joost was now employed in the distribution of this money. All the clerks and soldiers were given a sum equivalent to three months' pay ; but the artisans received only one month's pay, and although it was pointed out to them not only by Joost himself, but also by Governor Fergusson and Commodore de

1872 Haes, that this was correct and in accordance with the **CHAP.** orders that had been given, the men conceived the idea **xxxiii** that the Lieutenant was either showing favouritism or retaining the greater part of the money that they should have had for himself. Although it is perfectly clear that there was not the slightest ground for this suspicion, the belief seems to have taken a firm hold on the workpeople, and they had already used threatening language to Joost himself and had visited the Commodore on the subject that very morning. Once the riot began, therefore, it was a comparatively short step from their smouldering discontent and personal feeling against Joost to open violence, and there can be very little doubt that he was intentionally shot by some of these dissatisfied workpeople in the crowd. Their annoyance at Emin sang's appointment also led to his being singled out for some rough usage, but he seems to have completely lost his head and to have imagined his danger to be far greater than it really was.

This is the explanation of the origin of this affair that is in accordance with the evidence given at the inquest ; but there is yet another version still current in Elmina which describes Emin sang as the real object of attack and the wounding of Joost as a regrettable accident. According to this account, Emin sang had incurred the displeasure of the King and Chiefs by arranging that this meeting, at which the distribution of the compensation grant was to be discussed, should take place in his house. They regarded this as a great presumption on his part, as any such meetings had always been held in the Castle, and maintained that if this was no longer possible, owing to the change of flags, the meeting should have been held in the King's house. Emin sang also seems to have been suspected of intriguing to secure the control of this fund, and possibly to gain a portion of it for himself, and there are those who allege that the companies had been assembled to go to his house and order him not to interfere in the arrangements. So it came about that when they met the Commodore's party, Emin sang was at once singled out for

attack, whereupon he tried to save himself by taking hold of Lieutenant Joost and only fled into Molenaar's house when that officer was dragged away from him. This version, given by persons who were living in Elmina at the time, and who point out that both the Commodore and Lieutenant Joost were new arrivals and strangers against whom they could have no complaints, is certainly reasonable ; and although, as has been mentioned, it is hardly borne out by the evidence given at the inquest, it nevertheless receives some support from Emensang's subsequent conduct ; for his evident alarm and absolute refusal to leave the house in which he had taken refuge certainly point to his having had some suspicion that it was he and not the Dutch officers who had really been attacked.

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Kobina Edjan's position at this time was, of course, very unsatisfactory ; for although he had been deposed by a portion of his subjects, and this destoolment, unconstitutional though it was, had been formally confirmed by the Dutch Governor, yet he was still regarded as King by the remainder of his people. On the 9th of May, however, this state of affairs was brought to an end. Governor Hennessy was then visiting Elmina and sent his clerk to call the King and Chiefs to meet him in the Castle. Kobina Edjan refused to come, and explained that he had been deposed by Governor Fergusson and the people of the Garden Town, and that although he had been present at the transfer, he had not been recognized as King, and had taken no part in the ceremony. Although he distinctly stated that it was on account of his opposition to the English flag that he had been deposed, Mr. Hennessy then and there reinstated him without further enquiry, saying, "Kobina Edjan, I recognize you as King of Elmina." He was then saluted by the Governor's order and left the Castle in his palanquin. It is of some importance to bear these facts in mind when considering the King's subsequent conduct, though it must be mentioned that there is some disagreement between the several accounts of what happened at this interview. The version just given, however, seems to be the correct one.

Four men—Kwaku Tawia, Kwamin Fosu, Kobina

1872 Akroma and Yow Kesi—were arrested and put on their trial
CHAP. for the murder of Lieutenant Joost. The trial lasted three
XXXIII days, ending on the 29th of June, when the jury, after
having taken three and a quarter hours to consider their
verdict, found all the prisoners guilty, with the exception
of Akroma, who was discharged. The King tried every
means to persuade the Governor to commute the sentence
of death passed on the other three to one of imprisonment
or fine, but without avail, and they were hanged on the
22nd of July on a gallows raised on the Castle battlements
overlooking the town and afterwards buried in the yard.

So soon as it became known on the Coast that Adu Bofo
had returned to Kumasi, renewed efforts were made to
secure the release of the missionaries, which it was con-
fidently expected would soon take place ; but although the
King himself really seemed disposed to let them go, Adu
Bofo flatly refused to do anything of the kind. At a
meeting of the Council held in Kumasi on the 17th of
February, he had first of all refused to part with them at
all, and then demanded the enormous ransom of 1,800
ounces of gold (equivalent to £6,480). Of all the Chiefs
who were present at this meeting, the Kings of Mampon
and Adansi alone said that it would be better to let them
go quite free if they went at all, and pointed out that if
they were not released the Ashantis must prepare for war.
Adu Bofo's demand was refused ; but although the
Governor wrote saying that he could not even think of
exchanging money for men, he offered to pay any actual
expenses that Adu Bofo had incurred, not exceeding a
thousand pounds, which sum was to be provided by the
Basel Mission. The superintendent of the mission had
agreed to this arrangement, but very justly complained
of the Governor's action in having allowed the Ashanti
hostages to go free while requiring him to pay for the
release of the captives for whose safety they had been given.

There can be little doubt that at this time the King
himself was in favour of peace, and the fact that war
subsequently ensued was due partly to his youth and the
pressure brought to bear upon him by the older and more

ambitious members of his Council, and partly to the ill-¹⁸⁷² advised and eminently conciliatory policy adopted by the ^{CHAP.} Governor-in-Chief. A letter written to the Governor by ^{xxxiii} the missionaries, dated Kumasi, 3rd September 1872, gives a very fair idea of the King's position. They say: "The King has so often declared again and again that he is the friend of your Excellency, that he truly wants peace, and as for his part he would send the white prisoners, but he seems to be entirely in the hands of his Chiefs; he says *they* want the money, and it is to be seen clearly that he has not power enough to resist them. We believe surely that they on the pitch of their excitement and in their blindness would force the King, by his great oath, to begin a new war."¹

When the Dutch retired, a present of an enormous mirror and a general's cocked hat and sword was sent by them to the King, and Mr. Pope Hennessy sent a hundred pounds' worth of gold embroidered silk on behalf of the British Government and a gold ring from himself. He also promised to double the annual sum that had been paid to the King by the Dutch—though not, of course, as tribute—and actually released the only hostages he had, amongst whom was Adu Boffo's son Opoku, and sent them to Kumasi while the missionaries were still in captivity, and, as if this were not enough, in April removed the embargo on the sale of munitions of war and opened the roads to the frontier, thus enabling the Ashantis to prepare for a war that these restrictions had hitherto rendered very difficult, if not impossible. He also selected Plange as his messenger, although his previous conduct was open to grave suspicion and he had caused some dissatisfaction by exceeding his instructions and bringing certain local disputes between the Elminas and Fantis before the King. Presumably the Governor expected to accomplish all he desired in return for these favours. Anyone, however, with more experience of the country would have known that now that matters had gone thus far, such a result was highly improbable. A savage does not look at these

¹ *Transfer of Dutch Possessions, etc.*, part i, p. 154.

1872 things in quite the same light as more civilized peoples :
CHAP. with him leniency is usually a mistake, and firmness
XXXIII combined with the most scrupulous justice is the only
policy that pays in the absence of overwhelming force,
which last is the argument he understands best of all.
This vacillating and irresolute attitude, therefore, only
had the effect of showing the Ashantis the kind of man
with whom they had to deal, and from this time forth war
was secretly decided upon, though a temporizing policy
had to be adopted at first to enable them to replenish their
stock of powder, lead, and salt, which had been sadly
depleted by Adu Bozzo's long campaign.

Ever since the exchange of territory in 1868, and even
before then, the Apollonian district had been in a dis-
turbed state and constantly distracted by civil wars, which
had impoverished the country, destroyed all trade, and
completely closed the roads from Axim to Assini. This
state of affairs was primarily due to the feud between
the Beyins, who had rejected the Dutch flag and whose
town had been bombarded, and the Ateabus, who had
accepted it : there was, however, a second and older cause.
Prior to 1868, Afu, one of the Captains of Kwesi Amaki
the King of Apollonia, had rebelled against him and kept
up a civil war for many months, until in the end the English
had interfered and seized and imprisoned him in Cape
Coast Castle. When these districts were transferred to the
Dutch in 1868, however, Afu had been released, and imme-
diately renewed his war against Amaki, whom he eventually
conquered and drove into French territory. It was at
about this time that the Dutch Commandant abandoned
Apollonia Fort and retired to Axim. Afu then burned
Beyin and several more of Amaki's towns, wrecked the
fort and spiked the guns, and was preparing to follow his
enemy to Assini, when he was assassinated by one of
Amaki's people. On the death of Afu, Amaki returned to
Beyin ; but Kwamin Blay, a brother of the deceased rebel,
took up the quarrel and established himself as Chief of
Ateabu, whence he ruled the whole country from the
Ankobra River to within a few miles of Beyin. He had

been attacked by the Axims in 1870 ; but they had found his town so strongly stockaded that they had been unable to take it and had been driven off with great slaughter. Blay was supported by the people of Edikrum on the western side of Amaki's territory towards Assini, and Amaki by the Assinis and Axims and to some extent by the Ashantis. This was the position of affairs when the Dutch retired.

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Apollonia had never been occupied since the acquisition of the Dutch Possessions, and matters had recently been made worse by the murder of some of Blay's people by the Axims. This had occurred in May 1872, when a messenger who had been sent with presents to the Chiefs was returning from Beyin with Administrator Ussher's stick. He was accompanied on the road by a party of Blay's people, and it was these men who had been murdered. This outrage, the loss of trade, the danger of disputes with the Ashantis, the closure of the road, and the possibility of complications with the French, who sent weekly mail runners from Grand Bassam and Assini to Axim and had already demanded protection for them in British territory, all combined to make the final adjustment of these quarrels necessary, and it was therefore decided to send a special mission to the various Chiefs for this purpose.

Captain Dyer of H.M.S. *Torch* and Doctor Johnson the Acting Civil Commandant of Axim, were chosen for this duty, and were accompanied by Mr. Molenaar a Dutch mulatto of Elmina, as interpreter. During August they visited all the principal towns in the disturbed district and held palavers with the King of Axim, Blay, Amaki, and their respective Chiefs. Flags were given to them, and each one undertook to keep the road open through his own district, but one and all were loud in their complaints against the others. Blay naturally complained of the murder of his people in May, and said that Amaki was a great rogue, while Amaki described his enemy as the son of a slave and a rebel, and the King of Axim refused to recognize Blay at all or to treat with anyone but Amaki. Eventually, however, it was agreed that both Amaki and

1872 Blay should send special envoys to Cape Coast, where the
 CHAP. Administrator should settle their disputes. On their way
 XXXIII there, these envoys met the King of Axim, who did not
 wish to be specially represented and agreed to be bound
 by anything that Amaki's messenger might arrange.
 Peace was made at Cape Coast, and it was agreed that, as
 Blay had been established for so long in the Ankobra
 district, he should be recognized as its Chief, but rank
 below Amaki.

When the officers of this mission reached Axim on the 14th of August, the King produced a six-pound shot which he said was one of two that had been fired through one of the houses in the town from the evening gun the night before. Strict enquiry was made, and it was found that one of the soldiers of the 2nd West India Regiment who garrisoned the fort had had two shot in his possession, and had also been seen to put something into the gun. He was sent to Cape Coast on board the *Torch* for trial and apologies were made to the King, who was assured that it had only been a foolish act of mischief on the part of some of the soldiers. After this, however, strict orders were given that the gun, which was fired at nine o'clock every night, was in future to be fired to seaward.

Several other long-standing disputes were also settled at this time. The Krobos and Akwapims had long had differences, and a meeting was arranged by Captain Lees, the Civil Commandant of Accra, for their discussion. This meeting, which was held on the 21st of August at Sassabi, was attended by the Kings and Chiefs of Eastern and Western Krobo, Akwapim, Accra and Christiansborg, and, after a long conference, peace was made and a treaty or agreement¹ entered into and signed by all the parties. There were also threats of civil war in Assin, where the King, Chibu Daku, had given offence to his Chiefs and people, fully 2,000 of whom were already in arms. They were induced to come to Cape Coast however, where they arrived early in September with about 800 followers.

¹ For the full text of this document, *vide* Parliamentary Paper, *Dutch Possessions, Ashantee Invasion*, part i, p. 143.

Their complaint was investigated, and judgment went 1872 against the King. Some rioting took place, but was quickly suppressed ; the King deposited fifty ounces of gold, and the Chiefs forty ounces, as security for their peaceful and loyal behaviour for twelve months, and the affair was thus satisfactorily terminated. Other quarrels between the Sekondis, Ahantas and Wassaws were also settled.

CHAP.
xxxiii

In Kumasi the effects of Mr. Pope Hennessy's weakness were soon seen. Plange was delayed for ten weeks on the road by the difficulty of transporting the huge mirror that had been sent by the Dutch Government over the narrow forest paths, and when he at length reached the capital his presence was ignored for several weeks longer. It was not until the 29th of July that he was suddenly sent for by the King and told to read the letters he had brought, and not until the 5th of August that the customary presents were sent to him, which, even then, were unusually small.

On the 2nd of September the Council met, and the subject of the proposed ransom came up for consideration. Great dissatisfaction was expressed that the Governor should have offered only £1,000 in answer to the demand for £6,480 ; but, after a long discussion, the King succeeded in lowering the demands of his Chiefs to £2,000, below which they absolutely refused to go. Plange was then asked to give his opinion, and, quite unable to conceal his annoyance, declared that the Governor would never consent to pay a farthing more than the £1,000 that he had named as his highest offer, and that if the missionaries were not liberated the roads to the coast would immediately be closed. "The Chiefs first laughed, then a general tone of dissatisfaction was apparent, and the storm broke out in curses, oaths and threats. 'A few days ago,' said the King, 'I thought you were joking ; if you are in earnest you may come. We are ready ! Your Governor cannot leave his fort without an umbrella, so afraid is he of sun and rain. Let him try to come to us. For a long time the Ashantees have been going up to Fantee, and then the white men hid themselves in their forts. It would be some-

1872 thing new if the Fantees were to come here ! ' This was
 CHAP. spoken amid thundering applause. The Bantama Prince¹
 XXXIII then shook his fist in Plange's face, and in the most offen-
 sive and insulting language threatened war. The Queen-
 Mother said, ' I am only a woman, but would fight the
 Governor with my left hand.' ' I am but a small Chief,'
 said another, ' yet shall the Governor pale before me ' ;
 while many voices cried, ' Whoever sells fixes the price.
 We had trouble enough to get these goods here ; if the
 Governor will not buy them, he may leave them.' At last
 there was a frantic and united cry of ' We will not give
 them up. Let him fetch them with fire and sword ; we
 will kill them ' ; while the King turned angrily to Plange,
 adding, ' If you wish, I can show you my supply of pow-
 der.'² During this stormy scene, the King of Mampon
 alone had remained quiet : he it was who had already
 advocated the liberation of the missionaries without any
 ransom, and to him Plange now turned for help, asking
 him to try to quell the excitement and uproar. " That is
 a good word," said the King ; " we will now break up,"
 and the meeting came to an end. The Ashantis evidently
 realized that they had been premature in showing their
 real intentions ; for the Linguists came to Plange and
 told him that he need not inform the Governor of what
 had occurred, which, in fact, he never did. The King
 also sent for him the next morning and apologized for the
 scene. The fact was, that war having already been
 secretly decided upon, the question of the amount of the
 ransom was no longer one of great importance to the Chiefs,
 who were merely using it as a means of prolonging the
 negotiations indefinitely so as to gain time for their prepara-
 tions. These, on account of the different fetish ceremonies
 that have to be performed and the necessity for accumu-
 lating a sufficient store of war materials before they are
 cut off from their sources of supply, are always lengthy.

¹ Amankwa Tia.

² Ramseyer and Kühne, p. 180. A more extensive verbatim report
 of this meeting extracted from Plange's private journal is given by
 Brackenbury, *Ashanti War*, vol. i, pp. 43 *et seq.*

On the 13th of October, Owusu Koku Kuma, a nephew of Prince Ansa, arrived in Cape Coast with a large retinue, and delivered a letter from the King demanding £2,000 ransom. Kofi Karikari, however, had provided him with a second letter, in which he agreed to accept the £1,000 that had been offered, but had told him not to deliver it until he had first satisfied himself that the larger sum would not be forthcoming. These letters had been written for the King by Plange, who contrived to let the Governor know their contents and thus ensured his holding out. The second letter was accordingly produced at a later meeting, and the ambassador then demanded payment before he returned, promising that the captives would then be released. Mr. Salmon, however, who was now administering the Government, absolutely refused to accede to this request, and it was finally arranged that the money should be paid over to Mr. F. C. Grant of Cape Coast to be held in trust for the King until the missionaries had been set free. This was done and a letter sent to inform the King of the arrangements that had been made.

The King had also asked that Atjiempon might be sent back to him. This Chief was still in Half Assini, whither he had been banished by the Dutch, but though he had a few of his people with him, the vast majority of them, numbering over 700 inclusive of women and children, were still in Elmina. He would have been disgraced if he had returned to Kumasi without them, while they, in the same way, dared not go back without him ; and, since it was obviously impossible to send so many people to join him in Assini, it was decided to bring Atjiempon to Cape Coast. His removal was additionally desirable, because so long as he remained in Half Assini he was a constant source of danger, and was known to be doing his utmost to foment quarrels amongst the western tribes and incite them to acts of disloyalty and rebellion. The duty of bringing Atjiempon to Cape Coast was entrusted to Colonel Foster the Inspector-General of the Armed Police, who went to Half Assini on board H.M.S. *Coquette* with fifty of his Hausas and landed soon after daybreak. The Chief of

1872 the town was called, sentries were posted around Atjiempon's house, and the compound was then entered. After a long speech to the Chief of Half Assini, which lasted about an hour and cannot have been very pleasant hearing for his guest, who was shown in the worst possible light, Colonel Foster suddenly turned to Atjiempon and told him that he must go with him to Cape Coast. The Chief sprang up from his seat and as quickly sat down again, absolutely astounded. He flatly refused to do anything of the kind, and the Colonel's repeated assurances that he meant what he said, and that if he did not go willingly he would certainly be taken by force, failed to shake his determination. A sign was therefore made to the Hausas outside, who filed into the compound and surrounded the party, which, in addition to Atjiempon Yow himself, consisted of his son Buatin, Yow Kodia and another Chief, and ten attendants. The prisoners were hurried down to the beach, where they made desperate efforts to resist being embarked, but soon found that struggling was of no avail and were hustled into the surf boat and taken off to the *Coquette*. A few armed Ashantis had been seen near the house and others watched the proceedings on the beach, but they kept well away and did not offer to attack the Hausas. The prisoners were landed at Cape Coast on the 28th of October, and a strong escort was required to take them from the landing-place and protect Atjiempon from the fury of the populace, who accorded him anything but a flattering reception.

The feelings of hatred and the wish for revenge with which Atjiempon's barbarous conduct had inspired all Fantis now made it difficult to ensure his safety on the journey to Kumasi, and it was not until the 12th of December that he and his party were allowed to leave. Even then they had to be smuggled out of the town at three o'clock in the morning accompanied by an escort of Hausa Police. They were stopped at Daman by the Abras and again at Yankumasi by the Assins, who refused to allow them to pass until a letter and stick had been sent up by the Governor ; but they were at length put across the Pra on Christmas Day, and their escort then returned to Cape

Coast. Dawson, one of the Government interpreters, was sent up at the same time with a letter informing the King that the ransom would only be paid to his messengers on the arrival of the missionaries in Cape Coast, and not, as he had wished, when they reached the Pra. 1872
CHAP.
XXXIII

In Kumasi active preparations were now being made for war. At a Council meeting held at Bantama on the 22nd of October, the Chiefs had sworn to march against the Coast, and the King had replied, "If you go, I shall go with you"; and on the 8th of November Plange and the missionaries were suddenly told to prepare themselves for the journey to Fomana, the frontier town, where they were to await the payment of the ransom to the King's messengers and then cross the Pra. They left Kumasi on the 11th and reached Fomana five days later. Here they remained while messengers were sent on to inform the Governor of their arrival and receive the money; but on the 8th of December men and hammocks arrived from Kumasi and they were ordered back, but not before the mob in Fomana had robbed them of nearly all their small possessions, while Plange was put in irons and flogged.

The real reason for these movements of the prisoners is uncertain. The most probable explanation is that the King sent them to Fomana, believing that the ransom would be paid to his messengers so soon as they were known to be on the frontier, when he probably intended to release them. The arrival of Dawson with the Administrator's letter telling him that the money would only be paid on their arrival in Cape Coast seems to have been the signal for their recall and favours this view; but there are other equally reasonable explanations. Possibly the King considered this latest condition unfair and felt that the frontier was the proper place for the transaction to take place. He may have been just as unwilling to send the captives to Cape Coast without first receiving the money as the Administrator was to send the money to Kumasi before receiving the captives. Possibly, however, Kofi Karikari was loath to part with them at all, for there can be no doubt that he greatly prided himself on the

1872 possession of white men. It also seems that Plange had
CHAP. written privately to the Administrator saying that the
XXXIII Ashantis were not to be trusted, and advising him to
refuse to pay the ransom or to liberate Atjiempon until
the captives were actually in Cape Coast. This letter
must have been opened and its contents made known to
the messengers—possibly by Prince Ansa, with whom
they always stayed—for the King knew all about it, and
was very angry with Plange for having abused his position
as an ambassador sent to arrange peace by interfering in
this way. The King, too, may have had some suspicion
about the "Certificate of Apology." This accounts for
the ill-treatment Plange received ; for the Ashantis are
always most punctilious in their conduct towards am-
bassadors, and this is the only instance known in which
one has ever been roughly handled. On the other hand,
the whole business may have been arranged merely in
order to get the missionaries out of the way while the
army mobilized ; for they had no sooner left the capital
than everyone commenced open preparations for war,
and while they were at Fomana a constant stream of
carriers passed up the road with loads of powder, rum and
salt ; but when they reached Kumasi again on the 14th
of December they found the whole place silent and almost
deserted, for the army had marched out on the 9th.

While these events had been taking place in Kumasi,
a dispute between the European traders and the Chiefs
and people had very nearly brought about a serious dis-
turbance in Cape Coast. It had been the custom ever since
Europeans had established their first trading posts in the
country to pay a commission to those Chiefs and influential
natives who provided their customers from the interior
with food and lodging and brought them to their stores.
This commission was half an ackie in the ounce—about
3 per cent—on the gold, ivory and money they brought.
There were no inns in the town where these people could
have stayed, and this arrangement had always worked
well. It was an inducement to the Chiefs and others to
encourage these traders to come down and to treat them

well, and it pleased the latter to be entertained apparently 1873
free of charge when they came to the coast towns, for, CHAP.
although of course it was they who paid this commission
in the end, it was done in such an indirect way that they
did not notice it. It must also have been of some advan-
tage to the traders to have their customers looked after
and guided to their places of business by these local agents,
who, being well known, gave some kind of guarantee for
the good conduct and honest dealing of their guests.

Most of these traders from the interior were, of course, Ashantis, who, ever since the roads had been closed during the last war, had ceased to visit the coast and been com-
pelled to obtain their supplies from the more distant market of Assini, so that for the past eight or nine years there had been no trade on which to pay this customary commission. Now, however, the opening of the road and the removal of the embargo on the sale of munitions of war by Mr. Hennessy had resulted in a great influx of Ashantis and trade was as brisk as ever ; but the Europeans, headed by Mr. Cleaver the agent for Messrs. F. & A. Swanzy, tried to evade payment of the commission by saying that they had abolished the custom some years before, whereas it had been the total absence of this up-
country trade that had caused it to lapse automatically. The Fantis, of course, would not put up with this ; they were still providing the visitors with food and lodging, and would have been out of pocket unless they recovered their expenses from the Ashantis themselves. But the Akan peoples, besides being most hospitably inclined, are essentially conservative and very averse to innovations or modifications of old-standing institutions of any kind, and it would have been most difficult to persuade either party to make this change. It would almost certainly have caused ill-feeling on the part of the Ashantis, who would have suspected that they were being imposed upon, and would thus have damaged the reviving trade. After a time, as the agents of the various firms showed no dis-
position to come to any arrangement with the people, the latter boycotted their stores.

1872 On the morning of Friday the 25th of October, a
 CHAP. number of men posted themselves opposite the door of each
 XXXIII store as it was opened and molested people who tried to
 pass in and out to trade, in some cases taking the goods
 they had bought from them. The crowd gradually in-
 creased, and Number 2 Company's drum was beaten, but
 although nearly every able-bodied man in the town was
 out and the greatest excitement prevailed, not a single
 man was armed, and the only approach to violence was the
 throwing of a little sand and gravel at some of the traders
 who were on their way to Government House to complain.
 A small body of unarmed police that was sent out was
 forced back by sheer weight of numbers, but Mr. Salmon
 soon arrived on the scene with Judge Chalmers and a few
 armed police and persuaded the people to disperse quietly
 and leave the disputed point in abeyance until it could be
 enquired into and settled. The Secretary of State, in his
 despatch on this subject, said he considered it "desirable
 that the allowances in question should be paid by the
 local Government to the Chiefs according to the custom,
 and the amount thereof be afterwards recovered from the
 merchants," and requested the Administrator to "consider
 and report . . . in what way this may most conveniently be
 done." It is difficult to see how the local Government
 could have assessed the amounts due to individuals, and
 there appears to be no record of anything further having
 been done in the matter. The rapid supervention of the
 Ashanti war and the stoppage of all trade would have
 closed the incident for the time, and the subsequent con-
 quest of Ashanti and declaration of the Gold Coast as a
 Colony would materially have altered the view of the case.

Colonel Harley¹ was appointed Administrator in November, and one of his first acts was to set apart a large piece of land on the western side of Cape Coast as a cemetery.² The land was bought³ and cleared by the Government and

¹ West India Regiment.

² This is the cemetery opposite the present High Court.

³ Here we find the Authorities buying land—even though it was to be set apart primarily for the use of the people—instead of availing themselves of the admission formerly made that the Government had a right to dispose of land in Cape Coast. (*Vide* p. 541.)

handed over to the Chiefs on the 21st of November. Two 1872 days later they visited it and marked it out into family CHAP. and Company plots. Hitherto the people had always burried their dead beneath their houses, so that Cape Coast was really one vast graveyard, and it was high time that so insanitary a practice was abolished. The custom was due partly to a desire to protect the grave from desecration, for the corpse was often decked with gold ornaments and other valuables that were buried with it, and partly to a belief that the spirit¹ of the deceased retained an interest in the family and to some extent protected it. Formerly the English themselves used to do nearly the same thing, burying their dead in the Castle yard, which is practically paved with old tombstones, though the majority of the inscriptions have long since been worn away.² The construction of a good road from Cape Coast to Elmina was also begun.

¹ Sraman.

² The initials on the graves of Maclean and "L. E. L." which look so fresh, were recut by order of Governor Sir Matthew Nathan only a few years ago.

